Connecticut Statutes
§ 52-572h — Negligence actions. Doctrines applicable. Liability of multiple tortfeasors for damages.
Connecticut § 52-572h
This text of Connecticut § 52-572h (Negligence actions. Doctrines applicable. Liability of multiple tortfeasors for damages.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572h (2026).
Text
(a)For the purposes of this section:
(1)“Economic damages” means compensation determined by the trier of fact for pecuniary losses including, but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care and loss of earnings or earning capacity excluding any noneconomic damages;
(2)“noneconomic damages” means compensation determined by the trier of fact for all nonpecuniary losses including, but not limited to, physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional suffering;
(3)“recoverable economic damages” means the economic damages reduced by any applicable findings including but not limited to set-offs, credits, comparative negligence, additur and remittitur, and any reduction provided by section 52-225a;
(4)“recoverable noneconomic
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Related
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2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 4282 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
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Watts v. Connecticut National Bank, No. Cv92 0327923s (Aug. 25, 1995)
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Urda v. Glynos, No. Cv95 0067734 (May 23, 1996)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4010-V (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)
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Berlepsch v. Peck, No. 423137 (Jan. 25, 2000)
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Spruill v. Downing, No. Cv 93 0068193 S (Sep. 6, 1995)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 10395 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1995)
Harnicar v. Emirzian, No. Cv 93 0063335 (Mar. 22, 1995)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 2621 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1995)
Rosato v. Appel, No. 30 45 83 (Jun. 7, 1996)
1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4566 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1996)
Breeden v. Town of Wallingford, No. Cv 93-0342206 (Jul. 15, 1994)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7420 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1994)
Leonidas v. Greco, No. Cv 92 0506260 (Aug. 25, 1994)
1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 8610 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1994)
Santiago v. Hartzhein, No. Cv 94-0355457 S (Dec. 1, 1995)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 13398 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1995)
Johnson v. Przondo, No. Cv 950465565s (Oct. 21, 1996)
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Legislative History
(P.A. 73-622, S. 1; P.A. 82-160, S. 241; P.A. 86-338, S. 3; P.A. 87-227, S. 3; P.A. 88-364, S. 69, 123; P.A. 99-69, S. 1, 2.) History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and added Subsec. (d) re family car doctrine, formerly Sec. 52-572i; P.A. 86-338 added provisions re the definition of economic and noneconomic damages, the limitation of a person's liability to his proportionate share of recoverable damages, the calculation of each person's proportionate share of damages, the reallocation of an uncollectible amount of damages among other liable parties, the establishment and exercise of a right of contribution, the effect of the provisions of the section on any right of subrogation or indemnity and the applicability of the provisions of the section to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation; P.A. 87-227 substantially revised and rewrote section including, inter alia, revising the definitions, replacing “person” with “party” throughout section, making section applicable to actions for damage to property occurring on or after October 1, 1987, including settled or released persons in the attribution of percentages of negligence, requiring the jury or court to specify any findings of fact necessary for the court to specify recoverable economic damages and recoverable noneconomic damages, revising the method of reallocating an uncollectible amount of damages so that all recoverable economic damages are reallocated among the other defendants and the claimant is fully compensated for such recoverable economic damages, providing the total recovery by a party seeking contribution shall be limited to the amount paid by such party in excess of such party's proportionate share of the judgment, replacing provisions re when an action for contribution must be brought depending upon if a judgment has or has not been rendered with requirement that an action for contribution be brought within two years after the party seeking contribution has made the final payment in excess of his proportionate share of the claim and adding Subsec. (n) re the effect of a release, settlement or similar agreement on liability and the total award of damages; P.A. 88-364 made a technical change in Subsec. (g); P.A. 99-69 added Subsec. (o) prohibiting apportionment of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties liable on any basis other than negligence and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective May 27, 1999, and applicable to any civil action pending on or filed on or after August 11, 1998. Cited. 175 C. 112; Id., 477. Section did not abrogate common law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors, related only to modification of contributory negligence doctrine and of the doctrines of abolition, last clear chance and assumption of risk. 176 C. 523. Cited. 179 C. 372; Id., 425; 181 C. 515; Id., 650; 182 C. 236; Id., 125; 183 C. 473; 184 C. 205; Id., 594; 186 C. 370; 187 C. 339; 188 C. 607; 189 C. 601; 190 C. 285; 193 C. 15; 194 C. 645; 196 C. 341; 203 C. 607; 208 C. 82; 212 C. 509; 214 C. 1; 216 C. 200; 222 C. 775; 225 C. 566; 228 C. 441; 231 C. 77; 232 C. 559; 234 C. 660; 235 C. 107; 236 C. 625; Id., 670; Id., 820; 239 C. 798; 240 C. 694; 241 C. 399; 242 C. 169. Plain language of section provides that only negligent persons may be cited in by defendant for apportionment for liability purposes and, therefore, a person whose conduct was reckless, willful and wanton is not liable pursuant to section and cannot be added for purposes of apportionment; Supreme Court extended section as matter of common law to permit apportionment between a negligent and an intentional tortfeasor. 246 C. 223. Apportionment principles of section do not apply where apportionment complaint rests on any basis other than negligence, including strict liability, of which product liability is simply a form. 253 C. 787. By enacting P.A. 99-69, Sec. 1(o), legislature merely clarified section to preclude a common law right to apportionment between a negligent and intentional tortfeasor. 263 C. 358. Because statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, as indicated by Sec. 52-572o, the simpler and less confusing approach to cases where jury must determine which, among many, causes contributed to plaintiff's injury, is to couch the analysis in proximate cause rather than allowing defendants to raise a defense of superseding cause. Id., 424. Defendant may assert under a general denial that the negligence of an employer who is not a party to the action is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 287 C. 20. Cited. 6 CA 383; 11 CA 1; 14 CA 561; 15 CA 371; Id., 392; 24 CA 446; 26 CA 220; Id., 509; 27 CA 471; 30 CA 327; 31 CA 584; 35 CA 301; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 107; 37 CA 453; Id., 515; 38 CA 685; 41 CA 61; Id., 373; Id., 856; 43 CA 453; 46 CA 18; Id., 377; Id., 391. Enactment of statute did not render general verdict rule inapplicable. 53 CA 399. Trial court should instruct jury that if it is unable to determine how much of plaintiff's damages is attributable to each of the three tortfeasors from separate motor vehicle accidents, jury may make a rough apportionment and if unable to do so, jury must apportion the damages equally among each party whose negligent actions caused injury to the plaintiff. 57 CA 134. Statute applies only to negligence actions and not to claims based on recklessness. 86 CA 728. Purpose of apportionment statute is to prevent any defendant from paying more than his or her share of award and permits inclusion on verdict form of defendant who has received a directed verdict in his favor, allowing jury to apportion liability to him even though he is relieved of obligation to pay. 90 CA 766. Comparative negligence statute does not alter Connecticut doctrine as to proximate cause and thus does not affect the rule that failure to use a seat belt is not contributory negligence. 32 CS 89. Cited. 33 CS 187. No contribution among joint tortfeasors where both parties are negligent. 35 CS 268. Cited. 37 CS 574; 38 CS 597; 39 CS 20. Public policy concerning comparative negligence applied to Sec. 31-293 discussed. Id., 222. Cited. 40 CS 214; 43 CS 168; 44 CS 510. “Damage to property” does not include purely commercial losses. 47 CS 166. Subsec. (b): When plaintiff's conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, the assumption of risk doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence embodied in statute should apply. 190 C. 791. The mere availability of comparative negligence under section does not negate application of the wrongful conduct rule which precludes a plaintiff from recovering for injuries sustained as a direct result of his or her own illegal conduct of a serious nature. 311 C. 370. Defense of contributory negligence applies to claims of negligent service of alcohol to minor. 312 C. 184. Subsec. (c): Discussed re applicability of Subsec. (g) to actions against the state under Sec. 52-556. 247 C. 256. P.A. 86-338 replaced common-law rule of joint and several liability and provisions dealing with apportionment of liability were not repealed by P.A. 87-227. Id., 638. Provides for apportionment of liability only among those parties from whom plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. 249 C. 634. Adoption of alternative liability rule. 333 C. 206. Subsec. (f): Subdiv. (4): Jury entitled to attribute and divide percentage of negligence only among parties to the action. 33 CA 714. Subsec. (g): State, when sued pursuant to a waiver of sovereign immunity under Sec. 52-556, is not immune from reallocation of damages pursuant to Subsec. 247 C. 256. Whether defendant made “good faith efforts” is a subjective, factual determination, and the phrase “good faith” is clear and unambiguous. 132 CA 146. Subsec. (k): Provision of Subsec. re impairment of right to indemnity applies to section, but not to suits under product liability act, Sec. 52-572m et seq. 205 C. 694. Subsec. (n): Trial court required to instruct jury to apportion liability where plaintiff had settled with named uninsured motorist carrier and defendant who had been found liable for damages. 257 C. 718. Trial court properly determined that withdrawal of the action against one of defendants did not constitute a “release, settlement or similar agreement” within meaning of statute, so as to permit an apportionment complaint by remaining defendant; a release and settlement represents a surrender of a cause of action pursuant to an agreement; a withdrawal shares few of the essential characteristics of a settlement and release and may be accomplished unilaterally and unconditionally; court construed “similar agreement” to mean an agreement having the same essential characteristics of a release or settlement, and presumed that had legislature intended for apportionment to apply to withdrawn parties, it would have used term “withdrawal” in addition to, or in lieu of “similar agreement”. 283 C. 412. Subsec. (o): Contributory negligence is not defense to recklessness; even if jury reasonably could have found that plaintiff's conduct was a contributory cause of accident, once jury determines that defendant's conduct was reckless, there is no apportionment of liability and damages between the parties. 266 C. 822. Apportionment under Subsec. is allowed for cause of action sounding in negligence against municipal defendant for failure to inspect pool after notice fell under negligence exception of Sec. 52-557n(b)(8). 344 C. 86.
Nearby Sections
15
§ 52-109
Substituted plaintiff.Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bluebook (online)
Connecticut § 52-572h, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/statute/ct/52-572h.