§ 53a-19 — Use of physical force in defense of person.

Connecticut § 53a-19

• Jurisdiction: Connecticut
• Title 53a: Penal Code
• Ch. 951: Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability

Text

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a person is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force, and he may use such degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose; except that deadly physical force may not be used unless the actor reasonably believes that such other person is (1) using or about to use deadly physical force, or (2) inflicting or about to inflict great bodily harm. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating, except that the actor shall not be required to retreat if he or she is in his or her dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100 , or place of work and was not the initial aggressor, or if he or she is a peace officer or a private person assisting such peace officer at his or her direction, and acting pursuant to section 53a-22 , or (2) by surrendering possession of property to a person asserting a claim of right thereto, or (3) by complying with a demand that he or she abstain from performing an act which he or she is not obliged to perform. (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor, except that his use of physical force upon another person under such circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so, but such other person notwithstanding continues or threatens the use of physical force, or (3) the physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.

Legislative History

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 19; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 5; P.A. 92-260, S. 4; P.A. 05-180, S. 1; P.A. 06-196, S. 184; P.A. 08-150, S. 49; P.A. 10-36, S. 15; P.A. 19-108, S. 3; P.A. 22-117, S. 9.) History: 1971 act specified that “reasonable” physical force is justified in Subsec. (a); P.A. 92-260 made technical changes; P.A. 05-180 amended Subsec. (b) to include a special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b within the purview of Subdiv. (1) and make technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 06-196 made a technical change in Subsec. (b)(1), effective June 7, 2006; P.A. 08-150 amended Subsec. (b) to include Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed under Sec. 14-8 and certified pursuant to Sec. 7-294d within purview of Subdiv. (1); P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (b) to replace “Department of Motor Vehicles inspector appointed” with “motor vehicle inspector designated” and make technical changes, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 19-108 amended Subsec. (b) to delete references to motor vehicle inspectors, and make technical changes; P.A. 22-117 amended Subsec. (b) to delete references to special policeman appointed under Sec. 29-18b, effective May 27, 2022. Cited. 166 C. 226. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law where evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 182 C. 66. Duty of retreat where aggressor is co-occupant of dwelling discussed. 185 C. 372. Cited. 188 C. 237; Id., 653; 194 C. 376; 196 C. 519; 198 C. 454; 199 C. 383; 200 C. 743; 203 C. 466; 204 C. 240; 206 C. 621; 207 C. 191; 209 C. 34; Id., 75; Id., 322. Determined failure to instruct jury that defense of self-defense was applicable to lesser included offense was harmless error; judgment of Appellate Court in 17 CA 502 reversed. 213 C. 579. Cited. Id., 593; 219 C. 295; 220 C. 602; 226 C. 917; 227 C. 518; 228 C. 335; Id., 851; 231 C. 484; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; Id., 517; 234 C. 381; 235 C. 274; 242 C. 211. Subjective-objective test under section applies only to defendant; subjectively, defendant must believe that the use of deadly force is necessary, and objectively, that belief must be reasonable. 264 C. 723. Cited. 1 CA 609; 5 CA 590; 7 CA 223; Id., 457; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 643; 13 CA 139; 15 CA 34; 16 CA 264; 17 CA 200; Id., 326; Id., 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; 19 CA 576; Id., 609; 20 CA 430; 23 CA 28; Id., 615; 24 CA 195; Id., 541; Id., 586; Id., 624; 25 CA 456; 27 CA 49; 28 CA 469; Id., 833; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 518; 29 CA 262; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; 32 CA 687; 33 CA 616; Id., 782; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 36 CA 506; 39 CA 563; 40 CA 189; Id., 805; 41 CA 255; Id., 584; 42 CA 348; 43 CA 488; 44 CA 62; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 216. Sufficiency of jury instructions re duty to retreat discussed. 48 CA 755. Statute construed to apply to person who also is usually lodged in those premises at night. 54 CA 26. First person to use physical force is not necessarily the initial aggressor; initial aggressor is the person who acts first in a manner that creates reasonable belief in another person's mind that physical force is about to be used upon that other person. 99 CA 736. Defendant's testimony that he believed the victim was going after defendant's girlfriend after the victim threatened to kill her and the ample circumstantial evidence of a history of a violent and abusive relationship between the victim and defendant's girlfriend about which defendant was fully aware entitled him to a jury charge on the defense of others. 126 CA 597; judgment reversed, see 307 C. 823. Cited. 34 CS 612. Use of deadly force not justified when attack by assailants on third person had stopped and assailants were leaving. 35 CS 570. Cited. 38 CS 619; 43 CS 46. Subsec. (a): Cited. 186 C. 654; 187 C. 199; 225 C. 916. Not only must defendant's belief in the type of threat facing him have been reasonable, but the degree of force used in response must be evaluated for reasonableness as well. 256 C. 193. Under the subjective-objective test, state must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant subjectively held an objectively reasonable belief that use of deadly force was necessary to defend himself or others. 292 C. 656. Use of the terms “honest” and “sincere” in the jury instructions were an accurate statement of the law of self-defense regarding the subjective portion of the subjective-objective test and did not mislead the jury. 318 C. 621. Cited. 3 CA 289; 5 CA 338; 22 CA 521; 25 CA 456; 29 CA 754; 31 CA 385. The subjective-objective inquiry into defendant's belief regarding the necessary degree of force requires jury to make two separate affirmative determinations in order for defendant's claim of self-defense to succeed. 68 CA 19. In the case of self-defense, eyewitness testimony of prior specific acts of violence perpetrated on defendant by his or her victim are admissible to show defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing. Id., 828. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not justified in using deadly physical force. 75 CA 80. Where a particular jury instruction, when viewed in isolation, could have been construed as dictating a purely objective standard, it was held that the charge as a whole, adequately instructed jury as to both the subjective and objective aspects of the test involved in a self-defense analysis. Id., 500. Trial court improperly instructed jury on defendant's claim of self-defense by removing from its consideration the disputed factual issue of whether defendant used nondeadly force in self-defense; new trial ordered. 97 CA 679. Subsec. (b): Cited. 186 C. 654; 229 C. 916, see also 35 CA 520. Defendant's knowledge of ability to retreat is measured according to the subjective standard of defendant's actual knowledge; defendant accused of felony murder may not rely on a claim of self-defense. 254 C. 184. Subdiv. (1) allows state to rebut self-defense claim by showing that defendant could have retreated safely before using deadly force; it does not follow that defendant is statutorily or constitutionally entitled to use evidence of retreat after using deadly force to bolster self-defense claim without permitting jury to consider other possible reasons for the flight. 279 C. 414. Unlike the subjective-objective test in Subsec. (a), the duty to retreat under 2003 revision imposes only a subjective requirement that retreat in complete safety be available and that defendant know of it. 292 C. 656. Cited. 31 CA 385; 34 CA 610; 40 CA 624; 43 CA 488; 44 CA 62. Retreat exception applies to a dwelling, not to a superior right to being outside the dwelling. 47 CA 91. Jury instruction that included an objective standard regarding the statutory duty to retreat was improper. 187 CA 661. Subsec. (c): Cited. 221 C. 58. Subdiv. (2): Person who first uses physical force is not necessarily the initial aggressor under section; judgment of Appellate Court in 30 CA 406 reversed. 228 C. 335. There was no occasion for trial court to instruct the jury on initial aggressor doctrine under Subdiv. (2) when the state did not claim that defendant was the initial aggressor. 246 C. 268. Subdiv. (2): Language of Subdiv. is plain and unambiguous and provides that initial aggressor is justified in using physical force only if he withdraws and certain other conditions are satisfied, and Subdiv. does not provide, or suggest, that initial aggressor who uses nondeadly force is justified in using deadly force to repel victim's unlawful escalation of force to the deadly level. 292 C. 734. Subdiv. (2): Although court used the word retreat in its jury instructions on the law of initial aggressor, rather than the word withdraw set forth in statute, such usage was not confusing or misleading. 299 C. 1. Subdiv. (3): Defendant is not disqualified as a matter of law under Subdiv. from asserting a claim of self-defense during a combat by agreement when one party unilaterally and dangerously escalates the equal and previously agreed upon terms of a fight; instruction charging the jury on combat by agreement did not misstate the law when such jury instruction required defendant to “actually know” rather than “actually and reasonably believe” that the victim had escalated the fight from the mere use of physical force to actual use or imminent use of deadly force. 318 C. 621. Subdiv. (1): Provocation element carries with it requirement that actor act with specific intent to elicit use of physical force by another. 19 CA 609. Cited. 22 CA 521; 35 CA 699. Jury could have reasonably concluded from evidence presented that defendant was not justified in using deadly force against the victim because he was the initial aggressor. 75 CA 80. Cited. 41 CS 525.