DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 1. This is a class action lawsuit on behalf of certain Harley-Davidson motorcycle owners seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief, under several legal theories, for an alleged defect in the motorcycles' engines. The plaintiffs have not alleged any personal injury or property damage caused by the defective engines, nor have they alleged that their motorcycle engines have actually failed or malfunctioned in any way. They allege, rather, that their motorcycles are diminished in value because the defect creates a "propensity" for premature engine failure.
¶ 2. The plaintiffs originally pleaded claims for negligence, strict products liability, fraud, and deceptive trade practices under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and (ll)(b) (1999-2000).1 The circuit court dismissed the entire action for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of their claims for common-law fraud and statutory deceptive trade practices, and the court of appeals reinstated both. We reverse.
¶ 3. An allegation that a product is diminished in value because the product line has demonstrated a propensity for premature failure such that the product [153]*153might or will at some point in the future fail prematurely is too uncertain and speculative to constitute a legally cognizable tort injury and is therefore insufficient to state damages in a tort claim for fraud. In addition, the economic loss doctrine bars this claim.
¶ 4. The plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim for deceptive trade practices in violation of Wis. Stat. § 100.18. The statute provides a private cause of action for pecuniary loss resulting from an advertisement to the public that contains an "assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading." Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), (ll)(b). The plaintiffs' claim is based primarily on the allegation that Harley-Davidson ("Harley") failed to disclose the engine defect prior to the plaintiffs' motorcycle purchases. A nondisclosure does not constitute an "assertion, representation or statement of fact" under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). The plaintiffs also allege that Harley's advertising material described the motorcycle engine as "premium" quality, "a masterpiece," and "[e]ighty-eight cubic inches filled to the brim with torque and ready to take you thundering down the road." This is classic advertising puffery, non-actionable at common law and under the statute.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 5. This is an appeal of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and therefore we accept as true, for purposes of this review, the following facts from the amended class action complaint. Plaintiff Steven C. Tietsworth and the members of the proposed class own or lease 1999 or early-2000 model year Harley motorcycles equipped with Twin Cam 88 or Twin Cam 88B [154]*154engines. Harley's marketing and advertising literature contained the following statement about the TC-88 engines:
Developing [the TC-88s] was a six-year process.... The result is a masterpiece. We studied everything from the way oil moves through the inside, to the way a rocker cover does its job of staying oil-tight. Only 21 functional parts carry over into the new design. What does carry over is the power of a Harley-Davidson® engine, only more so.
Harley also stated that the motorcycles were "premium" quality, and described the TC-88 engine as "[ejighty-eight cubic inches filled to the brim with torque and ready to take you thundering down the road."
¶ 6. On January 22, 2001, Harley sent a letter to Tietsworth and other owners of Harley motorcycles informing them that "the rear cam bearing in a small number of Harley-Davidson's Twin Cam 88 engines has failed. While it is unlikely that you will ever have to worry about this situation, you have our assurance that Harley-Davidson is committed to your satisfaction." (Emphasis added in amended complaint.) The letter went on to explain that the company was extending the warranty on the cam bearing from the standard one-year/unlimited mileage warranty, to a five-year/50,000 mile warranty. Separately, Harley developed a $495 "cam hearing repair kit" and made the kit available to its dealers and service departments, "to expedite rear cam bearing repair."
¶ 7. On June 28, 2001, Tietsworth, a California resident, filed this proposed class action lawsuit against Harley in Milwaukee County Circuit Court, alleging four claims: (1) negligence; (2) strict products liability; (3) common-law fraudulent concealment; and (4) deceptive trade practices contrary to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) [155]*155(the Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act or "DTPA"). Tietsworth later amended the complaint to name as representative plaintiffs four Wisconsin owners of motorcycles equipped with TC-88 engines.
¶ 8. The amended complaint alleges that the cam bearing mechanism in the 1999 and early-2000 model year TC-88 engines is inherently defective, causing an unreasonably dangerous propensity for premature engine failure. As is pertinent to the common-law fraud and statutory DTPA claims, the amended complaint alleged that Harley's failure to disclose the cam bearing defect induced the plaintiffs to purchase their motorcycles by causing them to reasonably rely upon Harley's representations regarding the "premium" quality of the motorcycles.
¶ 9. The amended complaint further alleges that if the plaintiffs had known of the engine defect, they either would not have purchased the product or would have paid less for it. The amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs' motorcycles have actually suffered engine failure, have malfunctioned in any way, or are reasonably certain to fail or malfunction. Nor does the amended complaint allege any property damage or personal injury arising out of the engine defect. Rather, the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiffs' motorcycles have diminished value, including diminished resale value, because Harley motorcycles equipped with TC-88 engines have demonstrated a "propensity" for premature engine failure and/or fail prematurely.
¶ 10. Harley moved to dismiss the complaint. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable William J. Haese, granted Harley's motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their common-law [156]*156fraud and DTPA claims only, and the court of appeals reinstated both. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2003 WI App 75, ¶ 1, 261 Wis. 2d 755, 661 N.W.2d 450.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶ 11. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests whether the complaint is legally sufficient to state a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 305 (1987). We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint (or here, the amended complaint) as true for purposes of our review. Id.; see also Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 923-24, 471 N.W.2d 179 (1991).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Common-Law Fraud Claim
¶ 12. The plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim is premised on the allegation that Harley failed to disclose or concealed the existence of the cam bearing defect prior to the plaintiffs' purchases of their motorcycles. It is well-established that a nondisclosure is not actionable as a misrepresentation tort unless there is a duty to disclose. Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 288 N.W.2d 95 (1980). Our decision in Ollerman outlined the three categories of misrepresentation in Wisconsin law — intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and strict responsibility misrepresentation — and described the common and distinct elements of the three torts. Id. at 24-25.
[157]*157¶ 13. All misrepresentation claims share the following required elements: 1) the defendant must have made a representation of fact to the plaintiff; 2) the representation of fact must be false; and 3) the plaintiff must have believed and relied on the misrepresentation to his detriment or damage. Id. The plaintiffs here allege intentional misrepresentation, which carries the following additional elements: 4) the defendant must have made the misrepresentation with knowledge that it was false or recklessly without caring whether it was true or false; and 5) the defendant must have made the misrepresentation with intent to deceive and to induce the plaintiff to act on it to his detriment or damage. Id.
¶ 14. Ollerman reiterated the general rule that in a sales or business transaction, "silence, a failure to disclose a fact, is not an intentional misrepresentation unless the seller has a duty to disclose." Id. at 26. The existence and scope of a duty to disclose are questions of law for the court. Id. at 27. Ollerman held that "a subdivider-vendor of a residential lot has a duty to a 'non-commercial' purchaser to disclose facts which are known to the vendor, which are material to the transaction, and which are not readily discernible to the purchaser." Id. at 42. We specified that this was a "narrow holding," premised on certain policy considerations present in non-commercial real estate transactions. Id. at 41-42.
¶ 15. The transactions at issue here, however, are motorcycle purchases, not residential real estate purchases, and it is an open question whether the duty to disclose recognized in Ollerman extends more broadly to sales of consumer goods. This is a significant common-law policy issue. Id. at 27. ("[W]hen a court [158]*158resolves a question of legal duty the court is making a policy determination.") But the parties did not brief it, and therefore we do not decide it.
i. No Legally Cognizable Injury
¶ 16. Ollerman also held that damages in intentional misrepresentation cases are measured according to the "benefit of the bargain" rule, "typically stated as the difference between the value of the property as represented and its actual value as purchased." Id. at 52-53. "Benefit of the bargain" damages in fraud cases "depend on the nature of the bargain and the circumstances of each case." Id. at 53.
¶ 17. In the context of deciding when a claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations, we have generally held that a tort claim is not capable of present enforcement (and therefore does not accrue) unless the plaintiff has suffered actual damage. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 315, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995); Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991). Actual damage is harm that has already occurred or is "reasonably certain" to occur in the future. Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 315; Hennekens, 160 Wis. 2d at 152-53. Actual damage is not the mere possibility of future harm. Id. at 153 (citing Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26-27, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989)). By statute, a fraud claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. Wis. Stat. § 893.93(l)(b).2 Although we are not confronted here with a question of [159]*159when this claim accrued for purposes of a statute of limitations defense, the amended complaint must adequately plead an actual injury — a loss or damage that has already occurred or is reasonably certain to occur — in order to state an actionable fraud claim. Ollerman, 94 Wis. 2d at 25, 54. In addition, fraud claims must be pleaded with particularity. Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2).
¶ 18. The injury complained of here is diminution in value only — the plaintiffs allege that their motorcycles are worth less than they paid for them. However, the amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs' motorcycles have diminished value because their engines have failed, will fail, or are reasonably certain to fail as a result of the TC-88 cam bearing defect. The amended complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs have sold their motorcycles at a loss because of the alleged engine defect. The amended complaint alleges only that the motorcycles have diminished value— primarily diminished potential resale value — because Harley motorcycles equipped with TC-88 engines have demonstrated a "propensity" for premature engine failure and/or will fail as a result of the cam bearing defect. This is insufficient to state a legally cognizable injury for purposes of a fraud claim.
¶ 19. Diminished value premised upon a mere possibility of future product failure is too speculative and uncertain to support a fraud claim. The plaintiffs [160]*160do not specifically allege that their particular motorcycles will fail prematurely, only that the Harley product line that consists of motorcycles with TC-88 engines has demonstrated a propensity for premature engine failure. An allegation that a particular product line fails prematurely does not constitute an allegation that the plaintiffs' particular motorcycles will do so, only that there is a possibility that they will do so.
¶ 20. We certainly agree with the court of appeals that the damages allegations in a fraud complaint are not evaluated against a standard of "absolute certainty" for purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Tietsworth, 261 Wis. 2d 755, ¶ 16. But an allegation that a product is diminished in value because of an event or circumstance that might — -or might not — occur in the future is inherently conjectural and does not allege actual benefit-of-the-bargain damages with the "reasonable certainty" required to state a fraud claim.
¶ 21. This conclusion is consistent with many federal and state court decisions that have affirmed the dismissal of claims brought under fraud, strict products liability, and other tort theories where the allegedly defective product has not actually malfunctioned. These "no injury" cases are too numerous to list, but for a representative sample, see, e.g., Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 147-48 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on allegedly defective heart valve that was functioning properly); Carlson v. General Motors Corp., 883 F.2d 287, 297 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of a claim for diminished resale value of diesel cars due to "poor reputation" rather than actual damage or loss resulting from vehicle defect); Briehl v. General Motors [161]*161Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 627-29 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of class action lawsuit for fraud and breach of warranty where the only alleged damage from vehicles' defective brake system was overpayment and diminished resale value); Jarman v. United Industries Corp., 98 F.Supp.2d 757, 767 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (dismissing fraud, warranty, and various statutory claims for purchase of allegedly ineffective pesticide where there is no allegation of actual product failure); Weaver v. Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 99-100 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing class action fraud and warranty lawsuit for allegedly defective integrated child seats where there is no allegation that the product has malfunctioned or the defect manifested itself); Yost v. General Motors Corp., 651 F.Supp. 656, 657-58 (D.N.J. 1986) (dismissing fraud and warranty claim for alleged engine defect where engine has not malfunctioned and plaintiff alleges diminished value only); Ziegelmann v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 649 N.W.2d 556, 559-65 (N.D. 2002) (collecting cases and dismissing class action fraud and negligence lawsuit for alleged brake system defect where damages were premised only on diminution in value); Frank v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 9, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (dismissing class action fraud, negligence, and products liability lawsuit for alleged seat backrest defect in the absence of allegation of actual product failure); Yu v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 732 N.E.2d 1173, 1177-78 (Ill. App. 2000) (affirming dismissal of class action fraud, negligence, and deceptive trade practices lawsuit for allegedly defective computer software where there was no allegation of actual product failure); Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726 So.2d 626, 631 (Ala. 1998) (affirming dismissal of class action fraud lawsuit for SUV [162]*162design defect alleged to cause rollover tendency where defect did not manifest itself and vehicles did not roll over).
¶ 22. We note, however, that the amended complaint does contain one allegation that is arguably sufficient to state a more particularized injury to these plaintiffs: at paragraph 35 of the amended complaint the plaintiffs allege that Harley knew that "all of the motorcycles with the TC-88s are defective and will prematurely fail." This reference to "all" motorcycles with TC-88 engines includes the plaintiffs' motorcycles, and therefore can be read as the equivalent of a more particularized allegation that the plaintiffs' motorcycles will fail prematurely. Accordingly, we address the application of the economic loss doctrine to this claim.
ii. Economic Loss Doctrine
¶ 23. Apart from the generally insufficient damages allegations in the fraud cause of action, the economic loss doctrine bars this claim. The economic loss doctrine is a judicially-created remedies principle that operates generally to preclude contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses associated with the contract relationship. Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 2003 WI 54, ¶¶ 33-35, 262 Wis. 2d 32, 662 N.W.2d 652.
¶ 24. Adopted by this court in Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 921, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989), the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from the failure of a product to live up to a contracting party's expectations. Wausau Tile, Inc. v. [163]*163County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 245-46, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999). The doctrine generally "requires transacting parties in Wisconsin to pursue only their contractual remedies when asserting an economic loss claim." Digicorp, 262 Wis. 2d 32, ¶ 34.
¶ 25. "Economic loss" for purposes of the doctrine includes the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior and does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. Northridge, 162 Wis. 2d at 925-26. It includes both direct economic loss and consequential economic loss. Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 401, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998). The economic loss doctrine has been extended to consumer transactions as well as transactions between commercial contracting parties. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 225 Wis. 2d 305, 311-12, 592 N.W.2d 201 (1999).
¶ 26. The economic loss doctrine is "based on an understanding that contract law and the law of warranty, in particular, is better suited than tort law for dealing with purely economic loss in the commercial arena." Daanen, 216 Wis. 2d at 403-04. "If a [contracting party] is permitted to sue in tort when a transaction does not work out as expected, that party is in effect rewriting the agreement to obtain a benefit that was not part of the bargain." Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, ¶ 27 n.19, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132.
¶ 27. Thus, we have often stated that the economic loss doctrine serves the following three important common-law policies:
(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort and contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties' freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3) [164]*164to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk of economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to assume, allocate, or insure against the risk.
Daanen, 216 Wis. 2d at 403.
¶ 28. The distinction between tort and contract law rests on their differing concepts of duty: "contract law rests on bargained-for obligations, while tort law is based on legal obligations" imposed on society at large. Wausau Tile, 226 Wis. 2d at 247; see also State Farm, 225 Wis. 2d at 316-18. The economic loss doctrine "recognizes that whether a product meets a certain level of performance or a purchaser's expectations is not a matter of societal interest [but] [r]ather, ... [is] a matter of contract." Id. at 321. "These differences in the source and nature of duty in contract and tort law produce different rules regarding remedy and damages (punitive damages are not recoverable in contract actions, for example), and the economic loss doctrine exists in large part to keep each in its proper sphere." Digicorp, 262 Wis. 2d 32, ¶ 75 (Sykes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
¶ 29. The economic loss doctrine has been applied by Wisconsin courts to bar claims of negligent and strict responsibility misrepresentation, and by federal courts applying Wisconsin law to bar claims of negligent, strict responsibility, and intentional misrepreséntation. Selzer v. Brunsell Bros., Ltd., 2002 WI App 232, ¶¶ 31-33, 257 Wis. 2d 809, 652 N.W.2d 806 (negligent and strict responsibility misrepresentation); Home Valu, Inc. v. Pep Boys, 213 F.3d 960, 964 (7th Cir. 2000) (intentional, negligent, and strict responsibility misrepresentation); Cooper Power Systems, Inc. v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., Inc., 123 F.3d 675, 682 (7th [165]*165Cir. 1997) (intentional misrepresentation); Badger Pharmacal, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1 F.3d 621, 628 (7th Cir. 1993) (negligent and strict responsibility misrepresentation).
¶ 30. Applying the economic loss doctrine to misrepresentation claims furthers the doctrine's central purpose:
Where there are well-developed contractual remedies, such as the remedies that the Uniform Commercial Code (in force in all U.S. states) provides for breach of warranty of the quality, fitness, or specifications of goods, there is no need to provide tort remedies for misrepresentation. The tort remedies would duplicate the contract remedies, adding unnecessary complexity to the law. Worse, the provision of these duplicative tort remedies would undermine contract law.
All-Tech Telecom, 174 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, "misrepresentations such as these, that ultimately concern the quality of the product sold, are properly remedied through claims for breach of warranty." Cooper Power Systems, 123 F.3d at 682.
¶ 31. We cited generally to the foregoing line of federal appellate opinions in last term's decision in Digicorp, 262 Wis. 2d 32, ¶¶ 43-45. Digicorp presupposed the general applicability of the economic loss doctrine to misrepresentation claims; the case tested the continued viability of the court of appeals' decision in Douglas-Hanson Co., Inc. v. BF Goodrich Co., 229 Wis. 2d 132, 598 N.W.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1999), which had recognized an exception to the economic loss doctrine for claims of intentional fraud-in-the-inducement of a [166]*166contract.3 Also at issue in Digicorp was an alternative to Douglas-Hanson'& broad fraud exception to the economic loss doctrine: the so-called Huron Tool claim, based on the Michigan case of Huron Tool and Engineering Co. v. Precision Consulting Services, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), which recognized a narrow fraud-in-the-inducement cause of action for misrepresentations "extraneous to" and not "interwoven with" the subject matter of the contract.
¶ 32. Two justices did not participate in Digicorp, however, and the five members of the court who decided the case divided 2-1-2 on the issue of a fraud-in-the-inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine. Digicorp, 262 Wis. 2d 32, ¶ 5 n.2 (Crooks, J., lead opinion, joined by Prosser, J.); ¶ 82 n.3 (Sykes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); ¶ 85 (Bradley, J., dissenting, joined by Bablitch, J.). A majority of the justices participating — Justices Crooks, who authored the lead opinion, joined by Justice Prosser and this writer — overruled Douglas-Hanson Co. to the extent that it recognized a broad exception to the economic loss doctrine for all claims of fraud-in-the-inducement of a contract. Digicorp, 262 Wis. 2d 32, ¶ 51.
¶ 33. Two members of the Digicorp majority, Justices Crooks and Prosser, announced their recognition of a narrow Huron Tool-type cause of action as an exception to the economic loss doctrine. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 5 n.2, 51. This writer dissented from that part of the lead opinion, concluding that a fraud-in-the-inducement exception to the economic loss doctrine was unnecessary [167]*167and inappropriate, because contract remedies at law and in equity for contracts fraudulently induced were adequate. Id. at ¶¶ 73-83 (Sykes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The three-justice majority reversed the judgment, agreeing that the facts of the case were insufficient to satisfy even a narrow, Huron Tool-type claim. Id., ¶¶ 62, 82.
¶ 34. Justice Bradley dissented in Digicorp, joined by Justice Bablitch; the dissenters rejected Huron Tool, and would have maintained Douglas-Hanson in its entirety. Id., ¶¶ 84-91. Thus, while a majority of the justices participating in Digicorp overruled Douglas-Hanson, and a separate majority announced a willingness to allow some type of fraud-in-the-inducement tort as an exception to the economic loss doctrine, three of the five justices participating (albeit different sets of three) rejected both Douglas-Hanson and Huron Tool. Accordingly, Digicorp did not produce the majority agreement necessary for the authoritative recognition of an element-specific fraud-in-the-inducement tort cause of action as an exception to the economic loss doctrine.
¶ 35. This case does not present an opportunity to determine whether a Huron Tool-type cause of action as an exception to the economic loss doctrine would be recognized by a majority of this court. The fraud alleged here plainly pertains to the character and quality of the goods that are the subject matter of the contract.
¶ 36. As such, the plaintiffs have warranty remedies for the alleged defects in their motorcycles. In addition, there are contract remedies at law and in equity to the extent that the plaintiffs were fraudulently induced to purchase their motorcycles. A contract fraudulently induced is void or voidable; a party fraudu[168]*168lently induced to enter a contract may affirm the contract and seek damages for breach or pursue the equitable remedy of rescission and seek restitutionary damages, including sums necessary to restore the party fraudulently induced to his position prior to the making of the contract. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Racine v. Notte, 97 Wis. 2d 207, 225, 293 N.W.2d 530 (1980); Eklund v. Koenig & Assocs., 153 Wis. 2d 374, 381, 451 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1989); Head & Seemann, Inc. v. Gregg, 104 Wis. 2d 156, 166-67, 311 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App 1981). The economic loss doctrine does not bar these contract remedies for fraudulently induced contracts. See Harley-Davidson Motor Co v. Powersports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973, 978 n.7 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting Wisconsin cases).
¶ 37. In short, we see no reason to recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine to allow this consumer contract dispute to be remedied as an intentional misrepresentation tort. The economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiffs' common-law fraud claim. The plaintiffs may have contract remedies — breach of contract/warranty or rescission, and restitution — but may not pursue a tort claim for misrepresentation premised on having purchased allegedly defective motorcycles.
B. DTPA Claim
¶ 38. The plaintiffs' statutory claim is based on Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), which generally prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading representations or statements of fact in public advertisements or sales announcements. The DTPA provides, in pertinent part:
[169]*169No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee thereof... with intent to induce the public in any manner to enter into any contract or obligation relating to the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any ... merchandise . . . shall make ... an advertisement, announcement, statement or representation of any kind to the public ... which advertisement, announcement, statement or representation contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) (emphasis added). The DTPA provides a private cause of action for persons suffering a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of the statute:
Any person suffering pecuniary loss because of a violation of this section by any other person may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and shall recover such pecuniary loss, together with costs, including reasonable attorney fees.
Wis. Stat. § 100.18(ll)(b)2.
¶ 39. Under the terms of the statute, a plaintiff asserting a DTPA claim must allege that the defendant has, with the specified intent, made an "advertisement, announcement, statement or representation ... to the public," which contains an "assertion, representation or statement of fact" that is "untrue, deceptive or misleading," and that the plaintiff has sustained a pecuniary loss as a. result of the "assertion, representation or statement of fact." Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1); see also Wis JI — Civil 2418.
¶ 40. As we have noted, the plaintiffs' case is premised primarily on the allegation that Harley failed to disclose the alleged motorcycle engine defect. A nondisclosure is not an "assertion, representation or statement of fact" under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). [170]*170Silence — an omission to speak — is insufficient to support a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). The DTPA does not purport to impose a duty to disclose, but, rather, prohibits only affirmative assertions, representations, or statements of fact that are false, deceptive, or misleading.4 To permit a nondisclosure to qualify as [171]*171an actionable "assertion, representation or statement of fact" under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) would expand the statute far beyond its terms.
¶ 41. To the extent that the amended complaint alleges any affirmative assertions, they are mere commercial "puffery" and hence legally insufficient to support a claim under the statute. Puffery has been defined as "the exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined." State v. American TV, 146 Wis. 2d 292, 301-02, 430 N.W.2d 709 (1988) (quoting Better Living, Inc. et al., 54 F.T.C. 648, 653 (1957), aff'd., 259 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1958)). See also Loula v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 175 Wis. 2d 50, 54, 498 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1993) (statement that a tool dealer would make as much money as a doctor or lawyer was an exaggeration, "the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined," and "so vague and indefinite that it amounts to nothing more than mere puffery," nonactionable at common law as a misrepresentation.)
¶ 42. In American TV, we held that "[a] general statement that one's products are best is not actionable as a misrepresentation of fact" and could not support a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18. American TV, 146 Wis. 2d at 302. We also concluded that the characterization of a product as "the finest" and a sale as a "clearance" or "closeout" were "merely examples of hyperbole and puffery," insufficient to state a claim under the DTPA. Id. at 299.
[172]*172¶ 43. Similarly here, the affirmative statements identified in the amended complaint constitute fairly obvious examples of puffery. Harley is alleged to have advertised the TC-88 as "a masterpiece," of "premium quality," and "filled to the brim with torque and ready to take you thundering down the road."
¶ 44. "Premium quality" equates to "the best," and is squarely within the puffery definition of American TV. The term "masterpiece" is arguably more precise than "the best," insofar as it connotes a specific engineering achievement, but this does not move the term out of the domain of puffery. One reason for excluding commercial puffs from the scope of actionable misrepresentations is that they are "not capable of being substantiated or refuted," id. at 302 (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395, 752 (1983)), and a factfinder would have as little hope of determining whether the TC-88 was indeed "a masterpiece" as it would of determining whether it was simply "the best." Harley's statement that the TC-88 is "filled to the brim with torque and ready to take you thundering down the road" lacks even the minimal linguistic specificity required to make it amenable to proof or refutation, however entertaining the attempt might prove to be.
¶ 45. Accordingly, because a nondisclosure is not an "assertion, representation or statement of fact" for purposes of the DTPA, and because the only affirmative assertions alleged in the amended complaint are mere puffery, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18.
By the Court.— The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
¶ 46. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation.