JIM HANNAH, Justice.
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals orders of the Greene County Probate Court, a temporary guardianship order entered May 16, 2001, a permanent guardianship order entered May 21, 2001, and a September 19, 2001, order. DHS asserts that this case is controlled by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-19-101&emdash;9-19-401 (Repl. 2002), and that the probate court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Act to decide the issue of guardianship, or in the alternative, abused its discretion in failing to decline jurisdiction by reason of conduct under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-208. DHS also asserts that the probate court erred when it failed to give full faith and credit to an order from a Florida court to pick up the child.
We hold that the probate court had jurisdiction to consider the guardianship petition. We further hold that the Florida ex parte order at issue was void ab initio and invalid on its face. We also hold that even had the Florida ex parte order been valid, it was not entitled to full faith and credit in that it was never registered or enforced in this state as required under the UCCJEA, and that DHS was without authority to take any action whatever on the order. The decision of the probate court is affirmed.
Facts
This case involves the seizure of a child by DHS without a warrant or order of any court of this state. DHS does not assert that the child was in immediate danger such that they were required to take custody without a warrant or order as allowed under the statutes of this state. In fact, DHS denies taking the child into DHS custody, but rather asserts that the child was taken and held by them in Arkansas under the authority of an ex parte order of the State of Florida. DHS relies on an ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody” issued by the Circuit Court of Osceloa County Florida, which was directed to “All and Singular the Sheriffs of the State of Florida or Other Law Enforcement Agencies.” The Arkansas Department of Human Services was not mentioned in this order.
DHS does not assert that this ex parte order from Florida was registered or that enforcement of the order was sought in the courts of this state under the UCCJEA. No notice was provided to Joyce Cox, who was caring for the child. No warrant to take custody was issued by a court of this state under the UCCJEA. DHS simply went to the house and took the child.
According to the testimony of Suzanne Henry, a supervisor for the Department of Human Services, Children and Family Services in Greene County, on May 15 she received a call from her superiors at DHS directing her to. “pick up a child” and “hold” her for the State of Florida. Ms. Henry expressed concern about taking custody of the child without a court order, and eventually, the Florida ex parte order was faxed to Ms. Henry. Ms. Henry then forwarded the Florida order to Lisa McGee, Deputy Counsel at the Office of Chief Counsel at DHS, for confirmation. According to Ms. Henry’s testimony, she received a call back and was told to “honor” the Florida order and to “pick-up the child and hold until Florida could pick the child up.” According to DHS’s pleadings, Lisa McGee directly told Ms. Henry to “take custody” of the child. Ms. Henry also testified that when she was speaking with authorities in Florida they told her that if DHS would pick up the child they “would be on the plane immediately.”
Ms. Henry then proceeded to the Cox home on May 15 where Cheyenne was in the physical custody of her paternal grandmother, Joyce Cox. Ms. Henry testified that no notice had been provided to Ms. Cox, and that they simply took the child. Ms. Henry also testified that “when I arrived to pick up the baby she was not in any danger. She was clean, and she looked fine. The room she stayed in was clean.” Ms. Henry further testified that on May 16 she informed authorities in Florida that they had Cheyenne.
On May 16, Ms. Cox filed a Petition to Appoint Guardian of Minor Child, which was considered ex parte and resulted in an Ex Parte Temporary Order of Guardianship granted that day. On May 17, the Temporary Order of Guardianship was faxed to Christine Berger, counsel for DHS. By this order, Ms. Berger and DHS were informed that DHS was ordered “to return the incapacitated person to the physical custody of the petitioner, Joyce Cox, immediately and without delay.” DHS did not return the child to Ms. Cox. Ms. Berger and DHS were further given notice in this order that a temporary hearing was to be held the next day at 9:30 a.m.
DHS decided not to comply with the probate court’s order and contacted Florida. They delivered Cheyenne to Florida authorities at the Memphis airport on the morning of the hearing such that by the time of the hearing, Cheyenne was out of the State of Arkansas. DHS asserts this case involves a race to the courthouse and because the Florida ex parte order was issued on May 15, and the Arkansas order on May 16, that they decided to follow the earlier Florida ex parte order.
DHS asserts further that what occurred in this case is simply a matter for the Florida courts because it arose when a pregnant woman fled Florida to Arkansas to give birth here for the express purpose of depriving Florida of jurisdiction of her child because Florida was about to terminate her parental rights to her other five children in Florida. DHS also asserts that Florida has a pending dependency-neglect proceeding on the family in Florida and has worked with this family since the late 1990s. Therefore, DHS asserts, Florida has interests that should be protected, and Cheyenne can be best served by the Florida courts.
Standard of Review
We review probate proceedings de novo, and we will not reverse the decision of the probate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Dillard v. Nix, 345 Ark. 215, 45 S.W.3d 359 (2001); Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 20 S.W.3d 896 (2000). When reviewing the proceedings, we give due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the probate judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA
DHS asserts that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship petition because Florida already had jurisdiction of the Pruitt family. The Florida circuit court had dependency-neglect proceedings pending before it with respect to each of Cheyenne’s five siblings who resided in Florida. DHS also argues that proceedings specifically concerning Cheyenne had already been commenced in Florida prior to May 16, 2001, when the probate court issued its order, and that the probate court should have, therefore, deferred to Florida. DHS argues that deference to Florida was especially proper in this case where Florida was already involved with the family, and where the mother only came to Arkansas to give birth to Cheyenne in order to deprive Florida of jurisdiction. The May 15, 2001, ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody” issued by the Florida circuit court shows Florida was attempting to exert some manner of jurisdiction over Cheyenne prior to May 16, 2001, when the probate court issued its Ex Parte Temporary Order of Guardianship.
DHS asserts that under the UCCJEA, Florida had jurisdiction.
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JIM HANNAH, Justice.
The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) appeals orders of the Greene County Probate Court, a temporary guardianship order entered May 16, 2001, a permanent guardianship order entered May 21, 2001, and a September 19, 2001, order. DHS asserts that this case is controlled by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-19-101&emdash;9-19-401 (Repl. 2002), and that the probate court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Act to decide the issue of guardianship, or in the alternative, abused its discretion in failing to decline jurisdiction by reason of conduct under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-208. DHS also asserts that the probate court erred when it failed to give full faith and credit to an order from a Florida court to pick up the child.
We hold that the probate court had jurisdiction to consider the guardianship petition. We further hold that the Florida ex parte order at issue was void ab initio and invalid on its face. We also hold that even had the Florida ex parte order been valid, it was not entitled to full faith and credit in that it was never registered or enforced in this state as required under the UCCJEA, and that DHS was without authority to take any action whatever on the order. The decision of the probate court is affirmed.
Facts
This case involves the seizure of a child by DHS without a warrant or order of any court of this state. DHS does not assert that the child was in immediate danger such that they were required to take custody without a warrant or order as allowed under the statutes of this state. In fact, DHS denies taking the child into DHS custody, but rather asserts that the child was taken and held by them in Arkansas under the authority of an ex parte order of the State of Florida. DHS relies on an ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody” issued by the Circuit Court of Osceloa County Florida, which was directed to “All and Singular the Sheriffs of the State of Florida or Other Law Enforcement Agencies.” The Arkansas Department of Human Services was not mentioned in this order.
DHS does not assert that this ex parte order from Florida was registered or that enforcement of the order was sought in the courts of this state under the UCCJEA. No notice was provided to Joyce Cox, who was caring for the child. No warrant to take custody was issued by a court of this state under the UCCJEA. DHS simply went to the house and took the child.
According to the testimony of Suzanne Henry, a supervisor for the Department of Human Services, Children and Family Services in Greene County, on May 15 she received a call from her superiors at DHS directing her to. “pick up a child” and “hold” her for the State of Florida. Ms. Henry expressed concern about taking custody of the child without a court order, and eventually, the Florida ex parte order was faxed to Ms. Henry. Ms. Henry then forwarded the Florida order to Lisa McGee, Deputy Counsel at the Office of Chief Counsel at DHS, for confirmation. According to Ms. Henry’s testimony, she received a call back and was told to “honor” the Florida order and to “pick-up the child and hold until Florida could pick the child up.” According to DHS’s pleadings, Lisa McGee directly told Ms. Henry to “take custody” of the child. Ms. Henry also testified that when she was speaking with authorities in Florida they told her that if DHS would pick up the child they “would be on the plane immediately.”
Ms. Henry then proceeded to the Cox home on May 15 where Cheyenne was in the physical custody of her paternal grandmother, Joyce Cox. Ms. Henry testified that no notice had been provided to Ms. Cox, and that they simply took the child. Ms. Henry also testified that “when I arrived to pick up the baby she was not in any danger. She was clean, and she looked fine. The room she stayed in was clean.” Ms. Henry further testified that on May 16 she informed authorities in Florida that they had Cheyenne.
On May 16, Ms. Cox filed a Petition to Appoint Guardian of Minor Child, which was considered ex parte and resulted in an Ex Parte Temporary Order of Guardianship granted that day. On May 17, the Temporary Order of Guardianship was faxed to Christine Berger, counsel for DHS. By this order, Ms. Berger and DHS were informed that DHS was ordered “to return the incapacitated person to the physical custody of the petitioner, Joyce Cox, immediately and without delay.” DHS did not return the child to Ms. Cox. Ms. Berger and DHS were further given notice in this order that a temporary hearing was to be held the next day at 9:30 a.m.
DHS decided not to comply with the probate court’s order and contacted Florida. They delivered Cheyenne to Florida authorities at the Memphis airport on the morning of the hearing such that by the time of the hearing, Cheyenne was out of the State of Arkansas. DHS asserts this case involves a race to the courthouse and because the Florida ex parte order was issued on May 15, and the Arkansas order on May 16, that they decided to follow the earlier Florida ex parte order.
DHS asserts further that what occurred in this case is simply a matter for the Florida courts because it arose when a pregnant woman fled Florida to Arkansas to give birth here for the express purpose of depriving Florida of jurisdiction of her child because Florida was about to terminate her parental rights to her other five children in Florida. DHS also asserts that Florida has a pending dependency-neglect proceeding on the family in Florida and has worked with this family since the late 1990s. Therefore, DHS asserts, Florida has interests that should be protected, and Cheyenne can be best served by the Florida courts.
Standard of Review
We review probate proceedings de novo, and we will not reverse the decision of the probate court unless it is clearly erroneous. Dillard v. Nix, 345 Ark. 215, 45 S.W.3d 359 (2001); Amant v. Callahan, 341 Ark. 857, 20 S.W.3d 896 (2000). When reviewing the proceedings, we give due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the probate judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id.
Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA
DHS asserts that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the guardianship petition because Florida already had jurisdiction of the Pruitt family. The Florida circuit court had dependency-neglect proceedings pending before it with respect to each of Cheyenne’s five siblings who resided in Florida. DHS also argues that proceedings specifically concerning Cheyenne had already been commenced in Florida prior to May 16, 2001, when the probate court issued its order, and that the probate court should have, therefore, deferred to Florida. DHS argues that deference to Florida was especially proper in this case where Florida was already involved with the family, and where the mother only came to Arkansas to give birth to Cheyenne in order to deprive Florida of jurisdiction. The May 15, 2001, ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody” issued by the Florida circuit court shows Florida was attempting to exert some manner of jurisdiction over Cheyenne prior to May 16, 2001, when the probate court issued its Ex Parte Temporary Order of Guardianship.
DHS asserts that under the UCCJEA, Florida had jurisdiction. We also note that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. 1738A (2002), is applicable and where conflicts exist is preemptive. Perez v. Tanner, 332 Ark. 356, 965 S.W.2d 90 (1998). This was also DHS’s argument in its motion to dismiss filed in probate court, and the issue of the validity of the Florida ex parte order was litigated below. Cox specifically asserted the Florida ex parte order was void ab initio. As DHS correctly states in its brief, the issue in this case is whether the probate court had jurisdiction to decide custody. The dissent confuses the issue by mistakenly analyzing this case under principles of significant connection that were modified by adoption of the UCCJEA.1
The UCCJEA as codified in Arkansas is comprised of three subchapters. Subchapter one provides general provisions, including definitions. Subchapter two sets out jurisdiction and the method whereby the courts of this state issue a child-custody determination order. Section 9-19-201 provides the criteria used to determine whether a state has jurisdiction to make an “initial child-custody determination.” “Initial determination” means the first child-custody determination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-102(8) (Repl. 2002). Under § 9-19-201(a) as applied to the facts of this case, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination if it is the home state of the child. The home state of a child of less than six months of age means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-102(7). See similarly, 28 U.S.C. 1738A(a)(4) under the PKPA. DHS agrees that under this definition, Arkansas is the home state, but argues that this Court must look at more than just whether Arkansas is the “home state.” DHS also argues conversely that Florida had jurisdiction and under the PKPA, once jurisdiction was had in Florida, the Arkansas court was without jurisdiction to act, because, as stated, that act is preemptive. As noted, the definition of “home state” is the same in PKPA as in the UCCJEA. Contrary to what DHS argues, Florida never had jurisdiction under the PKPA or under the UCCJEA to make a child-custody determination and, therefore, there was no jurisdiction in Florida on May 16, 2001, when the probate court acted.
DHS argues further and separately that a proceeding could not be commenced here because a proceeding regarding Cheyenne had already been commenced in Florida as evidenced by the existing dependency-neglect proceedings on Cheyenne’s siblings in Florida and based upon the May 15, 2001, ex parte “Order toTake-Into-Custody” of the Florida circuit court.
We will consider first the argument that the existing dependency-neglect proceedings in Florida somehow encompassed Cheyenne. It is true that if Florida had somehow had jurisdiction to. make a child-custody determination before the probate court did, then there would be exclusive continuing jurisdiction subject only to temporary emergency jurisdiction in this state. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202 — 9-19-204 (Repl. 2002). This illuminates some of the changes made in the UCCJEA to resolve concerns raised under the old Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), formerly Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-201 — 9-13-208 (Repl. 2002). Under the old UCCJA, there was a temptation to apply a significant-connection analysis in an attempt to override the “home state” analysis and secure jurisdiction.
Since passage of the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980 use of significant connection jurisdiction is limited to three primary circumstances: (1) in initial custody determinations when the child has no home state; (2) when a court with home state jurisdiction has declined to exercise jurisdiction; and (3) when significant connection jurisdiction is used in conjunction with continuing jurisdiction to allow a state that issued a custody order to modify it. . . .
Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice % 3-15 at 3-40 (2nd Ed 2001).
None of the circumstances apply in this case, and reliance on significant connection is misplaced. One of the purposes in enacting the UCCJEA was to avoid some of the jurisdictional conflicts, such as this, that arose under the UCCJA. The UCCJEA allows a court to assume jurisdiction in an initial child-custody determination based on significant connection only if the child has no home state. In re: Jorgensen, 627 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 2001). Arkansas is the home state as conceded by DHS.
We also note that although the alleged significant connection is Florida’s longstanding involvement with Stacy and Reuben Pruitt’s children in Florida, dependency proceedings in Florida are not filed as to families, but rather as to individual children. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.501 (2001). This statute speaks of “proceedings seeking an adjudication that a child is dependent. ...” The affidavit filed in the Florida court in support of the ex parte Order spoke to Cheyenne as an individual, not to her family. Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.650, pursuant to which the affidavit was submitted, speaks of “grounds to take a child into custody.” There is no support in the Florida statutes for the argument that there is a case on a family that somehow would encompass Cheyenne upon her birth into the family. Thus, we reject the argument that there was an ongoing case in the State of Florida with respect to the Pruitt family that would somehow include Cheyenne and provide jurisdiction in Florida on that basis.
DHS argues a second basis for jurisdiction in Florida that deprived the probate court of jurisdiction and that is because there was a simultaneous proceeding in Florida. More specifically, DHS argues that under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-206 (Repl. 2001), Florida had jurisdiction because the May 15, 2001, ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody,” issued based upon an affidavit that Cheyenne was at substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect, was issued before the probate court took jurisdiction on May 16, 2001. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-206 (Repl. 2002), provides that a court of this state may not exercise jurisdiction, excepting temporary emergency jurisdiction under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-204, where at the time of the commencement of the proceeding in this state, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has already been commenced in the court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter. The dissent states that unquestionably Florida had a child-custody proceeding commenced before it as contemplated under § 9-19-206(b) and 9-19-102(4); however, unquestionably Florida did not have jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the very provisions the dissent cites. As such, the proceedings in Florida wdre a nullity and could not be considered by the probate court.
It is undisputed that Cheyenne was born in Arkansas and had never been in Florida as of May 15, when the Florida court purported to issue an ex parte order to take Cheyenne into custody. A “child” for purposes of the UCCJEA “means an individual who has not attained eighteen (18) years of age.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-102(2) (Repl. 2002). This means that the UCCJEA does not apply to unborn infants. See In re Unborn Child of Starks, 18 P.3d 342 (Okla. 2001). The fact that Cheyenne may have been conceived in Florida is therefore of no impact in the analysis of jurisdiction. Until taken to Tennessee by DHS, Cheyenne had only lived in Arkansas. Under the UCCJEA, jurisdiction is decided on whether the state making the custody determination is the home state. Arkansas is the home state. The probate court correctly determined that it and not Florida had jurisdiction. Florida did not have jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA. It had no jurisdiction over Cheyenne.
In this same vein, DHS argues that Florida had jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. Ch. 61.13(2)(a), which provides:
The. court shall have jurisdiction to determine custody, notwithstanding that the child.is not physically present in this state at the time any proceeding- under this chapter, if it appears to the court that the child was removed from this state for the primary purpose of removing the child from the jurisdiction of the court in an attempt to avoid a determination or modification of custody.
This statute presupposes jurisdiction that does not exist in this case. Cheyenne was never in Florida to be removed from that state. Even though the dissent argues Cheyenne was ordered returned to Florida, this simply is not possible given she had never been there.
DHS argues yet further that the probate court should have declined jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-208 (Repl. 2002), which provides that jurisdiction should be declined where a person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of this state under the UCCJEA has engaged in unjustifiable conduct. DHS alleges that Stacy Pruitt and Cox entered into a conspiracy to deprive Florida of jurisdiction. However, even assuming a decision by a grandmother-to-be and her pregnant daughter-in-law, who was unencumbered by an injunction or otherwise from leaving a state to give birth in another, amounts to unjustifiable conduct, DHS provides nothing other than the allegation that even this occurred. DHS provides no authority as to what constitutes “unjustifiable conduct.” Further, this issue was raised before the probate court. We give due regard to the superior position of the probate judge in making such determinations and do not reverse unless the decision was clearly erroneous. Dillard, supra. The decision was not clearly erroneous. In any event, because the parents and Cox agreed to jurisdiction, the probate court had to accept jurisdiction. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-208(a)(1). Jurisdiction was also proper because no other state had jurisdiction. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-208(3). It would have been error had the probate court declined jurisdiction. Whether one might argue that this encourages persons to flee one state’s potential jurisdiction in a dependency-neglect proceedings when a state is anticipating filing as soon as the child is born simply begs the question before this court and ignores the law.
One of the purposes of the UCCJEA is to avoid relitigation of child-custody determinations in other states. A “child-custody determination means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child.” Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-102(3); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61-503(3)(2002). Before a child-custody determination may be made, notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided to persons who would be notified under state law, and specifically includes parents and persons having physical custody or who are acting as a parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-205 (2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.518 (2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.131(2001). See also, 28 U.S.C. 1738A(e).
The order at issue is not a “child-custody determination”that may be enforced pursuant to the UCCJEA. It is admitted to be a “Take-into-Custody” order. The order states that it was issued pursuant to a verified affidavit. The affidavit provided facts sufficient for the court to believe Cheyenne was at “risk of imminent harm.” It is an ex parte order for the state to take custody and is not enforceable under the UCCJEA or otherwise in Arkansas. The required notice and opportunity to be heard were not provided in ex parte proceedings. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-205 (2002); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.518 (2002). That this is an intrastate order to “Take-into-Custody” is also apparent because it is addressed to “All and singular the sheriffs of the state of Florida or other law enforcement agencies.” The dissent surprisingly declares that due process in Florida is satisfied by an ex parte hearing and an order based on an affidavit.
Full Faith and Credit
DHS additionally argues that the trial court erred when it failed to accord the Florida order full faith and credit. We disagree.
We first note that the procedure followed in this case by DHS was apparently receipt of the Florida ex parte “Order to Take-into-Custody” by DHS, followed by DHS “picking up” the child, holding the child for Florida, and then transporting the child to Memphis where DHS turned the child over to Florida authorities. DHS’s Brief in Support to Response to Petition for Order to Show Cause and Citation of Contempt confirms this where we find the following:
DHS’s procedure is to honor sister state’s orders and sister state’s reciprocate by honoring similar Arkansas orders. When DHS caseworkers receive an order from a sister state, they refer the order to a DHS attorney. Once the DHS attorney reviews the order and determines its validity, the attorney instructs the caseworker to honor the order.
This is inconsistent with the UCCJEA (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-19-101 — 9-19-401) and also inconsistent with Arkansas law more generally. Cheyenne was removed from her home by the state. A state may not remove a child from his home, absent exigent circumstances, without notice and a pre-removal hearing. Morrell v. Mock, 270 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2001); Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733 (10th Cir. 1997).
It is more than troubling that counsel at DHS would take it upon themselves to determine whether an order from a foreign jurisdiction should be afforded full faith and credit, and then execute the order. That requires judicial process. DHS is authorized to take custody of a child without a warrant or order pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-313(a)(l)(C) (Repl. 2002), where there are clear reasonable grounds to conclude that the juvenile is in immediate danger. Even then, a hearing must be provided within seventy-two hours. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-313. Danger to the child was not at issue in this case. Likewise, law enforcement may not act except on a court order absent exigent circumstances. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-316 (Repl. 2002). DHS has not argued that this child was in danger, and in fact, DHS supervisor Henry testified to the contrary, that the child was not in any danger, and that she appeared fine and well cared for. We also note that in its pleadings, DHS stated, “The Arkansas Department of Human Services is holding the child for the State of Florida and has no custodial relationship with the above mentioned child. Further, the Arkansas Department of Human Services has not filed a petition for custody of the child and does not intend to do so.” If DHS did not take custody of Cheyenne when they took her from the Cox home, then one is left to wonder just on what basis and on what justification she was in DHS’s possession.
DHS apparently attempts to rely upon full faith and credit as the reason they enforced the Florida order, inferring they must act upon an order from a foreign state to take a child into custody just as they must act on an order from a court of this state. This is directly contrary to longstanding elementary law. “The full faith and credit clause does not automatically make one state’s judgment an enforceable judgment in another state; instead, for the purpose of giving it effect, an action must be brought to make it a judgment in the second state.” 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §946 (1995).
Before uniform acts to enforce foreign judgments were adopted, an action had to be brought on the foreign judgment. See Rice v. Rice, 213 Ark. 981, 214 S.W.2d 235 (1948). Further, the mere filing of an action to enforce a judgment did not give the foreign judgment force and effect. A judgment of another state could not be executed in this state until the foreign judgment was first reduced to a domestic judgment. Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947). Thus, under general full-faith-and-credit analysis, the order was void on this basis as well when DHS attempted to execute it.
Nor will resort to the uniform acts assist DHS in its argument. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act is codified at Ark. Code Ann. §16-66-601 — 16-66-617 (Repl. 2002). Thereunder, the foreign order must be registered, and notice must be given. This was not done in this case. In any event, DHS correctly asserts that this case is controlled by the UCCJEA. DHS did not comply with the UCCJEA, which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard among other requirements, and on May 16, 2001, full faith and credit were not due.
Subchapter 3 of the UCCJEA as codified in this state provides how an order of child-custody determination is enforced. We note that we have already determined that the Florida ex parte “Order to Take-Into-Custody” is not a child-custody determination under the UCCJEA; however, even if it were, DHS was not entitled to act on it because they had not complied with the UCCJEA. Enforcement of foreign child-custody determinations is not a self-help process. Under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-305, the order is registered in the appropriate court in this state.2 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-305(a). In Stone v. Stone, 636 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), a party was attempting to enforce a South Dakota child-custody determination order in Minnesota. The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated, “Custody matters must be registered under the UCCJEA and child support matters must be registered under the UIFSA.” Stone, 636 N.W.2d at 598. The Minnesota Court of Appeals further stated, “Minnesota cannot take jurisdiction of custody issues when there is neither proper registration under the UCCJEA nor assertion of an existing custody dispute.” Id. A foreign child-custody determination must be registered to begin the process to enforce it.
Then, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-305 (b)(2), notice is served on certain persons, including any parent or person acting as a parent or person who has physical custody or claims rights of legal custody. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-305(a)(3) and § 9-19-209 (Repl. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §1738A(e). “Both the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act require that the contestants be given ‘reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 3-5 at 3-92 (2nd Ed. 2001). In a footnote, the UCCJEA is added. See also, 28 U.S.C. §1738A(e); UCCJA § 4, 9, and UCCJEA § 106. The notice must tell the person that an enforceable determination has been registered and that the validity of the determination may be challenged by requesting a hearing within twenty days. In the notice, they are also told that if they do not challenge the order, it will be enforced. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19— 305(d). At the hearing, the person challenging the order may show that the issuing court did not have jurisdiction, or that it has been stayed, vacated, or modified. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-305(d) (2-3). After either the hearing is held and the validity of the order is upheld, or where no challenge was made, the order will be enforced by the court. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-306) (Repl. 2002). The UCCJEA also provides for issuance of a warrant to take the child into custody, and provides that law enforcement may be involved. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-316 (Repl. 2002). There is no mention of DHS anywhere in the subchapter. As already discussed, there is but one instance where DHS may act as they did in this case and that is where a child is in immediate danger. This authority does not exist under the UCCJEA, but instead under Arkansas Code Annotated, Chapter 27, Juvenile Courts and Proceedings. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-313(a)(1)(C) (Repl. 2002). DHS does not assert they acted based upon any danger to Cheyenne.
The UCCJEA streamlines enforcement of foreign child-custody determinations in that they will be enforced in another state if, upon notice, the affected persons do not challenge the jurisdiction of the rendering court or, where they do, but the court in the enforcing state determines jurisdiction was proper. The UCCJEA does not dispense with proceedings to enforce the order in the state where it is to be enforced.
It is not up to DHS to decide what orders it will follow and what orders it will ignore. Further, it is up to Florida to register and enforce the order. They might well appropriately seek DHS’s help, but the process must be followed or we have chaos and acts not subject to the required supervision of the courts, as in this case.
There are additional problems with the Florida ex parte order in this case. The ex parte order to take into custody addresses “Florida and Other Law Enforcement Agencies.” The agency that took Cheyenne was the Arkansas Department of Human Services. It is unclear that this ex parte order was directed at anyone other than law enforcement in Florida. Too, DHS is not a law enforcement agency. It was not obligated or empowered by the order to seize Cheyenne even if it had been a valid, enforceable order. There was neither provision under the Florida ex parte order nor under the laws of this state for the action taken by DHS. Cheyenne was a child under the jurisdiction of this state and entitled to the protection of the courts of this state.
DHS’s conduct in this case is deeply disturbing. DHS asserts they were confused because they had two conflicting orders, one telling them to turn the child over to Florida, and one telling them to return the child to Joyce Cox. DHS asserts they acted on the first-in-time order. The simple fact is DHS was faced with one valid order to follow, that of the Probate Court of Greene County. Full faith and credit is not a complex or obscure legal principle. It requires the involvement of the courts of this state in enforcement of foreign judgments. DHS is utterly without authority to execute an order from a foreign jurisdiction on its own. DHS is not empowered to take custody of children except pursuant to the limited circumstances set out in the statutes, which requires immediate judicial review, or pursuant to an order of a court of this state.
Affirmed.
Glaze and Imber, JJ., dissent.