Callahan, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, the superintendent of police for the city of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport police department (plaintiffs), from a decision of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC).1 In its decision, the FOIC had concluded that the information appearing in permits, issued by the plaintiffs, to carry pistols or revolvers in the city of Bridgeport was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2).2 The plaintiffs appealed the deci[623] sion of the FOIC to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ l-21i (d) and 4-183. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
The factual situation that precipitated the plaintiffs’ appeal is undisputed. On October 7, 1987, a newspaper, the Fairfield County Advocate (Advocate), through an employee, Edward Ericson, requested the plaintiffs to furnish it with a list of all those residents of Bridgeport who possessed municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers.3 Ericson specified that for each permit [624] holder he desired to know the individual's name, birth-date, address, telephone number, occupation, sex, date of issuance of the permit and what weapons were registered to the individual. Initially, the plaintiffs informed Ericson that the information sought would be made available, but that it was not computerized and would take some time to produce. Thereafter, Ericson telephoned the plaintiffs regularly for approximately six weeks in an effort to obtain the requested information. That information, however, was not forthcoming. Thereafter, by letter dated December 7, 1987, the Advocate appealed to the FOIC alleging the wrongful denial of the desired data and requesting an order for its production.
On January 29, 1988, Commissioner Joan Fitch of the FOIC heard the Advocate’s appeal as a contested case. At the hearing the plaintiffs volunteered to make available to the Advocate the information that was contained in the permits issued by the plaintiffs with the exception of the names and addresses of the permit holders. Fitch, however, determined that all the requested information was subject to disclosure except the permit holders’ telephone numbers, which was not information appearing in the permits. She therefore recommended in her proposed finding to the FOIC that the plaintiffs be ordered to disclose the name, address, date of birth, occupation, and sex of all municipal permit holders and also the date the permits were issued and a description of any weapon registered.
The FOIC in a final decision dated April 27, 1988, and in a corrected final decision dated May 11, 1988, [625] substantially adopted Fitch’s recommendations.4 The FOIC concluded that the information requested by the Advocate, which appeared in municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers, was not exempt from disclosure as a medical, personnel or “similar” file pursuant to § 1-19 (b) (2) and that its disclosure did not constitute an invasion of personal privacy under that subsection. The FOIC, therefore, ordered that the plaintiffs disclose the information appearing in the permits.
The plaintiffs appealed the FOIC’s decision to the Superior Court. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the plaintiffs were aggrieved parties and were entitled to maintain the appeal. It also found that the plaintiffs’ copies of issued permits were public records that are kept on file or maintained by a public agency and that they were subject to disclosure unless they fell within the exception to disclosure set forth in § 1-19 (b) (2). Those findings are not disputed by either party. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers were medical, personnel or “similar” files exempt from disclosure under § 1-19 (b) (2).
The plaintiffs do not contend that a municipal permit to carry a pistol or revolver is a medical or personnel file. They argue instead that it is a “similar”5 file within the meaning of § 1-19 (b) (2) and therefore exempt from disclosure.
[626] In considering the plaintiffs’ argument, it must be noted initially that there is an “overarching policy” underlying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) favoring the disclosure of public records. Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193, 196, 585 A.2d 96 (1991); Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 431, 518 A.2d 49 (1986); Maher v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 310, 315, 472 A.2d 321 (1984). Our construction of the FOIA must be guided by the policy favoring disclosure and exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398, 604 A.2d 351 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 233, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 266, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984).
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Callahan, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, the superintendent of police for the city of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport police department (plaintiffs), from a decision of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC).1 In its decision, the FOIC had concluded that the information appearing in permits, issued by the plaintiffs, to carry pistols or revolvers in the city of Bridgeport was not exempt from disclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 1-19 (b) (2).2 The plaintiffs appealed the deci[623] sion of the FOIC to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes §§ l-21i (d) and 4-183. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court. We transferred the appeal to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
The factual situation that precipitated the plaintiffs’ appeal is undisputed. On October 7, 1987, a newspaper, the Fairfield County Advocate (Advocate), through an employee, Edward Ericson, requested the plaintiffs to furnish it with a list of all those residents of Bridgeport who possessed municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers.3 Ericson specified that for each permit [624] holder he desired to know the individual's name, birth-date, address, telephone number, occupation, sex, date of issuance of the permit and what weapons were registered to the individual. Initially, the plaintiffs informed Ericson that the information sought would be made available, but that it was not computerized and would take some time to produce. Thereafter, Ericson telephoned the plaintiffs regularly for approximately six weeks in an effort to obtain the requested information. That information, however, was not forthcoming. Thereafter, by letter dated December 7, 1987, the Advocate appealed to the FOIC alleging the wrongful denial of the desired data and requesting an order for its production.
On January 29, 1988, Commissioner Joan Fitch of the FOIC heard the Advocate’s appeal as a contested case. At the hearing the plaintiffs volunteered to make available to the Advocate the information that was contained in the permits issued by the plaintiffs with the exception of the names and addresses of the permit holders. Fitch, however, determined that all the requested information was subject to disclosure except the permit holders’ telephone numbers, which was not information appearing in the permits. She therefore recommended in her proposed finding to the FOIC that the plaintiffs be ordered to disclose the name, address, date of birth, occupation, and sex of all municipal permit holders and also the date the permits were issued and a description of any weapon registered.
The FOIC in a final decision dated April 27, 1988, and in a corrected final decision dated May 11, 1988, [625] substantially adopted Fitch’s recommendations.4 The FOIC concluded that the information requested by the Advocate, which appeared in municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers, was not exempt from disclosure as a medical, personnel or “similar” file pursuant to § 1-19 (b) (2) and that its disclosure did not constitute an invasion of personal privacy under that subsection. The FOIC, therefore, ordered that the plaintiffs disclose the information appearing in the permits.
The plaintiffs appealed the FOIC’s decision to the Superior Court. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal. In its memorandum of decision, the court found that the plaintiffs were aggrieved parties and were entitled to maintain the appeal. It also found that the plaintiffs’ copies of issued permits were public records that are kept on file or maintained by a public agency and that they were subject to disclosure unless they fell within the exception to disclosure set forth in § 1-19 (b) (2). Those findings are not disputed by either party. Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers were medical, personnel or “similar” files exempt from disclosure under § 1-19 (b) (2).
The plaintiffs do not contend that a municipal permit to carry a pistol or revolver is a medical or personnel file. They argue instead that it is a “similar”5 file within the meaning of § 1-19 (b) (2) and therefore exempt from disclosure.
[626] In considering the plaintiffs’ argument, it must be noted initially that there is an “overarching policy” underlying the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) favoring the disclosure of public records. Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193, 196, 585 A.2d 96 (1991); Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 421, 431, 518 A.2d 49 (1986); Maher v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 310, 315, 472 A.2d 321 (1984). Our construction of the FOIA must be guided by the policy favoring disclosure and exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 393, 398, 604 A.2d 351 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 233, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 266, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984).
In keeping with that policy, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are “similar” to medical and personnel files and are therefore entitled to the exemption from disclosure proyided such files by § 1-19 (b) (2). Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 232; Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra; Commissioner of Consumer Protection v. Freedom of Information Commission, 207 Conn. 698, 702, 542 A.2d 321 (1988). “The plaintiffs must meet a twofold burden of proof to establish the applicability of the § 1-19 (b) (2) exclusion. First, they must establish that the [permits] in question are within the categories of files protected by the exemption, that is, personnel, medical or ‘similar’ files. Second, they must show that disclosure of the records ‘would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.’ ” Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 431-32; Ottochian v. Free[627] dom of Information Commission, supra, 399-400; Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 196; Board of Education v. Freedom of Information Commission, 210 Conn. 590, 595, 556 A.2d 592 (1989). “This burden requires the claimant of the exemption to provide more than conclusory language, generalized allegations or mere arguments of counsel. Rather, a sufficiently detailed record must reflect the reasons why an exemption applies to the materials requested.” New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 776, 535 A.2d 1297 (1988); Emergency Medical Services Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 19 Conn. App. 352, 357, 561 A.2d 981 (1989).
As previously noted, the plaintiffs do not contend that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are medical or personnel files. The question to be resolved, therefore, is whether such permits are, as argued by the plaintiffs, “similar” files that are exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 1-19 (b) (2). If Bridgeport municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers are not “similar” files within the purview of § 1-19 (b) (2), such permits are not exempt from disclosure and it is unnecessary to consider whether their release would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra.6
The FOIA does not define what constitutes a “similar” file. We believe, however, that a municipal permit to carry a pistol or revolver is not a file “similar” to a medical or personnel file as envisioned by § 1-19 (b) (2). “We interpret the term ‘similar files’ to encompass only files similar in nature to personnel or medical files. This interpretation is consistent with our [628] policy of narrowly construing exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act. Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn. 183, 188, 470 A.2d 1209 (1984). We also recognize that when a reference to a general category follows an enumeration of specific categories, the general category is construed to embrace only objects similar to those included in the specific categories. Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 553, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. 1986) § 47.18.” Hartford v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 432 n.11.
In common parlance, a permit to carry a pistol or revolver is not “similar” to a medical or personnel file.7 Unlike a personnel or medical file, a permit to carry a pistol or revolver does not contain detailed information with a potential for disclosure of the intimate details of one’s personal life or capabilities.8 To conclude that a permit to carry a pistol or revolver is “similar” to a medical or personnel file and therefore exempt from disclosure would be a broad interpretation of § 1-19 (b) (2) that would stretch the ordinary meaning of “similar” to the breaking point. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the general principle that exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed. Ottochian v. Freedom of Information Com[629] mission, supra, 398; Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 233; Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 266; Board of Police Commissioners v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 188. Narrowly construed, the term “similar” in § 1-19 (b) (2) cannot be extended to equate a permit to carry a pistol or revolver with a medical or personnel file.
The plaintiffs’ most appealing argument for ascribing “similar” status, and hence confidentiality, to permits to carry pistols or revolvers is that of safety. The plaintiffs claim that if a list of permit holders was made public it would furnish a “shopping list” to the criminal element. They also claim that disclosure would warn criminals where they might encounter armed resistance to attempted criminal activity and thus possibly encourage violence on an escalated scale. There is, however, no evidence in the record that such results will occur unless pistol or revolver permits are exempt from disclosure. The plaintiffs’ theory is grounded in speculation and given approbation solely by the arguments of counsel and is therefore an insufficient basis for overturning the decision of the administrative agency. New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 776; Emergency Medical Services Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 357.
The plaintiffs also claim that the disclosure of the information contained in the permits is a violation of the permit holders’ federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and to keep and bear arms. The plaintiffs do not claim that the state cannot legitimately impose reasonable restrictions on the right to bear arms nor do they contend that the requirement for the issuance of a permit to carry a pistol or revolver in public is an unreasonable restriction of that right. They appear to argue, however, that if the information in a permit is subject to disclosure, a permit holder must forfeit [630] the constitutional right to privacy in order to exercise his or her constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Consequently, they seem to claim that disclosure constitutes an infringement on both rights of the permit holder. The success of the plaintiffs’ argument turns on whether the required disclosure of the information in a permit to carry a pistol or revolver violates a permit holder’s constitutional right to privacy.
The plaintiffs have, however, failed to posit a theory that would allow them to assert the constitutional rights of the individual permit holders. “ ‘We have uniformly resisted the efforts of litigants to assert constitutional claims of others not in a direct adversarial posture before the court.’ Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Housing Authority, 191 Conn. 514, 522, 468 A.2d 574 (1983).” Dinan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 220 Conn. 61, 72, 595 A.2d 864 (1991). “Under long established principles, a party is precluded from asserting the constitutional rights of another.” Bell v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 174 Conn. 493, 499, 391 A.2d 154 (1978).
We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed in their burden to demonstrate that municipal permits to carry pistols or revolvers in public are “similar” files entitled to exemption from disclosure by virtue of § 1-19 (b) (2) of the FOIA.9 We also conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to assert the constitutional rights of the individual permit holders who are not properly before us.
The judgment is affirmed.10
In this opinion the other justices concurred.