Armstrong v. United States

144 Ct. Cl. 659, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 49, 1959 WL 7586
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 14, 1959
DocketNo. 145-56
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 144 Ct. Cl. 659 (Armstrong v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armstrong v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 659, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 49, 1959 WL 7586 (cc 1959).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case, brought by some 117 firefighters at the Tinker Air Force Base at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, involves their right to compensation for the time they were required to spend on the employer’s premises, subject to call, but during which they were permitted to eat or sleep.

The case arises under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 295), and,, for a portion of the period, under the amendment thereof on September 1,1954, designated the Premium Pay Act (68 Stat. 1111; 5 U. S. C. 926).

1. Section 201 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 reads, in part, as follows:

Section 201. Officers and employees to whom this title applies shall, in addition to their basic compensation, be compensated for all hours of employment, officially ordered or approved, in excess of forty hours in any administrative work week, at overtime rates, as follows * * *.
[For employees receiving compensation of less than $2980 per annum, the overtime was one and one-half times the basic hourly rate of compensation, but, as the basic salary increased, the percentage of the basic rate for overtime decreased.]

The basic question presented is what Congress meant by the words, “hours of employment.” Did it intend to include therein time during which an employee was required to remain on the employer’s premises but during which he could eat or sleep ?

The first cases to reach the courts, in which the meaning of the words was in issue, were Wantock v. Armour & Co., 140 F. 2d 356; 323 U. S. 126; and Skidmore, et al. v. Swift & [661]*661Co., 136 F. 2d 112; 323 U. S. 134. They involved claims of firefighters for compensation for all the time they were required to remain on the employer’s premises in a standby status, including sleeping and eating time. They arose under the Fair Labor Standards Act, but this Act, as also the Federal Employees Pay Act, required overtime pay for “employment” beyond a certain number of hours. In both cases the employees claimed that all standby time should be included in hours of employment, even though a part of it was spent in eating and sleeping. The employer claimed that, since no labor was performed in any standby time, the employee was not entitled to compensation therefor.

In Wantock v. Armour & Co., supra, the District Court held that the employee was entitled to be paid for all standby time, except that spent in eating and sleeping. The employer appealed, but the employee did not. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 140 F. 2d 356, and the Supreme Court affirmed, 323 U. S. 126.

This case is authority for the right of the employee to recover compensation for standby time that does not include eating and sleeping time. His right to recover for eating and sleeping time was decided only by the District Court, which held he could not recover therefor.

In Skidmore, et al. v. Swift & Co., supra, the District Court held that the employees were not entitled to recover for any standby time, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 136 F. 2d 112. On certiorari by the Supreme Court the lower courts were reversed, 323 U. S. 134. The Supreme Court held that an employee might have the right to recover for standby time, depending on the facts of the particular case, and it remanded the case for findings of fact and for further proceedings. It did not specifically decide whether or not recovery could be had for time spent in eating and sleeping, but it clearly intimated that it could not be.

On pages 138-140 the Supreme Court summarizes Interpretative Bulletin 13 of the Wages and Hours Division, and discusses the weight to be given to it. After summarizing this bulletin the Supreme Court, at page 139, said:

The facts of this case do not fall within any of the specific examples given, but the conclusion of the Ad[662]*662ministrator, as expressed in the brief amicus curiae, is that the general tests which he has suggested point to the exclusion of sleeping and eating time of these employees from the workweek and the inclusion of all other on-call time: although the employees were required to remain on the premises during the entire time, the evidence shows that they were very rarely interrupted in their normal sleeping and eating time, and these are pursuits of a purely private nature which would presumably occupy the employees’ time whether they were on duty or not and which apparently could be pursued adequately and comfortably in the required circumstances; the rest of the time is different because there is nothing in the record to suggest that, even though pleasurably spent, it was spent in the ways the men would have chosen had they been free to do so.

It then discusses the weight to be given to the views of the Administrator, and concludes,

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. * * *

In conclusion it noted: “The courts in the Armour case weighed the evidence in the particular case in the light of the Administrator’s rulings and reached a result consistent therewith.”

Since these decisions, employees have been compensated for standby time, although no work was performed therein, but they have been denied compensation for time spent in sleeping and eating, although during that time they were subject to call. It has been generally understood that this was in accord with the clear intimation of the Supreme Court in the above cases, that an employee was not entitled to compensation for time spent in sleeping and eating, merely because such time was subject to possible interruptions.

This has been the uniform holding of our court, except in two cases where substantial labor was performed during the time set aside for sleeping and eating. Winsberg v. United States, 120 C. Cls. 511, under the Overtime Pay Act; Gaetke v. United States, 136 C. Cls. 756,; Collins v. United States, 141 [663]*663C. Cls. 573; Avary v. United States, 141 C. Cls. 577; and Ahearn, et al v. United States, 142 C. Cls. 309, all under the Federal Employees Pay Act.

In Farley v. United States, 131 C. Cls. 776, and in England v. United States, 133 C. Cls. 768, compensation was allowed because substantial labor was performed during the time set apart for sleeping and eating.

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has been of the same opinion. In addition to Wantock v. Armour & Co., supra, see Bowers v. Remington Rand, 159 F. 2d 114, and Bell v. Porter, 159 F.

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Bluebook (online)
144 Ct. Cl. 659, 1959 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 49, 1959 WL 7586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armstrong-v-united-states-cc-1959.