Durham,J.
Rick Beaman brought a state law wrongful discharge action against his employer. The action was based on the terms of an implemented offer effectuated by the employer after the collective bargaining agreement expired and the parties were unable to reach a new agreement.1 The trial court concluded that the action was preempted by federal labor law under the "potentially subject to" test of San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959). Because the action properly belonged in federal court, it was dismissed. We affirm.
Beaman worked for Yakima Valley Disposal, Inc. (Valley) from 1978 until he was terminated on September 29, 1987. While Beaman was employed at Valley, the employees of Valley were represented by Teamsters Local 524 (Union). On March 1, 1986, the collective bargaining agreement reached in 1983 expired.2 The parties were unable to reach a successor agreement and on June 1, 1986, Valley implemented its final offer.
[700]*700Valley told Beaman that the implemented offer would be his new employment contract. The implemented offer provided that "[discipline and discharge shall be for just cause." It also provided grievance procedures to be followed by any employee challenging a discharge as being imposed without just cause.
Beaman was discharged on September 29, 1987. He told his supervisors that he felt he had been unfairly discharged without just cause. He was not reinstated. On November 16, 1987, Beaman contacted a Union representative about the discharge. On November 18, a Union business representative wrote to Valley stating that the Union wished to meet with Valley to grieve the discharge pursuant to the terms of the implemented offer.
In a letter written December 3, 1987, Valley denied the Union's request for a meeting. The denial was based on Valley's assertions that the Union had abandoned its interest and that Beaman had failed to follow the grievance procedures.
On January 20, 1988, Beaman filed a complaint against Valley alleging "violation of promises of specific treatment in specific situations", discharge in violation of public policy, and claims for unpaid overtime. The first cause of action is based on Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), a case in which this court modified the common law doctrine of employment at will. Thompson held:
[I]f an employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship.
Thompson, at 230.
On May 24, 1988, Valley moved to dismiss Beaman's first cause of action as being preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. In the alternative, Valley moved for partial summary judgment as to the first cause of action. The other causes of action were [701]*701not subject to the motions. On July 1, 1988, the trial court found that Beaman's first cause of action was preempted and granted Valley's motion to dismiss.
The trial court first noted that there was no evidence that the Union had been decertified or that Valley had withdrawn its recognition of the Union. Further, because there were Union contacts with the employer "right up until the end of 1987", the court said that it could not find there had been abandonment of interest by the Union. The court went on to say that resolution of the state cause of action would require resolution of issues within the province of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), including questions of impasse, the legal status, effect, and enforceability of the implemented offer, and the legal status of the Union. In granting Valley's motion to dismiss, the court stated that the "potentially subject to" test of San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959) required a ruling in Valley's favor.
An order of dismissal was entered on July 20, 1988 and Beaman appealed. The Court of Appeals certified the case to this court.3
We begin with a caveat. This opinion does not decide which party was right or wrong. The only issue before us is jurisdiction; that is, if the federal court or the state court should be the ultimate finder of fact. By ruling in either party's favor on the jurisdictional issue, we in no way indicate approval of that party's conduct in the underlying action. Any party in these circumstances can properly raise [702]*702jurisdictional issues and our ruling on them is separate and distinct from assessing the factual merits of the case. Indeed, many facts relevant to the ultimate resolution of this case are not to be found in this record. Moreover, as the trial court noted, the important issues of impasse, the legality of the implemented offer, and the legal status of the Union itself are not for this court to decide. Any attempt to weigh the evidence on the limited record before us would not only be premature, but could easily lead to hasty and conjectural conclusions. By focusing on the subject matter of this case as opposed to the facts, it is possible to properly limit our inquiry and not stray into the province of the eventual finder of fact.
Our discussion begins with a brief overview of preemption as it has been applied to the area of labor law. Preemption of state law is a purely jurisdictional issue. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 391, 90 L. Ed. 2d 389, 106 S. Ct. 1904 (1986). Congress' power to preempt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of article 6 of the federal constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). Congressional power to legislate in the area of labor relations is long established. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (1937). However, because "[t]he precise extent to which state law must be displaced . . . has never been determined by the Congress", the Supreme Court has said it "cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States." Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289, 29 L. Ed. 2d 473, 91 S. Ct. 1909 (1971). Deciding if a state action is preempted by federal law requires review of congressional intent. Garner v. Teamsters, Local Union 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 98 L. Ed. 228, 74 S. Ct. 161 (1953). '"The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.'" Malone v. [703]*703White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 55 L. Ed. 2d 443, 98 S. Ct. 1185 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 11 L. Ed. 2d 179, 84 S. Ct. 219 (1963)). Congressional intent to preempt, however, often is not clear.
n such instances, the courts normally sustain local regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the States.
Malone, at 504.
In the area of labor law, three theories of preemption have developed: preemption based on section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA); the Machinists doctrine, found in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Empl. Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 49 L. Ed. 2d 396, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976); and the Garmon doctrine, found in San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
The parties agree that section 301 preemption, which addresses " [sjuits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization", 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), does not apply because there was no collective bargaining agreement in effect for the court to interpret. Valley argues that Beaman's claim is preempted under both the Machinists doctrine and the Garmon doctrine. Because we agree that Beaman's cause of action is preempted under Garmon, we need not decide the applicability of the Machinists doctrine.4 Accordingly, our discussion is limited to the application of the Garmon doctrine.
Congress entrusted the administration of labor policy to a centralized administrative agency, with a specially constituted tribunal to insure uniform application of its [704]*704substantive rules and to avoid conflicts inherent in a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures. Garmon, at 242-43.
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. . . . Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. . . .
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board.
(Footnote omitted.) Garmon, at 244-45.
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
Garmon, at 245.
The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.
(Footnote omitted.) Garmon, at 246.5 Thus, Garmon stands for the principle that potential, rather than actual, conflict is enough to warrant preemption.
Garmon went on to note two exceptions to this "potentially subject to" test. Preemption of state jurisdiction is not required "where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act", Garmon, at 243, or "where the regulated conduct touch[es] interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and [705]*705responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [it] could not [be inferred] that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act." (Footnote omitted.) Garmon, at 244. The Supreme Court has "refused to apply the Garmon guidelines in a literal, mechanical fashion." (Footnote omitted.) Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cy. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188, 56 L. Ed. 2d 209, 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978).
" [T]he decision to pre-empt. . . state court jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies" of permitting the state court to proceed. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 180 [17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967)].
(Footnote omitted.) Sears, at 189.
Having set forth the parameters of the Garmon doctrine, we now turn to its application. Under Garmon, Beaman's cause of action must be preempted if it is even "potentially subject to" sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. Garmon, at 245. Valley does not contend that section 7, which sets forth protected rights of employees, applies to this case. Rather, Valley asserts that preemption is required under section 8, which prohibits certain activities by employers or unions as unfair labor practices. Valley points specifically to sections 8(a)(5) and (d) of the NLRA which relate to collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively with a representative union and section 8(d), in part, imposes a duty of good faith on the parties to the collective bargaining process.
Resolution of Beaman's first cause of action would necessarily touch on Valley's good faith bargaining and, furthermore, would require the court to determine several issues reserved to the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. The court would have to determine if a valid impasse was reached, if the implemented offer was lawful, and, if not, what terms of the expired contract remain in effect, the legal status of the Union, and if Valley's refusal to deal with the Union was a violation of the NLRA.
[706]*706There is no evidence in the record that a determination of impasse was ever requested or made. More importantly, the existence of an impasse does not end the party's obligation to bargain in good faith; the duty is merely suspended. 1 C. Morris, Developing Labor Law 636 (2d ed. 1983). Furthermore, during an impasse, an employer "may not take action disparaging to the collective bargaining process or amounting to a withdrawal of recognition of the union's representative status." (Footnote omitted.) 1 C. Morris, at 636.
Despite references in his brief to his "former" Union, Beaman acknowledges that determination of the Union's status is within the NLRB's primary jurisdiction. Thus, he does not directly challenge the trial court's statements regarding withdrawal, decertification and abandonment. Instead, he argues that the passage of time alone, absent active bargaining, should somehow allow him to disregard the Union's presence. Further, Beaman concedes that the issues of impasse and valid implementation lie within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. Most importantly, he concedes that the issues involving the validity of the terms of the expired contract and the effect of Valley's refusal to deal with the Union also lie within the NLRB's primary jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he argues that preemption is not required because these issues need not be reached to resolve his claim.
Beaman makes three arguments in support of this contention. First, he argues that he has an individual contract with Valley, which exists totally apart from the expired collective bargaining agreement. Next, he argues that the controversy to be presented to the state court is not identical to that which could be presented to the NLRB. Finally, he argues that his cause of action is not preempted because it is based on a law of general applicability.
[707]*707Individual Contract
Beaman's argument that he has an individual contract with Valley hurts, rather than helps, him. It is difficult to imagine an action more disparaging to the collective bargaining process than an employer entering into new individual employment contracts with employees during an impasse. Moreover, bypassing the Union in this fashion belies an employer's recognition of the Union's representative status. If Valley did enter into such a contract with Beaman after impasse, arguably Valley committed an unfair labor practice. This is not to say that individual contracts can never exist where a collective bargaining agreement is, or has been, in place. However, Valley was not free to enter into such contracts in this case given its ongoing obligation to the collective bargaining process. Cf. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987); Bullock v. Automobile Club, 432 Mich. 472, 444 N.W.2d 114 (1989); Roberts v. Automobile Club, 138 Mich. App. 488, 360 N.W.2d 224 (1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
The dissent agrees that individual contracts cannot be used to defeat the policies of the NLRA Dissent, at 722 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337, 88 L. Ed. 762, 64 S. Ct. 576 (1944)). However, the dissent relies on J.I. Case to argue that Beaman's contract claim cannot create a conflict with those policies. J.I. Case does not support that position. There, the employees had entered into valid individual contracts with their employer prior to the union petitioning for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative. J.I. Case, at 333. As the dissent points out, the court "preserved the employees' right to recover for breaches of individual contracts unless those contracts were superseded by a collective bargaining agreement." (Italics ours.) Dissent, at 722-23. There is absolutely no evidence that Beaman had any contract with Valley prior to, or beyond the terms of, the expired collective bargaining [708]*708agreement. Thus, the dissent's own reading of J.I. Case distinguishes it from the present case.6
Controversy Presented
Beaman next relies on language in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cy. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 56 L. Ed. 2d 209, 98 S. Ct. 1745 (1978) and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 77 L. Ed. 2d 798, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983) to argue that his state action is not preempted because the controversy to be presented to the state court is not identical to that which could be presented to the NLRB. In so doing, Beaman disregards threshold determinations that must be made and oversimplifies the Court's reasoning, giving the language too literal and narrow a reading by taking specific language out of context. Furthermore, both cases are readily distinguished from the present case.
In Sears, the Supreme Court held that a state trespass action, which was brought by Sears against picketers who refused to leave Sears' property, was not preempted by federal labor law. The picketers, who were members of a carpenters union, were not Sears' employees and Sears did not have a collective bargaining agreement with the union. Sears was being picketed for using non-union carpenters. Sears sought, and was granted, an injunction removing the pickets to the public sidewalk. Sears, at 183.
In holding that the state action was not preempted, the Supreme Court noted that the state action, which was limited by the scope of the injunction, was concerned only with the location of the picketing. In contrast, any arguable unfair practice determination by the NLRB would focus on the objective of the picketing. Sears, at 198. The Court noted that '"the decision to pre-empt . . . state court [709]*709jurisdiction over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies'". Sears, at 189 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967)). Thus, the "critical inquiry" under Garmon is whether controversy presented to the state court is identical with that which could be presented to the NLRB. Sears, at 197.
Beaman contends that the issues here are not identical because the state court need only decide if Valley complied with the terms of the implemented offer in discharging him. He totally disregards the threshold determination that must be made. His claim is directly based on either an individual contract, the existence of which is arguably an unfair labor practice, or an implemented offer, the validity of which has never been determined. Beaman concedes that the questions of unfair labor practices and the validity of the implemented offer are within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Further, Beaman's focus on the Court's use of the word "identical" disregards the Court's concern with the interests being asserted and the effect on labor policies. Beaman does not adequately address these interests. He acknowledges that section 301 preemption would apply to this case if there were a current collective bargaining agreement in effect to be interpreted. Yet, he asks this court to hold that if an agreement is not in effect because of a breakdown in negotiation, that somehow the NLRB's interest in the process is extinguished. This we will not do. The NLRB has a strong interest in any action that interferes with the relationship between union employees and their employer, especially as it relates to the collective bargaining process.
Moreover, Sears is readily distinguished from the present case. Beaman was employed by Valley and had been covered by the expired collective bargaining agreement. In contrast, there was no pre-existing management-labor relationship between Sears and the union picketers. There [710]*710was not even an employer-employee relationship between them.7
Belknap is also readily distinguished from the present case. There, the Court was called on to decide if the NLRA preempts a misrepresentation and breach of contract suit brought in state court by strike replacements who were displaced by reinstated strikers. The replacements had been offered, and had accepted, permanent jobs. They were told that they would not be fired to accommodate returning strikers. The Court held that the action was not preempted under Garmon because the NLRB would focus on the rights of returning strikers, while the state interest was in protecting the rights of the replacements, whom the Court clearly viewed as third parties not directly involved in the ongoing labor dispute between the strikers and the employer. Belknap, at 510. As an employee admittedly covered by a series of collective bargaining agreements, Beaman cannot be characterized as a third party. Nor does a breakdown in negotiations for a successor agreement place him in a position analogous to the replacement workers in Belknap. Those workers based their breach of contract claim on the employer's promise of permanent employment, not a current or expired collective bargaining agreement.
Beaman cites Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63, 15 L. Ed. 2d 582, 86 S. Ct. 657 (1966) to support the assertion that " [sjhould Mr. Beaman's claim be preempted, '[t]he Board can award no damages, impose no penalty, or give any other relief' to Mr. Beaman." Brief of Appellant, at 17 (quoting Linn, at 63). Beaman does not say why he has not, or cannot, look to the NLRB for relief. More importantly, the fact that a given [711]*711remedy cannot be granted by the NLRB does not necessarily mean his claim is not preempted. "[R]emedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation [;] to allow the State to grant a remedy here [damages] which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict." San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
Law of General Applicability
Finally, Beaman argues that his cause of action is not preempted because it is based on a law of general applicability. In support of this argument, Beaman cites a law review article in which Professor Cox contends that Congress intended only to preempt laws regulating collective bargaining activity, and not laws of general applicability. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1972). Beaman then asserts that the Supreme Court adopted Cox's analysis in New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553, 99 S. Ct. 1328 (1979). In New York Tel., the Court upheld a statute which provided unemployment benefits to strikers. Beaman argues that his claim should not be preempted because, like the unemployment benefits granted in New York Tel., his claim is based on a law of general applicability. Beaman's reliance on New York Tel. is misplaced for three reasons.
First, New York Tel. referred to, but did not specifically adopt, the Cox test. Second, general applicability of a statute or law is not sufficient, in and of itself, to exempt it from preemption. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338, 97 S. Ct. 1056 (1977); New York Tel., at 533; Garmon, at 244. Third, in New York Tel., the Court relied on the legislative histories of the NLRA and the Social Security Act, which were enacted the same year, to conclude that Congress had not [712]*712intended the NLRA to preempt state unemployment compensation laws. New York Tel., at 527.8
Beaman makes no attempt to establish that Congress did not intend the NLRA to preempt state causes of action based on implemented offers. Nor does he address the potential impact of such a state action on federal interests. He simply states that Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) states a law of general applicability; therefore, his claim is not preempted. This is not sufficient to overcome preemption.
In sum, Valley has met its burden of showing at least an arguable case that the state action is preempted. Thus, the burden shifts to Beaman to establish jurisdiction. He has not met this burden. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Beaman's action as preempted by federal law under the "potentially subject to" test of San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Andersen, and Smith, JJ., and Callow, J. Pro Tern., concur.