Connecticut Statutes

§ 46a-51 — (Formerly Sec. 31-122). Definitions.

Connecticut § 46a-51
JurisdictionConnecticut
Title 46aHuman Rights
Ch. 814cHuman Rights and Opportunities

This text of Connecticut § 46a-51 ((Formerly Sec. 31-122). Definitions.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-51 (2026).

Text

As used in section 4a-60a and this chapter:

(1)“Blind” refers to an individual whose central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or whose visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees;
(2)“Commission” means the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities created by section 46a-52 ;
(3)“Commission legal counsel” means a member of the legal staff employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54 ;
(4)“Commissioner” means a member of the commission;
(5)“Court” means the Superior Court or any judge of said court;
(6)“Discrimination” includes segregation and separation;
(7)“Discriminatory emplo

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Legislative History

(1949 Rev., S. 7401; 1959, P.A. 145, S. 1; 1967, P.A. 253; 636, S. 5, 6; P.A. 75-350, S. 1; P.A. 76-96, S. 1, 2; P.A. 77-452, S. 61, 72; P.A. 80-422, S. 1; 80-449, S. 3, 6; P.A. 81-81, S. 3; 81-382, S. 1; P.A. 82-51, S. 2; P.A. 83-587, S. 56, 96; P.A. 84-204; P.A. 88-303, S. 4; P.A. 90-246, S. 1; 90-330, S. 2, 11; P.A. 91-58, S. 20; P.A. 95-79, S. 167, 189; P.A. 01-28, S. 1; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 189; P.A. 07-142, S. 1; P.A. 11-55, S. 1; 11-129, S. 20; P.A. 15-56, S. 2; 15-249, S. 1; P.A. 17-127, S. 1; 17-202, S. 96; P.A. 19-16, S. 2; 19-93, S. 1; P.A. 21-2, S. 1; 21-32, S. 10; P.A. 22-82, S. 7; P.A. 23-145, S. 2; P.A. 24-19, S. 39; 24-24, S. 16.) History: 1959 act added Subdiv. (k) defining age; 1967 acts redefined “employer” as one with three or more rather than five or more employees and redefined “commission” and “commissioner” to change commission name from commission on civil rights to commission on human rights and opportunities; P.A. 75-350 deleted definition of “age”, i.e. as “any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive”; P.A. 76-96 redefined “court” as court of common pleas rather than superior court; P.A. 77-452 redefined “court” as superior court; P.A. 80-422 deleted definition of “unfair employment practice”, defined “blind”, “commission counsel”, “discriminatory employment practice”, “discriminatory practice”, “mental retardation” and “respondent”, replaced alphabetic Subdiv. indicators with numeric indicators and arranged definitions in alphabetical order; P.A. 80-449 made no substantive change; Sec. 31-122 transferred to Sec. 46a-51 in 1981; P.A. 81-81 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to “section 47a-2a” which was subsequently transferred and redesignated Sec. 46a-64a; P.A. 81-382 added Subdiv. (17) defining “discrimination on the basis of sex”; P.A. 82-51 redefined “mental retardation” to adopt the definition of Sec. 1-1g of the general statutes; P.A. 83-587 substituted “46a-54” for “46-54” in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 84-204 added Subdiv. (18) defining “discrimination on the basis of religious creed”; P.A. 88-303 redefined “discriminatory practice” to include a violation of Sec. 4-114a; P.A. 90-246 amended Subdiv. (8) by deleting reference to repealed Sec. 46a-64a and adding reference to Sec. 46a-64c; P.A. 90-330 added definition of “learning disability”; P.A. 91-58 added reference in introductory clause to Sec. 4a-60a and proposed to add reference to Secs. 46a-81a to 46a-81o, inclusive, but said Secs. already included in existing reference to “this chapter”, amended definition of “discriminatory employment practice” to add reference to Sec. 46a-81c, and amended definition of “discriminatory practice” to include a violation of Sec. 4a-60a and Secs. 46a-81b to 46a-81o, inclusive; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include limited liability companies, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 01-28 added Subdiv. (20) defining “mental disability” and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality in Subdivs. (9), (10) and (18); June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 replaced “commission counsel” with “commission legal counsel” as the defined term and replaced “the counsel employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54” with “a member of the legal staff employed by the commission pursuant to section 46a-54” as the definition of said term, effective August 20, 2003; P.A. 07-142 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to Sec. 4a-60g and Secs. 46a-68c to 46a-68f, inclusive, and making technical changes, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 11-55 added Subdiv. (21) defining “gender identity or expression”; pursuant to P.A. 11-129, “mental retardation” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “intellectual disability” in Subdiv. (13); P.A. 15-56 amended Subdiv. (8) by adding reference to Sec. 31-40y in definition of “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 15-249 amended Subdiv. (9) by deleting reference to individuals employed in domestic service of any person in definition of “employee”, effective January 1, 2016; P.A. 17-127 added Subdiv. (22) defining “veteran”; P.A. 17-202 amended Subdiv. (15) by replacing “hearing impairment” with “being hard of hearing” in definition of “physically disabled”; P.A. 19-16 amended Subdiv. (8) by redefining “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 19-93 amended Subdiv. (8) by redefining “discriminatory practice”; P.A. 21-2 added Subdiv. (23) defining “race” and Subdiv. (24) defining “protective hairstyles”, effective March 4, 2021; P.A. 21-32 amended Subdiv. (7) to add reference to Secs. 31-51i(b) and (d) to (f) in definition of “discriminatory employment” and amended Subdiv. (8) to add reference to Secs. 31-51i(b) and (d) to (f), 46a-80b to 46a-80e and 46a-80k to 46a-80m in definition of “discriminatory practice”, effective January 1, 2023; P.A. 22-82 redefined “employee” and “employer” in Subdivs. (9) and (10), added Subdiv. (25) defining “domestic violence” and made technical changes; P.A. 23-145 added Subdiv. (26) defining “sexual orientation” and made technical changes, effective July 1, 2023; P.A. 24-19 amended Subdiv. (8) to add reference to Sec. 19a-498c; P.A. 24-24 made a technical change in Subdiv. (20). Annotations to former section 31-122: Cited. 153 C. 173; 163 C. 327. A corporation is not privileged under chapter to do what an individual is precluded from doing; segregating employment opportunity advertisements into sex classifications constitutes discrimination. 168 C. 26. Court cannot substitute its own discretion for that reposed by statute in hearing tribunal. 18 CS 125. Cited. 28 CS 472. Annotations to present section: Cited. 188 C. 44; 195 C. 226; 220 C. 307; 226 C. 670; 231 C. 328; 236 C. 96; 237 C. 209. Plaintiff who testified at trial that he had sustained a knee injury during course of his employment that required surgery and resulted in his receiving worker's compensation benefits and a disability rating for his knee satisfied statutory definition of being “physically disabled” under Subdiv. (15). 278 C. 692. Appellate Court properly applied the federal “remuneration test” rather than Connecticut's common-law “right to control” test to determine whether individual was an employee under section. 322 C. 154. Cited. 3 CA 464; 35 CA 474. Subdiv. (10) does not evince an intent by General Assembly to grant small businesses a license to discriminate, but instead evidences intention to exempt small businesses from the other burdens of act, not from its antidiscrimination policy. 64 CA 573. Subdiv. (15): Definition does not extend to those who may be regarded or perceived as disabled by their employers. 137 CA 446. Re definition of “employee”, common law “agency” or “right of control” test alone is insufficient in determining whether an individual is an employee; only if federal “remuneration” test is satisfied would a court apply common law “agency” or “right of control” test; courts may look to federal precedent for guidance in enforcing antidiscrimination statutes. 156 CA 239; judgment affirmed, see 322 C. 154. Court reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff was not suffering from a mental disorder defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but rather from a more general lack of requisite temperament. Id., 597. The United States Supreme Court's definition of “supervisor” in the case of Vance v. Ball , 570 U.S. 431-432, that is used by courts in Title VII cases, is the appropriate definition for distinguishing between the coworker and supervisor theories of liability for hostile work environment claims brought under CFEPA. 219 CA 1.

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Connecticut § 46a-51, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/statute/ct/46a-51.