SIMONETT, Justice.
We reverse the court of appeals’ ruling that a city council lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application to award a special use permit for the operation of a gun club because of the existence of a district court injunction prohibiting the gun club’s operation. We remand to the city council to prepare adequate findings of fact for its decision denying the requested amendment.
In May 1974, respondent City of Hugo issued to petitioner-relator White Bear Rod and Gun Club a special use permit to operate a gun club about 1 ½ miles east of the built-up portion of the city. The permit included a requirement that the noise level from the club’s operation, which included skeet and trap shooting, not exceed 40 decibels at any property line. Thereafter, in April 1976, in a separate proceeding brought by two environmental groups against the gun club, the Washington County District Court found that the club’s [741]*741operation would violate the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act and permanently enjoined the gun club’s operation. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s decision, Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.1977), adding, however, that our affirmance was not intended to preclude the gun club from attempting remedial action which might bring its operation into compliance with the environmental rights act. Id. at 783.
Since then the gun club has struggled without much success to make its operation palatable to the district court, the city council, and the neighboring public. In May 1980, the district court denied the gun club’s application to remove the permanent injunction because, it said, the shooting would still adversely affect the quietude of the area.1 For over a decade now, while the gun club has used its indoor firing range, it has never been able to do outdoor skeet and trap shooting because, apparently, it has never been able to meet the 40-decibel noise limitation.
In late 1984 the gun club tried again to raise the noise level limitation, resulting in this present appeal. It applied to the Hugo City Council to amend the special use permit to allow shooting noise at a “reasonable level,” which it proposed should be 55 decibels. The gun club produced evidence that the background noise level on the club’s property was already 45.8 decibels, and that to impose a 40-decibel level on the club’s operation set an impossible, hence unreasonable, standard. On March 6,1985, following two public hearings before its planning commission, the city council denied the requested permit amendment. The gun club sought judicial review by certiorari directly to the court of appeals. The court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that because of the outstanding injunction against the gun club, “the City of Hugo had no jurisdiction to consider the Club’s application for an amendment to its special use permit.” White Bear Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo, 377 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).
We granted the gun club’s petition for further review to clarify procedures where two forums — a municipal body and a district court — are both exercising jurisdiction over aspects of land use of a particular area.
I.
The City of Hugo raises a threshold issue, namely, whether certiorari is the proper procedure for judicial review of a city council’s denial of an amendment to a special use permit. We conclude certiorari lies, but only for a very narrow issue.
Certiorari is appropriate to review quasi-judicial proceedings only where there is no appeal and no other adequate remedy. Plunkett v. First National Bank of Austin, 262 Minn. 231, 233 n. 2, 115 N.W.2d 235, 237 n. 2 (1962). While city council decisions on special use permits are quasi-judicial, see Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn.1981), the City of Hugo argues certiorari is inappropriate here because Minn.Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1(1984), provides an adequate remedy in district court:
Any person aggrieved by an ordinance, rule, regulation, decision or order of a governing body or board of adjustments and appeals acting pursuant to sections 462.351 to 462.364 may have such * * * decision or order reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the district court * * *.
Judicial review of special use permits comes under this quoted language. [742]*742The statute is silent on what is an “appropriate remedy,” but in Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, supra, we made clear that certiorari ordinarily is no longer appropriate in reviewing any zoning matter, legislative or quasi-judicial. Id. at 416. We said a declaratory judgment or injunction action is generally more appropriate, or sometimes mandamus, although adding “there may be a quasi-judicial proceeding presenting a legal question to which certiorari still lends itself.” Id. citing Ram Development Co. v. Shaw, 309 Minn. 139, 244 N.W.2d 110 (1976) (involving an issue of parliamentary procedure). It seems to us we have here, as in Ram, a narrow legal procedural question which lends itself to certiorari, namely: Did the Hugo City Council set out its decision in proper legal form for judicial review?
But if certiorari lies, should it issue from the district court or the court of appeals? The court of appeals relied on Minn.Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3 (Supp.1985) to conclude that a “petition for a writ of certiorari is now properly taken to [the court of appeals] rather than the district court.” 377 N.W.2d at 52. This section says the court of appeals “shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to all agencies, public corporations and public officials * * *.” Respondent City of Hugo argues that while the court of appeals has “jurisdictional capacity” regarding certiora-ri, such review is more efficiently conducted in the district court. We agree. Section 480A.06, subd. 3, does not purport to grant exclusive jurisdiction for writs of certiorari to the court of appeals; section 462.361, subd. 1, makes clear that the district court has at least2 concurrent certiorari jurisdiction. While we conclude that henceforth an aggrieved person should seek relief first in the district court, judicial economy dictates in this instance that we reach the merits of the gun club’s appeal.
II.
We hold, as a matter of law, the Hugo City Council’s decision denying the special use permit amendment lacks any findings of fact or other explanation of its decision adequate for any judicial review.
In denying the gun club’s application, the city council cryptically listed nine “reasons” as set out below.3 These so-called reasons are nothing more than a list of the council’s sources of information and tell a reviewing court nothing about how the council may have evaluated or used this information.4
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SIMONETT, Justice.
We reverse the court of appeals’ ruling that a city council lacks jurisdiction to entertain an application to award a special use permit for the operation of a gun club because of the existence of a district court injunction prohibiting the gun club’s operation. We remand to the city council to prepare adequate findings of fact for its decision denying the requested amendment.
In May 1974, respondent City of Hugo issued to petitioner-relator White Bear Rod and Gun Club a special use permit to operate a gun club about 1 ½ miles east of the built-up portion of the city. The permit included a requirement that the noise level from the club’s operation, which included skeet and trap shooting, not exceed 40 decibels at any property line. Thereafter, in April 1976, in a separate proceeding brought by two environmental groups against the gun club, the Washington County District Court found that the club’s [741]*741operation would violate the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act and permanently enjoined the gun club’s operation. On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s decision, Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.1977), adding, however, that our affirmance was not intended to preclude the gun club from attempting remedial action which might bring its operation into compliance with the environmental rights act. Id. at 783.
Since then the gun club has struggled without much success to make its operation palatable to the district court, the city council, and the neighboring public. In May 1980, the district court denied the gun club’s application to remove the permanent injunction because, it said, the shooting would still adversely affect the quietude of the area.1 For over a decade now, while the gun club has used its indoor firing range, it has never been able to do outdoor skeet and trap shooting because, apparently, it has never been able to meet the 40-decibel noise limitation.
In late 1984 the gun club tried again to raise the noise level limitation, resulting in this present appeal. It applied to the Hugo City Council to amend the special use permit to allow shooting noise at a “reasonable level,” which it proposed should be 55 decibels. The gun club produced evidence that the background noise level on the club’s property was already 45.8 decibels, and that to impose a 40-decibel level on the club’s operation set an impossible, hence unreasonable, standard. On March 6,1985, following two public hearings before its planning commission, the city council denied the requested permit amendment. The gun club sought judicial review by certiorari directly to the court of appeals. The court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that because of the outstanding injunction against the gun club, “the City of Hugo had no jurisdiction to consider the Club’s application for an amendment to its special use permit.” White Bear Rod & Gun Club v. City of Hugo, 377 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn.Ct.App.1985).
We granted the gun club’s petition for further review to clarify procedures where two forums — a municipal body and a district court — are both exercising jurisdiction over aspects of land use of a particular area.
I.
The City of Hugo raises a threshold issue, namely, whether certiorari is the proper procedure for judicial review of a city council’s denial of an amendment to a special use permit. We conclude certiorari lies, but only for a very narrow issue.
Certiorari is appropriate to review quasi-judicial proceedings only where there is no appeal and no other adequate remedy. Plunkett v. First National Bank of Austin, 262 Minn. 231, 233 n. 2, 115 N.W.2d 235, 237 n. 2 (1962). While city council decisions on special use permits are quasi-judicial, see Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn.1981), the City of Hugo argues certiorari is inappropriate here because Minn.Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1(1984), provides an adequate remedy in district court:
Any person aggrieved by an ordinance, rule, regulation, decision or order of a governing body or board of adjustments and appeals acting pursuant to sections 462.351 to 462.364 may have such * * * decision or order reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the district court * * *.
Judicial review of special use permits comes under this quoted language. [742]*742The statute is silent on what is an “appropriate remedy,” but in Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, supra, we made clear that certiorari ordinarily is no longer appropriate in reviewing any zoning matter, legislative or quasi-judicial. Id. at 416. We said a declaratory judgment or injunction action is generally more appropriate, or sometimes mandamus, although adding “there may be a quasi-judicial proceeding presenting a legal question to which certiorari still lends itself.” Id. citing Ram Development Co. v. Shaw, 309 Minn. 139, 244 N.W.2d 110 (1976) (involving an issue of parliamentary procedure). It seems to us we have here, as in Ram, a narrow legal procedural question which lends itself to certiorari, namely: Did the Hugo City Council set out its decision in proper legal form for judicial review?
But if certiorari lies, should it issue from the district court or the court of appeals? The court of appeals relied on Minn.Stat. § 480A.06, subd. 3 (Supp.1985) to conclude that a “petition for a writ of certiorari is now properly taken to [the court of appeals] rather than the district court.” 377 N.W.2d at 52. This section says the court of appeals “shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to all agencies, public corporations and public officials * * *.” Respondent City of Hugo argues that while the court of appeals has “jurisdictional capacity” regarding certiora-ri, such review is more efficiently conducted in the district court. We agree. Section 480A.06, subd. 3, does not purport to grant exclusive jurisdiction for writs of certiorari to the court of appeals; section 462.361, subd. 1, makes clear that the district court has at least2 concurrent certiorari jurisdiction. While we conclude that henceforth an aggrieved person should seek relief first in the district court, judicial economy dictates in this instance that we reach the merits of the gun club’s appeal.
II.
We hold, as a matter of law, the Hugo City Council’s decision denying the special use permit amendment lacks any findings of fact or other explanation of its decision adequate for any judicial review.
In denying the gun club’s application, the city council cryptically listed nine “reasons” as set out below.3 These so-called reasons are nothing more than a list of the council’s sources of information and tell a reviewing court nothing about how the council may have evaluated or used this information.4 While the city council was not required to prepare formal findings of fact, it was, “at a minimum,” required to “have the reasons for its decision recorded or reduced to writing and in more than just a conclusory fashion.” Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416.
We remand to the Hugo City Council to prepare appropriate findings for its decision on the gun club’s application for an amendment to its special use permit.5 Af[743]*743ter it has ' done so, the gun club should then, if it decides to seek judicial review, bring a declaratory judgment action in district court.
III.
Implicit in the remand is a recognition that the Hugo City Council has jurisdiction to entertain the application for the permit amendment. We so hold. To the extent the court of appeals has ruled otherwise, we reverse.
There are two forums exercising jurisdiction over how the gun club may use its land. The Hugo City Council’s jurisdiction arises under its zoning ordinance and its authority to issue special use permits. The district court’s jurisdiction has been invoked by private citizens who sought and successfully obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting a use of the land that would be in violation of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.
To some extent, the jurisdiction of the two forums overlaps, but neither forum excludes the other.6 Each acts within its own appropriate sphere and there is no conflict. Simply put, for the gun club to conduct outdoor shooting it must be in compliance with the Hugo zoning ordinance and the special use permit issued pursuant thereto and also be in compliance with the requirements of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.
The two forums have similar though different approaches to the land use issues involved. The city council applies the criteria set out in its ordinance having in mind, generally, the welfare of the community.7 On appeal, the reviewing court reviews the record to determine if the decision is reasonable and based on legally sufficient reasons with a proper factual basis. C.R. Investments, Inc. v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn.1981); see also White Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn.1982) (council has wide discretion). On the other hand, the district court, applying the criteria of the environmental rights act, considers whether the gun club’s use of the land will pollute or impair quietude, whether there are feasible alternatives, and whether the gun club’s activity is consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of public health, safety and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for the protection of its natural resources. Minn.Stat. § 116B.01 (1984). The district court makes findings of fact, [744]*744which on appellate review will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
Conceivably, there may be situations where a landowner seeking a special use permit may be able to meet the criteria of one forum but not the other, but, as stated, the landowner must pass muster in both forums. In this case, the landowner has been unsuccessful in obtaining a feasible special use permit not just once before both the city council and the district court, but twice.
If the gun club seeks review of the city council’s decision after remand by bringing a declaratory judgment action in district court, we suggest the gun club, assuming it has new evidence since it was last in district court 6 years ago, also bring an action to modify the district court’s injunction on the requirements for quietude. Both proceedings could be consolidated for trial in district court. All interested parties would then be in court and any evidence need be given only once. The district court could coordinate the two proceedings and perhaps get this matter resolved once and for all.
Reversed and remanded.
WAHL, J., concurs specially.