Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.

282 F.R.D. 259, 2012 WL 1144060, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48011
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedApril 4, 2012
DocketNo. C 11-cv-1846 LHK (PSG)
StatusPublished
Cited by75 cases

This text of 282 F.R.D. 259 (Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 282 F.R.D. 259, 2012 WL 1144060, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48011 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL DEPOSITIONS, AND GRANTING-IN-PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

PAUL S. GREWAL, United States Magistrate Judge.

In this patent infringement action, Plaintiff Apple Inc. (“Apple”) moves to compel Defendants and counter-claimants Samsung Electronics Co., LTD, Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (collectively “Samsung”) [262]*262to produce six witnesses for depositions.1 Samsung cross-moves for a protective order to prevent the depositions.2 On March 27, 2017, the parties appeared for hearing. Having considered the argument and evidence presented, the court hereby GRANTS Apple’s motion to compel, but only in PART. The court also GRANTS-IN-PART Samsung’s motion for a protective order.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Apple originally moved to compel depositions of fourteen Samsung employees.3 Subsequently, Samsung filed a protective order to prevent Apple from taking the deposition of ten of those employees, having dropped its apex objections to Dong Hoon Chang, Min-hyung Chung, Ken Korea, and Seung Gun Park.4 In its opposition to Apple’s motion to compel depositions, Samsung further narrowed its apex objections to nine Samsung employees.5 Apple thereafter withdrew deposition notices for three Samsung employees.6 The six remaining Samsung employees at issue are high-ranking employees of Samsung Electronics Co., LTD (“SEC”)7 or Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (“STA”):

1. Gee Sung Choi (“Choi”);

2. Jong Kyun Shin (“Shin”);

3. Won-Pyo Hong (“Hong”);

4. Seungwhan Cho (“Cho”);

5. Dale Sohn (“Sohn”);

6. Joseph Cheong (“Cheong”).

Apple argues that it is entitled to these depositions because each SEC witness has unique, firsthand, non-repetitive knowledge of facts and events central to this litigation. The SEC witnesses acted in their authoritative, decisionmaking capacities regarding certain Samsung policies that directed other employees to consider and compare Apple products when designing or re-designing the accused products or features. The STA witnesses are personally knowledgeable of or responsible for development, marketing, and finance decisions relating to the U.S. market for the accused products. Because Samsung has not produced any discovery from these witnesses, all of the evidence it relies upon has been pieced together from other witness sources. There are no extraordinary circumstances or burdens that should prevent Apple from taking the depositions.

Samsung responds that these six witnesses hold the title of Executive Vice President or higher, oversee at a minimum entire groups or divisions of employees, and have only high-level knowledge far removed from the facts at issue in the case. Apple has not demonstrated that the information it seeks is unique, first-hand, and non-repetitive, principally because Apple has failed to obtain this information through other less burdensome means.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,”8 including forbidding a deposition,9 or limiting its scope.10 The party seeking a protective order bears the burden of showing good cause for the order by “demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the [263]*263discovery.”11 When a party seeks the deposition of a high-level executive (a so-called “apex” deposition), courts have “observed that such discovery creates a tremendous potential for abuse or harassment.”12 The court therefore has discretion to limit discovery where the discovery sought “can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” 13

“In determining whether to allow an apex deposition, courts consider (1) whether the deponent has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of the facts at issue in the ease and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive discovery methods.”14 However, “a party seeking to prevent a deposition carries a heavy burden to show why discovery should be denied.”15 Thus, it is very unusual “for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether absent extraordinary circumstances.” 16 “When a witness has personal knowledge of facts relevant to the lawsuit, even a corporate president or CEO is subject to deposition.”17 “A claimed lack of knowledge, by itself it is insufficient to preclude a deposition.”18

III. DISCUSSION

The “apex” doctrine exists in tension with the otherwise broad allowance for discovery of party witnesses under the federal rules. This judicially-created vehicle appropriately seeks to limit the potential for the discovery rules to serve as a tool for harassment. Yet the court finds the doctrine’s common application to the classic paradigm of a single-hierarchy corporate structure to be ill-suited to determining apex status and the resulting bounds of appropriate discovery in the case of a large, multinational corporation. A company of global proportions, like Samsung, may in a single breath identify tens of high-level executives, each in charge of what amounts to its own, significant division or sub-organization within the company. In such a case, the two-prong test for unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge and for the party’s attention to other, less intrusive discovery methods must form only part of a more nuaneed equation. In order that the “apex” designation as applied to multiple executives does not itself become a tool for evading otherwise relevant and permissible discovery, the court must assess not only the materiality of the proposed deponent’s knowledge of pertinent facts and the availability of other means for the party to access that knowledge, but—with apologies—the person’s degree of “apex-ness” in relation to these factors. On the proverbial sliding scale, the closer that a proposed witness is to the apex of some particular peak in the corporate mountain range, and the less directly relevant that person is to the evidence proffered in support of his deposition, the more appropriate the protections of the apex doctrine become.

It is thus Samsung’s burden to demonstrate that each “apex” witness is so entitled to that designation, and where less entitled, is even further removed from having personal, non-repetitive knowledge of discoverable information. Although not expressly set forth in its papers, at oral argument Apple did not concede the apex status of the witnesses at issue, other than Samsung’s Chief [264]*264Executive Officer, Gee Sung Choi.19

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
282 F.R.D. 259, 2012 WL 1144060, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48011, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/apple-inc-v-samsung-electronics-co-cand-2012.