Opinion
PETERS, J.
The Freedom of Information Act, which requires the meetings of a public agency to be open to the public; General Statutes § 1-21;1 defines the term “meeting” to exclude “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining.” General Statutes § 1-18a (b).2 The sole issue in these certified administrative appeals is whether grievance proceedings between a teachers union and a public school board come, in whole or in part, within the legislative exclusion for “strategy or negotiations.”
This action arises from the consolidation of two appeals, the procedural history and factual underpinnings of which are undisputed. On April 29, 1992, and on May 6, 1992, the committee on grievances of the defendant Waterbury board of education (board) conducted grievance hearings at the initiation of the plaintiff, the Waterbury Teachers Association (union). The union had brought these grievances against the board on behalf of certain members as a result of alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement in place between the board and the union. Although, pur[838]*838suant to § l-18a (a),3 the board is concededly a public agency, the board and the union agreed not to hold the grievance hearings in public. The complainants, Marc S. Ryan and James B. Craig (individual complainants), an editorial writer and reporter, respectively, and their newspaper, the defendant Waterbury Republican-American (newspaper), filed with the defendant freedom of information commission (commission), a complaint challenging the absence of public notice of, and public access to, these grievance hearings.
After a contested hearing, the commission concluded that the grievance sessions held by the committee on grievances should have been conducted in accordance with the terms of § 1-21 and ordered the board and the union to comply with the statute in the future. The commission came to the same conclusion with respect to a second complaint, also filed by the individual complainants and the newspaper, concerning another closed grievance hearing that had been held on December 15, 1993.
Pursuant to General Statutes §§ l-21i and 4-183 (a),4 the union appealed the validity of these orders to the [839]*839trial court.5 After consolidating these separate actions, the court sustained the union’s appeals, concluding that grievance proceedings were “part of the ongoing collective bargaining process.” The individual complainants, the newspaper and the commission then appealed to tire Appellate Court, which, after determinining that “grievance hearings constituted negotiations,” affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 42 Conn. App. 700, 709, 682 A.2d 125 (1996). We granted, in identical terms, the two petitions for certification to appeal filed, respectively, by the individual complainants and the newspaper, and by the commission.6 We reverse the judgments of the Appellate Court.
In analyzing the scope of the statutory exclusion for “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining” contained in § l-18a (b), we do not write on a clean slate. In Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 711— 13, 663 A.2d 349 (1995), we recently construed this subsection to exclude from the term “meeting” only those parts of collective bargaining sessions that relate specifically to “strategy or negotiations,” rather than to collective bargaining proceedings in their entirety. We [840]*840arrived at this construction in light of the long-standing legislative policy of the Freedom of Information Act favoring “the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 712; see Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act’s exceptions to disclosure. See, e.g., Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 651, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. 621, 626, 609 A.2d 998 (1992).
The question before us, therefore, is whether grievance hearings, in their entirety, are properly to be characterized as “strategy” or “negotiation” sessions. This question is not answered in the affirmative simply because grievance procedures arise out of, and relate to, collective bargaining. In other words, to establish the applicability of the exclusion, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the duty to bargain in good faith that is imposed by our labor law “is an ongoing duty that continues after initial contract negotiations are over . . . [and] includes the duty to negotiate any question arising under an existing contract.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 120-21, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991); see General Statutes § 10-153e (d) (defining on-going duty to negotiate in good faith).
To determine whether grievance hearings qualify as “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bar[841]*841gaining,” we must begin with a description of the operational characteristics of such hearings as documented in the administrative record. Cf. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 234 Conn. 714-18. In the present case, the principal evidence regarding the conduct of the grievance hearing, apart from the contractual description of the grievance process,7 was the testimony of John Cronan, the president of the union. His testimony indicated that the [842]*842grievance process involves two stages, the presentation of evidence to demonstrate the violation of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement and the request for a remedy to correct the alleged violation. With respect to the remedy, he testified that the parties “bargain back and forth” and often resolve the grievance through a new interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
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Opinion
PETERS, J.
The Freedom of Information Act, which requires the meetings of a public agency to be open to the public; General Statutes § 1-21;1 defines the term “meeting” to exclude “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining.” General Statutes § 1-18a (b).2 The sole issue in these certified administrative appeals is whether grievance proceedings between a teachers union and a public school board come, in whole or in part, within the legislative exclusion for “strategy or negotiations.”
This action arises from the consolidation of two appeals, the procedural history and factual underpinnings of which are undisputed. On April 29, 1992, and on May 6, 1992, the committee on grievances of the defendant Waterbury board of education (board) conducted grievance hearings at the initiation of the plaintiff, the Waterbury Teachers Association (union). The union had brought these grievances against the board on behalf of certain members as a result of alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement in place between the board and the union. Although, pur[838]*838suant to § l-18a (a),3 the board is concededly a public agency, the board and the union agreed not to hold the grievance hearings in public. The complainants, Marc S. Ryan and James B. Craig (individual complainants), an editorial writer and reporter, respectively, and their newspaper, the defendant Waterbury Republican-American (newspaper), filed with the defendant freedom of information commission (commission), a complaint challenging the absence of public notice of, and public access to, these grievance hearings.
After a contested hearing, the commission concluded that the grievance sessions held by the committee on grievances should have been conducted in accordance with the terms of § 1-21 and ordered the board and the union to comply with the statute in the future. The commission came to the same conclusion with respect to a second complaint, also filed by the individual complainants and the newspaper, concerning another closed grievance hearing that had been held on December 15, 1993.
Pursuant to General Statutes §§ l-21i and 4-183 (a),4 the union appealed the validity of these orders to the [839]*839trial court.5 After consolidating these separate actions, the court sustained the union’s appeals, concluding that grievance proceedings were “part of the ongoing collective bargaining process.” The individual complainants, the newspaper and the commission then appealed to tire Appellate Court, which, after determinining that “grievance hearings constituted negotiations,” affirmed the judgments of the trial court. Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 42 Conn. App. 700, 709, 682 A.2d 125 (1996). We granted, in identical terms, the two petitions for certification to appeal filed, respectively, by the individual complainants and the newspaper, and by the commission.6 We reverse the judgments of the Appellate Court.
In analyzing the scope of the statutory exclusion for “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bargaining” contained in § l-18a (b), we do not write on a clean slate. In Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 234 Conn. 704, 711— 13, 663 A.2d 349 (1995), we recently construed this subsection to exclude from the term “meeting” only those parts of collective bargaining sessions that relate specifically to “strategy or negotiations,” rather than to collective bargaining proceedings in their entirety. We [840]*840arrived at this construction in light of the long-standing legislative policy of the Freedom of Information Act favoring “the open conduct of government and free public access to government records.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 712; see Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 166, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 208 Conn. 442, 450, 545 A.2d 1064 (1988); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 324, 328, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). We consistently have held that this policy requires us to construe the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act to favor disclosure and to read narrowly that act’s exceptions to disclosure. See, e.g., Gifford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 641, 651, 631 A.2d 252 (1993); Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. 621, 626, 609 A.2d 998 (1992).
The question before us, therefore, is whether grievance hearings, in their entirety, are properly to be characterized as “strategy” or “negotiation” sessions. This question is not answered in the affirmative simply because grievance procedures arise out of, and relate to, collective bargaining. In other words, to establish the applicability of the exclusion, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the duty to bargain in good faith that is imposed by our labor law “is an ongoing duty that continues after initial contract negotiations are over . . . [and] includes the duty to negotiate any question arising under an existing contract.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 120-21, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991); see General Statutes § 10-153e (d) (defining on-going duty to negotiate in good faith).
To determine whether grievance hearings qualify as “strategy or negotiations with respect to collective bar[841]*841gaining,” we must begin with a description of the operational characteristics of such hearings as documented in the administrative record. Cf. Glastonbury Education Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 234 Conn. 714-18. In the present case, the principal evidence regarding the conduct of the grievance hearing, apart from the contractual description of the grievance process,7 was the testimony of John Cronan, the president of the union. His testimony indicated that the [842]*842grievance process involves two stages, the presentation of evidence to demonstrate the violation of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement and the request for a remedy to correct the alleged violation. With respect to the remedy, he testified that the parties “bargain back and forth” and often resolve the grievance through a new interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. That new interpretation may result in the execution of new memoranda of understanding that may become part of present or future collective bargaining agreements. In assessing this evidence, the commission concluded that the parties at the grievance sessions had “discussed matters other than strategy or negotiation with respect to collective bargaining, and [843]*843[had done] so clearly when receiving lestimony and evidence from witnesses.” (Emphasis added.) With respect to discussions between the parties on the subject of remedies or settlements of grievances, however, the commission made no express finding and stated no express conclusion.
The parties draw different inferences from this administrative record. The union argues that, despite the administrative finding, grievance sessions must be entirely closed because they constitute contract negotiations that, pursuant to § l-18a (b), axe exempt from the open meeting requirement. The individual complainants and the newspaper argue that, despite the administrative evidence regarding the effect of grievance settlements on the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, grievance sessions must be entirely open because their agenda is unrelated to negotiations or strategy with respect to collective bargaining.8 The commission, in its brief, and more clearly at oral argument, has taken an intermediate position. It argues that, under §§ l-18a (b) and 1-21, the public is guaranteed access to the evidentiary portions of a grievance hearing, but not to those portions of the hearing wherein the parties discuss remedies and settlements. We agree with the commission.
As the commission urges, we hold that § l-18a (b) must be construed to contemplate a bifurcated grievance hearing. Grievance hearings are meetings that must be open to the public during the presentation of evidence regarding the underlying facts allegedly giving [844]*844rise to the grievance, but they may be closed to the public, in the absence of a waiver, during negotiations regarding appropriate remedies or settlements. Such a construction of § l-18a (b) invokes, by analogy, the parallel provisions of § l-18a (e) (2),9 pursuant to which a public agency may adjourn a meeting to go into executive session for “strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency ... is a party.” Indeed, in similar circumstances arising under § l-18a (e) (l),10 we have expressly required a public hearing during the eviden-tiary portions of hearings held to evaluate the job performance of a public employee, while at the same time recognizing that the public agency may deliberate in private about the conclusions to be drawn from such evidence. Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 190, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984) (Freedom of Information Act must be construed to mandate that “hearing” portion of administrative proceeding be open to public). The same logic applies here.
Although the scope of the administrative order at issue in this case is not free from ambiguity, a fair reading of that order indicates that the union and the board, in future grievance proceedings, must comply with the requirements of § 1-21 by providing notice and by allowing public access with respect to those portions [845]*845of the hearing that involve “receiving testimony and evidence from witnesses.” As we have construed the statute, that order was appropriate and should have been upheld.
The judgments of the Appellate Court are reversed and the cases are remanded to that court with direction that they be remanded to the trial court with direction to dismiss the appeals from the orders of the commission.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.