Connecticut § 53a-101 Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony.

Connecticut Statutes

§ 53a-101 — Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony.

Connecticut § 53a-101

Title 53aPenal Code

Ch. 952Penal Code: Offenses

This text of Connecticut § 53a-101 (Burglary in the first degree: Class B felony.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-101 (2026).

Text

(a)A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and, in the course of committing the offense, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone, or (3) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein.

(b)An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission.

(c)Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony prov

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(a) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when (1) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, or (2) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and, in the course of committing the offense, intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury on anyone, or (3) such person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein. (b) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing” the offense if it occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or flight after the attempt or commission. (c) Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony provided any person found guilty under subdivision (1) of subsection (a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which five years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.

Legislative History

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 103; P.A. 80-442, S. 21, 28; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 2.) History: P.A. 80-442 specified in Subsec. (c) that five years of imposed sentence may not be suspended or reduced when person is guilty under Subsec. (a)(1), effective July 1, 1981; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (a) to restructure provisions, add Subdiv. (3) re entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein, which conduct was formerly classified as burglary in the second degree under Sec. 53a-102 but was deleted from said section by same act, and make technical changes, effective March 1, 2008. Cited. 161 C. 283; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 500; 190 C. 496; 205 C. 456; 207 C. 412; 210 C. 199; 216 C. 563; 220 C. 112; 222 C. 331; 227 C. 32; 229 C. 691. Cited. 1 CA 724; 6 CA 24; 8 CA 491; 13 CA 133; 19 CA 245; 24 CA 563; 29 CA 704; 30 CA 416; 35 CA 107; Id., 714; 46 CA 118. There was sufficient evidence for jury to conclude that defendants took steak knives to arm themselves during the burglary and thus committed burglary in the first degree. 52 CA 149. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251. Subsec. (a): Cited. 170 C. 162; 175 C. 398. Subdiv. (1): Presence of a tire iron used to break into an apartment is insufficient by itself to satisfy statutory definition in Sec. 53a-3(7) to support finding of attempted burglary in first degree; potential for injury considered only in conjunction with circumstances of actual or threatened use. 177 C. 140. Cited. 178 C. 564; 180 C. 481, 482; Id., 557. Subdiv. (2): A lesser included offense of felony murder. Id., 599. Cited. 182 C. 366; 185 C. 211; 186 C. 599; 188 C. 372; Id., 574; 189 C. 383; Id., 611; 190 C. 104; 194 C. 241; 196 C. 157; Id., 225; 197 C. 413; 199 C. 62; 200 C. 9; Id., 586; 203 C. 159; 204 C. 714; 205 C. 61; Id., 485; 209 C. 416; 214 C. 132; 216 C. 282; Id., 367; 217 C. 419; 219 C. 269; 221 C. 430; Id., 447; Id., 685; 223 C. 41; Id., 243; Id., 299; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 32, 48; Id., 616, 622; 228 C. 234; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 802; 241 C. 702; Id., 784; 242 C. 445; Id., 523. Utility room in rear of gas station convenience store in which defendant sexually assaulted and murdered victim, being a separate room and structurally distinct from the convenience store that could be reached only through gas station's garage bay area and not open to the public, reasonably could have been found to be a separate “building” under statute. 252 C. 274. Trial court correctly permitted jury to consider charge of burglary in the third degree as lesser included offense of burglary in the first degree; state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for burglary in the first degree. 275 C. 192. Subdiv. (2): Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1. Cited. 6 CA 667; Id., 697; Id., 701; 8 CA 631; 9 CA 79; Id., 208; 10 CA 176; 12 CA 662; 13 CA 554; 14 CA 67; Id., 657; 15 CA 342; 16 CA 184; Id., 318; Id., 455; 17 CA 391; 19 CA 179; Id., 618; 21 CA 244; 23 CA 692; 24 CA 556; 25 CA 428; Id., 565; 26 CA 641; 27 CA 73; Id., 786; Id., 794; 30 CA 68; 31 CA 312; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 279; 36 CA 774; 38 CA 481; Id., 531; 39 CA 45; 40 CA 60; 41 CA 255; Id., 317; Id., 817; 42 CA 78; 44 CA 307; 45 CA 187; Id., 261. Direct evidence of an entry is not required when evidence is such that the trier of fact reasonably could infer that something defendant did inside the building could not have been done without first entering the building. 78 CA 646. Crimes of burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (1) and burglary in the first degree in violation of Subdiv. (2) each contain an element the other does not; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (1), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein and that he was armed with a dangerous instrument; to convict defendant under Subdiv. (2), state had to prove that defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein and that in the course of committing the crime, he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly inflicted bodily injury on another person; Subsec. does not require state to prove that defendant forcibly entered the building or that defendant was in possession of stolen property. 96 CA 421. Trial court reasonably concluded that defendant injured the victim while in immediate flight from the commission of a burglary even though evidence demonstrated that defendant struck the victim beyond the property line of the residence where the burglary occurred. 132 CA 718. Subdiv. (3): Charges for burglary in the first degree, arising under Subdiv., and home invasion, under Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(1), are susceptible to separation into parts, thus defendant's conviction of both offenses did not violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 187 CA 847.