OTIS, Justice.
This appeal surfaces a fundamental issue bearing on the role of the judiciary in countermanding legislative decisions reached by municipal officials. The court’s authority to interfere in the management of municipal affairs is, and should be, limited and sparingly invoked. There is nothing in this record which justifies the court’s intervention.
The facts are for the most part undisputed. The White Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. (the Docking Company) applied for and received from the City of White Bear Lake a special use permit in 1975 allowing the company to install a 10 foot by 18 foot trailer office on the shore of White Bear Lake.
The area in question was zoned R-B, Retail Business, and required 30 foot front yard and rear yard setbacks, requirements which could not be met with the Docking Company’s contemplated use. In granting the permit the City waived those requirements.
In April, 1979, the Docking Company, without seeking an amended permit, removed the 10 foot by 18 foot trailer and installed a 10 foot by 50 foot mobile trailer in its place. The City thereupon brought proceedings to enjoin the Docking Company from maintaining the mobile trailer on its lot without a new permit. The district [176]*176court issued an injunction and the company responded by applying for a permit.
By a vote of three to one the City Council rejected the company’s petition, for reasons which were well within the exercise of discretion inherent in their office. Thereupon the respondent sought and obtained from the district court a writ of mandamus directing the council to issue the permit.
Members of the council expressed concern because of the failure to meet setback requirements. While willing to tolerate that inadequacy with an 18 foot trailer, the council was unwilling to extend the waiver to a 50 foot mobile trailer. In addition, the council had legitimate misgivings that a precedent would be established, since heretofore there had been no mobile trailer offices of any kind anywhere on the lake-shore. Rightly or wrongly the council was of the opinion that the location of a mobile trailer of that size, and the possible proliferation which might follow, would adversely affect the value of conventional homes in the area.
Having made an independent examination of the City’s quasi-judicial decision, as we must, we do not find, as did the trial court, that the City is estopped from refusing to expand its permit; or that the City’s action was arbitrary and capricious; or that the reasons assigned by the council do not have “the slightest validity” or bearing on the general welfare of the immediate area. Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn.1979); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.1981).
The mere fact that the trial court might have reached a different conclusion, had it been a member of the council, does not invalidate the judgment of the City officials if they acted in good faith and ■within the broad discretion accorded them by the ordinance itself.
The setting aside of routine municipal decisions should be reserved for those rare instances in which the City’s decision has no rational basis. Except in such cases, it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of their duties.
In a comprehensive consideration of the law governing standards of review in zoning matters, Honn. v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.1981), we discussed the distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial matters, such as variances and special use permits, and said:
* * * [T]he standard of review is the same for all zoning matters, namely, whether the zoning authority’s action was reasonable. Our cases express this standard in various ways: Is there a “reasonable basis” for the decision? or is the decision “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious”? or is the decision “reasonably debatable”?
Id., 313 N.W.2d at 417. We went on to point out that in special use permit cases, “reasonableness” is measured by the standards set out in the local ordinance, and not by the standards contained in the statute.
Here the relevant provisions of the City of White Bear Lake ordinance governing special uses are as follows:
405. ZONING CODE: SPECIAL USES
405.010. Special Uses Generally. Certain uses, while generally not suitable in a particular zoning district, may, under some circumstances, be suitable. When such circumstances exist, a special use permit may be granted. Conditions may be applied to issuance of the permit and a periodic review of the permit may be required.
* * * * * *
Special Use Permits may be granted or denied in any district by action of the City Council. In granting a special use permit, the Council shall consider the advice and recommendations of the Planning Commission and the effect of the proposed use upon the health, safety, morals, convenience, and general welfare of occupants of surrounding lands, existing and anticipated traffic conditions including parking facilities on adjacent streets and land, and the effect on values [177]*177of property in the surrounding area, and the effect of the proposed use on the Comprehensive Plan. If it shall determine that the proposed use will not be detrimental to the health, safety, convenience, morals, or general welfare of the community nor will seriously depreciate surrounding property values, and that said use is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this Ordinance and the City Plan, the Council may grant such permits.
******
Any change involving structural alteration, enlargement, intensification of use, or similar change not specifically permitted by the special use permit issued shall require an amended special use permit and all procedures shall apply as if a new permit were being issued.
White Bear Lake, Minn. Ordinance 456, ch. 405 (1968) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the ordinance characterizes uses which require special permits as being those “generally not suitable in a particular zoning district * * * ” (emphasis added) and authorizes conditions and periodic review for amended permits as well as for initial permits. Here the original use sought and authorized was for a structure with dimensions of 10 by 18 feet only.
The ordinance directs the council to consider the advice and recommendations of the planning commission, but it does not require the commission’s approval. In addition, the wording of the ordinance imposes this duty on the council only in granting a permit but is silent with respect to its denying a permit. Any structural enlargement specifically requires a permit.
In affidavits presented to the trial court three council persons commented on the detrimental effect of enlarging the use of the property.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OTIS, Justice.
This appeal surfaces a fundamental issue bearing on the role of the judiciary in countermanding legislative decisions reached by municipal officials. The court’s authority to interfere in the management of municipal affairs is, and should be, limited and sparingly invoked. There is nothing in this record which justifies the court’s intervention.
The facts are for the most part undisputed. The White Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. (the Docking Company) applied for and received from the City of White Bear Lake a special use permit in 1975 allowing the company to install a 10 foot by 18 foot trailer office on the shore of White Bear Lake.
The area in question was zoned R-B, Retail Business, and required 30 foot front yard and rear yard setbacks, requirements which could not be met with the Docking Company’s contemplated use. In granting the permit the City waived those requirements.
In April, 1979, the Docking Company, without seeking an amended permit, removed the 10 foot by 18 foot trailer and installed a 10 foot by 50 foot mobile trailer in its place. The City thereupon brought proceedings to enjoin the Docking Company from maintaining the mobile trailer on its lot without a new permit. The district [176]*176court issued an injunction and the company responded by applying for a permit.
By a vote of three to one the City Council rejected the company’s petition, for reasons which were well within the exercise of discretion inherent in their office. Thereupon the respondent sought and obtained from the district court a writ of mandamus directing the council to issue the permit.
Members of the council expressed concern because of the failure to meet setback requirements. While willing to tolerate that inadequacy with an 18 foot trailer, the council was unwilling to extend the waiver to a 50 foot mobile trailer. In addition, the council had legitimate misgivings that a precedent would be established, since heretofore there had been no mobile trailer offices of any kind anywhere on the lake-shore. Rightly or wrongly the council was of the opinion that the location of a mobile trailer of that size, and the possible proliferation which might follow, would adversely affect the value of conventional homes in the area.
Having made an independent examination of the City’s quasi-judicial decision, as we must, we do not find, as did the trial court, that the City is estopped from refusing to expand its permit; or that the City’s action was arbitrary and capricious; or that the reasons assigned by the council do not have “the slightest validity” or bearing on the general welfare of the immediate area. Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn.1979); Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.1981).
The mere fact that the trial court might have reached a different conclusion, had it been a member of the council, does not invalidate the judgment of the City officials if they acted in good faith and ■within the broad discretion accorded them by the ordinance itself.
The setting aside of routine municipal decisions should be reserved for those rare instances in which the City’s decision has no rational basis. Except in such cases, it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of their duties.
In a comprehensive consideration of the law governing standards of review in zoning matters, Honn. v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.1981), we discussed the distinction between legislative and quasi-judicial matters, such as variances and special use permits, and said:
* * * [T]he standard of review is the same for all zoning matters, namely, whether the zoning authority’s action was reasonable. Our cases express this standard in various ways: Is there a “reasonable basis” for the decision? or is the decision “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious”? or is the decision “reasonably debatable”?
Id., 313 N.W.2d at 417. We went on to point out that in special use permit cases, “reasonableness” is measured by the standards set out in the local ordinance, and not by the standards contained in the statute.
Here the relevant provisions of the City of White Bear Lake ordinance governing special uses are as follows:
405. ZONING CODE: SPECIAL USES
405.010. Special Uses Generally. Certain uses, while generally not suitable in a particular zoning district, may, under some circumstances, be suitable. When such circumstances exist, a special use permit may be granted. Conditions may be applied to issuance of the permit and a periodic review of the permit may be required.
* * * * * *
Special Use Permits may be granted or denied in any district by action of the City Council. In granting a special use permit, the Council shall consider the advice and recommendations of the Planning Commission and the effect of the proposed use upon the health, safety, morals, convenience, and general welfare of occupants of surrounding lands, existing and anticipated traffic conditions including parking facilities on adjacent streets and land, and the effect on values [177]*177of property in the surrounding area, and the effect of the proposed use on the Comprehensive Plan. If it shall determine that the proposed use will not be detrimental to the health, safety, convenience, morals, or general welfare of the community nor will seriously depreciate surrounding property values, and that said use is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this Ordinance and the City Plan, the Council may grant such permits.
******
Any change involving structural alteration, enlargement, intensification of use, or similar change not specifically permitted by the special use permit issued shall require an amended special use permit and all procedures shall apply as if a new permit were being issued.
White Bear Lake, Minn. Ordinance 456, ch. 405 (1968) (emphasis added).
It should be noted that the ordinance characterizes uses which require special permits as being those “generally not suitable in a particular zoning district * * * ” (emphasis added) and authorizes conditions and periodic review for amended permits as well as for initial permits. Here the original use sought and authorized was for a structure with dimensions of 10 by 18 feet only.
The ordinance directs the council to consider the advice and recommendations of the planning commission, but it does not require the commission’s approval. In addition, the wording of the ordinance imposes this duty on the council only in granting a permit but is silent with respect to its denying a permit. Any structural enlargement specifically requires a permit.
In affidavits presented to the trial court three council persons commented on the detrimental effect of enlarging the use of the property. Councilman Ernest McCarty stated that the city was attempting to upgrade the area in question by alleviating a “significant traffic-pedestrian-bicycle problem”; that the parcel is undersized in depth; and if a permanent structure were sought, the size of the parcel would not be sufficient under the zoning code.
William Bennis, another councilman, voted against the permit because in his opinion the property was too small for a 10 by 45 foot trailer, and the permit would establish a precedent for placing mobile homes on the lakeshore. He stated: “In light of the fact that petitioner could not put a permanent structure 10 X 45 feet in dimension on the premises, it is only logical that a portable structure of those dimensions should not be allowed on the premises.” He, too, was apprehensive of the. possible proliferation of mobile homes on the lakeshore and their impact on single family lakeshore residences.
Councilwoman Donna Rask also expressed concern over failure to meet the 30 foot front and rear setbacks which would be required were the structure permanent, noting “ * * * that they are a logical guide in determining whether or not the parcel is of sufficient size to accommodate the 10' X 45' mobile home being used by petitioner as an office.”
We not only find this reasoning persuasive but hold that the grounds assigned constitute a rational basis for the council’s decision. Such grounds fall well within the criteria set forth in the zoning code. In a community as relatively small as White Bear Lake, city officials have the experience, competence, and capacity to measure the impact of a permit on property values and to weigh and assess similar issues without relying on expert witnesses to determine whether or not the use “ * * * is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of [the] zoning ordinance and the city plan”.
To the extent the council’s decision was influenced by esthetic considerations which might affect the value of private residences, we set forth rules which by analogy are relevant here, in C. R. Investments, Inc., v. Village of Shoreview, 304 N.W.2d 320, 327 (1981):
Esthetic considerations such as the architectural style and general appearance of any proposed apartment project will be a major consideration but will not be the [178]*178sole justification for approval or denial of any proposed apartment building. [Comprehensive Village Plan, Part Two, Section III, C(B) 8(b) 10].
* sfc * ⅜ *
Nothing touches a citizen so personally as his daily environment. A healthful, safe, efficient and pleasant living area to return to at the end of the day is as essential to the well-being of a citizen as good physical conditions under which to work.
* * * * sfc *
Human values differ, social and economic status differs among areas, and certain legal restraints are present which require the setting of minimum, reasonable, and uniform standards, the “minimum” may be acceptable in one part of the community while in others, residents may desire higher standards. [Comprehensive Village Plan, Part Two, Section IV].
Accordingly the order of the district court is reversed and the writ of mandamus is quashed.
KELLEY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.