Connecticut Statutes
§ 46a-60 — (Formerly Sec. 31-126). Discriminatory employment practices prohibited.
Connecticut § 46a-60
This text of Connecticut § 46a-60 ((Formerly Sec. 31-126). Discriminatory employment practices prohibited.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 (2026).
Text
(a)As used in this section:
(1)“Pregnancy” means pregnancy, childbirth or a related condition, including, but not limited to, lactation;
(2)“Reasonable accommodation” means, but is not limited to, being permitted to sit while working, more frequent or longer breaks, periodic rest, assistance with manual labor, job restructuring, light duty assignments, modified work schedules, temporary transfers to less strenuous or hazardous work, time off to recover from childbirth or break time and appropriate facilities for expressing breast milk; and (3) “Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when considered in light of factors such as (A) the nature and cost of the accommodation;
(B)the overall financial resources of the employer;
(C)the overall size of the
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Related
Zawacki v. Realogy Corp.
628 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. Connecticut, 2009)
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495 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D. Connecticut, 2007)
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356 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D. Connecticut, 2005)
Lorenzi v. Connecticut Judicial Branch
620 F. Supp. 2d 348 (D. Connecticut, 2009)
Cross v. Larosa, No. Cv 96-0477442s (Jan. 13, 1998)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 18 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1998)
Hubert v. Corrections
(D. Connecticut, 2022)
Connecticut Dep. of Transportation v. Chro, No. Cv98-0492664s (Mar. 4, 1999)
1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2818 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1999)
Kavy v. New Britain Board of Education, No. Cv99-0492921s (May 21, 2001)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 7329 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
Smith v. State Department of Social Services, No. 439313 (Oct. 2, 2001)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 13469 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
Hargrove v. State, No. Cv99-0497428s (Jul. 22, 2002)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 9810-ah (Connecticut Superior Court, 2002)
Downing v. Yale Univ. Health Services, No. Cv 94-0364862-S (Dec. 26, 1995)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 14381 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1995)
Feathers v. Vivisection Investigation, No. Cv 99 0080107 S (Aug. 31, 2000)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 10627 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2000)
Edwards v. Johnson's Hardware Supply Co., No. 562836 (Feb. 3, 2003)
2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 1998 (Connecticut Superior Court, 2003)
Norton v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. Cv 98-0578441-S (Oct. 6, 1998)
1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 11300 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1998)
Cotter v. State Department of Revenue, No. Cv 92-0452415s (Feb. 10, 1993)
1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 1510 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1993)
Dufraine v. Commission on Human Rt./opp., No. Cv93-0528541-S (Feb. 8, 1995)
1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 1237 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1995)
Hernandez v. Standard Mattress Co., No. Cv91 039 74 08 S (Aug. 12, 1992)
1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7566 (Connecticut Superior Court, 1992)
Washington v. Girard Mitsubishi, No. Cv-02-0125810 S (Feb. 21, 2003)
2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2578-di (Connecticut Superior Court, 2003)
Brightly v. Abbott Terrace Health Center, No. Cv 98 0148584 (Nov. 15, 2001)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 15941-mc (Connecticut Superior Court, 2001)
Legislative History
(1949 Rev., S. 7405; 1955, S. 3035d; 1959, P.A. 145, S. 3; 1963, P.A. 261; 1967, P.A. 426, S. 2; P.A. 73-279, S. 14; 73-647; P.A. 75-350, S. 2; 75-446, S. 2; P.A. 78-148, S. 10; 78-350, S. 1, 6; P.A. 79-152; 79-303; 79-304, S. 1; 79-480, S. 1; P.A. 80-285; 80-422, S. 9; P.A. 81-382, S. 2; P.A. 82-196, S. 1; P.A. 86-381; P.A. 88-303, S. 3, 6; P.A. 89-147, S. 1, 3; P.A. 90-88, S. 3; 90-330, S. 3, 11; P.A. 98-180; P.A. 01-28, S. 8; P.A. 11-55, S. 24; 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 17-118, S. 1; 17-127, S. 4; P.A. 19-16, S. 4; 19-93, S. 8; P.A. 21-69, S. 1; P.A. 22-78, S. 7, 8; 22-82, S. 10.) History: 1959 act specified that discrimination based on age is unfair employment practice in Subdivs. (a), (b), (c) and (f), added exception re bona fide occupational qualification or need in Subdiv. (f) and added provision specifying when provisions of section are not applicable; 1963 act limited provision specifying when section does not apply to provisions “as to age”; 1967 act specified that discrimination based on sex is unfair employment practice in Subdivs. (a), (b), (c) and (f); P.A. 73-279 made discrimination based on physical disability including blindness an unfair employment practice in Subdivs. (a), (b), (c) and (f); P.A. 73-647 added Subdiv. (g) re termination of employment because of pregnancy as unfair employment practice; P.A. 75-350 added proviso in Subdiv. (1) of provision specifying when section does not apply re new employees' inclusion in existing retirement or pension plans and collective bargaining agreements; P.A. 75-446 made discrimination because of marital status an unfair employment practice in Subdivs. (a), (b), (c) and (f); P.A. 78-148 made discrimination because of mental retardation an unfair employment practice in Subdivs. (a), (b), (c) and (f); P.A. 78-350 revised previous provision specifying inapplicability of section to delete inapplicability re termination of employment where employee is entitled to benefits under retirement or pension plan or collective bargaining agreement and re operation of terms of retirement or pension plan or group or employee insurance plan, inserting new provisions as Subdivs. (1) to (3); P.A. 79-152 divided section into Subsecs., replacing alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators accordingly and adding provision in Subsec. (a)(7), formerly Subdiv. (g), re transfer of pregnant employee to temporary position; P.A. 79-303 revised Subsec. (b)(1) to include retirement or pension plans for employees of higher education institution, and, in conjunction with P.A. 79-304, expanded Subsec. (b)(2) re age and level of position and added Subdiv. (b)(5); P.A. 79-480 specified discrimination based on present or past history of mental disorder as unfair employment practice in Subsec. (a); P.A. 80-285 added Subsec. (a)(8) re sexual harassment; P.A. 80-422 rephrased provisions, substituted “discriminatory” for “unfair” employment practices and added Subdivs. (2) to (4) in Subsec. (b); Sec. 31-126 transferred to Sec. 46a-60 in 1981; P.A. 81-382 added Subdivs. (9) and (10) as discriminatory practices; P.A. 82-196 amended Subsec. (b) to limit the allowable reduction in employee benefit plan insurance coverage provided to any employee who has reached the age of 65 to the amount of such coverage available under Medicare; P.A. 86-381 amended Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (b)(1) to increase from $27,000 to $44,000 the threshold amount of annual retirement benefits receivable by certain employees which permit the termination of their employment; P.A. 88-303 amended Subsec. (b)(1) by deleting provisions re inapplicability of section to a person who has reached the age of 70 and is entitled to benefits under a pension or retirement plan for state or municipal employees or for certain teachers; inserting a provision specifying that the section is applicable to certain teachers at independent institutions of higher education who are mandatorily retired on or before December 31, 1993, after reaching age 70, removing the provision to limit the allowable reduction in employee benefit plan insurance coverage provided to any employee who has reached the age of 65 to the amount of such coverage available under Medicare; providing that the terms of health insurance plans must entitle all employees to coverage under the same conditions regardless of age; rewriting Subdiv. (2) to prohibit age-based pension plan provisions and substituting “normal retirement age in the applicable retirement or pension plan” for “date on which he becomes eligible for the maximum possible retirement benefit available to him” in Subdiv. (4); P.A. 89-147 substituted July 1, 1993, for December 1, 1993, in Subpara. (A) of Subdiv. (1) of Subsec. (b) as the date before which certain persons may be mandatorily retired after reaching age 70 and to which the section does not apply; P.A. 90-88 amended Subsec. (b)(1) to allow for the provision of reduced coverage for Medicare eligible employees of employers with less than 20 employees; P.A. 90-330 amended Subsec. (a) to include persons with learning disabilities; (Revisor's note: In 1995 the indicators (1), (2) and (3) in Subsec. (a)(8) were changed editorially by the Revisors to (A), (B) and (C) respectively for consistency with statutory usage); P.A. 98-180 added Subsec. (a)(11) making discrimination based on genetic information a discriminatory practice; P.A. 01-28 made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (a) by changing “mental disorder” to “mental disability”; P.A. 11-55 amended Subsec. (a) to prohibit in Subdivs. (1), (2), (3) and (6) discrimination because of an individual's gender identity or expression and prohibit in Subdiv. (8) harassment on the basis of an individual's gender identity or expression; pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability” in Subsec. (a); P.A. 17-118 added new Subsec. (a) re definitions, redesignated existing Subsecs. (a) and (b) as Subsecs. (b) and (c), amended redesignated Subsec. (b) to delete former Subpara. (E) re transfer of pregnant employee to suitable temporary position, delete former Subpara. (F) re informing pregnant employee re appeal of transfer, delete former Subpara. (G) re informing employees re giving notice of pregnancy, add new Subpara. (E) re limiting, segregating or classifying employee due to pregnancy, add new Subpara. (F) re discriminating against employee on basis of pregnancy, add new Subpara. (G) re reasonable accommodation due to pregnancy, and add Subparas. (H) to (K) re reasonable accommodation in Subdiv. (7), replace “section” with “subdivision” re definition of “sexual harassment” in Subdiv. (8), and added Subsec. (d) re employer to provide written notice to employees re discrimination related to pregnancy and childbirth and commission to develop courses of instruction and conduct public education; P.A. 17-127 amended Subsec. (a) to add “status as a veteran”, and make technical changes; P.A. 19-16 amended Subsec. (b)(8) by adding provisions re employer's corrective action, defining “corrective action”, deleting reference to this subdivision in definition of sexual harassment, and making technical changes; P.A. 19-93 amended Subsec. (b)(8) to add provision allowing commission to find that corrective action taken by employer was reasonable based on evidence presented despite employer's failure to obtain a written agreement from employee concerning modifications in the conditions of employment; P.A. 21-69 amended Subsecs. (a)(2) and (b)(1) to make technical changes and added Subsec. (b)(12) re prohibition on requesting prospective employee's age, date of birth, dates of attendance or graduation from educational institution on initial application; P.A. 22-78 made technical changes in Subsecs. (b)(10) and (d)(1), effective May 24, 2022; P.A. 22-82 amended Subsec. (b) by prohibiting in Subdivs. (1), (2), (3) and (6) discrimination based on status as a victim of domestic violence, by adding Subdiv. (13) re prohibition on employer from denying an employee a reasonable leave of absence in order to seek treatment for injuries and services resulting from domestic violence and by making technical changes. Annotations to former section 31-126: Cited. 140 C. 537; 153 C. 173; Id., 652. Final judgment by arbitrators as to employment discrimination bears action. 163 C. 309. Cited. Id., 327; 165 C. 318. Sex classification in help wanted advertising constitutes a per se violation; sex discrimination is an unfair employment practice which newspapers are not allowed to promote; a newspaper aids and abets sex discrimination by offering sex classifications in help wanted advertisements and commits an unfair employment practice; bona fide occupational qualification exceptions are rare; a corporation is a “person” and a newspaper corporation publishing an advertising section in sex-segregated columns is guilty of promoting the unfair employment practice of sex discrimination in hiring. 168 C. 26. Cited. Id., 504; 170 C. 327; 172 C. 485. Failure to define specifications for position or to test capabilities of applicant resulting in blanket exclusion from position is unfair employment practice. 176 C. 88. Cited. Id., 291; Id., 533; 177 C. 75; 179 C. 471; 198 C. 479; 211 C. 464. Purpose of statute is to eliminate discrimination in employment for specified reasons, and it is only within these prescribed reasons that statute operates. 17 CS 93. Not unfair employment practice for corporation employer to require complainant to work regular factory shifts although this would require work on a religious sabbath. 28 CS 341. Annotations to present section: Cited. 193 C. 558; 195 C. 226; 196 C. 208; 202 C. 601; Id., 609; 211 C. 129; 226 C. 670; 232 C. 91; 236 C. 96; Id., 681; 238 C. 337. Sec. 46a-100 represents an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity, authorizing actions against the state for alleged discriminatory employment practices in violation of section; claims properly brought before the commission are outside the cognizance of Claims Commissioner. 291 C. 384. Cited. 16 CA 379; 40 CA 577. Plaintiff provided no authority or per se rule equating violation of section with intentional infliction of emotional distress and court was not inclined to create such a rule. 61 CA 108. To ensure compliance with the purpose of the Fair Employment Practices Act, a teacher who is discharged for any of the reasons enumerated in Sec. 10-151(d) must be afforded the protections of this section. 142 CA 248. Legislature intended to make state discrimination laws coextensive with the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964; If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee, and if a defendant effectively rebuts the presumption of intentional discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's justification for the plaintiff's dismissal was merely pretextual. 211 CA 676. Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gross and the Second Circuit's decision in Natofsky , the motivating factor test remains the applicable causation standard under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. 213 CA 605. Subsec. (b)(1) by its plain and unambiguous terms does not prohibit disability discrimination by association. 226 CA 335. Cited. 39 CS 528. Actions brought under section may include actions brought against police departments. 50 CS 420. Former Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (1): Good faith not exculpatory under statute; target of fair employment legislation is the effect, not the purpose, of discrimination. 188 C. 44. Cited. 198 C. 479; 202 C. 150; 211 C. 464; 220 C. 307; 228 C. 545; 231 C. 328. Subdiv. (1): Sec. 46a-86 does not authorize award of damages for emotional distress and attorneys' fees for violation of this section. 232 C. 91. Cited. Id., 117; 236 C. 250; 237 C. 209. Section does not expressly obligate employer to accommodate employee's work-at-home requests, or to refrain from taking adverse action against employee who persists in efforts to secure such arrangement. 249 C. 766. Subdiv. (1) does not impose liability on individual employees. 259 C. 729. Because Fair Employment Practices Act clearly expresses a public policy determination by legislature that employers with fewer than 3 employees shall be exempt from liability for discrimination on the basis of sex, including pregnancy-related discrimination, a common-law claim for wrongful discharge on the basis of pregnancy will not lie against such employers. 260 C. 691. Trial court should not have remanded case to referee because employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff was denied promotion because of failure to obtain same license as required for prior job occupants and where license requirement was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and not pretextual. 272 C. 457. Subdiv. (1) imposes a duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation to their disabled employees. 286 C. 390. Plaintiff had no standing under statute because as a recipient of surviving spouse pension allowance, plaintiff was not within a class of persons statute was intended to protect; section pertains only to those persons who have sought or obtained an employment relationship with the employer alleged to have engaged in a discriminatory employment practice. 287 C. 56. Subdiv. (8): Arbitrator's interpretation of just cause provision of a collective bargaining agreement as barring the grievant's termination of employment for sexual harassment of a coworker violated the clear, well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in this state and the award was correctly vacated. 309 C. 519. Subsec. prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals whom they regard as physically disabled. 314 C. 773. Cited. 4 CA 423; 5 CA 643; 18 CA 241; 27 CA 635; 35 CA 474; 38 CA 506; 41 CA 1; 44 CA 446; Id., 677. Federal standards reviewed for guidance in enforcing state antidiscrimination statutes; court held that defendant had provided plaintiff with reasonable accommodation. 57 CA 767. Subdiv. (7): There is a public policy against sex discrimination in employment sufficiently expressed in statutory and constitutional law to permit a cause of action for wrongful discharge; although Sec. 46a-51(10) excludes many employers from the requirements of the act, the clear public policy against sex discrimination transcends the exclusion. 64 CA 573. Company may be held liable for discrimination even where decision-making official did not intentionally discriminate if information used by that official in deciding to terminate a worker's employment was filtered through another employee who had a discriminatory motive. 72 CA 212. Subdiv. (1): State's public policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disabilities is embodied in Subdiv. 81 CA 726. Subdiv. (7): Trial court's finding of discriminatory practice affirmed, contrary to defendant's assertions, plaintiff's claim of discriminatory practice does not fail merely because evidence offered to prove defendant's violation of subparagraph arose out of an incident that is also arguably within purview of another subparagraph under same statutory subdivision. 88 CA 60. Subsec. establishes a well-defined and dominant public policy against workplace sexual harassment and extends to the actions of an employee. 125 CA 408. There is no claim under Subsec. for person regarded or perceived as disabled by employer. 137 CA 446; judgment reversed, see 314 C. 773.
Nearby Sections
15
§ 46a-11
Duties and powers of director.Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bluebook (online)
Connecticut § 46a-60, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/statute/ct/46a-60.