Ahearn v. United States

142 Ct. Cl. 309, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 140, 1958 WL 7388
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 7, 1958
DocketNo. 332-55
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 142 Ct. Cl. 309 (Ahearn v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ahearn v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 309, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 140, 1958 WL 7388 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs sue for overtime and night differential pay-alleged to be due them for services as firefighters at the United States Naval Base, Newport, Rhode Island. Their claims are based upon sections 201 and 301 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, as amended, 59 Stat. 295. The claims of plaintiffs herein, one hundred and eleven in number, except for travel pay, are similar, in both law and fact, to those of other firefighters recently considered by this court in Avary, et al. v. United States, 141 C. Cls. 577, and Collins v. United States, 141 C. Cls. 573.

The trial herein was limited by stipulation to the question of liability, with the amount of any recovery to be determined by further proceedings pursuant to Rule 38 (c).

Plaintiffs first claimed entitlement to pay for all time spent in eating and sleeping, while on tours of duty at their fire stations, but, at oral argument they abandoned these claims in the light of the Avary and Collins cases, supra. Remaining for consideration are plaintiffs’ contentions that they are entitled to compensation for work actually performed during time set aside for sleeping and eating, and for time spent in travel by boat to two fire stations located on islands offshore from the base proper.

During the period of the present claims, plaintiffs have been on duty for a total of 72 hours per week. Each of the three weekly 24-hour tours, comprising the 72 hours, is divided into three parts, by the regulations under which they were paid: 8 hours in a work status; 8 hours in a standby status; and 8 hours for sleeping and eating. For the first 40 hours in a work and standby status, they were paid regular rates of pay, and for the last 8 hours they were paid at overtime rates.

[311]*311Prior to May 23, 1953, they were paid at overtime rates for some specific types of work performed during sleeping time, but otherwise received no pay for hours set aside for sleep. It cannot be determined from the record what specific work performed during sleeping and eating time, prior to May 23, 1953, was paid for and what was not. Thereafter, they received pay for two-thirds of the total time spent at their duty stations, with no extra pay for duties performed during sleeping time. Up to May 1953 a night differential of 10 percent of basic compensation for all hours of employment between 6:00 p. m. and 6:00 a. m. was received by plaintiffs for all of such time except that set aside for sleeping from 10:00 p. m. to 6: 00 a. m., but thereafter they received differential pay for two-thirds of such hours whether sleeping or not.

The change in the method of compensation resulted from a change in the regulation of the Department of the Navy, to conform to the “two-thirds rule” for compensation of employees whose duties were irregular in time, which had previously been promulgated by the Civil Service Commission. This rule provided for pay for two-thirds of the time on duty, on the theory that the other one-third was consumed ;n sleeping and eating.

The nature of the duties performed by plaintiffs during hours set aside for sleeping are set forth in detail in our findings of fact. They include claims for two hours’ per man per tour of duty on alarm desk duty, and other miscellaneous things, such as, standing by at movies and dances on the base, removal of snow from in front of the fire houses, standing by while tankers discharged cargo, patrols, etc.

What we have said in Avary, et al. v. United States, supra, and Collins v. United States, supra, decided the same day, is dispositive of the primary claims herein. In those cases we held that time spent in sleeping and eating is noncompensable, but that time spent in actual labor during these periods is compensable under sections 201 and 301 of the Federal Employees Pay Act, supra. To the extent that plaintiffs have not been compensated for work actually performed during periods set aside for eating and sleeping they are entitled to recover.

[312]*312Approximately one hour of each tour was consumed in eating.1 In addition, plaintiffs were paid night differential for two-thirds of all applicable hours after the 1953 change in regulations. Prior thereto, they had not been paid during time set aside for sleep. For ten hours out of each 24-hour tour plaintiffs were permitted to sleep, except for the period from December 1950 to August 1951, when only 8 hours were allowed. Since, under section 301 of the Act, night differential is payable only for hours of “duty”,2 plaintiffs prior to the 1953 change have been overpaid for two hours in which they were permitted to sleep, and after that date were overpaid, under the two-thirds rule for all of such pay received for time in which they slept.

Since this case is before us only on the question of liability, proof was not adduced to show the number of hours spent by each plaintiff in the various activities listed in finding 11. A good many of them were not performed during sleeping and eating time; others occupied only a negligible amount of time. Where a substantial amount of time was spent on these duties during eating and sleeping time, such as the desk watch, for instance, plaintiffs are to be compensated therefor, but where the time spent was negligible, it is to be disregarded, under the de minimis rule.

Against the total time spent on such duties during eating and sleeping time, defendant is entitled to an offset for the number of hours over eight in which plaintiffs were permitted to eat or sleep, but for which they have been paid, as well as for all overpayments of night differential pay.

A further claim is asserted for time spent in travel by boat to and from island fire stations. Plaintiffs say that the time consumed3 by travel in boats furnished by the Navy is [313]*313“employment” within the meaning of the Act. Section 201 reads in part as follows:

Sec. 201. Officers and employees to whom this title applies shall, in addition to their basic compensation, be compensated for all hours of employment, officially ordered or approved, in excess of forty hours in any administrative workweek, at overtime rates as follows: * * *

Was the time spent in boat travel to and from their duty stations hours of employment?

Plaintiffs urge that the doctrine of Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U. S. 590, is controlling. We do not think this case is apposite. It was there decided that dangerous underground travel by iron miners to and from mine workings wholly within the mines, in cars furnished and operated by the mine owners and under their supervision and control, was compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act.4 The miners checked in at the opening to the mine on the surface of the ground; from there they were required by the owners to ride in ore cars or other cars to a platform about two miles from their place of work and to walk the rest of the way. This journey from the checking in place, all on the owner’s property, was a necessary incident to their employment.

The facts of this case are quite different.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 Ct. Cl. 309, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 140, 1958 WL 7388, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ahearn-v-united-states-cc-1958.