Universal Match Corp. v. United States

161 Ct. Cl. 418, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 72, 1963 WL 8568
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 5, 1963
DocketNo. 554-59
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 161 Ct. Cl. 418 (Universal Match Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Universal Match Corp. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 418, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 72, 1963 WL 8568 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This suit seeks $33,731.42 because of the termination by the defendant, for its own convenience, of a contract for the production of photoflash cartridges. Plaintiff, a St. Louis-based company, had a series of three agreements (Contracts 744, 850, 866) with the St. Louis Ordnance District of the Department of the Army to manufacture various types of these items. The only one of the contracts involved here is No. 866, entered into on June 30, 1954. It contained a standard termination-for-convenience article, obligating the defendant to pay, on such termination, for all completed supplies accepted by the Government and also for other costs incurred in the performance of the work terminated.

Because of the plaintiff’s difficulties with, and the consequent changes in, the prototype cartridge contract — No. 744, entered into a year earlier — the Government did not wish to incur costs under the new supplemental contract, No. 866, until it was sure that the items, as they might be changed in the course of performing the initial contract, could in fact be produced. Satisfactory cartridges had not yet been made under Contract 744. During the negotiations for Contract 866, plaintiff met this obstacle by writing to the defendant that it was “agreeable to a clause providing that no cost will be incurred against the pending contract [No. 866] without the prior approval of the Contracting Officer until this contract be released for production.” The Government’s notice of award referred to this letter as part of the company’s proposal which the Government accepted, and Article VIII of the formal contract provided that the contractor was not to incur any costs in preparation for production under this contract without prior written approval of the contracting officer.

Simultaneously with the negotiation of Contract 866, the parties were also considering another supplemental cartridge contract, No. 850 — not involved in the present case — which contained an identical provision for prior written approval of costs, designed to deal with the same uncertainty as to the [420]*420feasibility of making the end-item. This Contract 850 was wholly released for production in March 1955.

The production problems under the basic Contract 744 continued until the early part of 1956, when these difficulties were solved and the parties then began to consider production and delivery under Contract 866. Informal oral discussions led to a letter from plaintiff to the Ordnance District, dated May 22, 1956, in which the contractor requested “release of Contract 866 for material procurement and production.” The letter pointed out that there would be an interruption in schedule between Contract 744 and Contract 866 unless the latter “can be released shortly”; it was also said that aluminum prices had increased several times since the original contract date but that if Contract 866 were immediately released the plaintiff would be able to produce the cartridges at no extra cost.

In response, the contracting officer’s letter of June 27, 1956, authorized plaintiff to procure materials necessary for production of the cartridges covered by Contract 866 but also specifically said that “acquisition of materials shall be limited to the raw materials necessary for production of the cartridge in accordance with the change orders” applicable to this item in Contract 744 (which changes were to be incorporated in Contract 866) (emphasis added). The contracting officer deliberately restricted his release to raw materials in order to meet plaintiff’s complaint about the rising price of aluminum, but the company’s representative has testified that he did not notice the word “raw” in the letter.1

The Government terminated Contract 866, for its own convenience, on October 4, 1956. No deliveries had been made under it, and none of the contract items had been completed. Plaintiff’s settlement proposal, as revised, consisted of claims for (a) a large number of electric primers, finished components destined for incorporation in the end-item, and [421]*421(b) dies and other tooling for manufacturing the end-item. These claims were denied by the contracting officer on the ground that the primers and the tooling were not “raw materials”, which alone had been released for acquisition by the plaintiff. The Board of Contract Appeals affirmed on the same ground.

Plaintiff no longer contends that the primers and the tooling were “raw materials.” 2 The argument in this court is, first, that the parties agreed, when they negotiated Contract 866, that the contract when released for production would be released in toto; and, second, that the defendant’s letter of June 27, 1956, necessarily amounted to such a total release, despite its wording. We cannot adopt either of these propositions.3

First, we think it clear that the parties did not agree that Contract 866 would have to be released, for every purpose, all at one time. In the simultaneous negotiations for companion Contract 850 plaintiff did indicate that it objected to piecemeal release of the contract for production and desired a single release in toto. But the letter it wrote (on June 18, 1954) embodying that specific condition (see finding 8) was confined to Contract 850', and the nearly contemporaneous letter (of June 25, 1954) accepting the Government’s release requirement for Contract 866 (involved here) failed to include or refer to any such limitation. Be that as it may, the conduct of the parties affirmatively discloses that they distinguished between a release of an end-item for production (whether the release be single or multiple) and the incurring of costs prior and preparatory to the production-release. Plaintiff’s basic letter of June 25, 1954, on Contract 866 — which was incorporated in the award— states that ho cost will be incurred without the prior approval of the contracting officer “imtil this contract be released for production” (emphasis added). This envisages the incurring of costs, with Government approval, before a release for production. The formal contracts for both [422]*422Contract 866 and Contract 850 declared (in Article VIII) that the contractor had to have approval for incurring any costs “in preparation for production under the contract.” This, too, assumes that there can be expenditures prior to production. When Contract 850 was released for production in March 1955 (over a year before the defendant’s letter of June 27, 1956, on Contract 866), the contracting officer expressly wrote that the company was “authorized to incur costs in preparation for production” and also that the contract was released for production. When plaintiff came to seek the go-ahead signal on Contract 866, in May 1956, it likewise separated procurement of materials from a release for production, asking for “release of Contract 866 for material procurement and production” (emphasis added). The defendant answered, in its letter of June 27th, by releasing the contract for the procurement of raw materials only. In the light of this contractual history, it seems plain that the parties contemplated that Contract 866 could be released for the purchase of the necessary materials, all or in part, before it was released for actual production of the end-item.4

What the parties thus anticipated as within their agreement did come to pass.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
161 Ct. Cl. 418, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 72, 1963 WL 8568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/universal-match-corp-v-united-states-cc-1963.