Donworth, J.
This is an action for the recovery of support-money payments alleged to be due plaintiff, Janet Griffin Scudder, and chargeable against the estate of her deceased divorced husband.
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, a widow with two minor boys, married the decedent, Dr. Sidney T. Scudder, on October 3, 1952. Thereafter, her two children (who were born on January 1, 1945, and October 4, 1947, respectively) were adopted by the decedent. Plaintiff and the decedent were divorced in King county on March 9, 1956. Prior to the divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which provides, in part:
“4. That second party shall pay to the first party the sum of $50.00 per month for the support of each of the said minors, Peter Trenholme Scudder and Paul Gynther Scudder, during their minority, and shall make payments into the registry of the Superior Court for King County.”
[456]*456The divorce decree entered thereafter provided, in part, as follows:
“3. The property settlement agreement heretofore entered into by and between the parties be and is approved in every detail, . . .
“5. That the plaintiff be and he is ordered and directed to pay to the defendant for the support and maintenance of the two minor children of the parties the sum of $50.00 per month for each child.” (Italics ours.)
Prior to his death on March 10, 1957, the decedent paid all support payments. No payments were made after that date.
The plaintiff timely filed a creditor’s claim against the decedent’s estate, in the sum of twelve thousand dollars, claiming support for her minor sons at the rate of fifty dollars per month for each child during their minority, being all amounts accrued or to accrue subsequent to March 10, 1957, the date of Dr. Scudder’s death. The claim was rejected by the executrix and this action was brought upon the rejected claim.
After trial, the judge made his findings and conclusions and entered judgment allowing plaintiff’s claim in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars for the fifteen months which had elapsed to the date of trial, and for the further allowance of fifty dollars per month for each child payable to the plaintiff during their minority, provided that the children are still being supported by the plaintiff and they are not emancipated. Defendant appeals.
The error assigned by the appellant involves but the single issue of whether decedent’s obligation to pay child support survives his death.
Appellant and respondent both discuss at length our decision in Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913), in which the husband’s duty of support arose out of a consensual property settlement agreement, which was not mentioned in the divorce decree at all. Consequently, there was no provision whatever in the decree relating to the husband’s obligation of child support. In the course of its opinion, this court decided that the trial court had the power to charge the husband’s estate with the obligation [457]*457oí child-support payments. The real basis of the Stone decision is that this court held that it was the intention of the parties that the obligation of their contract should survive the husband’s death.
We think that the case at bar is not controlled by the Stone case because the decree before us approved the property settlement agreement “in every detail,” and therefore the rights and duties of the parties arise by operation of law. Whereas originally the husband’s obligation for support payments arose out of the provisions of the property settlement agreement, once these provisions were approved and confirmed by judicial decree, the husband’s obligation to make such payments became subject to modification, alteration, and revision by the court. Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn. (2d) 207, 228 P. (2d) 470, 22 A. L. R. (2d) 1410 (1951).
Thus, if Dr. Scudder had lived and his earning power had subsequently become impaired, he would have had the right to apply to the court for a reduction of the support payments on the basis of a change in circumstances. Shattuck v. Shattuck, 141 Wash. 600, 251 Pac. 851 (1927). Here, his earning power has not merely been impaired, but, by virtue of his death, it had absolutely ceased to exist. No conceivable change in circumstances could be of greater materiality to the persons concerned. Yet, under respondent’s contention, the husband’s obligation for support payments continues to be measured by the same set of circumstances that existed at the time the divorce decree was entered. Thus, a divorced physician whose professional income is reduced by a lessening of his earning power may obtain equitable relief, but the legatees of a physician whose professional income ceases to exist because of his death must continue to pay the same amounts for child support that were first fixed by the court on the basis of his earnings when the divorce was granted. These two rules seem to us to be highly inconsistent.
Assuming that the trial court has power to require support payments for a minor child to continue after the death of the husband, the immediate question before us [458]*458is whether, in this instance, the trial court exercised its power to that extent. Standing alone, a decree ordering the husband to provide support for his minor children operates in personam, and would not survive his death. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264; 246 Pac. 27, 47 A. L. R. 110 (1926). In this respect, it is no different from an alimony decree.
In Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P. (2d) 247 (1935), this court held that before the provisions of an alimony decree could survive the death of the husband,
“ . . . the provision for continuance of such payments after death must either be specifically stated in the decree, or else its language must be so clear and unmistakable as to indicate that the court intended that the decree should have that effect. In the absence of specific statement or clear intention, it will be presumed that the payments abate upon the death of either spouse.”
Construing the instant decree as though the language of the settlement agreement’were expressly set out therein, we think that it falls far short of compliance with the above quoted rule. But, even if the problem before us be regarded as strictly one of contract construction without reference to the decree, we are not persuaded that this case falls within the Stone v. Bayley rule.
In the Stone case, supra, the court found that it was the father’s intent that the support payments as provided in the contract should survive his death, because he had provided in his will for the support of his children by a prior marriage without making any such testamentary provision for the support of the child of his second marriage. The court interpreted this fact to mean that the father had recognized his continuing contractual obligation to provide for the support of the child in question. The two boys involved in the present case were born to the wife during a prior marriage and had been adopted by the second husband (now deceased) after his marriage to their mother.
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Donworth, J.
This is an action for the recovery of support-money payments alleged to be due plaintiff, Janet Griffin Scudder, and chargeable against the estate of her deceased divorced husband.
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, a widow with two minor boys, married the decedent, Dr. Sidney T. Scudder, on October 3, 1952. Thereafter, her two children (who were born on January 1, 1945, and October 4, 1947, respectively) were adopted by the decedent. Plaintiff and the decedent were divorced in King county on March 9, 1956. Prior to the divorce, the parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which provides, in part:
“4. That second party shall pay to the first party the sum of $50.00 per month for the support of each of the said minors, Peter Trenholme Scudder and Paul Gynther Scudder, during their minority, and shall make payments into the registry of the Superior Court for King County.”
[456]*456The divorce decree entered thereafter provided, in part, as follows:
“3. The property settlement agreement heretofore entered into by and between the parties be and is approved in every detail, . . .
“5. That the plaintiff be and he is ordered and directed to pay to the defendant for the support and maintenance of the two minor children of the parties the sum of $50.00 per month for each child.” (Italics ours.)
Prior to his death on March 10, 1957, the decedent paid all support payments. No payments were made after that date.
The plaintiff timely filed a creditor’s claim against the decedent’s estate, in the sum of twelve thousand dollars, claiming support for her minor sons at the rate of fifty dollars per month for each child during their minority, being all amounts accrued or to accrue subsequent to March 10, 1957, the date of Dr. Scudder’s death. The claim was rejected by the executrix and this action was brought upon the rejected claim.
After trial, the judge made his findings and conclusions and entered judgment allowing plaintiff’s claim in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars for the fifteen months which had elapsed to the date of trial, and for the further allowance of fifty dollars per month for each child payable to the plaintiff during their minority, provided that the children are still being supported by the plaintiff and they are not emancipated. Defendant appeals.
The error assigned by the appellant involves but the single issue of whether decedent’s obligation to pay child support survives his death.
Appellant and respondent both discuss at length our decision in Stone v. Bayley, 75 Wash. 184, 134 Pac. 820 (1913), in which the husband’s duty of support arose out of a consensual property settlement agreement, which was not mentioned in the divorce decree at all. Consequently, there was no provision whatever in the decree relating to the husband’s obligation of child support. In the course of its opinion, this court decided that the trial court had the power to charge the husband’s estate with the obligation [457]*457oí child-support payments. The real basis of the Stone decision is that this court held that it was the intention of the parties that the obligation of their contract should survive the husband’s death.
We think that the case at bar is not controlled by the Stone case because the decree before us approved the property settlement agreement “in every detail,” and therefore the rights and duties of the parties arise by operation of law. Whereas originally the husband’s obligation for support payments arose out of the provisions of the property settlement agreement, once these provisions were approved and confirmed by judicial decree, the husband’s obligation to make such payments became subject to modification, alteration, and revision by the court. Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn. (2d) 207, 228 P. (2d) 470, 22 A. L. R. (2d) 1410 (1951).
Thus, if Dr. Scudder had lived and his earning power had subsequently become impaired, he would have had the right to apply to the court for a reduction of the support payments on the basis of a change in circumstances. Shattuck v. Shattuck, 141 Wash. 600, 251 Pac. 851 (1927). Here, his earning power has not merely been impaired, but, by virtue of his death, it had absolutely ceased to exist. No conceivable change in circumstances could be of greater materiality to the persons concerned. Yet, under respondent’s contention, the husband’s obligation for support payments continues to be measured by the same set of circumstances that existed at the time the divorce decree was entered. Thus, a divorced physician whose professional income is reduced by a lessening of his earning power may obtain equitable relief, but the legatees of a physician whose professional income ceases to exist because of his death must continue to pay the same amounts for child support that were first fixed by the court on the basis of his earnings when the divorce was granted. These two rules seem to us to be highly inconsistent.
Assuming that the trial court has power to require support payments for a minor child to continue after the death of the husband, the immediate question before us [458]*458is whether, in this instance, the trial court exercised its power to that extent. Standing alone, a decree ordering the husband to provide support for his minor children operates in personam, and would not survive his death. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264; 246 Pac. 27, 47 A. L. R. 110 (1926). In this respect, it is no different from an alimony decree.
In Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P. (2d) 247 (1935), this court held that before the provisions of an alimony decree could survive the death of the husband,
“ . . . the provision for continuance of such payments after death must either be specifically stated in the decree, or else its language must be so clear and unmistakable as to indicate that the court intended that the decree should have that effect. In the absence of specific statement or clear intention, it will be presumed that the payments abate upon the death of either spouse.”
Construing the instant decree as though the language of the settlement agreement’were expressly set out therein, we think that it falls far short of compliance with the above quoted rule. But, even if the problem before us be regarded as strictly one of contract construction without reference to the decree, we are not persuaded that this case falls within the Stone v. Bayley rule.
In the Stone case, supra, the court found that it was the father’s intent that the support payments as provided in the contract should survive his death, because he had provided in his will for the support of his children by a prior marriage without making any such testamentary provision for the support of the child of his second marriage. The court interpreted this fact to mean that the father had recognized his continuing contractual obligation to provide for the support of the child in question. The two boys involved in the present case were born to the wife during a prior marriage and had been adopted by the second husband (now deceased) after his marriage to their mother. Although this fact would not affect the deceased husband’s legal obligation to support the children, it is a factor to be considered in determining the intention of the parties in entering into a contract of child support.
[459]*459Of further significance is the fact that the settlement agreement required Dr. Scudder to maintain a life insurance policy on his life, naming the wife and children as beneficiaries, to secure the payment of $21,326.60 of community indebtedness to third parties which the husband had agreed to discharge. The contract further stated that “This obligation shall not be construed to include the support payments for the minor children.” Thus, in our opinion, it was the intention of the parties that these outstanding bills should be paid by the husband irrespective of whether he lived or died. However, by express provision of the settlement agreement, his obligation to keep the insurance in effect did not pertain to the support payments for the minor children. If the parties had intended that the husband was to remain liable for the child-support payments after his death, it would seem only natural that they would have also provided therefor by securing the support payments in the same manner as his obligation to pay the bills was secured. Under these circumstances, it seems clear that the only reason the parties did not secure the obligation for support payments was because they intended it to be personal to the husband and not to continue beyond his death.
The decree before us is simply a recitation of the husband’s common-law duty to support his children during their minority, and nothing more. Under both the decree and the common law, the duration of the duty is the same, to wit, as long as the child is a minor. The question here is what is the legal effect of the death of the husband during his child’s minority?
If the husband had died during the marriage, his common-law duty to support his minor children would have died with him and he could, by appropriate provision in his will, have prevented them from acquiring any interest in his estate. Thus, to hold the husband’s estate liable under the facts of this case is equivalent to holding that a child is better off merely because his parents are divorced when his father dies, and, also, that the father, as a result of the divorce, is deprived of the right to make a testamentary disposition of his property as he sees fit.
[460]*460In conclusion, we are convinced that if a judicial decree is to be held to impose upon the father a greater duty of child support than that required by the common law, the decree must specifically state that such obligation is to survive the death of the obligor.
We hold that the Stone case is not controlling in the present case for the reasons stated above, and that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed with directions to disallow respondent’s claim with respect to child support for any period subsequent to the death of Dr. Scudder.
It is so ordered.
Weaver, C. J., Hill, Rosellini, Ott, and Foster, JJ., concur.