Me. Justice Bkewer
delivered the opinion of the court.
The question to be considered is not as to the validity of the grant to the Southern Pacific Company, but only as to its extent. It may be conceded' that the company took title to lands generally along its line, from Tehaehapa Pass to its junction with the Texas Pacific; and the contention of the government is here limited to those lands only Avhich lie Avithin the granted limits of both the Atlantic and Pacific and the Southern Pacific Companies, at the crossing of their lines, as definitely located. As it appears from the record that, at the time of the location of the f ormernompany’s line, so many of the tracts within these overlapping limits had been taken up by preemption and homestead entries that the indemnity limits were not' large enough to supply its deficiency, it is obvious that the land to be affected by this decision is of limited area in comparison Avith the large body of lands covered by the grant to the Southern Pacific.
The contention of the government is, that these lands were not included Avithin the grant to the Southern Pacific. Such contention implies ho want of good faith on its. part. It is not' attempting to take back or forfeit that Avhich it has once [593]*593granted.. It is only seeking, a difference of opinion having arisen, an adjustment, a determination of the extent of its grant. Less than that could not be expected; more than that could not be asked of it.
The grants to both the Atlantic and Pacific and the Southern Pacific Companies were grants in prcesenti. The language is, “there be, and hereby is, granted.” The construction and effect of such words of grant have often been considered by this court. ' In the recent case of St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, 139 U. S. 1, 5, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the court, said: “ As seen by the terms of the third section of the act, the grant is one in prcesenti; that is, it purports to pass a present title to the lands designated by alternate sections, subject to such exceptions and reservations as may arise from sale, grant, preemption or other disposition previous to the time' the definite route of the road is fixed. The language of the statute is, £ that there be, and hereby is, granted ’. to the company every alternate sec- • tion of the lands designated, which implies that the property itself is passed, not any special or limited interest in it. The words also import a transfer of a present title’ not a promise to transfer one in the future. The route not being at the time determined, the grant was in the nature of a float, and the title did not attach to any specific'sections until they were capable of identification; but when once identified the title-attached to them as of the date of the grant, except as to such sections as were specifically reserved. It is in this sense that the grant is termed one in prcesenti; that is to say, it is of that character as to all lands within the terms of the grant, and not reserved from it at the time of the definite location of the route. This is the construction given to similar grants by this court,. where the question has been often considered; indeed, it is so well' settled as to be no longer open to discussion. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44, 60; Leavenworth, Lawrence &c. Railroad Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733; Missouri, Kansas &c. Railway Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co., 97 U. S. 491; Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U. S. 426. The terms of present grant are in some cases qualified by [594]*594other portions of the granting act, as in the case of Rice v. Railroad Co., 1 Black, 358; but unless qualified they are to receive the interpretation mentioned.”
In view of this late and clear declaration, it would be a waste of time to attempt a reexamination of the questions, or a restatement of the reasons which have established these' as the settled rules of law in respect to land grants, and made it so that the old common law rule as to the necessity of identification to a conveyance has not been controlling in determining the scope and effect of a Congressional land grant. Yet reference may be had to the still later case of Bardon v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 145 U. S. 535, in which the doctrine that title passes by relation as of the date of the grant was held to exclude from a grant land which, at the date of the act, was held under a homestead claim, although the claim had been abandoned, and the land restored to the _ public domain before the filing of the map of definite location. It may also not be amiss to notice the case of Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44. In that case land had been granted to the State of Wisconsin, to aid in' the construction of a railroad.- The language of the grant was like that in this: “There.be, and is hereby, granted.” A further provision was that if the road be not completed within ten years, “ no further sales shall be made, and the lands unsold shall reVert to the United States.” The railroad was not completed within the time specified. Thereafter timber was cut and removed from these lands, and the question for consideration was as to the ownership of that timber. It was held that the timber was the property of the State; that by the grant, title to the land passed to the State upon the location of the route; and that, though the road was pot. completed within the time specified, and though there- was the provision that the unsold lands- should revert, yet the title stñí remained in the State, held under a condition subsequent, and held, until the government- should take some steps to assert a forfeiture.
Applying these well-settled rules to the cases.at l)ar, there can be little difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. The 'grant to the Atlantic and Pacific was made in 1866; to the Southern [595]*595Pacific in 1871. They were grants in prwsenti, When maps of definite location were filed and approved, the grants severally took effect by relation as of the dates of the acts. The map of definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific Company’s road along .the lands in controversy was filed and approved on April 11, 1872. Then the specific tracts were designated, and to them the title of the Atlantic and Pacific attached as of July 27, 1868. If anything in the land laws of the United States can be considered as thoroughly settled by repeated decisions, it is this. It matters not when the map of definite location of the Southern Pacific was filed and approved, whether before or after April 11, 1872; for when • filed the grant could take effect by relation only as of March 3,1871, and at that time, and for nearly five years theretofore, the title to these lands had been in the Atlantic and Pacific. It matters not that the act of 1871 in terms purports to bestow the same rights, grants and privileges as were granted to the Southern Pacific Eailroad Company by the act of 1866. That merely defines the extent of the grant and the character of the rights and privileges; it does not operate to make the latter grant take effect by relation as of the date of the prior grant, and thus subject the grants to the two companies to the rule controlling cotemporaneous- grants, as established by St. Paul & Sioux City Railroad v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad, 112 U. S. 720, and Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad v. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway, 117 U. S. 406. Even if Congress had in terms expressed an intent to that effect in a subsequent. act; it was not competent, by such legislation, .to divest the rights already vested in the Atlantic and Pacific Company. So the case, in the best way of putting it for the defendant, is the case of two pompanies with conflicting grants, each of whose line of definite' location has been approved- by the Land Department. Unquestionably, the grant older in date takes the land.
Some stress seems to have been laid in the court below bn the proviso to the act of 1871, which reads“Provided, however, that this section shall in no way affect or impair the fights, present or prospective, of the Atlantic and Pacific [596]*596Bailroad Company, or any other railroad company.” But the language of thiá proviso is negative and restrictive, and not affirmative and enlarging. It says substantially that nothing in the grant to the Southern Pacific shall affect or impair other grants. Surely the declaration that this grant does not affect some other grant, does not make this grant any larger than it would have been without that declaration. It simply prevents it from having any effect, which, but for the declaration, it might-be supposed to have on something else. If without those words it could take nothing granted to the Atlantic and Pacific, a fortiori with them it takes nothing.
But it is urged by counsel for defendant that no map of definite location of line between the Colorado Biver and the. Pacific Ocean was ever filed by the Atlantic and Pacific or approved .by the Secretary, of the Interior. This contention is based upon these facts: The Atlantic and Pacific Company claimed that, under its charter, it was authorized to build a road from the Colorado Biver to the Pacific Ocean, and thence along the coast up to San Francisco; and it filed maps thereof in four sections. San Buenaventura was the point where the westward line first touched the Pacific Ocean; One of these maps was of that portion of the line extending from the' western boundary of Los Angeles County, a point east of San Buenaventura, and through that place to San Miguel Mission, in the direction of San Francisco. In other words, San Buenar ventura was not the terminus of any line of definite location from the Colorado Biver westward, whether shown by one or more maps, but only an intermediate point' on one sectional map. When the four maps were filed, and in 1872, the Land Department, holding that the Atlantic and Pacific Company was-authorized to build not only from the Colorado Biver directly to the Pacific Ocean, but- also thence north 'to San Francisco, approved them as establishing the line of definite location. Subsequently, and'-when Mr. Justice Lamar was Secretary of the Interior, the ‘matter was reexamined, and it was properly held that under the act of 1866, the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific was exhausted when its line reached the Pacific Ocean. San Buenaventura was, therefore, held to be [597]*597the western terminus, and the location of the line .approved to that point. The fact that its line was located, and maps filed thereof in sections, is immaterial. St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 139 U. S. 1. Indeed, all the transcontinental roads, it is believed, filed their maps of route in sections. So the question is whether the filing a map of definite location from the Colorado Eiver through San Buenaventura to San Francisco, under a claim of right to construct a road the entire distance, is good as a map of definite location from the Colorado Eiver to San Buenaventura, the latter point being the limit of the grant. We .think, unques=tionably, it is. Though a party claims more than he is legally entitled to, his claim ought not to be rejected for that to which he has a right. The purpose of filing a map of definite location is to enable the Land Department to designate the lands passing under the grant; and when a map of such a line is filed, full information is given, and, so far as that line may legally extend, the law perfects the title. It surely cannot be that a company must determine at its peril the extent to which its grant may go, or that a mistake in such determination works a forfeiture of all its rights to lands.
In this connection, reference may be. had to the contention of the Southern Pacific Company, that it filed its map of definite location on April 3, 18V1, more than a year before the filing of its map by the Atlantic and Pacific Company; that, therefore,-its title then attached to these lands, the saíne as to any other lands along its line; and that, if such title was displaced by any subsequent filing of the Atlantic and Pacific ^Company’s map, it was only conditionally displaced; that is, displaced on condition that the Atlantic and Pacific Company should, by the final completion of its road, perfect' its right thereto. But whatever title or right the Southern Pacific Company might acquire by a prior filing of its map was absolutely displaced when the Atlantic and Pacific Comr pany’s map was filed. Illy as it may accord with the common law notions of identification of tracts as essential to a valid transfer of title, it is fully settled that we are to construe these acts of Congress as laws as well as grants; that [598]*598Congress intends no scramble between companies for the grasping of titlés by priority of location, bnt that it is to be regarded as though title passes as of the date of the act, and to the company having priority of grant, and, therefore, that in the eye of the law it is now as though there never was a period of time during which any title to these lands was in the Southern Pacific. As said in the case of Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. Kansas Pacific Railway, 97 U. S. 491, 497:
“It is always to be borne in mind, in construing a Congressional grant, that the agt by which it is made is a law as well as a conveyance, 'and that such effect must be given to it as will carry out the intent of Congress. That intent should not be defeated by applying to the grant the. rules of the common law, which are properly applicable only to transfers between private parties. To the validity of such transfers it may be admitted that there must exist a present power of identification of the land; and that where no such power exists, instruments, with words of present grant, are operative, :if at all, only as contracts to convey. But the rules of the common law must yield in this, as in all other cases, to the legislative will.”
So now, whatever may have been the dates of filing by the respective companies, the case stands as though the lands granted to the Atlantic and Pacific had been identified in 1866, and title had then passed, and there never was a title of any kind vested in the Southern Pacific Company.
And whatever of plausibility there might be in this suggestion Of counsel, based upon the old common law rules in inspect to the effect of a lack of identification ppon attempted conveyances between private parties, it fails entirely because its map of definite location was not filed^ by the Southern Pacific Company until long after the filing by the Atlantic and Pacific Company. ; It is true that the bills of complaint in these cases allege' that “ said Southern Pacific Railroad Company accepted said grant, and on A^ril 3, 1871, did designate the line of its said road by a plat thereof, which it on that day filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General [599]*599Land Office, and did construct and complete said road in the manner and within the time prescribed, except that it.did not connect with the Texas and Pacific Bailroad, and on April 3, 1871, the odd sections of public land for thirty miles in width on each side of said route, to which the United States had full title, not reserved, sold, granted, appropriated and free- from all claims and rights, were, by the Department of the Interior, ordered withdrawn from sale and entry and reserved.”
This allegation apparently refers by its terms to the line of definite location, as provided for in section 3 of the act of July 27, 1866, inasmuch as it uses the words of that section, to wit, “at the time the line of said road is designated by a plat thereof.” And if this were á matter vital to the case,-it might be necessary to require that- the bill be amended to conform to the proof, though it may be remarked that the allegations in the last part of the clause quoted, in respect to the withdrawal of lands, seem to indicate that the map of general route rather than that of definite location was referred to-
The distinction between the line .of definite location and the general route is well known. . It was clearly pointed out in the case of Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 119 U. S. 55. The act under consideration in that case was that of July 2,1861, 13 Stat. 365', making a grant to the Northern Pacific Bailroad Company. The third section of' that net, as the third of this, made the grant, and provided for the line of definite location. Sección 6 authorized the fixing "of the general route, -and- its language in respect to that, matter is the same as that of section 6 of the act- before us. It reads: “ That the President of the United States shall .cause the lands to be surveyed for forty ruñes in width on both sides of the entire line of said road, after the general rout© shall -be fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of said rañroad; and the odd section's of land hereby granted shall not be liable to sale or entry,-” etc. Beferrin'g to this matter, it was said in the opinion in that case, on pages'. 71 and 72: “The act of Congress not only contemplates the filing by the company, in the office of the' Commissioner of [600]*600the General' Land Office, of a map showing the definite location of the line'of its road, and limits the grant to such alternate odd sections as have not, at' that time, been reserved, sold, granted or otherwise appropriated, and are free from preemption, grant or other claims or rights ; but it also contemplates a preliminary designation of the general route of the road, and the exclusion from sale, entry or preemption of the adjoining odd sections within forty miles on each side, until the definite location is made. . . . The general route may be considered as fixed when its general course and direction are determined after an actual examination of the country or from a knowledge of it, and is designated by a line on a map showing the general features of the adjacent country and the places through or by which it will pass. The officers of the Land Department are expected to exercise supervision over'the matter so as to require good faith on the part of the •company in designating the general route, and not to accept an arbitrary and capricious selection of the line irrespective of the character of the country through which ‘the road is to be constructed. 'When the general route of the road is thus fixed in good faith, and information thereof given to the Land Department by filing the map thereof with the Commissioner of the General Land Office, or the Secretary of the Interior, the law withdraws from sale or preemption the odd sections to the extent of forty miles on each side. The object of the law in this particular is plain; it is to preserve the land for the company to which, in aid of the construction of the road, it is-granted. Although the act does not require the officers of the Land Department to give notice to the local land officers.of the withdrawal of the odd sections from sale or preemption, it has been the practice of the Department in such cases, to .formally withdraw them.”
As the act of July 27, 1866, the one before us, is in these respects exactly like that of. the one before the court in that case, it must be held that here, as there, Congress provided for two separate matters; one the fixing of the general route, and the other the designation of the line of definite location.; and an examination of the evidence shows that the map which [601]*601was filed on April 3, 1871, was simply one of general route, and therefore did not work a d'es'gn tion of the tracts of land to which the Southern Pacific’s grant attached, As the map was filed within one month after the grant, it might b.e inferred that there had not been sufficient time to fix the line of definite location, though, of course, it would be possible, as counsel suggests, that the company had surveyed the line in anticipation of the grant, and the matter of time would not be decisive. But turning to the map itself, a copy of which is in evidence, we find that this is the certificate made thereon by the Southern Pacific Company:
To Hon. C. Delano, Secretary of the Interior, and Hon. Willis Drummond, Commissioner of General Land Office:
“ Please to take notice that this map is filed by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, of California, in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office, in the Department of the Interior, for the purpose of designating by the heavy red line traced thereon the general route of the line of railroad, as near as may be, from a point at or near Tehachapa Pass, by way of Los Angeles to the Texas Pacific.Railroad at or near the Colorado River, adopted by the said Southern Pacific Railroad Company in pursuance of the power and authority granted to said company by the 23d section of the act of Congress of the United States, entitled ‘ An act to incorporate the Texas Pacific Railroad Company, and to aid in the construction of its road, and for other purposes,’ approved March 3, 1871, and in pursuance of the pro'visions of the act of July 27, 1866, referred to in said 23d section, and for the purpose of "obtaining the benefit of the provisions of said acts of Congress.
“Chas. Crocker,
“ President, Southern Pacific Railroad ComjpcmyS
Not only that, but upon the filing of the map, and on April 21, 1871, the Commissioner of the General Land Office sent to the i\ ceiver at Los Angeles a letter making a direction of withdrawal, in which he says, referring to this matter: “ The com[602]*602pany having filed a diagram, designating the general route of said road, I herewith transmit a map showing thereon the line of route, as also the 20 and 30-mile limits of the grant, to the line of withdrawal for the Southern Pacific Railroad under the act of 1866, and you are hereby'directed to withhold from sale or location, preemption or homestead entry all the odd-numbered sections falling within those limits.” 1
Further, there is in evidence an exemplification of a diagram in the Land’Office, showing the limits of the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Company, with the intersecting limits of the grant to the Southern Pacific Company, on which diagram appear two lines, one traced in blue, and marked “ branch of the Southern Pacific Railroad; ” and the other in red, somewhat divergent therefrom, marked “Southern Pacific Railroad, definite location.” Still further, on the minutes of the proceedings of meetings of the directors of the Southern Pacific road, held on April 10, September 8, and October 1, 1874, appear resolutions similar in their character, but having reference to different parts of the line between Tehachapa Pass and the. Texas Pacific Railroad.’
The one passed at thepneeting on April 10,1874, is in these words:
“ Resolved, That the line of railroad as it has been surveyed and laid out oh map marked £ AA,5 and described as follows: Commencing at a point in the northwest quarter (N.’W. J) of section [three] (3), township two (2) north, range fifteen (15) west, San Bernardino base and meridian, and running thence in a southeasterly direction to the city of Los Angeles, and thence in an easterly direction to a point" in -the northeasteriy quarter (N.E. £) of section twenty-seven (27), township one (1) south, range nine (9) west, San Bernardino base and meridian, being map and profile of section No. one, Southern Pacific Railroad and telegraph line authorized by the twenty-third "section of the. Texas Pacific Railroad act, approved March 3d, 1871, be- and the same is hereby, adopted as the route of said railroad, between the points named
.“(Signed) J7 L. ’Willcutt, Seely.”
[603]*603So, only at these late days was the line of definite location determined upon by the company. Of course, therefore, the map filed April 3, 1871, could not have been a map of that line, but was, as it states, only of the general route, and there was then no designation of lands to which the Southern Pacific Company’s title could attach.
On the other hand, the Atlantic and Pacific Company did file its maps of definite location. This appears from the certificates thereon. In the one covering the line along the lands in controversy, the chief engineer of the company certifies that E. N. Bobinson was a deputy engineer, and 'that the latter, “ as shown by his field-notes, did actually survey and mark upon the ground, or cause to be surveyed and marked upon the ground, the line or route of. the Atlantic and Pacific Bailroad,” etc., as delineated upon the map; and that his acts in the premises were duly approved and accepted on behalf of the company, by himself as chief engineer. A.nd in the further official certificate of the company it is stated that the “ map shows the line or route of the said Atlantic and Pacific Bailroad -in the county, . . being a part of the line or route of said railroad, as definitely fixed in compliance with said acts of Congress,” etc. These maps were received and approved by the Land Department as maps of definite location. It follows that in fact the line of definite location of the Atlantic and Pacific was established, and maps thereof filed and approved before any action in that respect was taken by the Southern Pacific Company. . There never was a time, .therefore, at which the grant of the Southern Pacific could be said to have attached to these lands; and the plausible argument based thereon, made by counsel in behalf of the Southern Pacific Company, falls to the ground.
Again, it is urged that the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific having been forfeited, there is nothing now in the way of the Southern Pacific’s grant attaching to these lands; that in the interpretation of rights under land grants, regard has always been had by this court to the intention of Congress; that it was the intention of Congress that, these lands should pass to some 'company to aid in the construction of a railroad, either [604]*604the Atlantic and Pacific or the Southern Pacific; that they cannot now be applied to aid in the construction of the former company’s road; and that, therefore, to carry into effect the intent of Congress, they should be applied to aid in the construction of the latter company’s line. "We think this contention is erroneous, both as to the law and the intent of Congress. It was held in the case of Kansas Pacific Railway v. Punmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, that, where a homestead right had attached to a tract at the time of the definite, location of the railway company’s line, which homestead was afterwards abandoned, the tract was simply Restored to the public domain, and did not pass to the railway company under its grant; that the grant only attached to lands which were the subject of grant at the time; and that the company had no interest in the question as to what afterwards became of a tract which was not public land at the time its grant became fixed. On page 644 the court observed: “ The right of the homestead having attached to the land it was excepted out of the grant as much as if in a deed it had been excluded from the conveyance by metes and bounds.” The same doctrine was affirmed in Hastings and Dakota Railroad v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357; Sioux City &c. Land Co. v. Griffey, 143 U. S. 32; Bardon v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 145 U. S. 535.
Neither can it fairly be said that it was the intent of Congress that these lands should pass conditionally to the Southern Pacific Company. Good faith must be imputed to Congress. Jt cannot be supposed that Congress intended to give to the Southern Pacific Company that which it had already given to the Atlantic and Pacific Company. It knew that it had granted lands to the Atlantic and Pacific for a road -to the Pacific Ocean, and that that company was then engaged in constructing" its road, and proceeding with as much rapidity as other Pacific companies had done. "Within little over a month from the date of this grant to the Southern Pacific Company, and on April 20, 1871, it gave to the Atlantic and Pacific Company authority to issue bonds secured by a mortgage on its road, equipment, lands, franchises, privileges, etc. 17 Stat. 19, c. 33. Congress, therefore, was expecting that the Atlantic [605]*605and Pacific Company would construct its road, and, with this expectation, had no thought of giving to the Southern Pacific Company that which it had already given to the Atlantic and Pacific Company.
Further, as indicating the intent of Congress, reference may be had to the first proviso to section 3 of the act of 1866, which, by the terms of section 18 of that act and the act of 1871, becomes one of the conditions of the grant to the Southern Pacific Company. That proviso is : “ Provided, That if said route shall be found upon the line of any other railroad route, to aid in the construction of which lands have been heretofore granted by the United States, as far as the routes are upon the same general line, the amount of land heretofore granted shall be deducted from the amount granted by this act.” That proviso may not be technically and strictly applicable to this case, in that a road crossing another may perhaps not be said to be found upon the line of such other road, or to be upon the same general line, yet the import of this proviso is clear, to the effect that Congress was not only not intending to give to one company that which it had already given to another, but intended that lands previously granted should be definitely excepted from the later grant.
Not only that, but by section' 9 of the original act it was provided “ that if the Atlantic and Pacific make any breach of the conditions hereof, and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then, in such case, at any time hereafter, the United States may do any and all acts and things which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the said road.” In other words, the intent of Congress was that this road to the Pacific should be built; that if there was any delay on the part of the Atlantic and Pacific Company, it might itself take all needful and necessary measures to accomplish the building; and to that end of course, use all the lands it proposed to grant therefor. Can it be supposed that this purpose of Congress was forgotten, or that its intent was changed when it made the grant to the Southern Pacific, or that it had anything in contemplation other than that, after the completion of the Atlantic and Pacific road, and the [606]*606appropriation of the lands along its line to aid in that construction,'the Southern Pacific Company might, if it saw fit to build a road from Tehachapa Pass to the Texas tpid Pacific Railroad, obtain the remainder of the lands along that line ?
Indeed, the intent of Congress in all railroad land grants, as has been understood and declared by this court again and again, is that such grant shall operate at a fixed time, and shall take only such lands as at that time are public lands, and, therefore, grantable by Congress, and is never to be taken as a floating authority to appropriate all tracts within the specified limits which at any subsequent time may become public lands. The question is asked, supposing the Atlantic and Pacific Company had never located its finé west of the Colorado River, would not these lands have passed to the Southern Pacific Company under its grant? Yery likely that may be so. The language of the Southern Pacific Company’s grant is broad enough to include all land along its • line and if the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Company had never taken, effect, it may be that there is nothing which would interfere with the passage of the title to the Southern Pacific Company.
But that is a matter of' result from the happening of something neither intended nor expected. While it may have been within the knowledge of Congress as among the possibilities, that' result was not the purpose sought to be. accomplished by this legislation. • If any other than the general rule as to land grants had been intended, it is to be expected that such intention would have been clearly expressed. So when intent is to be considered, the question' is whether Congress intended, the title having once vested in the Atlantic and Pacific, that the Southern Pacific Company should stand waiting to take the lands at some future time, however distant,, when the Atlantic and Pacific Company’s title should fail. ■
Again, there can be no question,, under the authorities heretofore cited, that, if the act of forfeiture had not been passed by Congress, the Atlantic and Pacific could yet construct its road, and that, constructing it, its title'to these .lands would become perfect. No power but that of Congress could interfere with this_ right of the Atlantic and. Pacific.' No one. but [607]*607the grantor can raise the question of a breach of a condition subsequent. Congress, by the act of forfeiture of July 6,1886, determined what should become of the lands forfeited. It enacted that they be restored to the public domain. The forfeiture was not for the benefit of the Southern Pacific; it -was not to enlarge its grant as it stood prior to the act of forfeiture. It had given to the Southern Pacific all that it had. agreed to in its original grant; and now, finding that the Atlantic and Pacific was guilty of a breach of a condition subsequent, it elected to enforce a forfeiture for that breach, and a forfeiture for its own benefit.
Our conclusions, therefore, are, that a valid and sufficient ma,p of definite location of its route from the Colorado River to the Pacific Ocean was filed by the Atlantic and Pacific Company, and approved by the Secretary of the Interior; that by such act the title to these lands passed, under the grant of 1866, to the Atlantic and Pacific Company, and remained held by it subject to a condition subsequent until the act of forfeiture of 1886; that by that act of forfeiture the title of the Atlantic and Pacific was retaken by the general government, and retaken for its own benefit, and not that of the Southern Pacific Company; and that the latter company has no title of any kind to these lands.
The decrees of the Circuit Court must he reversed, and the cases remanded with instructions to enter decrees for the plaintiff for the relief sought.