United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Emp'rs Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.

902 F.3d 1
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedAugust 21, 2018
Docket17-1714
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 902 F.3d 1 (United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Emp'rs Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Food & Commercial Workers Unions & Emp'rs Midwest Health Benefits Fund v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 902 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2018).

Opinion

BARRON, Circuit Judge.

In these consolidated appeals from orders dismissing two putative antitrust class actions, purchasers of a brand-name, prescription drug allege that the drug maker unlawfully delayed the entry of generic versions of the drug into the United States market. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the drug maker committed antitrust violations by obtaining through a fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("Patent Office") a patent for a particular form of a component necessary to manufacture a drug to treat leukemia and by then seeking to enforce that patent through "sham" infringement litigation against manufacturers trying to enter the market with generic versions of that drug.

The drug maker moved to dismiss the antitrust actions on the ground that there was no fraud and that it was immune from antitrust liability for merely enforcing its patent through litigation. The drug maker claimed this immunity based on the Noerr - Pennington doctrine. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington , 381 U.S. 657 , 669, 85 S.Ct. 1585 , 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965) ; E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. , 365 U.S. 127 , 136, 81 S.Ct. 523 , 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961). That doctrine provides a party immunity from antitrust liability for petitioning the government for redress, in light of the First Amendment right to petition the government. And it is clear that the petitioning activity within this *5 doctrine's protection includes enforcing one's intellectual property rights in court. See Prof'l Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (" PREI "), 508 U.S. 49 , 63-65, 113 S.Ct. 1920 , 123 L.Ed.2d 611 (1993) (applying Noerr - Pennington immunity to copyright infringement litigation); Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Momenta Pharm., Inc. , 850 F.3d 52 , 56-58 (1st Cir. 2017) (applying Noerr - Pennington immunity to patent infringement litigation).

The District Court agreed with the drug maker that Noerr - Pennington immunity applied to its alleged conduct and, on that basis, dismissed the putative class actions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. The District Court acknowledged that Noerr - Pennington immunity has two exceptions. An antitrust defendant may not enjoy the immunity in enforcing its patent if it obtained that patent through a fraud on the Patent Office, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. , 382 U.S. 172 , 177-78, 86 S.Ct. 347 , 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965), or if its suit to enforce the patent is a "sham" for impermissible anti-competitive conduct, PREI , 508 U.S. at 51 , 113 S.Ct. 1920 . The District Court held, however, that the purchasers had not plausibly alleged that either exception applies here. We now affirm.

I.

The putative class actions at issue in these consolidated appeals were brought against Novartis, which distributes and holds the patents for Gleevec, a prescription drug for treating leukemia. 1 Health plans that purchased Gleevec on behalf of their beneficiaries-so-called end payers-are the plaintiffs in the first action. A party standing in the shoes of a direct purchaser of the drug is the named plaintiff in the other action.

The suits arise from the following events. In 1996, Novartis obtained the original patent for Gleevec, or Patent No. 5,521,184 ("Patent '184"). This patent claimed Gleevec's active ingredient-a compound called "imatinib"-as well as the compound's "corresponding salts." That patent's expiration date was July 4, 2015.

Four years after obtaining that patent, Novartis filed an application for another one. This application sought a patent that pertained to one of the compound's "corresponding salts," the "mesylate" salt of imatinib. Specifically, Novartis's patent application claimed a particular crystalline form of that salt-namely, the non-needle or "ß-crystalline" form.

According to the complaints filed in each of the antitrust actions against Novartis, chemists commonly modify compounds from "free base" to "salt" form during the pharmaceutical process in order to enhance the drug's properties, such as its solubility. The complaints further point out that, although a salt can be left amorphous, chemists often crystallize salts in various shapes to further select for favorable properties. For this reason, a patent for a particular crystalline form of one of imatinib's corresponding salts, such as the one Novartis claimed, could be quite valuable.

The patent examiner rejected Novartis's patent application for the ß-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate.

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902 F.3d 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-food-commercial-workers-unions-emprs-midwest-health-benefits-ca1-2018.