Shea, J.
This appeal arises out of an arbitrator’s award ordering the plaintiff, the Thomaston board of education (board), to promote a teacher to the position of department head of the Thomaston high school English department. The board, instead of challenging the award in court, eliminated the department head position for the admitted purpose of preventing the teacher from holding the position. The teacher and the union [112]*112filed an unfair labor practice charge with the state labor relations board (labor board), which ordered the board of education to comply with the arbitrator’s award and restore the position. The board of education thereupon appealed to the Superior Court, challenging both the decision and the order. The court vacated the order of the labor board, holding that the elimination of a teaching position was in the sole discretion of the board of education and thus that the labor board was without authority to order the board to restore the position. This appeal ensued.
I
The labor board’s factual findings are unchallenged. Fred Schipul taught English at Thomaston high school for eighteen years. In December, 1985, he applied for the position of English department chairperson, which was then vacant. In January, 1986, the board of education awarded the position to a less senior teacher. Schipul filed a grievance based on the provision in the teachers’ collective bargaining agreement1 that required [113]*113the board to promote the most senior teacher “where two or more applicants are equal in qualification.”2 On August 10, 1986, the arbitrator upheld the grievance and ordered the board of education to promote Schipul, retroactively to January, 1986.
Meanwhile, before the arbitration award was made, the board of education voted to eliminate all department head positions from its budget. Two weeks after the award was issued, however, the board restored all department head positions—all, that is, except the position of English department head. As a result of the award, the board of education paid Schipul what he would have received as department head until the position was eliminated, but never allowed him to perform the job.
Schipul’s bargaining representative, the Thomaston Education Association, duly filed an unfair labor practice charge with the labor board, claiming that the board of education’s actions interfered with Schipul’s statutory right to file a grievance. The board of education admitted before the labor board that its sole reason for not restoring the position of English department head was to prevent Schipul from holding that position, for which it honestly believed he was unqualified.
II
Although the trial court’s memorandum of decision did not address whether the school board’s conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, that issue has been presented to us on appeal by both parties. The board of education maintains that because the arbitrator’s decision was “not concerned with the future elimination of the position but only with Schipul’s entitlement to the position in January, 1986, when it indeed did [114]*114exist,” (emphasis in original) the elimination of the position in August, 1986, could not logically be a repudiation of the arbitrator’s decision that Schipul was entitled to the position in January, 1986, and that, because the establishment of teaching positions is discretionary, elimination of the position could not be an unfair labor practice. The labor board contends that the board of education’s action, which effectively nullified the arbitrator’s award and flouted the contractually mandated grievance arbitration process, constituted a refusal to participate in good faith in mediation and arbitration, an unfair labor practice under General Statutes § 10-153e (b) (4) and (5) of the Teachers Negotiation Act (TNA).3 123 We conclude that the board of education’s arguments are without merit, and agree with the labor board.4
A
The labor board first claims that the board of education’s action was an unfair labor practice specifically prohibited by General Statutes § 10-153e (b) (5), “refusing to participate in good faith in mediation or arbi[115]*115tration.” Without discussing that particular subsection of the TNA, the board of education emphasizes the absence in the TNA of language in the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-407 et seq., specifically listing failure to comply with an arbitration award as an unfair labor practice,5 and argues that this absence shows that the legislature did not intend failure to comply with an arbitration award to constitute an unfair labor practice under the TNA.
Before considering the implications of the legislature’s decision not to include in the TNA a provision such as § 7-470 (a) (6) of MERA, we will consider the language of the TNA as it is written. Section 10-153e (b) (5) makes “refusing to participate in good faith in mediation or arbitration” an unfair labor practice. The word “arbitration” is a general term that may refer either to arbitration of individual claims that an employer has breached a collective bargaining agreement (grievance arbitration) or to arbitration of broader disputes concerning the conditions of employment in general, arising either during contract negotiations or in some cases during the term of an existing contract (interest arbi[116]*116tration). Section 10-153e (b) (5) does not define the term further to indicate the type or types of arbitration to which it refers.
We construe a statute as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation. Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987). Where the same words are used in a statute two or more times, they will ordinarily be given the same meaning. State ex rel. Hyde v. Dowe, 129 Conn. 266, 271, 28 A.2d 12 (1942). In the TNA, §§ 10-153d6 and 10-153Í7 use the terms [117]*117“mediation” and “arbitration” to refer to a specific set of procedures a school board and teachers’ union must pursue if negotiations with respect to the conditions of employment of teachers in general; General Statutes [118]*118§ 10-153f (b), (e); reach an impasse.8 *****8 Thus, in §§ 10-153d and 10-153f “arbitration” means interest arbitration, not arbitration of individual grievances.
If we read § 10-153e and § 10-153f concurrently, we must conclude that § 10-153e (b) (5) addresses only the contract mediation and interest arbitration procedures mandated by § 10-153Í, not the arbitration of an individual employee’s grievances. The alternative interpretation, that § 10-153e (b) (5) makes refusal to arbitrate any individual grievance an unfair labor practice, would impose a duty to arbitrate grievances upon a board of education even if its collective bargaining agreement included no such requirement. Had the legislature intended such a result, we believe it would have included in the TNA the plain language it used in § 7-470 (a) (6) of the MERA. The MERA, unlike the TNA, guarantees the right to mediation or arbitration of individual grievances. See General Statutes § 7-472.9
[119]
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Shea, J.
This appeal arises out of an arbitrator’s award ordering the plaintiff, the Thomaston board of education (board), to promote a teacher to the position of department head of the Thomaston high school English department. The board, instead of challenging the award in court, eliminated the department head position for the admitted purpose of preventing the teacher from holding the position. The teacher and the union [112]*112filed an unfair labor practice charge with the state labor relations board (labor board), which ordered the board of education to comply with the arbitrator’s award and restore the position. The board of education thereupon appealed to the Superior Court, challenging both the decision and the order. The court vacated the order of the labor board, holding that the elimination of a teaching position was in the sole discretion of the board of education and thus that the labor board was without authority to order the board to restore the position. This appeal ensued.
I
The labor board’s factual findings are unchallenged. Fred Schipul taught English at Thomaston high school for eighteen years. In December, 1985, he applied for the position of English department chairperson, which was then vacant. In January, 1986, the board of education awarded the position to a less senior teacher. Schipul filed a grievance based on the provision in the teachers’ collective bargaining agreement1 that required [113]*113the board to promote the most senior teacher “where two or more applicants are equal in qualification.”2 On August 10, 1986, the arbitrator upheld the grievance and ordered the board of education to promote Schipul, retroactively to January, 1986.
Meanwhile, before the arbitration award was made, the board of education voted to eliminate all department head positions from its budget. Two weeks after the award was issued, however, the board restored all department head positions—all, that is, except the position of English department head. As a result of the award, the board of education paid Schipul what he would have received as department head until the position was eliminated, but never allowed him to perform the job.
Schipul’s bargaining representative, the Thomaston Education Association, duly filed an unfair labor practice charge with the labor board, claiming that the board of education’s actions interfered with Schipul’s statutory right to file a grievance. The board of education admitted before the labor board that its sole reason for not restoring the position of English department head was to prevent Schipul from holding that position, for which it honestly believed he was unqualified.
II
Although the trial court’s memorandum of decision did not address whether the school board’s conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, that issue has been presented to us on appeal by both parties. The board of education maintains that because the arbitrator’s decision was “not concerned with the future elimination of the position but only with Schipul’s entitlement to the position in January, 1986, when it indeed did [114]*114exist,” (emphasis in original) the elimination of the position in August, 1986, could not logically be a repudiation of the arbitrator’s decision that Schipul was entitled to the position in January, 1986, and that, because the establishment of teaching positions is discretionary, elimination of the position could not be an unfair labor practice. The labor board contends that the board of education’s action, which effectively nullified the arbitrator’s award and flouted the contractually mandated grievance arbitration process, constituted a refusal to participate in good faith in mediation and arbitration, an unfair labor practice under General Statutes § 10-153e (b) (4) and (5) of the Teachers Negotiation Act (TNA).3 123 We conclude that the board of education’s arguments are without merit, and agree with the labor board.4
A
The labor board first claims that the board of education’s action was an unfair labor practice specifically prohibited by General Statutes § 10-153e (b) (5), “refusing to participate in good faith in mediation or arbi[115]*115tration.” Without discussing that particular subsection of the TNA, the board of education emphasizes the absence in the TNA of language in the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-407 et seq., specifically listing failure to comply with an arbitration award as an unfair labor practice,5 and argues that this absence shows that the legislature did not intend failure to comply with an arbitration award to constitute an unfair labor practice under the TNA.
Before considering the implications of the legislature’s decision not to include in the TNA a provision such as § 7-470 (a) (6) of MERA, we will consider the language of the TNA as it is written. Section 10-153e (b) (5) makes “refusing to participate in good faith in mediation or arbitration” an unfair labor practice. The word “arbitration” is a general term that may refer either to arbitration of individual claims that an employer has breached a collective bargaining agreement (grievance arbitration) or to arbitration of broader disputes concerning the conditions of employment in general, arising either during contract negotiations or in some cases during the term of an existing contract (interest arbi[116]*116tration). Section 10-153e (b) (5) does not define the term further to indicate the type or types of arbitration to which it refers.
We construe a statute as a whole and read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a reasonable overall interpretation. Ganim v. Roberts, 204 Conn. 760, 763, 529 A.2d 194 (1987). Where the same words are used in a statute two or more times, they will ordinarily be given the same meaning. State ex rel. Hyde v. Dowe, 129 Conn. 266, 271, 28 A.2d 12 (1942). In the TNA, §§ 10-153d6 and 10-153Í7 use the terms [117]*117“mediation” and “arbitration” to refer to a specific set of procedures a school board and teachers’ union must pursue if negotiations with respect to the conditions of employment of teachers in general; General Statutes [118]*118§ 10-153f (b), (e); reach an impasse.8 *****8 Thus, in §§ 10-153d and 10-153f “arbitration” means interest arbitration, not arbitration of individual grievances.
If we read § 10-153e and § 10-153f concurrently, we must conclude that § 10-153e (b) (5) addresses only the contract mediation and interest arbitration procedures mandated by § 10-153Í, not the arbitration of an individual employee’s grievances. The alternative interpretation, that § 10-153e (b) (5) makes refusal to arbitrate any individual grievance an unfair labor practice, would impose a duty to arbitrate grievances upon a board of education even if its collective bargaining agreement included no such requirement. Had the legislature intended such a result, we believe it would have included in the TNA the plain language it used in § 7-470 (a) (6) of the MERA. The MERA, unlike the TNA, guarantees the right to mediation or arbitration of individual grievances. See General Statutes § 7-472.9
[119]*119The labor board’s own decisions support our interpretation, as they have repeatedly cited § 10-153e (b) (4), not (b) (5), when finding unfair labor practices in situations similar to the one now before us. See In the Matter of East Hartford Board of Education, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations Decision No. 1911 (July 7, 1980); In the Matter of Southington Board of Education, Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations Decision No. 1788 (July 19, 1979).
B
In addition to finding that the board of education’s conduct was an unfair labor practice under § 10-153e (b) (5), the labor board also concluded that the board of education’s conduct was an unfair labor practice under § 10-153e (b) (4) as a “refus[al] to negotiate in good faith with the employees’ bargaining agent.” Our conclusion that repudiation of a grievance arbitration award is not an unfair labor practice under § 10-153e (b) (5) does not prevent the labor board from determining that the board’s action in this case constituted an unfair labor practice under § 10-153e (b) (4).
In accordance with widely held principles of administrative and labor law, we traditionally have accorded [120]*120deference to the labor board’s interpretation of the acts it is charged with enforcing. Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 263, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, 202 Conn. 492, 503, 522 A.2d 264 (1987); State Board of Labor Relations v. Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 74, 411 A.2d 28 (1979). “[Reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency’s enabling Act . . . .” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 464 U.S. 89, 97, 98 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 439, 78 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1983); N.L.R.B. v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350, 98 S. Ct. 651, 54 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1978). The agency’s practical construction of the statute, if reasonable, is “ ‘ “high evidence of what the law is.” ’ ” Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100, 106, 561 A.2d 429 (1989). In judging whether the labor board’s interpretation was reasonable, we may look to federal labor law for guidance in construing our labor relations acts. Success Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, 175 Conn. 165, 168, 397 A.2d 85 (1978) (construing state Labor Relations Act); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 579, 295 A.2d 526 (1972) (construing TNA). In light of federal labor law precedent, we consider the labor board’s interpretation of the act both reasonable and persuasive.
The “duty to bargain in good faith” is a term of art in labor law. It is an ongoing duty that continues after initial contract negotiations are over. N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436, 87 S. Ct. 565, 17 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1967); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966); Hartford Principals’ & Supervisors’ Assn. v. Shedd, supra, 503; Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 190 Conn. 235, 241-42, 460 A.2d 1255 (1983). It includes the duty to negotiate “any question arising” [121]*121under an existing contract. General Statutes § 10-153e (d).10 If the contract requires arbitration of unresolved grievances, the duty to bargain in good faith includes the duty to participate in good faith in the grievance arbitration process, for “dispute resolution under the grievance-arbitration process is as much a part of collective bargaining as the act of negotiating the contract.” United Technologies Corporation, 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1971); see also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960).
“Going through the motions” does not fulfill the duty to bargain in good faith. Thus, failing to provide the other party with relevant information during the collective bargaining process or at other times; Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 241; failing to make contract proposals in good faith; New Canaan v. State Board of Labor Relations, 160 Conn. 285, 292, 278 A.2d 761 (1971); and failing to bargain before making unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment after a contract has been signed; Fibreboard Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203, 85 S. Ct. 398, 13 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1964); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra, 596; have all been described as [122]*122breaches of the duty to bargain in good faith. These types of conduct have one thing in common: they are attempts to evade the statutorily mandated collective bargaining process. See New Canaan v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra.
The board of education’s conduct fits the same description. The board and the teachers association bargained to include in their contract a provision regulating promotions and another provision providing for grievance arbitration of employment decisions, including promotions. The board of education’s attempt to circumvent these provisions makes the collective bargaining process a hollow exercise.
The board of education’s attempt to “evade” the arbitrator’s decision is thus no different from a repudiation of the arbitration process itself. Since repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement as a whole constitutes ipso facto a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith; see Taylor Bus Services, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 530, 550 (1987); N.L.R.B. v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964);11 an employer who repudiates the grievance process as a whole by refusing to process [123]*123grievances violates the duty to bargain in good faith, as the National Labor Relations Board has consistently held. See, e.g., Conoco, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 548 (1987); Manchester Health Center, Inc., 287 N.L.R.B. 328 (1987); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839 (1969). Repudiation of an arbitration award may also violate the duty to bargain in good faith; Meat & Allied Food Workers Local No. 248 v. Packerland Packing Co., 411 F. Sup. 1280 (E.D. Wis. 1976); O. P. Held, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 676 (1987); B. N. Beard Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 191 (1977); when the repudiation constitutes a rejection of the grievance process itself. See General Chemical Corporation, 290 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1103 (July 29, 1988).12
[124]*124In this case, the board deliberately flouted the grievance arbitration provision of the contract between the board and the Teachers’ Association. Instead of seeking to vacate or modify the award pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-418,13 52-41914 and 52-420,15 [125]*125it decided to do indirectly what it could not do directly: keep Fred Schipul out of the position that the arbitrator had determined he was qualified for and entitled to hold.
The board argues that its sincere belief that Schipul was unqualified somehow releases it from its duty to comply in good faith with the grievance arbitration process. It is not exceptional for an employer charged with violating a promotion provision in a collective bargaining agreement to believe sincerely that the grievant is less qualified than the candidate promoted. The point is that the board of education agreed to let an arbitrator decide whether the grievant was the most qualified candidate for the position in question. Once the board agreed to subject promotions to the grievance process, it was bound by the arbitrator’s decision. East Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 1662, 212 Conn. 368, 372, 561 A.2d 1388 (1989); Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 684, 427 A.2d 859 (1980); Board of Educations. Waterbury Teachers Assn., 168 Conn. 54, 62, 357 A.2d 466 (1975). “ ‘There are situations in which it is not enough that an employer is convinced he is right,’ N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., [377 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1967)], and this is one of them.” General Teamsters Local 162 v. N.L.R.B., 568 F.2d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 1978).
[126]*126The board further contends that its obligations under General Statutes §§ 10-22016 and 10-22217 exempt it from the rule that an arbitrator’s unchallenged decision is final and binding. Under these statutes, the board is required to “implement the educational interests of the state . . . as in its judgment will best serve the interests of the school district” and is authorized to spend the money the town appropriates for education “in [its] discretion.” The board argues that these statutes require it to eliminate a teaching position rather than allow a teacher the board feels is unqualified to hold that position.
The board’s argument reaches too far. If § 10-220 compels the board of education to follow its own judgment at all times, § 10-220 could just as easily compel the board of education to perform acts specifically prohibited by the statutes, including discrimination on the basis of race, sex or union membership, so long as the board genuinely believed those acts were in the best interests of the school district. “ ‘ “In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and the courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.” ’ ” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. B.W. Beardsley, Inc., 208 Conn. 13, 20, 542 A.2d 1159 (1988). “A statute . . . should not be interpreted [127]*127to thwart its purpose.” Builders Service Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 267, 276, 545 A.2d 530 (1988). The legislature did not intend the general mandate of § 10-220 to swallow up the collective bargaining process mandated by the TNA.
Finally, the board of education argues that it cannot be an unfair labor practice for it to perform an act that lies within its exclusive discretion, namely, the elimination of a teaching position. We have held, however, that a public employer’s discretion to hire and fire18 may not be used as a “subterfuge to circumvent the provisions of the act.” Winchester v. State Board of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 369, 402 A.2d 332 (1978); L. Suzio Construction Co. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 148 Conn. 135, 144, 168 A.2d 553 (1961); Imperial Laundry, Inc. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 142 Conn. 457, 467, 115 A.2d 439 (1955).
The facts in Winchester are especially similar to the facts now before us. In that case, the Winchester fire department eliminated its only salaried position after Armand Sartirana, who held the position, joined a union. Although we held in Winchester that the protections of MERA did not cover a one-person bargaining unit, so that the employer had no duty to conduct contract negotiations with the union; Winchester v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 361-62; we went on to hold that the employee’s rights under MERA had nevertheless been violated when the position was eliminated, even though the department claimed that the position was eliminated for economic reasons. Id., 371. While Winchester dealt with anti-union animus in violation of General Statutes § 7-470 (a) (1) (parallel to General Statutes § 10-153e [b] [1]), which is not alleged in the present case, and did not address the scope of [128]*128the discretion granted to school boards, it presented essentially the same issue we confront here: may a public employer do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly, that is, may it use its discretionary power to eliminate a position in order to bring about a prohibited result? In Winchester and in the present case, the answer is “no.”
Ill
Once the labor board had correctly determined that the board of education had committed an unfair labor practice, it was empowered to order a remedy that would best effectuate the purposes of the act. General Statutes § 10-153e (e).19 Our labor board, like the National Labor Relations Board, has broad remedial powers. Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra, 241. Its enumerated powers include the power to order reinstatement and back pay for unjustly terminated employees, including the power to order reinstatement of all employees who have been subject to an unfair labor practice. General Statutes § 31-107 (c).20 A public employer subject to such an [129]*129order would implicitly have to find the necessary funds to comply with a back pay order. In this case, of course, the labor board’s order requires the board of education to restore and fund a position it had voted to eliminate. The board of education argues that creation and elimination of teaching positions lies within its exclusive authority and that the labor board exceeded its authority by requiring the board to recreate a defunct teaching position. “The short answer is that the Board had jurisdiction to find an unfair labor practice and to remedy it.” N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., supra, 716.
While as a general proposition it is true that creation or elimination of teaching positions is within the “sound discretion” of the board of education; Baston v. Ricci, 174 Conn. 522, 528, 391 A.2d 161 (1978); West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra, 586; we have also held that the TNA divests the board of education of some of its discretionary power under [130]*130General Statutes §§ 10-220 and 10-222. West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, supra. A board of education may not use its discretionary power to eliminate teaching positions in order to bypass the grievance arbitration process. Consequently, the labor board has the power to order the board of education to restore a teaching position eliminated for such an improper purpose. The board of education retains the right to eliminate the position if it has a legitimate reason for doing so, or to terminate or demote the teacher if his performance is objectively inadequate.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the board of education’s appeal from the decision and order of the labor board.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.