Stafford, J.
The sole issue in this case is whether justice district courts have jurisdiction to entertain and try damage claims arising under the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.
Respondent collection agency, Spokane General Credit, Inc., as assignee of a debt allegedly owed to Bestway Fuel, Inc., by petitioner, Linda Strenge, initiated an action in Spokane County District Court to collect $119.15 claimed to be due on her open account. Petitioner counterclaimed for treble damages under RCW 19.86.090 of the Consumer Protection Act. She alleged that respondent engaged in abusive collection practices proscribed by RCW 19.16.440 which reads in part:
[T]he commission by a licensee or an employee of a licensee of an act or practice prohibited by RCW 19.16-.250 are declared to be unfair acts or practices or unfair methods of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce for the purpose of the application of the Consumer Protection Act found in chapter 19.86 RCW.
[25]*25During the trial it developed that respondent had indeed violated certain provisions of the Collection Agency Act, RCW 19.16.250(14), (18),1 by attempting to collect court costs, services fees and attorney's fees before they were reduced to judgment. The district court (justice court) awarded respondent judgment for the unpaid balance of $39.15. But, acting pursuant to RCW 19.16.4502 the court properly refused to award respondent any sum for court costs, collection costs, attorney's fees, or other costs, or interest. On the other hand, the court declined to entertain petitioner's counterclaim under RCW 19.86, claiming lack of jurisdiction over claims under the Consumer Protection Act.
Linda Strenge petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari to review the justice court's decision that it lacked such jurisdiction. The Superior Court, because of the importance of the issue, certified the matter to the Court of Appeals which in turn certified the matter to this court.
We reverse the justice court and hold that it has jurisdiction over claims brought under the Consumer Protection [26]*26Act for the following reasons: (1) the legislature has, pursuant to the Washington State Constitution, conferred justice courts with jurisdiction over proceedings of this nature (i.e., an action for a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars); (2) the language of RCW 19.86.090 allows complainants under the act to bring their suits either in justice court or in superior court; and (3) such a result is both in the public interest and consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act.
[25]*25"(18) Collect or attempt to collect in addition to the principal amount of a claim any sum other than allowable interest, collection costs expressly authorized by statute, and, in the case of suit, attorney's fees and taxable court costs."
[26]*26First, article 4, section 6 (amendment 28)3 invests the superior court with original and general jurisdiction in all cases and in all proceedings in which jurisdiction is not exclusively vested by law in some other court or forum. Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331, 351-52, 413 P.2d 940 (1966). Similarly, justice court jurisdiction is provided for in the state constitution. However, the power to determine the extent of justice court jurisdiction is lodged in the legislature which is authorized to prescribe the jurisdiction of justice courts provided such jurisdiction does not "trench upon" the jurisdiction of the superior court. Const. art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28) .4 That limitation has been interpreted to mean that the investing of original jurisdiction in the superior courts does not prevent the legislature from giving concurrent jurisdiction to justice courts in the same class of cases.
[27]*27The language of the constitution is not that the superior courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, but it gives to the superior courts universal original jurisdiction, leaving the legislature to carve out from that jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, and any other inferior courts that may be created.
(Italics ours.) Moore v. Perrott, 2 Wash. 1, 4, 25 P. 906 (1891). To date we have not deviated from that interpretation. Accord, State v. Haye, 72 Wn.2d 461, 467, 433 P.2d 884 (1967); State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 291, 298, 136 P. 147 (1913); State v. Schaffer, 31 Wash. 305, 306, 71 P. 1088 (1903).
Following this interpretation, the legislature has "carved" the justice court's civil jurisdiction out of the original universal jurisdiction of the superior court. RCW 3.66. For example, RCW 3.66.020 lists the civil actions and proceedings over which justice courts have jurisdiction. RCW 3.66.020(3) specifically provides that justice courts shall have jurisdiction in civil actions "for a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars."
Second, we have clearly stated that RCW 19.86.090, the damages section of the Consumer Protection Act, imposes a civil penalty. Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 85 Wn.2d 637, 640, 538 P.2d 510 (1975). The statutory penalty is limited to one thousand dollars. Thus, by virtue of RCW 3.66.020(3) justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts over the civil penalty provided for in RCW 19.86.090 unless the legislature has provided there, or in some other statute, that the superior courts have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. There is no such limiting provision.
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Stafford, J.
The sole issue in this case is whether justice district courts have jurisdiction to entertain and try damage claims arising under the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.
Respondent collection agency, Spokane General Credit, Inc., as assignee of a debt allegedly owed to Bestway Fuel, Inc., by petitioner, Linda Strenge, initiated an action in Spokane County District Court to collect $119.15 claimed to be due on her open account. Petitioner counterclaimed for treble damages under RCW 19.86.090 of the Consumer Protection Act. She alleged that respondent engaged in abusive collection practices proscribed by RCW 19.16.440 which reads in part:
[T]he commission by a licensee or an employee of a licensee of an act or practice prohibited by RCW 19.16-.250 are declared to be unfair acts or practices or unfair methods of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce for the purpose of the application of the Consumer Protection Act found in chapter 19.86 RCW.
[25]*25During the trial it developed that respondent had indeed violated certain provisions of the Collection Agency Act, RCW 19.16.250(14), (18),1 by attempting to collect court costs, services fees and attorney's fees before they were reduced to judgment. The district court (justice court) awarded respondent judgment for the unpaid balance of $39.15. But, acting pursuant to RCW 19.16.4502 the court properly refused to award respondent any sum for court costs, collection costs, attorney's fees, or other costs, or interest. On the other hand, the court declined to entertain petitioner's counterclaim under RCW 19.86, claiming lack of jurisdiction over claims under the Consumer Protection Act.
Linda Strenge petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari to review the justice court's decision that it lacked such jurisdiction. The Superior Court, because of the importance of the issue, certified the matter to the Court of Appeals which in turn certified the matter to this court.
We reverse the justice court and hold that it has jurisdiction over claims brought under the Consumer Protection [26]*26Act for the following reasons: (1) the legislature has, pursuant to the Washington State Constitution, conferred justice courts with jurisdiction over proceedings of this nature (i.e., an action for a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars); (2) the language of RCW 19.86.090 allows complainants under the act to bring their suits either in justice court or in superior court; and (3) such a result is both in the public interest and consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act.
[25]*25"(18) Collect or attempt to collect in addition to the principal amount of a claim any sum other than allowable interest, collection costs expressly authorized by statute, and, in the case of suit, attorney's fees and taxable court costs."
[26]*26First, article 4, section 6 (amendment 28)3 invests the superior court with original and general jurisdiction in all cases and in all proceedings in which jurisdiction is not exclusively vested by law in some other court or forum. Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331, 351-52, 413 P.2d 940 (1966). Similarly, justice court jurisdiction is provided for in the state constitution. However, the power to determine the extent of justice court jurisdiction is lodged in the legislature which is authorized to prescribe the jurisdiction of justice courts provided such jurisdiction does not "trench upon" the jurisdiction of the superior court. Const. art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28) .4 That limitation has been interpreted to mean that the investing of original jurisdiction in the superior courts does not prevent the legislature from giving concurrent jurisdiction to justice courts in the same class of cases.
[27]*27The language of the constitution is not that the superior courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, but it gives to the superior courts universal original jurisdiction, leaving the legislature to carve out from that jurisdiction the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, and any other inferior courts that may be created.
(Italics ours.) Moore v. Perrott, 2 Wash. 1, 4, 25 P. 906 (1891). To date we have not deviated from that interpretation. Accord, State v. Haye, 72 Wn.2d 461, 467, 433 P.2d 884 (1967); State ex rel. Keasal v. Superior Court, 76 Wash. 291, 298, 136 P. 147 (1913); State v. Schaffer, 31 Wash. 305, 306, 71 P. 1088 (1903).
Following this interpretation, the legislature has "carved" the justice court's civil jurisdiction out of the original universal jurisdiction of the superior court. RCW 3.66. For example, RCW 3.66.020 lists the civil actions and proceedings over which justice courts have jurisdiction. RCW 3.66.020(3) specifically provides that justice courts shall have jurisdiction in civil actions "for a penalty not exceeding one thousand dollars."
Second, we have clearly stated that RCW 19.86.090, the damages section of the Consumer Protection Act, imposes a civil penalty. Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 85 Wn.2d 637, 640, 538 P.2d 510 (1975). The statutory penalty is limited to one thousand dollars. Thus, by virtue of RCW 3.66.020(3) justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with superior courts over the civil penalty provided for in RCW 19.86.090 unless the legislature has provided there, or in some other statute, that the superior courts have sole and exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. There is no such limiting provision.
In this vein, it is clear that RCW 19.86.090 provides:
[28]*28Any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020 . . . may bring a civil action in the superior court . . . and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: Provided, That such increased damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars.
(Italics ours.) Consequently, the issue thus becomes whether the statutory words "may bring an action in the superior court" reflect a legislative intent that an action for this type of civil penalty must be brought exclusively in superior court or whether the jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the justice courts under Const. art. 4, § 6 and § 10 and RCW 3.66.020(3).
We are convinced the expression denotes concurrent jurisdiction. Words in a statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears. Department of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wn.2d 549, 552, 512 P.2d 1094 (1973). The ordinary meaning of the word "may" conveys the idea of choice or discretion. State ex rel. Beck v. Carter, 2 Wn. App. 974, 977, 471 P.2d 127 (1970). While there appears to be no serious dispute over such a construction of the word "may," it hás been suggested that the phrase "may bring a civil action in the superior court" as used in RCW 19.86.090 denies petitioner a choice of bringing a suit in either the justice courts or the superior court. "May,” it is urged, merely indicates that a private litigant is under no compulsion to sue at all. We do not agree with that oversimplified view. The mere existence of a statute which creates a civil remedy never compels or requires a private person to bring suit. A prospective litigant may always choose whether to pursue a civil action, regardless of the legislature's use of the word "may." The word "may," as used in the Consumer Protection Act, cannot be said to have no more meaning than merely to inform a potential claimant of that which he already knows, i.e., that he is not forced to sue. Rather, common sense tells us [29]*29the word "may" permits the plaintiff to make a choice of forums—either justice court or superior court.
The legislative scheme to allow claimants, under the Consumer Protection Act, to commence suit in either justice or superior court is further evidenced by limitation of the amount of the civil penalty to $1,000, the constitutional and statutory jurisdictional maximum for justice courts. Const. art. 4, § 6, § 10 (amendment 28); RCW 3.66.020(3).
Finally, the fundamental object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In so doing, first consideration is given to the context and subject matter of the statute itself. Moreover, legislative intent is to be ascertained from the statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the legislation. State v. Sponburgh, 84 Wn.2d 203, 210, 525 P.2d 238 (1974). Further, a statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object. If the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat that object, it should receive the former construction. Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wn.2d 302, 310, 501 P.2d 1063 (1972).
The purpose of the Consumer Protection Act is "to complement the body of federal law governing . . . unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair and honest competition. . . . To this end this act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served. ” RCW 19.86.920. (Italics ours.) The use of the word "shall" indicates that a liberal construction of the act is required.
We have recently indicated the necessity of interpreting RCW 19.86.090 liberally. In Hockley v. Hargitt, 82 Wn.2d 337, 510 P.2d 1123 (1973), Justice Brachtenbach, speaking for a unanimous court, emphasized both the State's public policy of liberally construing the Consumer Protection Act as well as the inadequacy of remedies available to consumers. We have not been alone in recognizing the necessity for broader private consumer remedies. See: Report of the [30]*30National Institute for Consumer Justice, Redress of Consumer Grievances, 13; Staff Studies Prepared for the National Institute for Consumer Justice on Small Claims Courts, 13; Comment, The Small Claims Court in the State of Washington, 10 Gonz. L. Rev. 683 (1975); Note, Consumer Protection in Florida, 23 Fla. L. Rev. 528, 533 (1971); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 Pa. L. Rev. 395, 437 (1966); cf. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 Boston U. L. Rev. 559, 569 (1968); Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. Rev. 281 (1971); Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 Yale L.J. 745, 764 (1967).
We cannot avoid the observation that the justice court's ruling would effectively preclude an average consumer from seeking recovery for the many legitimate small monetary claims that could otherwise be brought in justice court or in the small claims department of that court. From a practical standpoint, the mere cost of filing a case in superior court might well frustrate consumers with small claims from attempting to secure a meaningful airing of proper consumer problems. The instant case is such an example. The amount in dispute is only $39.15. Yet, if petitioner was required to pursue her remedy as a separate case in the superior court, rather than as a counterclaim in the same justice court action, she would be assessed an additional filing fee of $32. We cannot believe the legislature intended such a result.
The wording of RCW 19.86.090 and the broad purpose expressed in RCW 19.96.902 clearly reflect a legislative intent to give justice and superior courts concurrent jurisdiction over claims under the Consumer Protection Act. The judgment of the Spokane County District Court refusing jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaim is reversed.
Rosellini, Hamilton, and Utter, JJ., concur.
Dolliver, J., concurs in the result.