United States v. Wyche

266 F. Supp. 3d 885
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 21, 2017
DocketCase No. 3:17CR21-HEH
StatusPublished

This text of 266 F. Supp. 3d 885 (United States v. Wyche) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Wyche, 266 F. Supp. 3d 885 (E.D. Va. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Overruling Defendant’s Objection to Calculation of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines)

Henry E. Hudson, United States District Judge

On April 24, 2017, the Defendant, Eric Wyche (“Wyche”), entered a plea of guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, pursuant to a written plea agreement. Sentencing was deferred pending the completion of a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). In preparing the PSR, the United States probation officer calculated Wyche’s sentencing guidelines. She determined that Wyche had a Total Offense Level of 25, fourteen criminal history points putting him in Category VI, and a resulting guideline range of 110-120 months. In computing Wyche’s total offense level, the probation officer applied two enhancements to his base offense level of 22. The officer applied a two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3C 1.1 and a four-level adjustment based on the firearms use in the commission of another felony under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Presently at issue is the probation officer’s determination that Wyche’s base offense level is 22. According to the PSR, the probation officer’s calculation is derived from U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). This section reads in pertinent part:

[887]*887[The applicable] Base Offense Level [is] 22, if (A) the offense involved a (i) semiautomatic firearm that is capable of accepting a large capacity magazine; or (ii) firearm that is described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); and (B) the defendant, committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.

U;S.S.G. § 2142.1(a)(3).

Specifically, Wyche’s objection focuses on whether his robbery conviction in 2009 in the Circuit Court, of the City of Richmond is a crime of violence as that term is employed in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3). Resolution of this issue is guided by the application notes to § 2K2.1, specifically the definition of “crime of violence.” The application note indicates that “ ‘[c]rime of violence’ has the meaning given that term in § 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the Commentary to § 4B1.2.” ' U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.l.

Turning to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, it provides the following definition of a “crime of violence”:

The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or-explosive-material as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(l-2).

Wyche argues that his 2009 robbery conviction meets neither of the definitional criteria for a crime of violence under U.S;S.G. § 4B1.2. His challenge has two facets. First, that the common law definition of robbery historically employed in Virginia requires a lesser level of force than envisioned under § 4B1.2(a)(l), and second, that the Virginia common law definition of robbery is broader than the contemporary generic definition, which must be relied upon in applying § 4B1.2(a)(2). Because robbery is an enumerated offense under § 4B1.2(a)(2) and common law robbery in Virginia is consistent with the contemporary generic definition of that offense, the Court need not venture into § 4B1.2(a)(l).1

Wyche argues that even though robbery is included as an enumerated offense under the definition of “crime of violence” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), it must still meet the similarity-of-elements standard using the categorical approach articulated in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court found that with regard to prior crimes enumerated in a sentencing enhancement statute, Congress intended to refer to the “generic, contemporary meaning” of the crime. Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Such meaning, the Court explained, can be derived from “the generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.” Id.

Courts must compare the state statute under which the defendant was [888]*888previously convicted to the enumerated crime’s “generic” definition. United States v. Flores-Granados, 783 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2015). “If the defendant was previously convicted in a State where the generic definition has been adopted or where the state statute is narrower than the generic view then there is no problem because in both cases the conviction necessarily implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the elements of [the] generic [crime].” Id. (quotation marks omitted; alterations in. original). “However, if the state statute ‘criminalizesfe] a broader scope of conduct than the Guideline crime [then it] is not categorically a crime of violence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Perez-Perez, 737 F.3d 950, 953 (4th Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original).

In Virginia, the punishment for robbery is fixed by statute, Va. Code § 18.2-58, but the offense is not statutorily defined, and Virginia courts must look to the common law for its definition. “Robbery at common law is defined as the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation.” George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 277, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991) (internal quotation marks ‘ and citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Anderson, 278 Va. 419, 424, 683 S.E.2d 536 (2009).

A close review, of Virginia jurisprudence interpreting and applying the common law definition of robbery demonstrates that the core element is the taking of property from a person against their will. To sustain a robbery conviction, force or intimidation must be directed at the person of the victim. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 42 Va.App. 443, 592 S.E.2d 400, 403 (2004). The victim must actually be put in fear by the willful conduct or words of the accused. Harris v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App, 519, 351 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1986). The -United States maintains that the time-honored common law definition of robbery in Virginia comports with the so-called generic definition.

The Court agrees.

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Related

Taylor v. United States
495 U.S. 575 (Supreme Court, 1990)
United States v. Lockley
632 F.3d 1238 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Ali v. Com.
701 S.E.2d 64 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2010)
Com. v. Anderson
683 S.E.2d 536 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 2009)
Spencer v. Commonwealth
592 S.E.2d 400 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 2004)
Harris v. Commonwealth
351 S.E.2d 356 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1986)
United States v. Walker
595 F.3d 441 (Second Circuit, 2010)
George v. Commonwealth
411 S.E.2d 12 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1991)
State Ex Rel. Vandal v. Adams
115 S.E.2d 489 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1960)
State v. Al-Amin
578 S.E.2d 32 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2003)
State v. Powell
608 A.2d 45 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1992)
Coles v. State
821 A.2d 389 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2003)
State v. Robertson
740 A.2d 330 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1999)
United States v. Carlos Perez-Perez
737 F.3d 950 (Fourth Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Marlon Flores-Granados
783 F.3d 487 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Kareem Doctor
842 F.3d 306 (Fourth Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Robert Winston
850 F.3d 677 (Fourth Circuit, 2017)
Maxwell v. Commonwealth
183 S.E. 452 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1936)
In re T.H.
721 S.E.2d 728 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
266 F. Supp. 3d 885, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-wyche-vaed-2017.