Anders v. United States

162 Ct. Cl. 719, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 128, 1963 WL 8501
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1963
DocketNo. 114-54
StatusPublished

This text of 162 Ct. Cl. 719 (Anders v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anders v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 719, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 128, 1963 WL 8501 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

This is another suit by employees of the Government seeking compensation for time spent on Government premises during which they were permitted to sleep and eat. They have been paid under the “two-thirds” rule. The facts are fully set out in the report of the Commissioner.

We have approved the application of this rule in quite a number of cases arising under several different Acts: the War Overtime Pay Act of 1943, 57 Stat. 75;1 section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 522, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 673c (1958) ;2 the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 296, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 911 (1958);3 and others. But plaintiffs say it is not applicable to wage board employees. In Gaetke, et al. v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 756, 145 F. Supp. 913 (1956), plaintiffs relied on both the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, supra, and section 23 of the Act of March 28, 1934, supra. Section 23 of the 1934 Act applied to wage board employees. We said the “two-thirds” rule “was a sensible and realistic application of the statute to the peculiar requirement of plaintiffs’ jobs.” This statement was intended to apply to each of the Acts relied upon. We know of no reason why the “two-thirds” rule is not equally applicable to wage board employees as it is to any other employees.

All the reasons assigned by plaintiffs for its inapplicability in this case have been dealt with in previous opinions and decided adversely to plaintiffs. See cases cited supra, and see also Sawyer, et al. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 152, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 868 (1957); Wright v. United States, 144 Ct. Cl. 810, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959); Bean v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 267, 175 F. Supp. 166 (1959); Ahearn v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 21, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 932 (1961); Nardone v. General Motors, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 336 (N.J. 1962). We see no point in repeating here the matters discussed in the cases cited.

[721]*721Defendant does not insist on the counterclaims it asserts except as set-offs against any amounts the court might find plaintiffs are entitled to recover.

It results that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover and their petition and defendant’s counterclaims are dismissed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner C. Murray Bernhardt, and the briefs and arguments of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. Plaintiffs were employed for various periods of time during the six years prior to the filing of the petition in this case as wage board employees by the Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, California. The petition in this case was filed on March 16,1954, and, because of the statute of limitations and termination of the activities upon which the claims are premised, it only covers the 15% month period from March 16, 1948 through June 80, 1949. More specifically, the claims are limited to those times during the period March 16,1948-June 30,1949, when plaintiffs were employed in the category of ship maintenance mechanics (hereinafter designated as “SMM”) at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard or at Antioch, one of the Shipyard’s inland anchorages.

2. The plaintiffs seek to recover additional overtime compensation and additional night differential pay during the periods when they were employed as ship maintenance mechanics. Plaintiffs, as wage board employees, claim rights under the provisions of the Act of March 28, 1934 (48 Stat. 522), as amended (5 U.S.C. § 673c, (1958)). Basically, plaintiffs seek to recover additional overtime compensation and additional night differential pay for work allegedly performed during periods available for sleeping and eating purposes.

3. Plaintiffs, at all times material herein, were employed on the basis of 72 hours of duty each week. These 72 hours were divided into three 24-hour tours of duty each week, each tour of duty commencing officially at 8 a.m., 'and continuing until 8 a.m., the following day. Plaintiffs were paid on the basis of the so-called “two-thirds” rule despite the fact that they were classified as wage board employees. [722]*722Under this rule, each hour on duty was regarded as equivalent to two-thirds of an hour of working time. As a result, the 72 hours of duty each week was considered to be 48 hours for pay purposes, with 8 hours of the 48 hours being paid at overtime rates. The remaining 24 hours of the 72 hours of duty each week were treated as being available for sleeping and eating purposes and were not considered as com-pensable time. Night differential compensation was likewise computed under the “two-thirds” rule. The “two-thirds” rule governed the manner of compensating plaintiffs while they were employed as ship maintenance mechanics.

4. To properly understand this case it is helpful to relate certain background facts which, while they are antecedent to the claim period itself, are explanatory of the situation which existed when the claim period herein commenced in March 1948.

(a) Early in 1946, the Mare Island Naval Shipyard was advised that it would be responsible for large numbers of “laid-up” or decommissioned ships. This was the initial phase of the post-war retrenchment program. The Shipyard Commander and subordinate officers and civilian employees, including the Chief of the Fire Department and the Chief of Police, conferred as to means to discharge this responsibility effectively. The alternatives were to place civilian guards on the “laid-up” ships on the basis of three 8-hour shifts per 24-hour period, or to hire personnel from among the general yard workmen who were then being separated through reduction-in-force procedures, rerate these general yard workmen as civilian firefighters, and operate under the so-called “two-platoon” system utilized by civilian firefighters consisting of 24 hours on duty, followed by 24 hours off duty, resulting in 72 hours of duty per week. While this matter was under consideration the Department of the Navy and/or the Civil Service Commission came out with ’a new job classification designed to meet the situation created by the “laid-up” ships. The new job classification was known as “Ship Maintenance Mechanic”, the primary function of which was to meet the security needs of the Navy with reference to idle ship anchorages. It was finally decided to engage personnel as ship maintenance mechanics [723]*723and to operate on the basis of the two-platoon system. The Chief of the Fire Department was given the added responsibility for the operation of the various anchorages containing the “laid-up” ships and the supervision of the ship maintenance mechanics, and Fire Chief James D. Greig maintained this responsibility throughout the operation of the anchorages, including the period of the instant claims.

(b) In recruiting personnel for the SMM positions, the yard workers who were facing separation were given job preference, were rerated as SMM, and were assigned to various anchorages where the decommissioned ships were nested.

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Related

Nardone v. General Motors, Inc.
207 F. Supp. 336 (D. New Jersey, 1962)
Winsberg v. United States
98 F. Supp. 345 (Court of Claims, 1951)
Gaetke v. United States
145 F. Supp. 913 (Court of Claims, 1956)
Sawyer v. United States
138 Ct. Cl. 152 (Court of Claims, 1957)
Collins v. United States
141 Ct. Cl. 573 (Court of Claims, 1958)
Avary v. United States
141 Ct. Cl. 577 (Court of Claims, 1958)
Ahearn v. United States
142 Ct. Cl. 309 (Court of Claims, 1958)
Armstrong v. United States
144 Ct. Cl. 659 (Court of Claims, 1959)
Bean v. United States
175 F. Supp. 166 (Court of Claims, 1959)

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Bluebook (online)
162 Ct. Cl. 719, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 128, 1963 WL 8501, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anders-v-united-states-cc-1963.