AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:
Appellant, New Orleans Public Service, Inc. (hereinafter NOPSI), appeals from an adverse decision of the district court holding that NOPSI is a government contractor subject to Executive Order 11246,1 and permanently enjoining NOPSI from failing and refusing to comply with the Order, as amended, and the implementing rules and regulations. Questions as to the force, coverage and enforcement of the Executive Order are involved. The principal issue today before us is whether a public utility which, under a city permit, enjoys a local monopoly in the sale of electricity and a near-monopoly in the sale of natural gas and which sells such energy to the Government in substantial amount can be required by the Government to comply with the equal opportunity obligations of Executive Order 11246, even though the utility has not agreed to be so bound. We hold that the Government can compel such a utility to follow the Order; however, we disagree with the district court as to the appropriate remedy.
Executive Order 11246 prohibits employment discrimination by government contractors. The Order was issued by President Johnson in 1965, and requires that all covered government contracts contain a nondiscrimination clause, including an agreement to take affirmative action to achieve the equal opportunity goals of the Executive Order’s mandate. Id. § 202.
NOPSI is a public utility which produces, distributes and sells electric power to consumers located in that part of New Orleans, Louisiana, on the east bank of the Mississippi River, and "sells and distributes natural gas to consumers throughout the city. The company sells its gas and electricity pursuant to indeterminate permits,2 like franchises, issued by the City Council of New Orleans. NOPSI is the only company with indeterminate permits to supply New Orleans with gas, and the east bank of the city with electricity. If any New Orleans consumer (including the Federal Government) on the east bank wishes to buy electric service, the consumer must purchase from NOPSI. NOPSI also provides most of the natural gas service to consumers (including the Federal Government) throughout the city, [462]*462and in those cases where companies receive their gas from other sources, NOPSI has agreed to the arrangement and has built and maintained the transmission line connecting the company with the parish boundary. The federal agencies which buy electricity from NOPSI are on the east bank, and have no alternative source of electric power. NOPSI is regulated by the City Council, which in 1973 granted the company rate increases for its electric and natural gas services to customers.
A number of federal agencies and installations in New Orleans are major purchasers of electricity and natural gas from NOPSI. In 1973 NOPSI supplied such federal users with nearly $2 million worth of electric utility service, and with more than $2,680,000 worth of electric and natural gas utility services combined. There are nine federal agencies which at the present time and during the period 1965-1973 each have received over $10,000 annually in combined gas and electric services from NOPSI; some of those each have received more than $50,000 in such utility services annually. The biggest user, the Michoud Assembly Facility (hereinafter Michoud) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter NASA), alone received approximately $1.4 million worth of electricity and natural gas in 1973. The agencies are billed monthly and pay for the services on a regular basis.
According to the district court opinion, NOPSI supplies the Government with utility services pursuant to various contractual arrangements. The court found that NOP-SI is supplying 22 federal agencies under written agreements. Some of those contracts predated the Executive Order, but the court found that they were modified by, inter alia, the 1973 revised rate schedules which were approved by the City Council; were applied to the particular contract by NOPSI; and were accepted, through payment, by the agency. A few of those contracts contained nondiscrimination clauses required by earlier Executive Orders. In the case of two agencies in the group, the Government had sent NOPSI a proposed new contract, containing the nondiscrimination clause required by Executive Order 11246, but NOPSI rejected the proposed contract on the ground that the clause was unsatisfactory. Other contracts were signed in 1972 or on dates not specified by the district court opinion and were modified by the revised rate schedules in 1973.
In addition, the district court found that NOPSI is supplying six other federal agencies pursuant to contracts which were not formal, written agreements. Some of those contracts, for example, were based on letter requests from the federal agencies; another was based on an oral agreement.
Somewhat more complicated is the relationship between NOPSI and NASA’s Michoud facility. Disagreement in that relationship precipitated the instant litigation. NOPSI supplied Michoud with electricity and natural gas under a written contract between the utility and the space agency which was signed in 1965 and terminated according to its own terms in June 1970. That contract contained an equal opportunity clause which was required by Executive Order 10925, the predecessor of Executive Order 11246. The contract also contained a limitation clause restricting the scope of the contract to the Michoud operations. Because of the NASA-NOPSI relationship involving utilities service at Michoud, the Government has tried in the past to review NOPSI’s compliance with Executive Order 11246, but NOPSI has resisted on the ground that it was not covered by the Order. Attempts between the Government and NOPSI to negotiate a new utilities contract for Michoud broke down, with the Government unwilling to agree to a scope limitation like that in the 1965 contract, and NOPSI unwilling to agree to an equal opportunity clause without such a limitation. Nevertheless, NASA asked NOPSI to continue supplying Michoud, and NOPSI has continued to do so even though the formal contract has expired, subject to the rate schedules set out by NOPSI at the time of the termination of the written contract. The district court, after surveying the pre[463]*463ceding facts, held that a contract existed between NASA and NOPSI.3
The Government’s efforts to conduct a compliance review of NOPSI began in 1969, and further unsuccessful attempts were made through 1972. This action was initiated by the Government through the Justice Department in 1973 to compel NOPSI’s compliance with the Executive Order. After holding that NOPSI was covered by the Order, the district court permanently enjoined the utility from failing or refusing to comply with the Order and implementing regulations. The injunction reached NOP-SI’s refusal to allow the Government to conduct compliance reviews of NOPSI, and authorized the parties to begin discovery. In addition, the court retained continuing jurisdiction to effectuate NOPSI’s full compliance with the Executive Order.
I. The Validity and Applicability of the Executive Order
A. The Executive Order Program
The Executive Order requires that every nonexempt government contract contain a clause under which the employer agrees not to discriminate in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and further agrees to take affirmative action to achieve the equal opportunity objective. Exec. Order No. 11246, § 202(1). The Secretary of Labor is responsible for the administration of the federal contract compliance program, and is empowered to issue rules and regulations to implement the Order. Id. § 201. In addition to the nondiscrimination clause, the required contract provision stipulates that the contractor will comply with all provisions of the Order and the implementing rules and regulations, id. § 202(4), that he will furnish all the information and reports4 required by tile Order and the regulations and that he will permit access to his books and records by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor in order that they may determine his compliance. Id. § 202(5).
The Secretary of Labor is given various powers under sections 205 to 208 to carry out his mandate, including the authority to investigate the employment practices of government contractors. Id. § 206. Elsewhere the Order sets out various sanctions and penalties, one of which is that the Secretary of Labor may recommend to the Justice Department that it enforce by appropriate proceedings, including suits for injunctive relief, the provisions of the required nondiscrimination clause. Id. § 209(a)(2). Before such proceedings are initiated, though, the Order directs that “[ujnder rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor,” the contracting agency shall make reasonable efforts to achieve compliance by “conference, conciliation, mediation, and persuasion.” Id. § 209(b).
For purposes of the instant case, the critical — and disputed — provision of the federal contract compliance program is found in the Secretary of Labor’s regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1, as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 3454, et seq. (1977), and states:
(e) Incorporation by operation of the Order. — By operation of the Order, the equal opportunity clause shall be considered to be a part of every contract and subcontract required by the Order and the regulations in this part to include such a clause whether or not it is physically incorporated in such contracts and whether or not the contract between the agency and the contractor is written.
§ 60-1.4(e).5 Cf. id. § 60-1.4(d) (incorporation by reference). The “equal opportunity [464]*464clause” referred to in the regulation is the nondiscrimination clause set forth in the Executive Order. “Contract” means any “government contract,” and “government contract” is defined to include “any agreement or modification thereof between any contracting agency and any person for the furnishing of supplies or services.” Id. § 60-1.3. The term “services,” as used in the regulation, includes utility services. Id. Executive Order 11246 states in section 202 that the Order applies to every government contract entered into after the effective date unless the contract is specifically exempted under section 204. No such exemption is applicable in the instant case.6 Therefore, assuming no problems concerning the Order’s basic validity or its application herein, NOPSI is clearly subject to the requirements of the program.
B. NOPSI’s Argument
NOPSI argues that the Executive Order and the regulations do not give the Labor Department’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance — the agency which administers the Executive Order — authority to compel the company to fulfill the affirmative action obligations of the program. In support of its position, NOPSI offers three arguments which speak to the validity of the regulations as herein applied, from the point of view of both executive power and general contract law.
First, NOPSI points out that it did not seek the Government’s business or any government contracts. NOPSI contends that the relevant judicial decisions on the Executive Order all involved employers that sought the Government’s business, e. g., by bidding for government contracts, or were unquestionably government contractors, and that each case therefore presented an element of consent which is here lacking. Second, the company argues that it has consistently refused to accept the Order’s affirmative action obligation. This argument, related to the first, assumes the necessity of NOPSI’s consent in order for the company to be bound by the nondiscrimination clause. Third, NOPSI contends that it is not furnishing energy to the Government pursuant to any contract, but instead is supplying such energy pursuant to its franchises, granted by the City, which require NOPSI to provide power to all consumers who request it. Under that argument, NOPSI’s status as a City franchisee precludes its having the status of a Federal Government contractor, given the fact that NOPSI has refused to accede to the contract terms required by the Government. Accordingly, NOPSI and amicus Mississippi Power & Light Company, appellant in No. [465]*46575-2590, 5 Cir., 1977, 553 F.2d 480, the companion case which we also decide today, challenge the application of the Executive Order both on the ground that it conflicts with the contractual principle of consent, and that it is action taken without authority from Congress.
C. The Program’s Force and Effect
The starting point of our analysis is the well-established proposition that the Order has the force and effect of law. Southern 111. Builders Ass’n v. Ogilvie, S.D.Ill., 1971, 327 F.Supp. 1154, aff’d, 471 F.2d 680 (7 Cir., 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, D.N.J., 1970, 320 F.Supp. 1284; U. S. v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, E.D. La., 1968, 282 F.Supp. 39; see Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 3 Cir., 1971, 442 F.2d 159, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95. Cf. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 5 Cir., 1967, 375 F.2d 629, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977, 88 S.Ct. 480, 19 L.Ed.2d 471 (involved predecessor order, No. 10925); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 3 Cir., 1964, 329 F.2d 3 (involved No. 10925 and prior orders). From that proposition flows our ultimate conclusion as to the validity of applying the Order to NOPSI in the instant case.
This circuit has held that Executive Order 10925, the predecessor of No. 11246, was issued pursuant to statutory authority because of the relationship between the anti-discrimination provision in the Order and the purposes of 40 U.S.C. § 486(a), the statute governing, inter alia, government procurement. Farkas, supra, 375 F.2d at 632 n. 1. More recently, the Third Circuit concluded that that statute supplied the express or implied authorization of Congress for the Executive Order today before us, as applied to government procurement. Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 170.
Additional indicia of congressional support for the Labor Department’s Executive Order program are discussed below, and furnish legal underpinning not only for the Executive Order, but for the regulation in dispute, 41 C.F.R. § 60 — 1.4(e), 42 Fed. Reg. 3454, 3459 (1977), as well. That is because an Executive Department regulation which is issued pursuant to an act of Congress and by the department responsible for the administration of the statute has the force and effect of law if it is not in conflict with an express statutory provision. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349, 40 S.Ct. 155, 157-58, 64 L.Ed. 297 (1920); see G. L. Christian & Assoc. v. United States, 1963, 312 F.2d 418, 424, 160 Ct.Cl. 1, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 444, 11 L.Ed.2d 314. We perceive no such conflict in the instant case.
Furthermore, the appropriate measure of the regulation’s validity is whether it was within the scope of the Executive Order. See Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 175. In deciding that question, we give special deference to the Labor Department’s interpretation of the Order which that department was charged to administer. Id.; see Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 792, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34, 91 S.Ct. 849, 854-55, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408, 81 S.Ct. 1529, 1535, 6 L.Ed.2d 924 (1961). The Executive Order specifically authorized the issuance of implementing regulations by the Secretary of Labor, and the disputed provision, 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.4(e), did nothing more than give teeth to the mandate of the Order. The regulation was thus within the scope of the presidential directive in so implementing it. Under the preceding principles of strong deference to administrative interpretation, we also find that the Department acted within the scope of the Order in applying the Order to NOPSI.
D. Executive and Legislative Action
As indicated earlier, the first strand of NOPSI’s argument — namely, the contention that the Government acted without authority in this case — has to do with executive power. Yet that contention ignores the fact of a long-entrenched government program, set in motion and continually kept alive by a series of presidents and approved [466]*466by Congress. The Executive Order program prohibiting employment discrimination by government contractors has been in effect since World War II. President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the first such Executive Order, and each of his successors has followed suit. See Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 168-71.
Roosevelt’s initial prohibition, Executive Order 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation), required a nondiscrimination clause in all defense contracts. Pursuant to a subsequent statute intended to expedite the war effort, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9001, 3 C.F.R. 1054 (Compilation 1938-1943), which stated that a nondiscrimination clause would be deemed incorporated by reference in all defense contracts covered by the statute. Executive Order 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation), issued in 1943, required the inclusion of a nondiscrimination clause in all government contracts, not just in defense contracts. However, that Order was still based upon the President’s war mobilization powers. Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 169. Executive Orders 8002 and 9346 were continued by President Truman in 1945. Exec. Order No. 9664, 3 C.F.R. 480 (1943-1948 Compilation). Six years later, the President signed an order continuing the provision that a nondiscrimination clause would be deemed incorporated by reference in all defense contracts, Exec. Order No. 10210, 3 C.F.R. 390 (1949 — 1953 Compilation), and the President, still acting under his war powers, issued another series of Executive Orders extending Executive Order 10210 to additional government agencies, other than the Department of Defense, engaged in defense-related procurement. Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 169. President Eisenhower issued Executive Orders which broadened the contract compliance program, and, significantly, those orders were not issued pursuant to the President’s power over defense production. Id. at 170. In 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation), inserting “affirmative action” language in a nondiscrimination clause required in all government contracts. And President Johnson in 1965 issued Executive Order 11246, transferring to the Secretary of Labor certain compliance functions previously vested in the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, and continuing the affirmative action requirement.
Although the Labor Department’s federal contract compliance program originated by Executive Order, rather than by legislation, Congress has considered the program on several occasions. At the least, there has been implied congressional approval of the program; it can even be argued that there has been express ratification. The Government correctly identifies three sources of legislative authorization for the Executive Order.
First, the President has express authority over direct federal procurement practices, under 40 U.S.C. § 486(a).7 While some presidents acted pursuant to their war powers in promulgating Executive Orders concerning employment discrimination by government contractors, the President’s broad statutory procurement power has been held to be authorization for other Executive Orders which were not related to war production. See Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 169-71; Farkas, supra, 375 F.2d at 632 n.1. Furthermore, more recent decisions involving Executive Order 11246 have candidly acknowledged the validity of the use by the President or Congress of the procurement process to achieve social and [467]*467economic objectives. See Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 7 Cir., 1975, 508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18; Northeast Const. Co. v. Romney, 1973, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 381, 485 F.2d 752, 760. Those cases stand for the proposition that equal employment goals themselves, reflecting important national policies, validate the use of the procurement power in the context of the Order.
The second source of legislative authorization is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. A reference in the Act, as originally enacted, id. § 2000e-8(d), to the Executive Order program indicated congressional intent that the program would continue in existence. See Contractors Ass’n, supra, 442 F.2d at 171. This reading of congressional intent is further supported by the decision of Congress at that time not to make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy in this area. See 110 Cong.Rec. 13650-52 (1964); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 5 Cir., 1970, 431 F.2d 1097, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 935, 28 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971).
Third, the debates surrounding the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.Law No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, which amended Title VII, offer additional evidence of congressional approval. For example, legislative sentiment in support of the Executive Order program surfaced in successful opposition to a renewed attempt to make Title VII the exclusive federal remedy. See 118 Cong.Rec. 3371-73 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams); id. at 3962, 3964 (remarks of Senator Javits). Additional support can be inferred from the defeat of a proposal to transfer the program to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See id. at 1387-98. Other aspects of the Act which were enacted into law illustrate congressional contemplation of the program’s continuance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-14, 2000e-17. To be sure, the legislative history does not show, in so many words, congressional ratification of the particular aspect of the Executive Order program here at issue, viz., the imposition by operation of the Order of the nondiscrimination clause on all government contractors, regardless of whether the employers have expressly consented to the clause. However, Congress not only has refused to circumscribe the role of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance in combating employment discrimination, but has indicated a concern for the efficacy of such efforts and an intent that they would continue. The regulation in controversy is an integral part of a long-standing program which Congress has recognized and approved. We have no difficulty, therefore, in finding congressional authorization for the provision.8 It follows that the applica[468]*468tion of the Order to NOPSI is also authorized, for such action requires no extension of the regulation’s coverage. The regulation incorporating by operation of the Order the nondiscrimination clause into every government contract would be a dead letter if the Government could not apply it to a government contractor like NOPSI, merely because the company refused to consent.
Although no circuit has confronted the precise legal issue today before us, we find the Contractors Ass’n case to be a very persuasive precedent. There the Third Circuit specifically considered the validity of the Philadelphia Plan, relating to minority hiring in federally-assisted construction projects, which was promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 11246. The court upheld the Plan, on the ground that it was within the implied authority of the President. Insofar as the Philadelphia Plan was instituted to implement the mandate of the Executive Order in a particular geographic area and industry, the court’s holding clearly flowed from a view that the Executive Order program itself was valid, at least with respect to federally-assisted construction contracts. Moreover, in language on all fours, the Third Circuit specifically stated that Executive imposition of nondiscrimination contract provisions (including an affirmative action clause) in the Government procurement area is action pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress. 442 F.2d at 170.
In response to the argument that a decision for the Government in this case would go beyond the Third Circuit’s holding in Contractors Ass’n, we believe that our decision today fits within that precedent and, in fact, approves a more confined power than did the Contractors Ass’n court. We here impose the nondiscrimination obligation on a company which, as a public utility, holds City-granted franchises and, pursuant thereto, (1) enjoys special economic advantages, including a monopoly, and (2) sells directly to the Government. To so apply the provision is far easier, in our judgment, than to apply it, as in Contractors Ass’n, to a mere bidder for federally-assisted construction project contracts. The ease of application is a function of both the Government’s legal power and the utility’s economic power in their direct contractual relationship.
E. Contract Law
The second aspect of NOPSI’s attack on the Executive Order as herein applied focuses on contract law. The company con[469]*469tends that its lack of consent to be bound by the nondiscrimination clause distinguishes the prior cases involving the validity of the Order. Whatever, if any, authorization exists for the program is vitiated when, as here, it is imposed on a nonconsenting public utility, the company argues, because the contractual consent principle is violated. We disagree.
We find that the absence of NOPSI’s consent to the Executive Order is not determinative, and does not render the prior caselaw distinguishable. Furthermore, we reject the company’s contention that NOP-SI is not a government contractor.
Government contracts are different from contracts between ordinary parties. See M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 1971, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 221, 455 F.2d 1289, 1304. See also Vacketta & Wheeler, A Government Contractor's Right to Abandon Performance, 65 Geo.L.J. 27 (1976). The Government has the unrestricted power to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127, 60 S.Ct. 869, 876, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940); Southern Ill. Bldrs. Ass’n v. Ogilvie, S.D.Ill., 1971, 327 F. Supp. 1154, aff’d, 471 F.2d 680 (7 Cir., 1972); cf. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Vacketta & Wheeler, supra. Agreement to such conditions is unnecessary: where regulations apply and require the inclusion of a contract clause in every contract, the clause is incorporated into the contract, even if it has not been expressly included in a written contract or agreed to by the parties. M. Steinthal, supra, at 1304; J. W. Bateson Co. v. United States, 1963, 162 Ct.Cl. 566, 569; G. L. Christian, supra, 312 F.2d at 424; see Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 43 S.Ct. 428, 67 L.Ed. 778 (1923). See also De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 61, 52 S.Ct. 78, 76 L.Ed. 168 (1931); College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12, 45 S.Ct. 199, 69 L.Ed. 490 (1925).9
A contractual relationship obviously exists between NOPSI and the Government, notwithstanding the company’s attempt to disclaim government-contractor status. This contractual relationship exists by virtue of the fact that the company sells millions of dollars worth of utility services to various agencies of the Federal Government, and has done so for many years. The district court’s extensive factual findings as to particular contracts aids us in this determination; however, we would reach it even in the absence of any oral or written agreements to particular terms, because the relationship so clearly reflects a contract.
Furthermore, we cannot understand how NOPSI seriously can deny status as a government contractor for the reason that it is supplying utility services to the Government pursuant to local franchises which require the company to furnish such energy to all consumers who request it. That the company services customers under local franchises does not negate the obvious fact that NOPSI renders such services to individual customers pursuant to contracts, whether written or parol, and whether explicit or implicit in the parties’ course of dealing.
NOPSI’s status as a public utility, operating under local franchises granted by the City of New Orleans, and providing services to the United States, renders the utility’s express consent unnecessary in light of the Executive Order. Acceptance of the benefits of the local franchises subjected NOPSI to the obligations attached thereto. Cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). When NOPSI undertook to satisfy those obligations by selling energy to the [470]*470Government, the company did so according to the terms imposed by the Government.10
NOPSI implies, in addition, that because of its public-utility status, imposition of the . Executive Order’s requirements would be unfair. The unfairness, the company suggests, stems from NOPSI’s lack of choice as to whether to accept the Government’s business. However, the fact that NOPSI is a public utility militates strongly in favor of allowing the Government to impose the obligations of the Executive Order on the company. NOPSI’s franchises give it a local monopoly in the sale of electricity and a near-monopoly in the sale of natural gas. A monopolistic government supplier, unlike a seller in an ordinary market, has the economic power to resist the Executive Order. In the situation under consideration, the Government needs to buy electric energy in the New Orleans area. If NOPSI were allowed to prevail in its contentions, the Government would have to either acquiesce or else go without necessary services. Obviously, a local utility cannot force such a dilemma upon the Government. Otherwise, a valid and important nationwide federal program, set in place by the President over a third of a century ago, continued by every one of his successors, approved by Congress and applicable to all government contractors, could be nullified by any seller with a monopoly in a service, supply or property needed by the Government, just by virtue of the seller’s economic position. Here, NOPSI’s monopoly exists only because of local legislative action. The supremacy clause of the Constitution obviously cannot countenance such a result. We hold, therefore, that the Government can compel NOPSI to comply with the equal opportunity obligations of Executive Order 11246, even though the company has not expressly consented to be bound by that Order.
II. NOPSI’s Fourth Amendment Contentions
NOPSI next contends that the Executive Order and implementing regulations violate the fourth amendment when applied to a public utility which does not seek to do business with the Government and has not consented to the provisions of the Order. This argument parallels the company’s central contention in the case, and is similarly without merit.
Section 202(5) of the Executive Order requires that all covered government contracts include a term whereby the contractor agrees to furnish all information and reports called for by the Order and implementing regulations, and to permit access to its (the contractor’s) books and records by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor in order to determine whether the contractor is complying with the program. That provision is effectuated by 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.43, requiring that each contractor
permit access during normal business hours to its premises for the purpose of conducting on-site compliance reviews and inspecting and copying such books, records, accounts and other material as may be relevant to the matter under investigation and pertinent to compliance •with the Order .
NOPSI contends that enforcement of these provisions herein would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure, in contravention of the rule enunciated in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). The company’s argument ignores the post-See development by the Supreme Court of administrative search doctrine, not to mention certain pre-See precedents. See, e. g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946).
[471]*471In See the Court applied the fourth amendment warrant requirement to commercial as well as residential premises, in the context of administrative code-enforcement inspections. The Court held only that an unconsented administrative entry upon the nonpublic areas of a commercial premises “may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure.” Id., 387 U.S. at 545, 87 S.Ct. at 1740. The See Court explicitly pointed out that it did not question “such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product.” Id., 387 U.S. at 546, 87 S.Ct. at 1741.
The Court drew upon the latter theme in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), recognizing a broad congressional authority to fashion rules concerning the supervision and inspection of the liquor industry, based upon a long history of regulation of that industry. This authority, the Court held, included the power to determine legislatively the standards of reasonableness for searches conducted pursuant to a liquor regulatory system. Id., 397 U.S. at 77, 90 S.Ct. at 777.11
The Supreme Court went one step further in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972), upholding a warrantless search of a firearms dealer under the federal gun control statute. In Biswell the Court could not rely on a deep-rooted pattern of federal regulation to justify the inspection system there in contention. However, the Court found that the system could be sustained because “[l]arge interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.” Id., 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. The same rationale controls the present case. The Government has a vital interest in achieving equal employment opportunity. The Executive Order program is designed to carry out that interest, at least with regard to the Government’s own contractors. And some sort of compliance process (including procedures for the inspection of company books and records and for access to company facilities) is necessary in order to make the program work.
The Biswell Court, deciding not to use the dealer’s submission to the search there at issue as the justification for upholding such a search, declared that “the legality of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.” Id., 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. That reasoning answers NOPSI’s argument about lack of consent herein. As we indicated earlier in this opinion, the Executive Order and its implementing regulations have the force and effect of law, were implemented pursuant to statutory procurement authority and have been approved by Congress since being issued. Therefore, they play the same validating role as a statute. Moreover, the Biswell decision is premised, to a certain extent, on the idea of implied consent, i. e., that such a regulated dealer, in choosing to engage in a pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, did so with the knowledge that it would be subject to inspection. Id., 406 U.S. at 316, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. Obviously, we do not find actual consent to the inspection system at bar. However, there is no policy justification for distinguishing between, on the one hand, a federally-licensed firearms dealer and, on the other, a public utility which, under City-granted franchises, enjoys a local monopoly and sells substantial amounts of energy to the Government, thus bringing the utility within the coverage of the federal contract compliance program. Therefore, we have no difficulty in applying, for fourth amendment purposes, the implied-consent concept of the cases involving administrative inspection of regulated businessmen, see, e. g., Almeida-Sanehez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), even [472]*472though that concept is a legal fiction. Our reasoning is consistent with the rule earlier announced in this circuit that where, as here, the Government validly regulates any business, the Government has a right to include in its regulations the requirement that certain records be kept open to official inspection so that the administrative agency can determine whether the company is complying. See Ray v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 638, 641-42 (citing 79 C.J.S. Searches & Seizures § 36, at 803), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S.Ct. 35, 19 L.Ed.2d 94 (1967); cf. Morton Salt, supra; Oklahoma Press, supra. We note finally that, under the inspection procedure contemplated by the Executive Order program, “the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions,” see Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at 317, 92 S.Ct. at 1597, and accordingly, we sustain the program against attack on fourth amendment grounds.12
III. The District Court’s Injunctive Order
We turn finally to NOPSI’s disagreement with the district court’s injunctive order. The company argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue that order, under which the court retained jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of enforcing the substantive provisions of the Executive Order.
We hold that, the district court having found NOPSI to be covered by the Executive Order, the task of obtaining NOPSI’s compliance with the program should be left to the Government’s own administrative compliance processes. Accordingly, we modify that part of the district court’s opinion which retained jurisdiction over this suit and which dictated a mandate of injunction clearly contemplating substantive enforcement of the Executive Order. Our decision is based on equitable considerations, and should not be read as holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction in any respect for its ruling. Resolution of NOPSI’s objections to the court’s injunctive order is therefore unnecessary to our holding; however, we proceed to dismiss all of the company’s present objections in order that they may not be interposed again as obstacles to enforcement of the program herein.
NOPSI makes two major arguments in this regard. The first is that the Government has failed to follow the procedural requirements of the Executive Order and implementing regulations. NOPSI alleges that the Government was required to proceed by conciliation and persuasion, but instead chose to pursue litigation in its compliance strategy. In addition, NOPSI contends that the Government has failed to [473]*473afford the company a hearing mandated under the program. In support of these assertions, NOPSI relies on a number of regulatory provisions. We need not respond to each assertion specifically, in view of the fact that the Government’s attempts to conduct a voluntary compliance review of NOPSI date back to 1969.
The regulations now in effect13 provide for the institution of administrative or judicial enforcement proceedings in response to violations of the Executive Order. Violations may be found, based upon, inter alia,
(iv) a contractor’s refusal to submit an affirmative action program; (v) a contractor’s refusal to allow an on-site compliance review to be conducted; (vi) a contractor’s refusal to supply records or other information as required by these regulations ... or (vii) any substantial or material violation or the threat of [such] a . violation of the contractual provisions of the Order, or of the rules or regulations issued pursuant thereto.
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(a)(l). The district court found such a violation. The regulations further provide that whenever the Director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance has reason to believe that there exists the threat or fact of violation of the Order or regulations, the Director
may institute administrative enforcement proceedings ... or refer the matter to the Department of Justice to enforce the contractual provisions of the Order, to seek injunctive relief . and to seek such additional relief, including back pay, as may be appropriate. There are no procedural prerequisites to a referral to the Department of Justice by the Director, and such referrals may be accomplished without proceeding through the conciliation procedures in this chapter, and a referral may be made at any stage in the procedures under this chapter.
Id. § 60-1.26(a)(2) (emphasis added).
The preceding regulation plainly rebuts NOPSI’s first contention.14 And the regulation also refutes NOPSI’s second major assertion, which is that the Justice Department cannot bring judicial proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Executive Order until the OFCC or the compliance agency (here the General Services Administration) has first exhausted the administrative procedures of the program. Two more observations are in order as to the exhaustion argument. First, the cases cited by NOPSI in support of that contention involve private actions and are, therefore, inapposite to the situation where the Government itself has decided to pursue judicial litigation in enforcing Executive Order 11246.15 Second, while we recognize that, as NOPSI argues, substantial arguments can be mustered for application of the exhaustion doctrine, we nevertheless have no reason to read an exhaustion requirement into a program which clearly and deliberately provides judicial enforcement as an alternative to administrative enforcement, and which explicitly rejects procedural prerequisites to judicial enforcement.
Despite our conclusion that the district court had both the jurisdiction and the power to direct by injunctive order NOP-SI’s compliance, we conclude that the enforcement function in this case would be better carried out administratively by the compliance agencies. This decision is [474]*474reached in the exercise of our equitable discretion, for “the manner, means and method for resolving” this dispute must be devised under “inherent equitable principles.” R. L. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 Cir., 1974, 491 F.2d 1364, 1367.16 In light of our holding that NOPSI is covered by the Executive Order and has violated it, our primary mission at this point, of course, is to render such relief as is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the mandate of the Executive Order as fully and expeditiously as possible. However, the relief imposed should not “run against the grain of fundamental fairness which should hopefully be the outcome of any equitable decree.” Id. at 1379. In the particular setting of this case, where NOPSI has never agreed to be bound by the Order, we believe that fundamental fairness requires that the Government, armed this time with this court’s opinion, now obtain the company’s voluntary compliance before calling for the support of our injunctive powers.
Other equitable factors support this result. The basic approach of the Executive Order program, as implemented, is enforcement by Executive agencies, in particular the Department of Labor, even though the Order itself provides the judicial enforcement alternative in section 209(a)(2). The Executive. has expertise, which this court lacks, in the administration of the program, and that expertise can profitably be brought to bear on the problem at bar. Further, we see no reason to burden our scarce judicial resources with the task of supervising the enforcement of the federal contract compliance program, unless such judicial enforcement becomes necessary.
Our decision today is not an invitation to further delay by NOPSI in complying with the Executive Order. Such delay would be intolerable. In its brief, NOPSI states:
If a court of final appellant (sic) resort upholds the District Court determination that NOPSI is a government contractor notwithstanding its refusal to consent to the contractual equal opportunity provisions of Executive Order 11246, the General Services Administration and OFCC should then be afforded the opportunity to work with NOPSI in developing an appropriate affirmative action program, if indeed one is found necessary . . .
Brief for Appellant at 46-47.17 That statement underlies the remedial approach which we today require. We assume, based on the quoted passage, NOPSI’s good faith in complying with the Order, given our holding that the company is covered by it.
To restate our decision, then, the appropriate government compliance agency— whether OFCC or GSA — may proceed by administrative action to obtain NOPSI’s compliance with the Executive Order. Though we are removing the injunctive mandate of the district court, our decision contemplates good faith negotiations between the parties, and certain issues decided herein are precluded from further negotiation. The company cannot any longer dispute its coverage under the Executive Order, nor can the company attempt to nullify the effect of the Order’s application by demanding limitation-of-scope language in any contract or proposed affirmative action program that would restrict the impact of the Order. Moreover, NOPSI has no valid fourth amendment objections to the Government’s demands for access either to the company’s facilities or to the company’s [475]*475books and records, nor can NOPSI further delay or resist compliance by insisting on merely technical or unnecessary procedural niceties.
The Government may proceed at once in enforcing the Executive Order by administrative action. The parties are advised that, having fashioned our relief on the assumption of NOPSI’s good faith in complying with our decision herein, this court will look with disfavor on any future attempts to delay compliance.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.