State v. Houck

203 P.2d 693, 32 Wash. 2d 681, 1949 Wash. LEXIS 399
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 7, 1949
DocketNo. 30662.
StatusPublished
Cited by76 cases

This text of 203 P.2d 693 (State v. Houck) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Houck, 203 P.2d 693, 32 Wash. 2d 681, 1949 Wash. LEXIS 399 (Wash. 1949).

Opinion

Simpson, J.

The state of Washington appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to an information and the entry of a judgment of dismissal. The information was worded as follows:

“He, the said John A. Houck, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 26th day of September, 1947, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully practice or attempt to practice medicine and surgery in this, that he, the said John A. Houck, acting as physician and obstetrician, delivered a child born to Mrs. Elizabeth Hardin and performed services at such time, including the administration of ether and the cutting of the umbilical cord, without having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate to practice medicine within the State of Washington and. having at said time only a license from the State of Washington as a ‘drugless healer’ permitted to practice ‘full sanipractic’; . . .
“He, the said John A. Houck, as a part of .the act or transaction alleged in Count I or a connected act or transaction, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 26th day of September, 1947, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully practice or attempt to practice medicine and surgery in this, that he, the said John A. Houck, administered a drug, the exact nature of which is unknown to the prosecuting attorney at this time, by hypodermic injection into the body of Mrs. Elizabeth Hardin, *683 without having at the time of so doing a valid, unrevoked certificate to practice medicine within the State of Washington, and having at said time only a license from the State of Washington as a ‘drugless healer’ permitted to practice ‘full sanipractic’; . . . ”

Assignment of error is “in sustaining respondent’s demurrer and entering judgment of dismissal.”

The charge was based upon Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10018 [P.P.C. § 734-31], which reads:

“Any person who shall practice or attempt to practice, or hold himself out as practicing medicine and surgery in this state, without having, at the time of so doing, a valid, unrevoked certificate as provided in this act, shall lie guilty of a misdemeanor. ...”

Our state constitution, Art. XX, § 2, provides:

“The legislature shall enact laws to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, and the sale of drugs and medicines.”

In order to implement the constitutional provision, the legislature has enacted several laws now contained in Rem. Rev. Stat., Title 68.'

Respondent takes the position that the court was correct in sustaining the demurrer because the information failed to charge that an emergency did not exist at the time and place mentioned in the information. He bases his contention upon the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10024 [P.P.C. § 734-43], which states in part: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit service in the case of emergency

This question has been presented to this court on various occasions. Our holding may be restated in the following language: Exceptions need not be negatived unless they are in the enacting clause of the law — that is to say, if the act defining a crime does not in itself define a defense or exception, it is not necessary to negative the exceptions or defense in charging the crime. State v. Davis, 43 Wash. 116, 86 Pac. 201; State v. Seifert, 65 Wash. 596, 118 Pac. 746; State v. Bartow, 95 Wash. 480, 164 Pac. 227; State *684 v. Young, 195 Wash. 515, 81 P. (2d) 799; United States v. Cook, 84 U. S. 168, 21 L. Ed. 538.

An examination of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10018, does not reveal any exception in favor of a drugless healer acting in an emergency. That exception, as we have stated, is contained in Rem. Rev. Stat., § 10024. It follows that the exception set out in another statute need not be mentioned in the information, but advantage must be taken of it as a matter of defense.

Was it the intention of the legislature to make the practice of obstetrics outside the scope of practice given to drugless healers?

In construing a statute and ascertaining the legislative intent, certain rules are observed by the courts. The legislative intent must be gleaned from a consideration of the whole act by giving effect to the entire statute and every part thereof. Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13; State ex rel. Baisden v. Preston, 151 Wash. 175, 275 Pac. 81; Pease v. Stephens, 173 Wash. 12, 21 P. (2d) 294; Arden Farms Co. v. Seattle, 2 Wn. (2d) 640, 99 P. (2d) 415; State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7 Wn. (2d) 104, 109 P. (2d) 291.

, Where the language of a statute is plain, free from ambiguity, and devoid of uncertainty, there is no room for construction because the meaning will be discovered from the wording of the statute itself. Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn. (2d) 498, 104 P. (2d) 478.

, Where an act has a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, it is the duty of the court to adopt a construction that is reasonably liberal in furtherance of the obvious or manifest purpose of the legislature. Othus v. Kozer, 119 Ore. 101, 248 Pac. 146; Gallagher v. Campodonico, 121 Cal. App. 765, 5 P. (2d) 486.

Statutes in pari materia must be construed together. Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things; and in construing a statute, or statutes, all acts relating to the same subject matter or having the same purpose, should be *685 read in connection therewith as together constituting one law. The object of the' rule is to ascertain and carry into effect the intent of the legislature, and it proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes having to do with related subject matters were governed by one spirit or policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions. State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court, 105 Wash. 676, 178 Pac. 827; Paltro v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 119 Wash. 101, 204 Pac. 1044.

The words and phrases used in statutes are interpreted in accordance with their common meaning, and this regardless of the policy of enacting it, or the seeming con-' fusion that may follow its enforcement. State v. Miller, 72 Wash. 154, 129 Pac. 1100.

From these general rules, it follows that our attention should first be directed to the determination of whether the drugless healing act, Laws of 1919, chapter 36, p. 64 (Rem. Rev. Stat, §§ 10112-10125 [P.P.C. § 517-1 to 517-31]), gave respondent the right to practice obstetrics. It must, of necessity, be assumed that, if the statute gave an individual complying with its provisions the right to practice obstetrics, the individual had the right to follow all medical procedure and use all proper medical methods leading up to and following delivery.

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Bluebook (online)
203 P.2d 693, 32 Wash. 2d 681, 1949 Wash. LEXIS 399, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-houck-wash-1949.