Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo

456 U.S. 305, 102 S. Ct. 1798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 91, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 34, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20538, 50 U.S.L.W. 4434, 17 ERC (BNA) 1217

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 27, 1982
• Docket: 80-1990
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA or Act), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), requires a district court to enjoin immediately all discharges of pollutants that do not comply with the Act’s permit requirements or whether the district court retains discretion to order other relief to achieve compliance. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the Act withdrew the courts’ equitable discretion. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 835 (1981). We reverse.

I

For many years, the Navy has used Vieques Island, a small island off the Puerto Rico coast, for weapons training. Currently all Atlantic Fleet vessels assigned to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean are required to complete their training at Vieques because it permits a full range of exercises under conditions similar to combat. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes miss land-based targets, and ordnance falls into the sea. That is, accidental bombings of the navigable waters and, occasionally, intentional bombings of water targets occur. The District Court found that these discharges have not harmed the quality of the water.

In 1978, respondents, who include the Governor of Puerto Rico and residents of the island, sued to enjoin the Navy’s operations on the island. Their complaint alleged violations of numerous federal environmental statutes and various other Acts.¹ After an extensive hearing, the District Court found that under the explicit terms of the Act, the Navy had violated the Act by discharging ordnance into the waters surrounding the island without first obtaining a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).² Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (PR 1979).

Under the FWPCA, the “discharge of any pollutant” requires a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 38 U. S. C. §§ 1311(a), 1323(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). The term “discharge of any pollutant” is defined as

“any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other floating craft.” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added).

Pollutant, in turn, means

“dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. . . 33 U. S. C. § 1362(6) (emphasis added).

And, under the Act, a “point source” is

“any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 1362(14) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added).

Under the FWPCA, the EPA may not issue an NPDES permit without state certification that the permit conforms to state water quality standards. A State has the authority to deny certification of the permit application or attach conditions to the final permit. 33 U. S. C. § 1341.

As the District Court construed the FWPCA, the release of ordnance from aircraft or from ships into navigable waters is a discharge of pollutants, even though the EPA, which administers the Act, had not promulgated any regulations setting effluent levels or providing for the issuance of an NPDES permit for this category of pollutants.³ Recognizing that violations of the Act “must be cured,” 478 F. Supp., at 707, the District Court ordered the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. It refused, however, to enjoin Navy operations pending consideration of the permit application. It explained that the Navy’s “technical violations” were not causing any “appreciable harm” to the environment.⁴ Id., at 706. Moreover, because of the importance of the island as a training center, “the granting of the injunctive relief sought would cause grievous, and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the general welfare of this Nation.”⁵ Id., at 707. The District Court concluded that an injunction was not necessary to ensure suitably prompt compliance by the Navy. To support this conclusion, it emphasized an equity court’s traditionally broad discretion in deciding appropriate relief and quoted from the classic description of injunc-tive relief in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944): “The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish.”

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions that the court order the Navy to cease the violation until it obtained a permit. 643 F. 2d 835 (1981). Relying on TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978), in which this Court held that an imminent violation of the Endangered Species Act required injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court erred in undertaking a traditional balancing of the parties’ competing interests. “Whether or not the Navy’s activities in fact harm the coastal waters, it has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until the permit procedure has been followed and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, upon review of the evidence, has granted a permit.” 643 F. 2d, at 861. The court suggested that if the order would interfere significantly with military preparedness, the Navy should request that the President grant it an exemption from the requirements in the interest of national security.”⁶

“In fact, if anything, these waters are as aesthetically acceptable as any to be found anywhere, and Plaintiff's witnesses unanimously testified as to their being the best fishing grounds in Vieques.” 478 F. Supp., at 667. “[I]f the truth be said, the control of large areas of Vieques [by the Navy] probably constitutes a positive factor in its over all ecology. The very fact that there are in the Navy zones modest numbers of various marine species which are practically non-existent in the civilian sector of Vieques or in the main island of Puerto Rico, is an eloquent example of res ipsa loquitur.” Id., at 682 (footnote omitted).

Because this case posed an important question regarding the power of the federal courts to grant or withhold equitable relief for violations of the FWPCA, we granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 813 (1981). We now reverse.

I-H I — I

It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy. It “is not a remedy which issues as of course,” Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U. S. 334, 337-338 (1933), or “to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling.” Consolidated Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 177 U. S. 296, 302 (1900). An injunction should issue only where the intervention of a court of equity “is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.” Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 456 (1919). The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 61 (1975); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 88 (1974); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U. S. 500, 506-507 (1959); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329.

Where plaintiff and defendant present competing claims of injury, the traditional function of equity has been to arrive at a “nice adjustment and reconciliation” between the competing claims, Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329. In such cases, the court “balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 440 (1944). “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329.

In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941). Thus, the Court has noted that “[t]he award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff,” and that “where an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest for whose impairment, even temporarily, an injunction bond cannot compensate, the court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff.” Yakus v. United States, supra, at 440 (footnote omitted). The grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 193; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S., at 329.

These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a “practice with a background of several hundred years of history,” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329, a practice of which Congress is assuredly well aware. Of course, Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra, at 329. As the Court said in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395, 398 (1946):

“Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied. ‘The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.’ Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503 . . . .”

In TVA v. Hill, we held that Congress had foreclosed the exercise of the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity. There, we thought that “[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer” than that before us. 437 U. S., at 173. The statute involved, the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., required the District Court to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam in order to preserve the snail darter, a species of perch. The purpose and language of the statute under consideration in Hill, not the bare fact of a statutory violation, compelled that conclusion. Section 7 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1536, requires federal agencies to “insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of [any] endangered species ... or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined ... to be critical.” The statute thus contains a flat ban on the destruction of critical habitats.

It was conceded in Hill that completion of the dam would eliminate an endangered species by destroying its critical habitat. Refusal to enjoin the action would have ignored the “explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act.” 437 U. S., at 173. Congress, it appeared to us, had chosen the snail darter over the dam. The purpose and language of the statute limited the remedies available to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the Act.

That is not the case here. An injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance. The FWPCA itself, for example, provides for fines and criminal penalties. 33 U. S. C. §§ 1319(c) and (d). Respondents suggest that failure to enjoin the Navy will undermine the integrity of the permit process by allowing the statutory violation to continue. The integrity of the Nation’s waters, however, not the permit process, is the purpose of the FWPCA.⁷ As Congress explained, the objective of the FWPCA is to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U. S. C. § 1251(a).

This purpose is to be achieved by compliance with the Act, including compliance with the permit requirements.⁸ Here, however, the discharge of ordnance had not polluted the waters, and, although the District Court declined to enjoin the discharges, it neither ignored the statutory violation nor undercut the purpose and function of the permit system. The court ordered the Navy to apply for a permit.⁹ It temporarily, not permanently, allowed the Navy to continue its activities without a permit.

In Hill, we also noted that none of the limited “hardship exemptions” of the Endangered Species Act would “even remotely apply to the Tellico Project.” 437 U. S., at 188. The prohibition of the FWPCA against discharge of pollutants, in contrast, can be overcome by the very permit the Navy was ordered to seek.¹⁰ The Senate Report to the 1972 Amendments explains that the permit program would be enacted because “the Committee recognizes the impracticality of any effort to halt all pollution immediately.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 43 (1971). That the scheme as a whole contemplates the exercise of discretion and balancing of equities militates against the conclusion that Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion in enforcing the statute.

Other aspects of the statutory scheme also suggest that Congress did not intend to deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory injunction. Although the ultimate objective of the FWPCA is to eliminate all discharges of pollutants into the navigable waters by 1985, the statute sets forth a scheme of phased compliance. As enacted, it called for the achievement of the “best practicable control technology currently available” by July 1, 1977, and the “best available technology economically achievable” by July 1, 1983. 33 U. S. C. § 1311(b). This scheme of phased compliance further suggests that this is a statute in which Congress envisioned, rather than curtailed, the exercise of discretion.¹¹

The FWPCA directs the Administrator of the EPA to seek an injunction to restrain immediately discharges of pollutants he finds to be presenting “an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the welfare of persons.” 33 U. S. C. § 1364(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This rule of immediate cessation, however, is limited to the indicated class of violations. For other kinds of violations, the FWPCA authorizes the Administrator of the EPA “to commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a compliance order . . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 1319(b).¹² The provision makes clear that Congress did not anticipate that all discharges would be immediately enjoined. Consistent with this view, the administrative practice has not been to request immediate cessation orders. “Rather, enforcement actions typically result, by consent or otherwise, in a remedial order setting out a detailed schedule of compliance designed to cure the identified violation of the Act.” Brief for Petitioners 17. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 320-322 (1981). Here, again, the statutory scheme contemplates equitable consideration.

Both the Court of Appeals and respondents attach particular weight to the provision of the FWPCA permitting the President to exempt federal facilities from compliance with the permit requirements. 33 U. S. C. § 1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).¹³ They suggest that this provision indicates congressional intent to limit the court’s discretion. According to respondents, the exemption provision evidences Congress’ determination that only paramount national interests justify failure to comply and that only the President should make this judgment.

We do not construe the provision so broadly. We read the FWPCA as permitting the exercise of a court’s equitable discretion, whether the source of pollution is a private party or a federal agency, to order relief that will achieve compliance with the Act. The exemption serves a different and complementary purpose, that of permitting noncompliance by federal agencies in extraordinary circumstances. Executive Order No. 12088, 3 CFR 243 (1979), which implements the exemption authority, requires the federal agency requesting such an exemption to certify that it cannot meet the applicable pollution standards. “Exemptions are granted by the President only if the conflict between pollution control standards and crucial federal activities cannot be resolved through the development of a practicable remedial program.” Brief for Petitioners 26, n. 30.

Should the Navy receive a permit here, there would be no need to invoke the machinery of the Presidential exemption. If not, this course remains open. The exemption provision would enable the President, believing paramount national interests so require, to authorize discharges which the District Court has enjoined. Reading the statute to permit the exercise of a court’s equitable discretion in no way eliminates the role of the exemption provision in the statutory scheme.

Like the language and structure of the Act, the legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended to deny courts their traditional equitable discretion. Congress passed the 1972 Amendments because it recognized that “the national effort to abate and control water pollution has been inadequate in every vital aspect.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 7 (1971). The past failings included enforcement efforts under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Refuse Act), 33 U. S. C. § 401 et seq. The “major purpose” of the 1972 Amendments was “to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 95. The permit system was the key to that policy. “The Amendments established a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s waters except pursuant to a permit.” Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 310-311; see generally EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 (1976). Nonetheless, “[i]n writing the enforcement procedures involving the Federal Government the Committee drew extensively . . . upon the existing enforcement provisions of the Refuse Act of 1899.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, supra, at 63. Violations of the Refuse Act have not automatically led courts to issue injunctions. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d 492, 535-538 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 500 F. 2d 167, 175 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 962 (1975); United States v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 491 F. 2d 562, 571 (CA1 1973), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 754, 759-760 (Me. 1975).

III

This Court explained in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), that a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied. As we did there, we construe the statute at issue “in favor of that interpretation which affords a full opportunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings ... in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to protect.” Id,., at 330. We do not read the FWPCA as foreclosing completely the exercise of the court’s discretion. Rather than requiring a district court to issue an injunction for any and all statutory violations, the FWPCA permits the district court to order that relief it considers necessary to secure prompt compliance with the Act. That relief can include, but is not limited to, an order of immediate cessation.

The exercise of equitable discretion, which must include the ability to deny as well as grant injunctive relief, can fully protect the range of public interests at issue at this stage in the proceedings. The District Court did not face a situation in which a permit would very likely not issue, and the requirements and objective of the statute could therefore not be vindicated if discharges were permitted to continue. Should it become clear that no permit will be issued and that compliance with the FWPCA will not be forthcoming, the statutory scheme and purpose would require the court to reconsider the balance it has struck.

Because Congress, in enacting the FWPCA, has not foreclosed the exercise of equitable discretion, the proper standard for appellate review is whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying an immediate cessation order while the Navy applied for a permit. We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1 The complaint charged the Navy with violations of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV); the Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U. S. C. § 4901 et seq.; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U. S. C. § 6901 et seq.; the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq.; the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U. S. C. § 470 et seq.; the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq.; the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U. S. C. § 1361 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV); the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U. S. C. § 401 et seq.; various Amendments to the United States Constitution, congressional and Presidential directives concerning cessation of Navy operations on the neighboring island of Culebra, and Puerto Rico law.

2 The District Court also found that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to file an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or a reviewable environmental record to support a decision not to file such a statement, Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 705 (PR 1979), and had failed to nominate historic sites to the National Register as required under the National Historic Preservation Act. Ibid. It ordered the Navy to nominate such sites and to file an EIS. Id., at 708. The Court of Appeals remanded issues under the Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act to the District Court for further consideration. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 835, 858, 860, 862 (1981). It vacated the order involving NEPA and remanded with orders to dismiss because the Navy had filed an EIS in the interim. Id., at 862. Only the issue involving the FWPCA is before this Court.

3 The EPA issues effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources. See generally E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112 (1977); 40 CFR part 400 et seq. (1981). In a situation somewhat similar to that before us, the Secretary of the Interior has, under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U. S. C. § 703 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), regulated deposit of shot into water by duck hunters who miss their targets. National Rifle Assn. v. Kleppe, 425 F. Supp. 1101 (DC 1976), affirmance order, 187 U. S. App. D. C. 240, 571 F. 2d 674 (1978).

4 The District Court wrote:

5 The District Court also took into consideration the delay by plaintiffs in asserting their claims. It concluded that although laches should not totally bar the claims, it did strongly militate against the granting of injunc-tive relief. Id., at 707.

6 Title 33 U. S. C. § 1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) provides, in relevant part:

“The President may exempt any effluent source of any department, agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with any such a requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to do so ... . No such exemptions shall be granted due to lack of appropriation unless the President shall have specifically requested such appropriation as part of the budgetary process and the Congress shall have failed to make available such requested appropriation. Any exemption shall be for a period not in excess of one year, but additional exemptions may be granted for periods of not to exceed one year upon the President’s making a new determination. The President shall report each January to the Congress all exemptions from the requirements of this section granted during the preceding calendar year, together with his reason for granting such exemption.”

7 The objective of this statute is in some respects similar to that sought in nuisance suits, where courts have fully exercised their equitable discretion and ingenuity in ordering remedies. E. g., Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P. 2d 700 (1972); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N. Y. 2d 219, 257 N. E. 2d 870 (1970).

8 Federal agencies must comply with the water pollution abatement requirements “in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity . . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 1323(a) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 80 (1971), pointed to “[f]ederal agencies such as the Department of Defense” for failing to abate pollution.

9 The Navy applied for an NPDES permit in December 1979. In May 1981, the EPA issued a draft NPDES permit and a notice of intent to issue that permit. The FWPCA requires a certification of compliance with state water quality standards before the EPA may issue an NPDES permit. 33 U. S. C. § 1341(a). The Environmental Quality Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico denied the Navy a water quality certificate in connection with this application for an NPDES in June 1981. In February 1982, the Environmental Quality Board denied the Navy’s reconsideration request and announced it was adhering to its original ruling. In a letter dated April 9, 1982, the Solicitor General informed the Clerk of the Court that the Navy has filed an action challenging the denial of the water quality certificate. United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Civ. Action No. 82-0726 (Dist. Ct. PR).

10 As we have explained, the 1972 Amendments to the FWPCA established the NPDES as

“a means of achieving and enforcing the effluent limitations. Under the NPDES, it is unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms. An NPDES permit serves to transform generally applicable effluent limitations and other standards — including those based on water quality — into the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual discharger, and the Amendments provide for direct administrative and judicial enforcement of permits. . . . With few exceptions, for enforcement purposes a discharger in compliance with the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit is deemed to be in compliance with those sections of the Amendments on which the permit conditions are based. ... In short, the permit defines, and facilitates compliance with, and enforcement of, a preponderance of a discharger’s obligations under the Amendments.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205 (1976) (footnote omitted).

11 We have, however, held some standards related to phased compliance to be absolute. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U. S. 64 (1980). In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1 (1981), we concluded that the federal common law of nuisance was pre-empted by the FWPCA and other similar Acts: “In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.” Id,., at 15; see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304 (1981). But, as we have also observed in construing this Act: “The question... is not what a court thinks is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress intended . . . .” E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S., at 138. Here we do not read the FWPCA as intending to abolish the courts’ equitable discretion in ordering remedies.

12 The statute at issue in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321 (1944), contained language very similar to that in § 1319(b). It directed the Price Administrator to seek “a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order” to halt violations. Id., at 322. The Court determined that such statutory language did not require the court to issue an injunction even when the Administrator had sued for injunctive relief. In Hecht Co., the court’s equitable discretion overrode that of the Administrator. If a court can properly refuse an injunction in the circumstances of Hecht Co., the exercise of its discretion seems clearly appropriate in a case such as this, where the EPA Administrator was not a party and had not yet expressed his judgment. The action of the District Court permitted it to obtain the benefit of the EPA’s recommendation before deciding to enjoin the discharge.

In Hecht Co., unlike here, the violations had ceased by the time the injunction was sought. The Court, however, explained that “the cessation of violations, whether before or after the institution of a suit by the Administrator, is no bar to the issuance of an injunction.” Id., at 327. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s characterization, post, at 327-328, the Court did not base its decision on the fact that violations had ceased.

13 See n. 6, supra.