Hamilton, J.
Esther B. and Arthur Franklin Bird were married on October 7, 1908. After raising three sons and a daughter to maturity they were divorced on May 3, 1951, at the respective ages of 64 and 65. Their decree of divorce, entered by default upon the motion of Mrs. Bird, provided:
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the property settlement agreement heretofore entered into- by the plaintiff and the defendant be and the same hereby is in all respects confirmed and ratified;
“It is Further by the Court Considered, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the plaintiff be and she hereby is awarded alimony tobe paid by the defendant in the sum of one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) per month so long as she shall live, or until her re-marriage.” (Italics ours.)
Mr. Bird regularly paid the designated alimony until his death on July 6, 1961. Thereafter Mrs. Bird filed a claim with his estate for alimony installments accruing after his death. The executor of Mr. Bird’s estate rejected the claim. Mrs. Bird then commenced this action seeking judgment in the sum of $150 per month payable from the estate commencing with the month of August, 1961, and continuing during her lifetime or until her remarriage. By the allegations of her complaint, Mrs. Bird based her claim upon the property settlement agreement and the provisions of the decree of divorce.
The executor answered Mrs. Bird’s complaint, admitting the existence of a property settlement agreement, its confirmation by the court, and the provisions of the decree, but denying Mrs. Bird’s entitlement to the relief sought.
[81]*81Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court, predicating its action upon an uncontroverted affidavit filed in support of Mrs. Bird’s motion, setting forth the decree and a finding of fact reciting the grounds for the divorce, granted Mrs. Bird’s motion and entered summary judgment directing continuation of alimony payments from Mr. Bird’s estate. The executor appeals from this judgment.
In this jurisdiction there is no question that our courts have the necessary power to decree that the obligation to pay alimony shall survive the death of a divorced husband. In discussing this judicial power, and the implementation thereof, we said in Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P. (2d) 247 (1935), pp. 181, 182, 183 and 184:
“Under the rule at common law, the obligation to pay alimony is regarded as a personal one and terminates upon the death of either the husband or the wife, [citing cases]
“This rule has been modified by statute in many states, so that now, generally, the courts have the power to provide in their decrees that alimony shall continue after the death of the obligor and be payable out of his estate. There is some diversity of opinion in the cases as to the degree of certainty that must appear in the decree itself relative to the time that the alimony is to continue. . . . it
“In the light of the reasoning furnished us by the many cases upon the subject, and at the same time having due regard for the liberal policy obtaining in this state in such matters, we are of the view (1) that the court has the power to prescribe in its decree that alimony shall continue beyond death; but (2) that, if the court exercises such power, the provision for continuance of such payments after death must either be specifically stated in the decree, or else its language must be so clear and unmistakable as to indicate that the court intended that the decree should have that effect. In the absence of specific statement or clear intention, it will be presumed that the payments abate upon the death of either spouse.” (Italics ours.)
We reaffirmed this basic position in Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn. (2d) 454, 348 P. (2d) 225 (1960), and in DeRiemer v. Old Nat. Bank of Spokane, 60 Wn. (2d) 686, 374 P. (2d) [82]*82973 (1962). And, in further amplification of the clarity required to carry support obligations growing out of divorce decrees beyond the grave, we stated in the Scudder case, supra, an en banc decision interpreting a child support provision directing payments “during their minority”:
“. . . we are convinced that if a judicial decree is to be held to impose upon the father a greater duty of child support than that required by the common law, the decree must specifically state that such obligation is to survive the death of the obligor.”
It is apparent, therefore, that, regardless of the attitude adopted by other jurisdictions, it has become the established policy and rule in this jurisdiction that judicially decreed alimony or support payments will abate upon the death of a divorced obligor, absent specific or manifestly clear and unmistakable decretal provision to the contrary.
We consider this rule a salutory one, if for no other reason than that it encourages the considered judgment inherent in clarity and certainty. It tends to exclude misunderstanding and ambiguity in an area of human relations where the emotions of the moment often conflict with afterthoughts, changing circumstances, death, and the intervention of third party interests. Abandonment of the rule would accomplish no practical result. Watering it down by sophisticated construction of questionable decretal language, however magnanimous the spirit, would lead but to confusion.
In the instant case, counsel for Mrs. Bird isolates the phrase “so long as she shall live,” as used in the paragraph of the decree quoted above, and in its isolation contends that it supports the trial court’s action. We can agree that such phrase, broadly speaking, is susceptible of the construction sought to be attached to it. We cannot agree, however, that standing alone, it constitutes a manifestly “clear and unmistakable” expression of judicial intent that the alimony obligation imposed by the decree was to become a continuing lien against the estate of Mr. Bird in derogation of his testamentary rights. If it is to be accorded such a literal meaning, then justice requires an equally literal [83]*83meaning be attached to the preceding phrase, “to be paid by the defendant,” which is capable of a reasonable inference that the payments imposed were to be made by the defendant in esse rather than in morte. The decree is, otherwise, utterly devoid of any indication that the divorce court gave consideration to the life expectancy of Mr. Bird, or to the effect of his death upon the alimony obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the phrase “so long as she shall live,” unaided by further decretal language clearly expressive of a judicial intent that the alimony obligations coupled thereto shall survive the death of the obligor, does not meet the standard of specificity and clarity required under the Murphy, Scudder and DeRiemer cases, supra. It follows that the decree, standing alone and unaided by surrounding circumstances, does not overcome the presumption that the payments abated upon the death of Mr. Bird.
As heretofore indicated, the interpretation of the provisions of this decree came before the trial court and comes before us via the summary judgment procedure, with the intent of the parties to the divorce proceedings and of the court entering the decree being the vital issue.
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Hamilton, J.
Esther B. and Arthur Franklin Bird were married on October 7, 1908. After raising three sons and a daughter to maturity they were divorced on May 3, 1951, at the respective ages of 64 and 65. Their decree of divorce, entered by default upon the motion of Mrs. Bird, provided:
“It is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the property settlement agreement heretofore entered into- by the plaintiff and the defendant be and the same hereby is in all respects confirmed and ratified;
“It is Further by the Court Considered, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the plaintiff be and she hereby is awarded alimony tobe paid by the defendant in the sum of one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00) per month so long as she shall live, or until her re-marriage.” (Italics ours.)
Mr. Bird regularly paid the designated alimony until his death on July 6, 1961. Thereafter Mrs. Bird filed a claim with his estate for alimony installments accruing after his death. The executor of Mr. Bird’s estate rejected the claim. Mrs. Bird then commenced this action seeking judgment in the sum of $150 per month payable from the estate commencing with the month of August, 1961, and continuing during her lifetime or until her remarriage. By the allegations of her complaint, Mrs. Bird based her claim upon the property settlement agreement and the provisions of the decree of divorce.
The executor answered Mrs. Bird’s complaint, admitting the existence of a property settlement agreement, its confirmation by the court, and the provisions of the decree, but denying Mrs. Bird’s entitlement to the relief sought.
[81]*81Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court, predicating its action upon an uncontroverted affidavit filed in support of Mrs. Bird’s motion, setting forth the decree and a finding of fact reciting the grounds for the divorce, granted Mrs. Bird’s motion and entered summary judgment directing continuation of alimony payments from Mr. Bird’s estate. The executor appeals from this judgment.
In this jurisdiction there is no question that our courts have the necessary power to decree that the obligation to pay alimony shall survive the death of a divorced husband. In discussing this judicial power, and the implementation thereof, we said in Murphy v. Shelton, 183 Wash. 180, 48 P. (2d) 247 (1935), pp. 181, 182, 183 and 184:
“Under the rule at common law, the obligation to pay alimony is regarded as a personal one and terminates upon the death of either the husband or the wife, [citing cases]
“This rule has been modified by statute in many states, so that now, generally, the courts have the power to provide in their decrees that alimony shall continue after the death of the obligor and be payable out of his estate. There is some diversity of opinion in the cases as to the degree of certainty that must appear in the decree itself relative to the time that the alimony is to continue. . . . it
“In the light of the reasoning furnished us by the many cases upon the subject, and at the same time having due regard for the liberal policy obtaining in this state in such matters, we are of the view (1) that the court has the power to prescribe in its decree that alimony shall continue beyond death; but (2) that, if the court exercises such power, the provision for continuance of such payments after death must either be specifically stated in the decree, or else its language must be so clear and unmistakable as to indicate that the court intended that the decree should have that effect. In the absence of specific statement or clear intention, it will be presumed that the payments abate upon the death of either spouse.” (Italics ours.)
We reaffirmed this basic position in Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn. (2d) 454, 348 P. (2d) 225 (1960), and in DeRiemer v. Old Nat. Bank of Spokane, 60 Wn. (2d) 686, 374 P. (2d) [82]*82973 (1962). And, in further amplification of the clarity required to carry support obligations growing out of divorce decrees beyond the grave, we stated in the Scudder case, supra, an en banc decision interpreting a child support provision directing payments “during their minority”:
“. . . we are convinced that if a judicial decree is to be held to impose upon the father a greater duty of child support than that required by the common law, the decree must specifically state that such obligation is to survive the death of the obligor.”
It is apparent, therefore, that, regardless of the attitude adopted by other jurisdictions, it has become the established policy and rule in this jurisdiction that judicially decreed alimony or support payments will abate upon the death of a divorced obligor, absent specific or manifestly clear and unmistakable decretal provision to the contrary.
We consider this rule a salutory one, if for no other reason than that it encourages the considered judgment inherent in clarity and certainty. It tends to exclude misunderstanding and ambiguity in an area of human relations where the emotions of the moment often conflict with afterthoughts, changing circumstances, death, and the intervention of third party interests. Abandonment of the rule would accomplish no practical result. Watering it down by sophisticated construction of questionable decretal language, however magnanimous the spirit, would lead but to confusion.
In the instant case, counsel for Mrs. Bird isolates the phrase “so long as she shall live,” as used in the paragraph of the decree quoted above, and in its isolation contends that it supports the trial court’s action. We can agree that such phrase, broadly speaking, is susceptible of the construction sought to be attached to it. We cannot agree, however, that standing alone, it constitutes a manifestly “clear and unmistakable” expression of judicial intent that the alimony obligation imposed by the decree was to become a continuing lien against the estate of Mr. Bird in derogation of his testamentary rights. If it is to be accorded such a literal meaning, then justice requires an equally literal [83]*83meaning be attached to the preceding phrase, “to be paid by the defendant,” which is capable of a reasonable inference that the payments imposed were to be made by the defendant in esse rather than in morte. The decree is, otherwise, utterly devoid of any indication that the divorce court gave consideration to the life expectancy of Mr. Bird, or to the effect of his death upon the alimony obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the phrase “so long as she shall live,” unaided by further decretal language clearly expressive of a judicial intent that the alimony obligations coupled thereto shall survive the death of the obligor, does not meet the standard of specificity and clarity required under the Murphy, Scudder and DeRiemer cases, supra. It follows that the decree, standing alone and unaided by surrounding circumstances, does not overcome the presumption that the payments abated upon the death of Mr. Bird.
As heretofore indicated, the interpretation of the provisions of this decree came before the trial court and comes before us via the summary judgment procedure, with the intent of the parties to the divorce proceedings and of the court entering the decree being the vital issue. It is admitted in the pleadings of the parties in the present action, and asserted in the decree of divorce, that Mr. and Mrs. Bird executed a property settlement agreement incidental to their separation and subsequent divorce action. The decree of divorce was entered by default. The trial court, in the instant case, did not have before it either the property settlement agreement, the pleadings in the divorce action, or the complete findings of fact upon which the decree of divorce was based. Neither do we. Absent, therefore, is any knowledge of the nature and extent of Mr. and Mrs. Bird’s property, the manner in which it was divided, their respective sources of income, their respective states of health at the time of the decree, or other similar circumstances which would bear upon a continuing need or reliance upon alimony payments beyond the death of Mr. [84]*84Bird and the intent of the parties or the trial court with respect thereto.
If, in fact, it was the intention of Mr. and Mrs. Bird, and of the court entering the decree of divorce, that the alimony payments should continue beyond the death of Mr. Bird, it is reasonable to believe that support for that intent could and would be found in the circumstances, documents, and proceedings preliminary to and supportive of the decree.
The trial court’s order granting summary judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Costs will abide final determination of the action.
Ott, C. J., Hill, Donworth, and Weaver, JJ., concur.