Whatcom County v. Eric Hirst
This text of Whatcom County v. Eric Hirst (Whatcom County v. Eric Hirst) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
..." i h l 1. '->'
20I5FEB23 fcilhS"
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
WHATCOM COUNTY, No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. Petitioner, 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-1)
ERIC HIRST; LAURA LEIGH BRAKKE; DIVISION ONE WENDY HARRIS; DAVID STALHEIM; and FUTUREWISE,
Cross Petitioners,
v.
WESTERN WASHINGTON GROWTH PUBLISHED MANAGEMENT HEARING BOARD, FILED: February 23, 2015 Respondent.
Cox, J. — Whatcom County appeals the Growth Management Hearings
Board's Final Decision and Order dated June 7, 2013 (FDO). The Board
determined that the Rural Element of the County's comprehensive plan and
zoning code, as amended by Ordinance No. 2012-032, fails to comply with the
Growth Management Act (GMA). Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris,
David Stalheim, and Futurewise (collectively Hirst) cross-appeals the FDO,
arguing that the Board erred by declining to declare the ordinance invalid. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/2
We hold that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure by taking official
notice of and relying on two documents without first providing the County the
opportunity to contest information in these documents. We also hold that the
Board erroneously interpreted and applied the law in determining that Ordinance
No. 2012-032 fails to comply with the GMA. But the Board did not abuse its
discretion by declining to declare the ordinance invalid. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In August 2012, Whatcom County adopted Ordinance No. 2012-032.1 By
its terms, Ordinance No. 2012-032 amended the Whatcom County
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Code.2 Among other things, this ordinance
amended certain Rural Element policies and adopted by reference various pre
existing County regulations. These amendments were in response to a series of
prior rulings from the Board and the courts requiring that the Rural Element of the
County's comprehensive plan and development regulations be brought into
compliance with the GMA.
Hirst petitioned the Board for review, challenging the adoption of
Ordinance No. 2012-032. In particular, Hirst challenged the ordinance on rural
land use planning, which included a challenge to the adequacy of the County's
measures to protect surface and groundwater resources.
1 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 178-93.
2 Id. at 178. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/3
The Board held a hearing in April 2013. Thereafter, the Board issued its
FDO. The Board concluded that the Rural Element amendments to the County's
comprehensive plan and development regulations do not constitute measures to
protect rural character by protecting surface and groundwater resources. Thus,
according to the Board, Hirst met its burden of demonstrating that the County
failed to comply with the GMA, specifically RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c).3 But the
Board denied Hirst's request for a declaration of invalidity.4 The Board remanded
the ordinance to the County to take corrective action within 180 days.5
Both parties appealed. The County sought review in Skagit County
Superior Court, challenging the Board's determination of noncompliance with the
GMA. Hirst sought review in Thurston County Superior Court, challenging the
Board's decision not to declare the ordinance invalid.
Thurston County superior court transferred Hirst's appeal to Skagit County
superior court, where the cases were consolidated under the Skagit County
cause number.6 The Board issued its Certificates of Appealability regarding the
FDO, certifying the consolidated appeals for direct review by this court.
In April 2014, the Board held a compliance hearing. The Board concluded
that "Whatcom County [was] in continuing non-compliance with the Growth
3]d,at1559(FDOat44).
4 id, at 1565 (FDO at 50).
6 Id. at 147-149. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/4
Management Act [as determined in the FDO]."7 The Board issued a Second
Order on Compliance.8
The County moved for discretionary review of the FDO, and we accepted
the consolidated appeals for direct review. We also granted the County's request
for discretionary review of the Second Order on Compliance. Based on the
agreement of the parties at oral argument and our review of the records before
us, we consolidate these matters.9
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In reviewing growth management hearings board decisions, courts give
"'substantial weight'" to a board's interpretation of the GMA.10 "Courts' deference
to boards is superseded by the GMA's statutory requirement that boards give
deference to county planning processes."11 Accordingly, a board's ruling that
7 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 72132-1) at 26 (emphasis omitted).
8 Id at 19-26.
9 Pursuant to RAP 3.4, the title of this case in this court remains the same as in the superior court. See Joint Stipulation, Motion, and Order Consolidating Appeals. Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 147-49.
10 Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 172 Wn.2d 144, 154, 256 P.3d 1193 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis County v. W. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 157 Wn.2d 488, 498, 139 P.3d 1096(2006)).
11 Id. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/5
fails to apply this "more deferential standard of review to a county's action is not
entitled to deference" from the courts.12
Comprehensive plans and development regulations are presumed valid
upon adoption.13 "To make a finding of noncompliance with the GMA, a board
must find that the county's actions are clearly erroneous, meaning the board has
a 'firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"14 The GMA
"'is not to be liberally construed.'"15
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs judicial review of
challenges to decisions by a board. Courts apply the standards of the APA,
chapter 34.05 RCW, and look directly to the record before the board.16 The party
challenging the board's decision bears the burden of proving it is invalid.17 The
validity of the decision is determined under the standards of review provided in
12 Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224, 238, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 RCW 36.70A.320(1); Town of Woodwav v. Snohomish County. 180 Wn.2d 165, 174, 322 P.3d 1219 (2014).
14 Kittitas County, 172 Wn.2d at 154-55 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis County, 157 Wn.2d at 497).
15 ]d (quoting Thurston County v. W. Wash. Growth Mqmt.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
..." i h l 1. '->'
20I5FEB23 fcilhS"
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
WHATCOM COUNTY, No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. Petitioner, 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-1)
ERIC HIRST; LAURA LEIGH BRAKKE; DIVISION ONE WENDY HARRIS; DAVID STALHEIM; and FUTUREWISE,
Cross Petitioners,
v.
WESTERN WASHINGTON GROWTH PUBLISHED MANAGEMENT HEARING BOARD, FILED: February 23, 2015 Respondent.
Cox, J. — Whatcom County appeals the Growth Management Hearings
Board's Final Decision and Order dated June 7, 2013 (FDO). The Board
determined that the Rural Element of the County's comprehensive plan and
zoning code, as amended by Ordinance No. 2012-032, fails to comply with the
Growth Management Act (GMA). Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris,
David Stalheim, and Futurewise (collectively Hirst) cross-appeals the FDO,
arguing that the Board erred by declining to declare the ordinance invalid. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/2
We hold that the Board engaged in unlawful procedure by taking official
notice of and relying on two documents without first providing the County the
opportunity to contest information in these documents. We also hold that the
Board erroneously interpreted and applied the law in determining that Ordinance
No. 2012-032 fails to comply with the GMA. But the Board did not abuse its
discretion by declining to declare the ordinance invalid. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
In August 2012, Whatcom County adopted Ordinance No. 2012-032.1 By
its terms, Ordinance No. 2012-032 amended the Whatcom County
Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Code.2 Among other things, this ordinance
amended certain Rural Element policies and adopted by reference various pre
existing County regulations. These amendments were in response to a series of
prior rulings from the Board and the courts requiring that the Rural Element of the
County's comprehensive plan and development regulations be brought into
compliance with the GMA.
Hirst petitioned the Board for review, challenging the adoption of
Ordinance No. 2012-032. In particular, Hirst challenged the ordinance on rural
land use planning, which included a challenge to the adequacy of the County's
measures to protect surface and groundwater resources.
1 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 178-93.
2 Id. at 178. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/3
The Board held a hearing in April 2013. Thereafter, the Board issued its
FDO. The Board concluded that the Rural Element amendments to the County's
comprehensive plan and development regulations do not constitute measures to
protect rural character by protecting surface and groundwater resources. Thus,
according to the Board, Hirst met its burden of demonstrating that the County
failed to comply with the GMA, specifically RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c).3 But the
Board denied Hirst's request for a declaration of invalidity.4 The Board remanded
the ordinance to the County to take corrective action within 180 days.5
Both parties appealed. The County sought review in Skagit County
Superior Court, challenging the Board's determination of noncompliance with the
GMA. Hirst sought review in Thurston County Superior Court, challenging the
Board's decision not to declare the ordinance invalid.
Thurston County superior court transferred Hirst's appeal to Skagit County
superior court, where the cases were consolidated under the Skagit County
cause number.6 The Board issued its Certificates of Appealability regarding the
FDO, certifying the consolidated appeals for direct review by this court.
In April 2014, the Board held a compliance hearing. The Board concluded
that "Whatcom County [was] in continuing non-compliance with the Growth
3]d,at1559(FDOat44).
4 id, at 1565 (FDO at 50).
6 Id. at 147-149. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/4
Management Act [as determined in the FDO]."7 The Board issued a Second
Order on Compliance.8
The County moved for discretionary review of the FDO, and we accepted
the consolidated appeals for direct review. We also granted the County's request
for discretionary review of the Second Order on Compliance. Based on the
agreement of the parties at oral argument and our review of the records before
us, we consolidate these matters.9
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In reviewing growth management hearings board decisions, courts give
"'substantial weight'" to a board's interpretation of the GMA.10 "Courts' deference
to boards is superseded by the GMA's statutory requirement that boards give
deference to county planning processes."11 Accordingly, a board's ruling that
7 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 72132-1) at 26 (emphasis omitted).
8 Id at 19-26.
9 Pursuant to RAP 3.4, the title of this case in this court remains the same as in the superior court. See Joint Stipulation, Motion, and Order Consolidating Appeals. Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 147-49.
10 Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 172 Wn.2d 144, 154, 256 P.3d 1193 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis County v. W. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 157 Wn.2d 488, 498, 139 P.3d 1096(2006)).
11 Id. No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/5
fails to apply this "more deferential standard of review to a county's action is not
entitled to deference" from the courts.12
Comprehensive plans and development regulations are presumed valid
upon adoption.13 "To make a finding of noncompliance with the GMA, a board
must find that the county's actions are clearly erroneous, meaning the board has
a 'firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"14 The GMA
"'is not to be liberally construed.'"15
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) governs judicial review of
challenges to decisions by a board. Courts apply the standards of the APA,
chapter 34.05 RCW, and look directly to the record before the board.16 The party
challenging the board's decision bears the burden of proving it is invalid.17 The
validity of the decision is determined under the standards of review provided in
12 Quadrant Corp. v. State Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224, 238, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 RCW 36.70A.320(1); Town of Woodwav v. Snohomish County. 180 Wn.2d 165, 174, 322 P.3d 1219 (2014).
14 Kittitas County, 172 Wn.2d at 154-55 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis County, 157 Wn.2d at 497).
15 ]d (quoting Thurston County v. W. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 164 Wn.2d 329, 342, 190 P.3d 38 (2008)).
16 ]d at 155.
17 Thurston County v. Cooper Point Ass'n, 148 Wn.2d 1, 7, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002). No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/6
RCW 34.05.570(3), which sets forth nine subsections for granting relief from the
board's decision.
A court reviews de novo alleged errors of law under RCW 34.05.570(3)(b),
(c), and (d).18 In reviewing claims under RCW 34.05.570(3)(e) that an order is
not supported by substantial evidence, a court determines whether there is "'a
sufficient quantity of evidence to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth or
correctness of the order.'"19
Here, the County primarily relies on three of these grounds for relief—
RCW 34.05.570(3)(c), (d), and (e)—to argue that the Board erred when it
concluded that the County's measures to protect water resources (water
availability and water quality) did not comply with the GMA.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
As an initial matter, Hirst argues that the County's failure to assign error to
the Board's findings of fact in its opening brief makes them verities on appeal.
We disagree.
RAP 10.3(g) requires a party to assign error to each finding of fact it
contends was improperly made with reference to the finding by number. 'The
appellate court will only review a claimed error which is included in an
18 Kittitas County, 172 Wn.2d at 155.
19 Jd. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thurston County. 164 Wn.2dat341). No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/7
assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining
thereto."20 Unchallenged findings of fact become verities on appeal.21
But a "'technical violation of the rules will not ordinarily bar appellate
review, where justice is to be served by such review.'"22 The Rules of Appellate
Procedure "allow appellate review of administrative decisions in spite of technical
violations when a proper assignment of error is lacking but the nature of the
challenge is clear and the challenged finding is set forth in the party's brief."23
Here, the Board did not enumerate and consolidate its findings of fact in
one location. But, to the extent it made such findings, the nature and extent of
the County's challenges to them are clear. Thus, this court's review is not in any
way hindered by the absence of any formal assignments of error. Significantly,
Hirst fails to claim any prejudice by the County's failure to assign error to any
findings in its opening brief. For both of these reasons, we reject Hirst's
argument and reach the merits of the County's challenges.
20 RAP 10.3(g).
21 Spokane County v. E. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 176 Wn. App. 555, 576, 309 P.3d 673 (2013), review denied, 179 Wn.2d 1015 (2014).
22 State v. Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 322, 893 P.2d 629 (1995) (quoting Dauqhtrv v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wn.2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979)).
23 Ferry County v. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., Wn. App. , 339 P.3d 478, 495 (2014); see also Yakima County v. E. Wash. Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 168 Wn. App. 680, 687 n.1, 279 P.3d 434 (2012) (concluding that the court was sufficiently apprised of the challenged findings for review despite Yakima County's failure to assign error to the Growth Management Hearing Board's informal findings). No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/8
WATER AVAILABILITY
The County argues that the Board erred when it concluded that the
County's measures to protect water availability were clearly erroneous.
Specifically, the County contends that the Board's conclusion is based on an
erroneous interpretation of the law under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d). We agree.
Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), courts "'accord deference to an agency
interpretation of the law where the agency has specialized expertise in dealing
with such issues, but [courts] are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a
statute.'"24
GMA Provisions
RCW 36.70A.020 states goals to guide the development and adoption of
comprehensive plans and development regulations. One of the stated goals is to
"[p]rotect the environment and enhance the state's high quality of life, including
air and water quality, and the availability of water."25
RCW 36.70A.070 sets forth mandatory elements of a comprehensive plan.
It states that "[c]ounties shall include a rural element."26 It further states that the
rural element "shall include measures that apply to rural development and protect
the rural character of the area, as established by the county, by ... [protecting ..
24 Utter v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 140 Wn. App. 293, 300, 165 P.3d 399 (2007) (quoting City of Redmond v. Cent. Puqet Sound Growth Mqmt. Hr'qs Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998)).
25RCW36.70A.020(10).
26 RCW 36.70A.070(5).
8 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/9
. surface water and groundwater resources ... ,"27 "'Rural character' refers to
the patterns of land use and development established by a county in the rural
element of its comprehensive plan" that, among other things, "are compatible
with the use of the land by wildlife and for fish and wildlife habitat" and "are
consistent with the protection of natural surface water flows and groundwater and
surface water recharge and discharge areas."28
After looking to these statutes and others, the Board concluded that the
GMA is "replete with requirements to protect ground and surface water and
ensure land uses are compatible for fish and wildlife."29 It also concluded that a
county's comprehensive plan rural lands provision "must include measures
governing rural development to protect water resources."30
We agree that these initial conclusions of the Board were proper
interpretations of the law. The County properly concedes in its opening brief that
the GMA requires it to "adopt a rural element that includes measures to protect
[water availability and water quality]."31 Accordingly, the question is whether the
Board properly concluded that the ordinance fails to protect water availability and
water quality as required by the GMA.
27 RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv).
28 RCW 36.70A.030(15)(d), (g).
29 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1537 (FDO at 22).
30 jd, at 1536 (FDO at 21).
31 Brief of Appellant Whatcom County at 1.
9 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/10
In Kittitas County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings
Board, the supreme court interpreted the GMA requirements for the protection of
water resources, specifically water availability.32 At issue in that case was
whether the Board properly concluded that Kittitas County's subdivision
regulations failed to protect water resources as required by the GMA.33 The
Board concluded that the subdivision regulations violated the water protection
requirements of the GMA because they "allow[ed] multiple subdivisions side-by-
side, in common ownership, which then [could] use multiple exempt wells."34
And the Board concluded that this "fail[ed] to assure that authorized subdivisions
[did] not contravene or evade water permitting requirements."35
In upholding the Board's decision, the supreme court rejected the
argument that Kittitas County was preempted from adopting regulations related
to the protection of groundwater resources.36 Rather, it concluded that "several
relevant statutes indicate that the County must regulate to some extent to assure
that land use is not inconsistent with available water resources."37 Itfirst pointed
to one of the same provisions we quoted earlier in this opinion to assert that the
32172Wn.2d 144, 175-81, 256 P.3d 1193 (2011).
33 JcLat 175.
34 ]cL (internal quotation marks omitted).
351^177.
36 \±a\M8.
37 jd at 178.
10 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/11
"GMA directs that the rural and land use elements of a county's plan include
measures that protect groundwater resources."38 It then pointed to other
provisions, codified at RCW 19.27.097 and 58.17.110, to assert that these
provisions "require counties to assure adequate potable water is available when
issuing building permits and approving subdivision applications."39 After looking
to these provisions it concluded, "[T]he County is not precluded and, in fact, is
required to plan for the protection of water resources in its land use planning."40
Accordingly, with respect to the issue in that case, the supreme court held
that the Board properly interpreted the GMA's mandate to protect water "to at
least require that the County's subdivision regulations conform to statutory
requirements by not permitting subdivision applications that effectively evade
compliance with water permitting requirements."41 And it affirmed the Board's
decision that Kittitas County's subdivision regulations failed to comply with that
mandate.
Here, as the Board expressly acknowledged in the FDO, the County's
subdivision regulations do not present the same problem that was at issue in
Kittitas. As the Board stated, the subdivision regulations "do not allow the 'daisy-
chaining' of plat applications that was the specific target of the Supreme Court's
38 id at 178 (citing RCW 36.70A.070(1), (5)(c)(iv)).
39 Id at 179.
40 Id
41 id at 181.
11 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/12
finding of noncompliance in the Kittitas case."42 In fact, the County's subdivision
regulations state that "[a]ll contiguous parcels of land in the same ownership
shall be included within the boundaries of any proposed long or short subdivision
of any of the properties" and that "lots so situated shall be considered as one
parcel... ,"43
Rather, at issue in this case, is the Board's decision that certain provisions
of the Whatcom County Code do not comply with the GMA because they
incorporate Department of Ecology rules respecting water availability and "this is
not the standard to determining legal availability of water."44 Specifically, the
Board took issue with Policies 2DD-2.C.6 and 2DD-2.D.7.
Policy 2DD-2.C.6 states:
Limit water withdrawals resulting from land division through the standards in the following Whatcom County Land Division regulations, adopted herein by reference:
a. WCC 21.04.090 Water supply, Short Subdivisions b. WCC 21.05.080 Water supply, Preliminary Long Subdivisions.1451
42 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1555 (FDO at 40).
43 Whatcom County Code 21.01.040(3)(a) (emphasis added).
44 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1556 (FDO at 41).
45 id at 1554-55 (FDO at 39-40).
12 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/13
With respect to this policy, the Board concluded: "Policy 2DD-2.C.6 does
not govern development in a way that protects surface water flows and thus fails
to meet the requirements of RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv)."46
The Board noted similar concerns with Policy 2DD-2.D.7, which states:
Regulate groundwater withdrawals by requiring purveyors of public water systems and private water system applicants to comply with Washington State Department of Ecology ground water requirements per WCC 24.11.050, adopted herein by reference.1471
With respect to this policy, the Board determined that Policy 2DD-2.C.7
"fails to limit rural development to protect ground or surface waters with respect
to individual permit-exempt wells as required by RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv)."48
In reaching these conclusions, the Board focused on the following: "The
Board notes the water withdrawals allowed under Policy 2DD-2.C.6 and 2.C.7
adopt by reference three existing code sections all of which allow use of exempt
wells except 'where [the Department of Ecology] has determined by rule that
water for development does not exist.' However, this is not the standard to
determining legal availability of water."49
As we read these regulations, they essentially provide that in determining
the availability of water, the County seeks to meet the requirements of the GMA
46id at 1556 (FDO at 41).
47 \±
48 id at 1557 (FDO at 42).
49 id at 1556 (FDO at 41).
13 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/14
by following consistent Department of Ecology regulations regarding the
availability of water. Yet, the Board concluded that the County's use of Ecology's
rules as a means of meeting the requirements of the GMA fails to comply with
this statute. Rather, the Board appears to conclude that the County must make
its own, separate determination of the availability of water in order to fulfil the
requirements of the GMA. This conclusion is an erroneous interpretation of the
law.
As explained earlier, Kittitas established that counties are not preempted
from adopting regulations for the protection of groundwater resources.50 The
supreme court squarely rejected Kittitas County's argument that only Ecology
has this authority, stating that preemption prevents counties from "separately
appropriating groundwaters."51 The court went on to hold that counties "must
regulate to some extent to assure that land use is not inconsistent with available
water resources."52
The court was silent about what other actions counties may take in order
to comply with the GMA. Thus, Kittitas does not expressly answer the question
before this court—whether the County must make its own determination about
the availability of water or whether it may meet the requirements of the GMA by
invoking the assistance of Ecology by the code provisions at issue here.
50 Kittitas County, 172 Wn.2d at 178.
51 id
52 id (emphasis omitted).
14 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/15
While Kittitas does not expressly answer this question, it provides helpful
guidance into the proper relationship between Ecology and counties for purposes
of the GMA. In rejecting Kittitas County's argument, based on RCW 90.44.040,
that it was preempted from adopting regulations related to the protection of
groundwater resources, the supreme court stated:
While [RCW 90.44.040] preempts the County from separately appropriating groundwaters, it does not prevent the County from protecting public groundwaters from detrimental land uses. Nothing in the text of chapter 90.44 RCW expressly preempts consistent local regulation^
It further explained:
While Ecology is responsible for appropriation of groundwater by permit under RCW 90.44.050, the County is responsible for land use decisions that affect groundwater resources, including subdivision, at least to the extent required by law. In recognizing the role of counties to plan for land use in a manner that is consistent with the laws regarding protection of water resources and establishing a permitting process, we do not intend to minimize the role of Ecology. Ecology maintains its role, as provided by statute, and ought to assist counties in their land use planning to adequately protect water resources.[54]
Thus, the supreme court in Kittitas anticipated consistent local regulation
by counties in land use planning to protect water resources. This necessarily
contemplates proper cooperation between Ecology and counties regarding the
protection of such resources.
53 Jd (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted).
54 id at 180 (emphasis added).
15 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/16
Here, under the County's regulations, it will only approve a subdivision or
building permit application that relies on an exempt well when the well site "does
not fall within the boundaries of an area where [Ecology] has determined by rule
that water for development does not exist."55 For example, relevant to this case,
the County's regulations do not permit development based on a private well that
is inconsistent with Ecology's rule for the Nooksack Water Resource Inventory
Area (WRIA 1), the "Nooksack Rule."
By incorporating Ecology's regulations to determine availability of water for
development, the County's regulations provide for cooperation between the
County's exercise of its land use authority and Ecology's management of water
resources. This method is consistent with the cooperative relationship
contemplated by Kittitas and is consistent with the laws regarding protection of
water resources under the GMA. The Board erred when it concluded otherwise.
Additionally, the Board's conclusion that the County may not rely on
Ecology to assist in this determination allows for inconsistent conclusions
between the County and Ecology about the availability of water. The Board's
conclusion would mandate such a result in this case, where the Board's
conclusions about the availability of water in WRIA 1 is contrary to Ecology's own
interpretation about the availability of water in that area. We address this more
fully in the next section.
55 Clerk's Papers at 1555 (FDO at 40).
16 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/17
Nooksack Rule
As stated earlier, the Board determined that the County's comprehensive
plan and development regulations fail to protect instream flows from impairment
by groundwater withdrawals. And the Board determined that the policies fail to
protect ground or surface waters with respect to individual permit-exempt wells.
Contained in its analysis is the Board's determination that the County must deny
a building or subdivisions permit in WRIA 1 unless the applicant can demonstrate
that the proposed groundwater withdrawal in that area will not impair minimum
instream flows. By concluding that the GMA mandate to protect water resources
requires the County to deny such applications, the Board again erroneously
interpreted the law and effectively required the County to adopt a policy
inconsistent with Ecology's administrative rules.
To provide context, we turn to the supreme court's review of general water
law principles in Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board and other relevant
cases.56 The doctrine of prior appropriation applies when an applicant seeks to
obtain a water right in Washington.57 "Under this doctrine, a water right may be
acquired where available public water is appropriated for a beneficial use, subject
to existing rights."58 The same principles apply to groundwater.59
56 142 Wn.2d 68, 79, 11 P.3d 726 (2000).
57 id
58 id
59 id
17 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/18
Ecology is responsible for appropriation of groundwater by permit under
RCW 90.44.050. When a person seeks a permit to appropriate groundwater,
Ecology must investigate the application pursuant to RCW 90.03.290 and
"affirmatively find": "(1) that water is available, (2) for a beneficial use, and that
(3) an appropriation will not impair existing rights, or (4) be detrimental to the
public welfare."60 "The groundwater code recognizes that surface waters and
groundwater may be in hydraulic continuity."61 Thus, "when Ecology determines
whether to issue a permit for appropriation of public groundwater, Ecology must
consider the interrelationship of the groundwater with surface waters, and must
determine whether surface water rights would be impaired or affected by
groundwater withdrawals."62
An exemption to the groundwater permitting requirement exists in RCW
90.44.050. Specifically, that statute provides an exemption for withdrawal of
groundwater for domestic uses in an amount not exceeding 5,000 gallons a
day.63 Accordingly, where the exemption applies, Ecology does not engage in
the usual review of a permitting application under RCW 90.03.290.64
60 id
61 id at 80.
62 id at 80-81.
63 Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC 146 Wn.2d 1, 4, 43 P.3d 4 (2002).
64Jdat16.
18 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/19
Ecology also has the exclusive authority to establish minimum instream
flows or levels to protect fish, game, birds, other wildlife resources, and
recreational and aesthetic values.65 Under this exclusive authority, Ecology
adopted a regulation dividing the state into 62 areas, commonly known as "Water
Resource Inventory Areas" (WRIAs).66 Ecology has adopted various rules
governing new appropriations of water in these areas.
Here, the Board stated its view of the law as follows:
In Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board, the Supreme Court made clear that where Ecology has administratively by adoption of rules closed a surface water body as in much of Whatcom County, and an applicant intends to rely on a new withdrawal from a hydraulically connected groundwater body, new water is no longer legally available for appropriation and the application must be denied. Likewise where Ecology has set minimum instream flow by rule, as in Nooksack WRIA 1, subsequent groundwater withdrawals may not contribute to the impairment of the flows.[67]
The Board then concluded that the County's regulations, which allow
approval of a subdivision or building permit that relies on a private well when the
proposed well site does not fall within the boundaries of an area where Ecology
has determined by rule that water for development does not exist, "falls short of
the Postema standard, as it does not protect instream flows from impairment by
groundwater withdrawals."68
65 RCW 90.03.247; RCW 90.22.010.
66 WAC 173-500-040.
67 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1555 (FDO at 40).
68 \±
19 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/20
The Board also concluded that the County's regulations allowing approval
of a subdivision or building permit using an exempt well except "where [Ecology]
has determined by rule that water for development does not exist" was
inconsistent with the availability of water in closed basins or where instream flows
were not met.69 It stated:
If Ecology has closed a stream to additional withdrawals, it is unlawful to initiate a permit-exempt groundwater withdrawal that would impact the stream. Where the proposed groundwater withdrawal is located within a basin closed to new surface water appropriations, or where Ecology has set instream flows that are not consistently met, there is a presumption that no additional water is legally available. Under RCW 19.27.097 or RCW 58.17.110, it is the applicant's burden to "provide evidence" that water is available for a new building or subdivision. Thus, according to Ecology, the County must deny a permit for a new building or subdivision unless the applicant can demonstrate factually that a proposed new withdrawal from a groundwater body hydraulically connected to an impaired surface water body will not cause further adverse impact on flows. The Board notes Whatcom County's regulations allow mitigations, purchase or transfer of water rights, and other appropriate strategies, but ultimately, a building permit for a private single-residential well does not require the applicant to demonstrate that groundwater withdrawal will not impair surface flows J701
Implicit in its analysis is the Board's determination that water is not
available for permit-exempt withdrawals in WRIA 1. And it effectively concluded
that the County must deny a building or subdivisions permit unless the applicant
69 id at 1556 (FDO at 41).
70 id at 1556-57 (FDO at 41-42) (emphasis added).
20 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/21
can demonstrate that a proposed new permit-exempt groundwater withdrawal will
not impair minimum instream flows.
The Board's conclusions are erroneous for several reasons.
First, the Board erroneously interpreted and applied Postema. The Board
concluded that the County's regulations fell short of the "Postema standard." But
Postema addressed issues arising from Ecology's denial of "applications for
groundwater appropriation permits" not permit-exempt withdrawals.71 Thus, the
County's regulations do not "fall short" of the "Postema standard," as we read
that case, because Postema does not squarely address the protection of
instream flows from permit-exempt groundwater withdrawals.
Second, the Board erroneously applied legal principles from one rule, the
Skagit River Basin Instream Flow Rule, to the rule at issue in this case, the rule
for WRIA 1 also known as the "Nooksack Rule."72 As stated earlier in this
opinion, the Board concluded that "[i]f Ecology has closed a stream to additional
withdrawals, it is unlawful to initiate a permit-exempt groundwater withdrawal that
would impact the stream."73 And it concluded that "according to Ecology, the
County must deny a permit for a new building or subdivision unless the applicant
can demonstrate factually that a proposed new withdrawal from a groundwater
71 Postema, 142 Wn.2d at 73.
72 Seech. 173-501 WAC.
73 Clerk's Papers at 1556-57 (FDO at 41-42).
21 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/22
body hydraulically connected to an impaired surface water body will not cause
further adverse impact on flows."74
To support these conclusions, the Board relied on a December 19, 2011
letter from Ecology to the Director of Snohomish County Planning and
Development Services. According to the Board, it believed that letter "explained]
the effect of closed basins and instream flows on rural residential
development."75 Significantly, the instream flow rule discussed in the letter was
the Skagit River Basin Instream Flow Rule, WAC 173-503.76 That is not the
Nooksack Rule, which covers most of Whatcom County. Nevertheless, the
Board reasoned, "While Snohomish County facts differ, the applicable legal
principles are the same."77
But the Board's reasoning directly conflicts with Postema. That is
because it is based on a uniform interpretation of instream flow rules,
erroneously assuming that they regulate permit-exempt withdrawals in different
regions in the same manner. In Postema, the supreme court recognized that
different basin rules contain different language and expressly declined "to search
for a uniform meaning to rules that simply are not the same."78 Thus, the Board
74 id at 1557 (FDO at 42).
75 id at 1556 (FDO at 41).
76 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 616.
77 id at 1556 (FDO at 41 n.154).
78 Postema, 142 Wn.2d at 87.
22 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/23
improperly relied on this letter concerning another basin to apply its reasoning to
the Nooksack Rule.
Finally, the Board erroneously interpreted the Nooksack Rule and required
the County to adopt an interpretation that is inconsistent with Ecology's
interpretation of the rule.
As the Board noted in the FDO, 'WRIA 1 comprises most of Whatcom
County."79 The regulation is fully set forth in WAC 173-501-010 et seq. In its
regulation for WRIA 1, Ecology established minimum instream flows and closed
specific sub-basins to new surface water appropriations.80
The Board concluded that if Ecology has closed a stream to additional
withdrawals, or if Ecology has set instream flows that are not consistently met, it
is unlawful to initiate a permit-exempt groundwater withdrawal that would impact
the stream. Accordingly, this assumes that the Nooksack Rule's closure of
certain water bodies bars permit-exempt groundwater use in WRIA 1 as a matter
of law. But this is contrary to Ecology's interpretation of the Nooksack Rule,
which is that the Nooksack Rule does not govern permit-exempt withdrawals.
On this latter point, we base our conclusion on the Department of
Ecology's amicus curiae brief in this case.81 We do so because courts generally
79 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1530 (FDO at 15 n.44).
80 See WAC 173-501 -030-040.
81 State of Washington, Department of Ecology's Amicus Curiae Brief.
23 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/24
"accord deference to an agency interpretation of the law where the agency has
specialized expertise in dealing with such issues."82
Ecology argues that "the Nooksack Rule does not mandate that water is
no longer available for certain new permit-exempt groundwater uses in rural
areas of Whatcom County and that land use applications relying on private wells
for water supply would have to be denied in all instances."83
First, Ecology argues that the express language of the Nooksack Rule
"only governs water uses proposed through the water right permitting system,
and not permit-exempt groundwater withdrawals."84 We agree.
Several provisions in the rule pertain only to whether water rights may be
established under the permitting system. And as Ecology asserts, "This
emphasis on the permitting system indicates that Ecology did not intend this Rule
to govern permit-exempt groundwater use under RCW 90.44.050."85 These
provisions are as follows:
WAC 173-501-030, which establishes instream flows in WRIA 1, states in
subsection (4), "Future consumptive water right permits issued hereafter for
82 Utter. 140 Wn. App. at 300.
83 State of Washington, Department of Ecology's Amicus Curiae Brief at 20.
84idat14.
85]dat16.
24 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/25
diversion of surface water in the Nooksack WRIA and perennial tributaries shall
be expressly subject to instream flows ... ."86
WAC 173-501-040, which establishes closures and partial year closures of
certain areas of the Nooksack River and in several creeks, states that when a
project is proposed on a stream that is closed to further appropriations, "the
department shall deny the water right application unless the project proponent
can adequately demonstrate that the project does not conflict with the intent of
the closure."87
WAC 173-501-060 relates to groundwater use. It provides:
If department investigations determine that there is significant hydraulic continuity between surface water and the proposed groundwater source, any water right permit or certificate issued shall be subject to the same conditions as affected surface waters. If department investigations determine that withdrawal of groundwater from the source aquifers would not interfere with stream flow during the period of stream closure or with maintenance of minimum instream flows, then applications to appropriate public groundwaters may be approved.^
As Ecology correctly states, 'The language in all the above sections
pertains to the issuance of water right permits, and cannot be read to also apply
to permit-exempt groundwater withdrawals which occur outside of the permitting
system administered by Ecology."89
86 (Emphasis added.)
87 WAC 173-501-040(2) (emphasis added).
88 WAC 173-501-060 (emphasis added).
89 State of Washington, Department of Ecology's Amicus Curiae Brief at 17-18.
25 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/26
Additionally, WAC 173-501-070, which is titled "Exemptions," provides the
following exemption:
(2) Single domestic, (including up to 1/2 acre lawn and garden irrigation and associated noncommercial stockwatering) shall be exempt from the provisions established in this chapter, except that Whatcom Creek is closed to any further appropriation, including otherwise exempted single domestic use. For all other streams, when the cumulative impact of single domestic diversions begins to significantly affect the quantity of water available for instream uses, then any water rights issued after that time shall be issued for in-house use only, if no alternative source is available.1901
As Ecology notes, this expressly exempts single domestic uses and there
is no express language in this section limiting the exempted domestic use to
groundwater.
In sum, these provisions do not, by their express terms, indicate that water
is not available under the circumstances of this case. We agree with Ecology
that "the Nooksack Rule, in its present form, does not govern permit-exempt
groundwater use."91
Ecology also argues that this is clear when read in contrast to water
management rules for other basins which include express language indicating
that they govern permit-exempt uses of water. For example, Ecology cites WAC
173-503, the rule for the Skagit River Basin. This is the basin rule in the
December 2011 letter on which the Board relied. The Skagit River Basin rule
90 (Emphasis added.)
91 State of Washington, Department of Ecology's Amicus Curiae Brief at 18.
26 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/27
states that "[f]uture consumptive water right permits issued hereafter for diversion
of surface water in the Lower and Upper Skagit (WRIA 3 and 4) and perennial tributaries, and withdrawalof groundwater in hydraulic continuity with
surface waterin the Skagit River and perennial tributaries, shallbe expressly subject to instream flows "92 As this emphasized language makes clear, in
contrast to the Nooksack Rule, this rule expressly indicates that it governs
permit-exempt uses of water
In sum, the Board's decision effectively requires the County to reach a
legal conclusion regarding water availability for permit-exempt withdrawals that is
inconsistent both with Postema and with Ecology's interpretation of the Nooksack
Rule. That simply is not the law.
The County also argues that the Board's "conclusion regarding the
County's obligations in making water availability determinations in closed basins
is not supported by substantial evidence . . . ,"93 In support of this, it argues that
the Board improperly relied on the December 2011 letter from Ecology to the
Director of Snohomish County Planning and Development Services. We agree.
The letter addresses issues in another basin having nothing to do with the
Nooksack Rule. Thus, it is not evidence of how Ecology administers the
Nooksack Rule.
92 WAC 173-503-040(5) (emphasis added).
93 Brief of Appellant Whatcom County at 25.
27 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/28
Hirst argues that the County "may not raise the issue of a controlling
'Ecology Interpretation' for the first time on appeal."94 But the issue of how to
properly interpret the Nooksack Rule was before the Board. And the County
expressly argued to the Board the legal position that Ecology confirms in its
amicus brief. Thus, this argument is without merit.
Hirst argues that Steensma v. Department of Ecology & Baves Brothers
LLC, a case cited by the County to support its position that Ecology has
interpreted the Nooksack Rule in a manner inconsistent with that advanced by
the Board, does not constitute a uniform agency interpretation that is entitled to
great weight.95 But the County cited this case as an example, to illustrate that
Ecology interpreted the rule this way in this one instance. It did not cite it to
establish a formal Ecology interpretation of the rule.
In any event, Ecology's amicus brief in this appeal fully explains its
interpretation of the Nooksack Rule. And that interpretation is fully consistent
with the position that the County took below and continues to take in this appeal.
Hirst argues that even if there was "an 'Ecology interpretation' expressing
a 'legal conclusion' that the [Nooksack Rule] 'was not intended to apply to permit
exempt withdrawals,' as the County claims, it would not immunize the County
94 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 20.
95 Brief of Appellant Whatcom County at 21-23 (citing Steensma v. Dep't of Ecology & Baves Bros., LLC, No. 11-053, 2011 WL 4301319 (Wash. Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd. Sept. 8, 2011)).
28 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/29
from its obligation to protect surface and ground water under the GMA."96 We
agree. But that argument does not come to grips with our conclusion that it is
proper for the County to fulfill its requirements under the GMA by adopting
regulations that are consistent with Ecology's Nooksack Rule.
Hirst argues that the Board's decision and reasoning are consistent with
state water law. Hirst is mistaken.
Hirst argues that "Postema establishes that 'a minimum flow set by rule is
an existing right which may not be impaired by subsequent groundwater
withdrawals."97 And he cites Swinomish Tribal Community v. Department of
Ecology for the proposition that the water code "does not contain 'any provision
permitting a jump to the head of the line in priority' for exempt wells."98
Accordingly, he asserts that "Postema and Swinomish . . . support the Board's
conclusion that the GMA requires the County to avoid impairment of surface
waters" and that even if the County's interpretation of the Nooksack Rule was
correct, "this original intent must change with changes in science and the law."99
As we already discussed, Postema did not address the issue of permit-
exempt withdrawals. Rather, its focus was on interpretation and application of
96 Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 29.
97 id at 30 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Postema, 142 Wn.2d at 81)
98 id. at 31-32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmtv. v. Dep't of Ecology. 178 Wn.2d 571, 598, 311 P.3d 6 (2013)).
99 id at 32.
29 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/30
the decision criteria when reviewing applications for permits. Additionally,
Swinomish is distinguishable on its facts, as it involved the Skagit Basin Rule, a
rule that expressly prohibited permit exempt withdrawals.100 In short, Hirst's
reliance on these cases is not persuasive.
We conclude that the Board incorrectly interpreted and applied the
relevant law in determining that the ordinance fails to comply with the GMA by
failing to include measures to protect rural character by protecting surface and
groundwater resources. Moreover, the letter on which it relied to interpret WRIA
1 requirements is not substantial evidence of how Ecology administers the
WATER QUALITY
The County next argues that the Board erred when it concluded that the
County's measures to protect surface and ground water quality were clearly
erroneous. Specifically, the County contends that the Board's conclusion is
based on an unlawful procedure. The County also contends that the Board's
conclusion is based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law and
is not supported by substantial evidence.
Unlawful Procedure
The County argues that the Board's conclusion is based on unlawful
procedure because it took official notice of two documents in a manner
inconsistent with its own rules. We agree.
100 Swinomish. 178 Wn.2d at 577.
30 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/31
RCW 34.05.570(3)(c) provides for relief from an agency order if the court
determines that the agency "has engaged in unlawful procedure or decision
making process, or has failed to follow a prescribed procedure." This court
reviews de novo a claim under this subsection.101
Additionally, RCW 34.05.570(h) provides for relief from an agency order if
the court determines that the order "is inconsistent with a rule of the agency
unless the agency explains the inconsistency by stating facts and reasons to
demonstrate a rational basis for inconsistency."
WAC 242-03-630, which was promulgated by the Board, provides that the
board or presiding officer may officially notice matters of law, including
Washington state law. The "Washington state law" category includes, among
other things, "decisions of administrative agencies of the state of Washington"
and "codes or standards that have been adopted by an agency of this state or by
a nationally recognized organization or association."102
Another regulation, WAC 242-03-640, provides that, "[i]n the absence of
conflicting evidence, the board or presiding officer, upon request made before or
during a hearing, may officially notice" certain material matters including, (a)
business customs, (b) notorious facts, and (c) technical or scientific facts.103 It
further states, "Parties shall be notified either before or during a hearing of the
101 Spokane County, 176 Wn. App. at 583.
102 WAC 242-03-630(2).
103 WAC 242-03-640(1).
31 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/32
material fact(s) proposed to be officially noticed, and shall be afforded the
opportunity to contest such facts and materials."104
Here, as part of its analysis in the FDO of water availability and water
quality problems the Board cited three documents that it termed "authoritative
references."105 The first document is the 2070 WRIA 1 State of the Watershed
Report.™6 The other two documents are documents of which the Board took
official notice—the Puget Sound Partnership's 2012/2013 Action Agenda for
Puget Sound, and the Washington State Department of Fish and Wildlife's Land
Use Planning for Salmon, Steelhead and Trout.107 The Board described the first
document as "a document adopted by a state agency" and described the second
document as "a science-based land use planner's guide to salmonid habitat
protection and recovery."108 The Board cited WAC 242-03-630 as its authority to
take official notice of these documents.109
Under WAC 242-03-630(2), the Board is authorized to take notice of,
among other things, "decisions of administrative agencies of the state of
Washington" or of "codes or standards that have been adopted by" a state
104 WAC 242-03-640(3) (emphasis added).
105 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1545 (FDO at 30).
106 id
107 id at 1524, 1546-50 (FDO at 9, 31-35).
108 id at 1524 (FDO at 9).
109 id
32 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/33
agency.110 Neither of these two documents falls within these categories. And no
other categories in this regulation appear to apply to these documents.111 Thus,
the Board improperly relied on this regulation to take official notice of these two
documents.
Hirst argues that the Board had the authority to take official notice of
government documents under a different regulation, WAC 242-03-640.112 We
disagree.
Under this regulation, the Board may take official notice of material facts
including "specific facts which are capable of immediate and accurate
demonstration by resort to accessible sources of generally accepted authority"
such as "facts stated in any publication authorized or permitted by law to be
made by any federal or state officer, department, or agency."113 Any party may
110 WAC 242-03-630(2) ("The board or presiding officer may officially notice ... (2) Washington state law. The Constitution of the state of Washington; decisions of the state courts; acts, resolutions, records, journals, and committee reports of the legislature; decisions of administrative agencies of the state of Washington; executive orders and proclamations by the governor; all rules, orders, and notices filed with the code reviser; and codes or standards that have been adopted by an agency of this state or by a nationally recognized organization or association.").
in See WAC 242-03-630(1 )-(6).
112 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim and Futurewise at 41-42.
113 WAC 242-03-640(1 )(b) ("In the absence of conflicting evidence, the board or presiding officer, upon request made before or during a hearing, may officially notice ... (b) Notorious facts. Facts so generally and widely known to all well-informed persons as not to be subject to reasonable dispute or specific facts which are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to accessible sources of generally accepted authority, including, but not exclusively, 33 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/34
request that official notice be taken of a material fact, or the board or presiding
officer may take official notice of a material fact on its own initiative.114 Taking such notice is expressly conditioned on "the absence of conflicting evidence."115
Hirst's argument fails for several reasons.
First, there is no showing that there was an "absence of conflicting
evidence" required under this subsection in order for the Board to take notice of
such material facts.116 Second, under this regulation, the parties "shall be
notified either before or during a hearing of the material fact(s) proposed to be
officially noticed, and shall be afforded the opportunity to contest such facts and
materials."117 This record fails to show any notice to any party either before or
during the hearing that the Board intended to take notice of these documents.
Finally, there is no showing that the parties were provided an opportunity to
contest these materials. To the contrary, the briefing indicates the County was
first aware that these two documents were the subjects of official notice by the
Board in its analysis when it issued the FDO.
facts stated in any publication authorized or permitted by law to be made by any federal or state officer, department, or agency.").
114 WAC 242-03-640(2).
115 WAC 242-03-640(1).
116 id
117 WAC 242-03-640(3) (emphasis added).
34 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/35
Hirst argues that the notice requirement "only applies to materials
'proposed' to be officially noticed."118 And he argues that these materials were
not "proposed," but rather, the Board took notice on its own initiative. But we
cannot accept the untenable proposition that the County should be deprived of
the opportunity to contest these materials on the basis that the Board took official
notice on its own initiative. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are,
necessarily, a part of these procedures. In short, this argument is not
persuasive.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Board engaged in unlawful
procedure when it took official notice of these two documents without notifying
the County and without affording it an opportunity to contest the materials prior to
the FDO. Additionally, the Board's actions are inconsistent with its rules, and the
Board did not explain the inconsistency. Accordingly, the question is what
remedy is appropriate.
Hirst argues that even if the Board erred, the County was not substantially
prejudiced.119 We cannot agree.
In the FDO, the Board characterized these two documents as
"authoritative references" when it discussed the factual basis for identifying water
availability and water quality issues. As such, we reject the argument that the
118 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 42.
119 id at 43-44.
35 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/36
Board's reliance on these documents for its decision did not prejudice the County.
Hirst points out that in addition to these two documents, the Board relied
on a third document to support its finding that the link between land development
and water resources is well-established. Hirst contends that the third document,
alone, could support this finding.
We do not quarrel with the proposition that land development can and
does impact water resources. We acknowledge that the Board refers in the FDO
to other evidence that was properly part of the administrative record as part of its
analysis of the water quality issue. Nevertheless, we simply do not know
whether the Board would have reached the same decision without the
documents that it improperly considered in its analysis. It is not our function to
make factual findings in this important area. Rather, it is the Board, in the first
instance, who must do so. We decline to speculate on what the Board would
have done on the basis of a proper record.
We conclude that the proper remedy is to reverse this portion of the FDO
and remand for reconsideration by the Board on a proper administrative record.
Erroneous Interpretation and Application of the Law
The County also argues that the Board's conclusion on the County's
measures protecting water quality is based on an erroneous interpretation and
application of the law "by effectively requiring the County to correct past or
36 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/37
existing impacts."120 The County argues that this conclusion is implicit based on
the Board's reliance on preexisting water quality problems as evidence to find
new regulations inadequate. To the extent that the Board implicitly concluded
that the County has a duty to "enhance" water quality rather than "protect" it, we
agree.
RCW 34.05.570(3)(d) provides that the court shall grant relief from an
agency order if it determines that the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law. A court reviews de novo a claim brought under this
subsection.121
Under the GMA, the County is required to include measures to protect
water quality. RCW 36.70A.070(1) states, 'The land use element shall provide
for protection of the quality and quantity of groundwater used for public
water supplies."122 RCW 36.70A.070(5)(c)(iv) states, "Counties shall include a
rural element," which "shall include measures that apply to rural development
and protect the rural character of the area ... by .. . [protecting... surface
water and groundwater resources ... ."123 Rural character "refers to the
patterns of land use and development established by a county in the rural
element of its comprehensive plan" that, among other things, "are consistent with
120 Brief of Appellant Whatcom County at 47.
121 Kittitas County. 172 Wn.2d at 155.
122 (Emphasis added.)
123 (Emphasis added.)
37 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/38
the protection of natural surface water flows and groundwater and surface
water recharge and discharge areas."124
In Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Western Washington Growth
Management Hearings Board, the supreme court expressly considered the
definition of the word "protect" as it was used in RCW 36.70A.172(1), which
requires counties "to protect the functions and values of critical areas."125 In that
case, the Board had concluded that the requirement under the GMA to "protect"
critical areas is met when local governments prevent new harm to critical
areas.126 The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community challenged this, arguing that
where an area is already in a degraded condition, it is not being protected unless
that condition is improved or enhanced.127
The supreme court rejected this argument. First, it looked to the dictionary
definition of the word "protect" provided by the Tribe, which was "to shield from
injury, danger or loss" and to protect, which "can result in [an object's]
enhancement."128 The supreme court stated that even under this definition,
"'can' is used to describe an option of enhancement, rather than a requirement
124 RCW 36.70A.030(15)(g) (emphasis added).
125 161 Wn.2d 415, 427-30, 166 P.3d 1198 (2007).
126 id at 427.
127 Id
128 id at 428 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/39
of enhancement, when defining 'protect.'"129 And it concluded that this definition
"illustrates that something can be protected without it being enhanced."130
Further, the supreme court looked to the GMA itself and noted that "[t]he
legislature has also recognized that 'protect' has a different meaning than
'enhance.'"131 It cited to several examples to support this assertion. After
reviewing these statutes, the court concluded that the legislature had not
imposed a duty on local governments to enhance critical areas, although it does
permit it.132 It stated, "Without firm instruction from the legislature to require
enhancement of critical areas, we will not impose such a duty."133 Thus, it
concluded that the "no harm" standard protects critical areas by maintaining
existing conditions.134
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community is instructive here. While that case
involved a different provision under the GMA, there is no reason this distinction
should be viewed differently in this context. A review of the relevant GMA
provisions provided above shows that the legislature has not imposed a duty on
the County to "enhance" the water quality as part of its efforts to protect it.
129 id
130 id
131 id at 429.
132 id at 429-30.
133 Jd at 430.
134 Id.
39 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/40
Rather, each of the relevant statutes requires the County to include measures to
"protect" water quality. Accordingly, like in Swinomish Indian Tribal Community,
without firm instruction from the legislature to require enhancement, we decline to
impose a duty to enhance water quality.
In sum, to the extent that the Board concluded that the County has an
obligation under the GMA to "enhance" water quality, this was an erroneous
interpretation of law.
Hirst argues that "the legislature has imposed a duty to 'enhance' water
quality."135 In support of this, Hirst points to Swinomish Indian Tribal Community
and asserts that, the supreme court, after examining RCW 36.70A.020(10),
"discussed the 'duty to enhance the quality of water.'"136
It is true that in that case the supreme court cited and briefly discussed
RCW 36.70A.020(10).137 It stated, "RCW 36.70A.020(10)[] lists as a goal of the
GMA to 'enhance the state's high quality of life, including air and water
quality.'"138 It is also true that the supreme court, in concluding that there was no
duty to enhance critical areas, later stated, "A duty to enhance the quality of
135 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 40.
136 id (emphasis omitted) (quoting Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmtv., 161 Wn.2d at 429-30).
137 Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmtv.. 161 Wn.2d at 429.
138 id (quoting RCW 36.70A.020(10)).
40 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/41
water is not a duty to enhance fish habitat."139 But whether RCW
36.70A.020(10) imposes a duty to enhance the water quality was not at issue in
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community. Further, RCW 36.70A.020(10) sets forth a
goal of the GMA, not a requirement. Accordingly, reliance on this case and
statute as establishing a duty to enhance water quality is not persuasive.
Substantial Evidence
The County contends that the Board's conclusion that the County's
measures fail to protect water quality is not supported by substantial evidence.140
First, the County argues that the Board's conclusion is based on general
evidence of existing water quality problems, which are insufficient to prove that
the ordinance fails to comply with the GMA. Second, the County also asserts
that the Board did not adequately evaluate or consider its water quality
protections. We conclude that we need not decide either question on the basis
of the record that is currently before us. But we do express concerns the Board
should consider on remand.
With regard to the first question, we need not decide whether the County's
characterization of the Board's action is correct. But it is something the Board
should address on remand. Importantly, as we already discussed, two of the
three documents that the Board considered as "authoritative resources" were
improperly considered by the Board in its FDO.
139 id. (emphasis added).
140 Brief of Appellant Whatcom County at 38-45.
41 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1 -l)/42
As for the second question, we view that as a question whether the Board
has adhered to the standard set in the GMA that "boards give deference to
county planning processes."141 As the law provides, a board's ruling that fails to
apply this "'more deferential standard of review' to a county's action is not entitled
to deference" from the courts.142
Beyond these two observations, we need not address the question of
water quality any further.
REQUEST FOR FINDING OF INVALIDITY
In his cross-appeal, Hirst contends that the Board erred when it denied his
request for a finding of invalidity. Specifically, Hirst argues that the Board
erroneously interpreted and applied the GMA because it applied an incorrect
legal standard. We hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to
make a determination of invalidity.
"If the growth board finds that the plan or regulation is flawed, it has two
options: (1) it may enter a finding of noncompliance or (2) it may enter a finding
of invalidity."143 If the growth board finds noncompliance, it remands the matter
to the county with instructions to comply within a certain time, and the county
plans and regulations remain valid during the remand period.144 "If the flaw in the
141 Kittitas County. 172 Wn.2d at 154.
142 Quadrant Corp.. 154 Wn.2d at 238.
143 Town of Woodwav. 180 Wn.2d at 174 (emphasis added).
144 id
42 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/43
plan or regulation represents a major violation of the GMA, the growth board has
the option of determining that the plan or regulation is invalid."145 "'Upon a
finding of invalidity, the underlying provision would be rendered void.'"146
RCW 36.70A.302(1) sets out the legal standards to apply in deciding
whether to make a determination of invalidity. It provides:
(1) The Board may determine that part or all of a comprehensive plan or development regulations are invalid if the board:
(a) Makes a finding of noncompliance and issues an order of remand under RCW 36.70A.300;
(b) Includes in the final order a determination, supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the continued validity of part or parts of the plan or regulation would substantially interfere with the fulfillment of the goals of this chapter; and
(c) Specifies in the final order the particular part or parts of the plan or regulation that are determined to be invalid, and the reasons for their invalidity.11471
Here, the Board denied Hirst's request for a finding of invalidity. It did so
after determining that the ordinance failed to comply with the GMA.
As the use of the word "may" necessarily implies, this decision is a matter
of discretion.148 Thus, the question is whether the Board abused its discretion.
In the final order, it stated:
145 id at 175 (emphasis added).
146 Id (quoting King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 138 Wn.2d 161,181, 979 P.2d 374 (1999)).
147 RCW 36.70A.302(1) (emphasis added).
148 See Strenqe v. Clarke. 89 Wn.2d 23, 28, 569 P.2d 60 (1977).
43 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/44
This Board has previously held that it will declare invalid only the most egregious noncompliant provisions which threaten the local government's future ability to achieve compliance with the Act. Although the Board finds areas of noncompliance with the GMA, [Hirst] ha[s] not met the standard for a declaration of invalidity.11491
As case law and the relevant statute indicate, the Board's decision to
make a finding of invalidity is discretionary. As the supreme court stated, "If the
growth board finds that the plan or regulation is flawed, it has two options ...
."150 And as the GMA states, 'The board may determine that part or all of a
comprehensive plan or development regulations are invalid .. . ,"151 Here, the
Board's statements merely reflect its view that this not a proper case to find
invalidity, not that Hirstfailed to satisfy the statutory requirements for invalidity.
This is a proper exercise of discretion.
Hirst argues, "The standard for a determination of invalidity is not 'the
most egregious noncompliant provisions which threaten the local government's
future ability to achieve compliance with the Act.'"152 And Hirst points out that
RCW 36.70A.302 nowhere requires a finding that noncompliant provisions are
"the most egregious" or that they threaten the local government's "future ability"
149 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1565 (FDO at 50) (footnote omitted).
150 Town of Woodwav, 180 Wn.2d at 174 (emphasis added).
151 RCW 36.70A.302(1) (emphasis added).
152 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 45-46 (quoting Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1565 (FDO at 50)).
44 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/45
to comply with the GMA. But with these statements, the Board was not
attempting to state the applicable test for invalidity under the statute. Rather, it
appears to be stating its own specific standard of when it chooses to exercise its
statutory authority to make an invalidity determination. This is seen by the
opening sentence, which states, "This Board has previously held it will declare
invalid only the most egregious noncompliant provisions which threaten the local
government's future ability to achieve compliance with the Act."153 This is
consistent with the GMA, which as stated above, grants the Board discretion.
Hirst also argues that the Board's denial of the invalidity request is not
supported by substantial evidence.154 Hirst argues that the record before the
Board shows that all of the requirements for invalidity are met, and he points to
different documents and evidence in the record to support the assertion that
continued validity of the ordinance will "substantially interfere with the goals of
the GMA."155 But given that this is a discretionary decision by the Board, this
argument is not relevant.
Hirst cites Spokane County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management
Hearings Board, where Division Three upheld a Board's determination of
invalidity, stating that the Board had "correctly interpreted and applied the law
153 Clerk's Papers (Case No. 70796-5) at 1565 (FDO at 50) (emphasis added).
154 Appellants' Brief & Brief of Respondents Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris and David Stalheim, and Futurewise at 44-50.
155 Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/46
upon thorough reasoning with due consideration for the facts."156 Hirst contrasts
Spokane County, arguing that in this case, the Board summarily dismissed
his invalidity argument. But because that case involved a determination of
invalidity, rather than a Board's decision not to find invalidity, it is distinguishable
and not helpful.
SECOND ORDER ON COMPLIANCE
The County also asks this court to reverse the Second Order on
Compliance. That order followed issuance of the FDO and a subsequent hearing
on whether the County had corrected the problems to bring the County into
compliance with the GMA. The County argues that the Board erred when it
concluded that the County's measures to protect surface and groundwater
availability, including the measures incorporated by the 2014 Ordinance, were
clearly erroneous.157 We agree.
As an initial matter, Hirst argues that the County is barred from raising and
arguing the issues it raises in this case "because it did not argue them before the
board, as RCW 34.05.554 requires."158 But because "[t]he various stages of this
litigation are part of a single proceeding," we reject this argument.159
156176 Wn. App. 555, 578, 309 P.3d 673 (2013), review denied. 179 Wn.2d 1015 (2014).
157 Opening Brief of Whatcom County (Case No. 72132-1) at 3.
158 Respondents' Brief of Eric Hirst, Laura Leigh Brakke, Wendy Harris, David Stalheim, and Futurewise (Case No. 72132-1) at 11.
159 Clallum County v. W. Wash. Growth Momt. Hr'gs Bd., 130 Wn. App. 127, 131-33, 121 P.3d 764 (2005). 46 No. 70796-5-1 (consolidated with Nos. 72132-1-1 and 70896-1-l)/47
This issue is controlled by the prior parts of this opinion. We held that the
FDO should be reversed and the matter remanded to the Board for
reconsideration on a proper record. Thus, we also reverse the second order.
We affirm the FDO on its invalidity determination and reverse on its
determinations regarding water availability and water quality. We also reverse
the Second Order on Compliance. We remand to the Board for reconsideration
on a proper record.
CuX,^3~, WE CONCUR:
IA* cAe -f -1
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Whatcom County v. Eric Hirst, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/whatcom-county-v-eric-hirst-washctapp-2015.