Nolan, J.
The plaintiff, Joao Vertentes, seeks further appellate review pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 11, after a decision of the Appeals Court.1 The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on a jury verdict which had awarded him $900,000, for injuries suffered when he was struck by a motor vehicle in the course of his employment as a construction worker on a highway rebuilding project. Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 463 (1983).2 After reviewing the factual and legal issues presented, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
The defendant, The Barletta Company, Inc. (Barletta), contracted with the Department of Public Works (department) to reconstruct a ten-mile length of Route 24 between Brockton and Bridgewater. Route 24, as the contract stated, is a high-speed and high-volume major highway. In connection with this contract, Barletta subcontracted portions of the work to several independent contractors, including Richard F. Lyons, Inc. (Lyons). Vertentes was an employee of Lyons.
On the afternoon of September 26, 1974, Vertentes was struck by a truck driven by a person not connected with the construction. At the time of impact, Vertentes was removing orange marker barrels from the highway. These barrels had not been placed in accordance with department regulations. Although Lyons’ personnel were working within the area, neither Barletta nor Vertentes introduced direct evidence indicating which subcontractor working in the area had placed the [167]*167barrels incorrectly in the roadway. Vertentes received workmen’s compensation benefits from Lyons and a settlement from the driver of the truck.
The trial judge found as a matter of law that the removal of barrels on a four-lane highway was an inherently dangerous activity. She instructed the jury that Barietta could be vicariously liable for the negligence of a subcontractor who placed the barrels in the roadway without adequate signs warning about the construction. The judge further instructed that Barietta could be found directly negligent for failing to supervise the safety precautions taken by its subcontractors in placing the barrels on the road. The jury returned a verdict finding Barietta 90% negligent and Vertentes 10% negligent. However, the special questions answered by the jury failed to designate the theory upon which Barietta was found negligent. On appeal from the denial of Barletta’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Appeals Court reversed the judgment.
1. Direct liability. We have reviewed the evidence further and conclude that a verdict based upon a finding that Barietta negligently caused Vertentes’ injuries by failing properly to supervise the safety procedures undertaken by its subcontractors in the placement of the barrels would “rest[ ] in surmise and conjecture.” Currie v. Lee Equip. Corp., 362 Mass. 765, 768 (1973). Vertentes merely established that Barietta retained the authority and responsibility to supervise the safety procedures employed by the subcontractors in the placement of the barrels. The evidence does not reveal any facts which would give rise to an inference that Barietta performed this duty negligently.
2. Vicarious liability. Vertentes requests that we extend the duty of care owed by an employer of an independent contractor who is performing inherently dangerous work to employees of the independent contractor.3 A hopeless conflict of authority exists among those jurisdictions which have consid[168]*168ered this issue.4 Vertentes suggests that this rule should be extended to employees for three reasons: (1) the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts intended employees to be included within the rule; (2) that it would be against public policy to deny relief to an employee based upon his employment status, and (3) that failure to extend the rule to employees of independent contractors would be inconsistent with G. L. c. 152, § 15, as amended through St. 1971, c. 941, § 1, which specifically allowed an employee a right of action against a third-party tortfeasor. We are not persuaded by any of these reasons and we hold that the duty owed by an employer of an independent contractor who is performing inherently dangerous work does not extend to the employees of the independent contractor.
Generally, an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his employees. Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 150 (1950). However, we held in Whalen that one who hires an independent contractor to perform work which is inherently dangerous is liable for failure to take precautions. Id. [169]*169For purposes of the instant case, we assume, without deciding, that Barletta hired subcontractors (independent contractors) to perform inherently dangerous work, i.e. the removal of barrels on a well traveled highway, and that as a result of failure to take precautions, the plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured. The question is whether the rule of Whalen applies to such an employee. We answer, No.
Vertentes asserts that because the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts did not adopt a specific exclusion for employees of independent contractors, they intended employees to fall within the protections under §§416 and 427, which are set forth in the margin.5 See Hagberg v. Sioux Falls, 281 F. Supp. 460, 468 n.7 (D.S.D. 1968). Specifically, Vertentes argues that the language, “peculiar risk of physical harm to others” in § 416, and “liability for physical harm caused to such others” in § 427 (emphasis supplied), must include employees of a subcontractor.
In the introductory notes to c. 15 of the Tentative Draft No. 7 (1962), of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the authors indicated that employees of independent contractors should be expressly excluded from recovery under all exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. However, this special note was not included in the final 1965 draft. Vertentes suggests that the failure to include this special note in the final draft implies [170]*170that the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts intended employees of independent contractors to recover.
While some courts have found this omission significant, Hagberg v. Sioux Falls, supra, we do not. We believe that the authors intentionally left unclear the question whether an employee of an independent contractor should recover. We also note that all illustrations following §§416 and 427 deal only with members of the general public.
Second, Vertentes argues that if we exclude employees from recovery under this exception, we would be violating the “public policy” of our decisions in Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206 (1978), and Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973). Vertentes claims that Poirier, supra, which abolished the “hidden defect” rule as applied to employees of independent contractors, imposed a single duty of care under all circumstances. Thus it eliminated any distinctions based upon the status of the plaintiff. His argument continues that to deny relief to employees of independent contractors in this case would derogate from this rule.
Poirier, supra,
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Nolan, J.
The plaintiff, Joao Vertentes, seeks further appellate review pursuant to G. L. c. 211A, § 11, after a decision of the Appeals Court.1 The Appeals Court reversed the judgment on a jury verdict which had awarded him $900,000, for injuries suffered when he was struck by a motor vehicle in the course of his employment as a construction worker on a highway rebuilding project. Vertentes v. Barletta Co., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 463 (1983).2 After reviewing the factual and legal issues presented, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
The defendant, The Barletta Company, Inc. (Barletta), contracted with the Department of Public Works (department) to reconstruct a ten-mile length of Route 24 between Brockton and Bridgewater. Route 24, as the contract stated, is a high-speed and high-volume major highway. In connection with this contract, Barletta subcontracted portions of the work to several independent contractors, including Richard F. Lyons, Inc. (Lyons). Vertentes was an employee of Lyons.
On the afternoon of September 26, 1974, Vertentes was struck by a truck driven by a person not connected with the construction. At the time of impact, Vertentes was removing orange marker barrels from the highway. These barrels had not been placed in accordance with department regulations. Although Lyons’ personnel were working within the area, neither Barletta nor Vertentes introduced direct evidence indicating which subcontractor working in the area had placed the [167]*167barrels incorrectly in the roadway. Vertentes received workmen’s compensation benefits from Lyons and a settlement from the driver of the truck.
The trial judge found as a matter of law that the removal of barrels on a four-lane highway was an inherently dangerous activity. She instructed the jury that Barietta could be vicariously liable for the negligence of a subcontractor who placed the barrels in the roadway without adequate signs warning about the construction. The judge further instructed that Barietta could be found directly negligent for failing to supervise the safety precautions taken by its subcontractors in placing the barrels on the road. The jury returned a verdict finding Barietta 90% negligent and Vertentes 10% negligent. However, the special questions answered by the jury failed to designate the theory upon which Barietta was found negligent. On appeal from the denial of Barletta’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Appeals Court reversed the judgment.
1. Direct liability. We have reviewed the evidence further and conclude that a verdict based upon a finding that Barietta negligently caused Vertentes’ injuries by failing properly to supervise the safety procedures undertaken by its subcontractors in the placement of the barrels would “rest[ ] in surmise and conjecture.” Currie v. Lee Equip. Corp., 362 Mass. 765, 768 (1973). Vertentes merely established that Barietta retained the authority and responsibility to supervise the safety procedures employed by the subcontractors in the placement of the barrels. The evidence does not reveal any facts which would give rise to an inference that Barietta performed this duty negligently.
2. Vicarious liability. Vertentes requests that we extend the duty of care owed by an employer of an independent contractor who is performing inherently dangerous work to employees of the independent contractor.3 A hopeless conflict of authority exists among those jurisdictions which have consid[168]*168ered this issue.4 Vertentes suggests that this rule should be extended to employees for three reasons: (1) the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts intended employees to be included within the rule; (2) that it would be against public policy to deny relief to an employee based upon his employment status, and (3) that failure to extend the rule to employees of independent contractors would be inconsistent with G. L. c. 152, § 15, as amended through St. 1971, c. 941, § 1, which specifically allowed an employee a right of action against a third-party tortfeasor. We are not persuaded by any of these reasons and we hold that the duty owed by an employer of an independent contractor who is performing inherently dangerous work does not extend to the employees of the independent contractor.
Generally, an employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his employees. Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 150 (1950). However, we held in Whalen that one who hires an independent contractor to perform work which is inherently dangerous is liable for failure to take precautions. Id. [169]*169For purposes of the instant case, we assume, without deciding, that Barletta hired subcontractors (independent contractors) to perform inherently dangerous work, i.e. the removal of barrels on a well traveled highway, and that as a result of failure to take precautions, the plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured. The question is whether the rule of Whalen applies to such an employee. We answer, No.
Vertentes asserts that because the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts did not adopt a specific exclusion for employees of independent contractors, they intended employees to fall within the protections under §§416 and 427, which are set forth in the margin.5 See Hagberg v. Sioux Falls, 281 F. Supp. 460, 468 n.7 (D.S.D. 1968). Specifically, Vertentes argues that the language, “peculiar risk of physical harm to others” in § 416, and “liability for physical harm caused to such others” in § 427 (emphasis supplied), must include employees of a subcontractor.
In the introductory notes to c. 15 of the Tentative Draft No. 7 (1962), of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the authors indicated that employees of independent contractors should be expressly excluded from recovery under all exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. However, this special note was not included in the final 1965 draft. Vertentes suggests that the failure to include this special note in the final draft implies [170]*170that the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts intended employees of independent contractors to recover.
While some courts have found this omission significant, Hagberg v. Sioux Falls, supra, we do not. We believe that the authors intentionally left unclear the question whether an employee of an independent contractor should recover. We also note that all illustrations following §§416 and 427 deal only with members of the general public.
Second, Vertentes argues that if we exclude employees from recovery under this exception, we would be violating the “public policy” of our decisions in Poirier v. Plymouth, 374 Mass. 206 (1978), and Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973). Vertentes claims that Poirier, supra, which abolished the “hidden defect” rule as applied to employees of independent contractors, imposed a single duty of care under all circumstances. Thus it eliminated any distinctions based upon the status of the plaintiff. His argument continues that to deny relief to employees of independent contractors in this case would derogate from this rule.
Poirier, supra, sought to impose direct liability for the negligence of an employer or hirer of an independent contractor in failing to provide a safe work environment. Id. at 228. Poirier differs significantly from the instant case because Vertentes seeks to impose vicarious liability on the employer, a species of liability which is not predicated on the employer’s direct negligence. We believe this difference renders the,Poirier holding inapplicable.
Moreover, denial of recovery for an employee of an independent contractor does not encourage an employer to evade liability through the device of a contract with an independent contractor. See Davis v. John L. Whiting & Son, 201 Mass. 91,93 (1909). An employer, Barietta in this case, does not escape liability either directly or indirectly because the contract price takes into account the independent contractor’s potential workmen’s compensation liability. Welker v. Kennecott Copper Co., 1 Ariz. App. 395, 403-404 (1965). The employer of the independent contractor, in effect, pays the workmen’s compensation premiums through the contract price. Vagle v. Pick[171]*171ands Mather & Co., 611 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
If we were to permit recovery in this case on the basis of vicarious liability, an employee of an independent contractor would collect more compensation than an injured employee of Barietta, who would be limited to workmen’s compensation benefits. This would impose a heavier burden upon employers who must rely on the services and expertise of independent contractors to perform hazardous work. See Vagle v. Pickands Mather & Co., supra. Furthermore, if we impose liability in cases such as this, employers of independent contractors who perform inherently dangerous work may demand indemnity from those contractors for any recovery obtained by the contractor’s employees. This would expose independent contractors to potential liability far greater than that of other employers covered by workmen’s compensation statutes. See Anderson v. Chancellor W. Oil Dev. Corp., 53 Cal. App. 3d 235, 242 n.2 (1975).
We have considered the other arguments of Vertentes and find no merit in them. For all these reasons we hold that Barietta, as the general contractor, is not vicariously liable to the plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor.
Judgment of the Superior Court reversed.