[613]*613DE MUNIZ, C. J.
In these two criminal cases, consolidated for purposes of opinion, each defendant was charged with drug-related crimes based on evidence obtained during separate traffic stops. In each case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the officer’s conduct unreasonably extended the duration of the traffic stop, in violation of Article I, section 9.1 State v. Rodgers, 219 Or App 366, 373, 182 P3d 209 (2008); State v. Kirkeby, 220 Or App 177, 186, 185 P3d 510 (2008). We allowed the state’s petitions for review and now conclude that each defendant was unlawfully seized in violation of Article I, section 9, because in each case the police conduct was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; was unrelated to the traffic violation investigation, identification, or issuance of a citation; and significantly restricted each defendant’s freedom of movement. Because there were no intervening circumstances or other circumstances mitigating the effect of the illegal seizures of each defendant, we conclude that each defendant’s consent, even if voluntary, was the product of police conduct that violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Because the consent to search in each case was a product of the unlawful seizure, the evidence obtained during the search, in both cases, must be suppressed. We therefore affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
I. FACTS, PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND, AND PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
For purposes of the issue presented here, the relevant facts of each case are undisputed.
A. State v. Rodgers
Defendant Rodgers was stopped by Corvallis Police Officer Van Arsdall for driving a vehicle with a burned-out license plate light in violation of ORS 816.330. Defendant provided Van Arsdall with a valid driver license and vehicle registration, but was unable to provide proof of insurance. [614]*614Defendant explained that the vehicle was borrowed and that he was driving it with the owner’s permission. While they were talking, Van Arsdall noticed a large container of blue liquid on the front passenger floorboard and a white sack with a smaller, square, metallic container inside it on the back seat. Van Arsdall also noticed that defendant had sores on his face, which Van Arsdall believed to be consistent with methamphetamine use. Van Arsdall returned to his patrol car and radioed a request for a records check.
In the meantime, a second officer, Kantola, arrived. Van Arsdall explained his observations to Kantola and told him that he believed that defendant had items in his vehicle that likely were used to produce methamphetamine. However, Van Arsdall testified at the suppression hearing that, at that point, he did not have enough information to arrest defendant — defendant’s records check had come back clear, and Van Arsdall therefore had a sufficient basis only to issue defendant a traffic citation. Notwithstanding the clear records check, Van Arsdall approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, while Kantola approached the passenger side. Van Arsdall asked defendant about the blue liquid, and defendant explained that it was windshield washer fluid. Van Arsdall then expressed concern about the metallic container in the white sack. Defendant removed the container from the sack and explained that it contained denatured alcohol, which he used for his job at a company that manufactured fertilizer. Van Arsdall then asked defendant for consent to search the vehicle. Defendant agreed, and, during the search, the officers found acid, lithium batteries, foil, and cold medicine containing pseudoephedrine — all precursor materials for manufacturing methamphetamine.
Defendant was charged with unlawful manufacture of a controlled substance. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle, on the ground that Van Arsdall unconstitutionally had extended the scope and duration of the traffic stop by questioning him without reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was being committed. The trial court concluded that Van Arsdall did not have reasonable suspicion to request to search the vehicle. However, the trial court found that defendant’s consent to [615]*615search was voluntary and that Van Arsdall’s request for consent did not extend the duration of the stop. The trial court therefore denied defendant’s motion to suppress, and defendant was convicted.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. That court concluded that Van Arsdall had extended the traffic stop beyond a reasonable time when he asked defendant about the containers instead of issuing a traffic citation. The Court of Appeals noted that Van Arsdall’s questions had been unrelated to the traffic infraction. Because Van Arsdall had lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s consent was the product of an unlawful seizure under Article I, section 9, and that the evidence discovered in the search of the vehicle therefore should have been suppressed. Rodgers, 219 Or App at 374.
B. State v. Kirkeby
A deputy sheriff who knew defendant by sight and knew that his driver license had been suspended saw defendant driving with a passenger in downtown Willamina. The deputy contacted his dispatcher, who confirmed that defendant had a suspended license but otherwise had no outstanding arrest warrants. Based on that information, the deputy activated his overhead lights — which remained on throughout the duration of the stop — and stopped defendant. Both defendant and the deputy got out of their respective vehicles and walked toward one another. The passenger remained in defendant’s vehicle. The deputy was concerned for his safety, because defendant had left his vehicle. When the deputy told defendant the reason for the stop, defendant seemed surprised and handed the deputy an Oregon driver license. Defendant was cooperative and businesslike, and he did not act in a threatening or aggressive manner. Also, throughout the deputy’s extensive history of prior contacts with defendant, defendant never had acted in a threatening or violent manner and never had displayed a weapon. At that point, the deputy had defendant’s name, date of birth, and driver license number, which was all the information necessary to complete a traffic citation. However, the deputy testified that he probably did not have all the information that he needed [616]*616because he did not have the vehicle registration and proof of insurance.
The deputy told defendant that the license was “no good” and asked him if he had any weapons on his person or in the vehicle. Defendant stated that he did not have any weapons. The deputy then asked for consent to conduct a pat-down, and defendant agreed. At some point, two additional officers arrived and observed the passenger while the deputy talked with defendant. After the patdown of defendant, the deputy felt fairly confident that defendant did not have any firearms on his person, but nonetheless asked for consent to examine each of the items that he had felt in defendant’s pockets, because he did not know what they were and wanted to investigate further. Defendant consented. The deputy testified that defendant was not free to leave at that time. The deputy, with defendant’s further consent, opened a small metal cylindrical container that he had found during the pat-down and discovered two ziplock bags containing a residual amount of a clear crystalline substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. By that time, four to five minutes had elapsed since the beginning of the stop.
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the patdown search. He acknowledged that questions concerning the presence of weapons may be authorized under ORS 810.410(3)(d), set out post, 347 Or at 619-20 n 3. However, defendant argued that, unless the officer has “a reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat of serious injury,” such questioning — including asking for permission to search for weapons — constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court granted defendant’s motion. The court concluded that the deputy’s request to conduct a patdown had not violated ORS 810.410; however, the trial court further concluded that that request had violated Article I, section 9, because the patdown had gone beyond “ordinary social intercourse” and therefore had amounted to a seizure of defendant without reasonable suspicion that defendant either posed a danger to the deputy or others, or had committed a crime.
[617]*617The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that the outcome was controlled by its decision in Rodgers. The Court of Appeals noted that, at the time that the deputy asked for consent to conduct a patdown, the deputy was not waiting for further information or otherwise prevented from completing the traffic stop; that is, instead of asking defendant for his vehicle registration and proof of insurance, the deputy had proceeded down an unrelated path. The court further determined that, under State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 115 P3d 908 (2005), the consensual search was the product of unlawful police conduct, because defendant had shown that, if not for the unlawful seizure, the deputy would not have been in a position to request consent, and the state for its part had not shown that intervening circumstances or factors had severed the connection between the unlawful stop and defendant’s consent. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court properly suppressed the evidence found in the container. Kirkeby, 220 Or App at 187.
C. Petitions for Review — Parties’ Arguments
The state petitioned for review in both cases. On review, the state argues that the Court of Appeals “refused to engage in what is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry into the reasonableness of the totality of [each] encounter.” The state contends that, instead, the Court of Appeals adopted a bright-line rule that will require police officers to follow a predetermined list of investigative steps, thereby imposing an artificial and unnecessary restriction on officers that is “in no manner compelled” by the protection against unreasonable seizures set out in Article I, section 9. The state concedes that the questioning here was unrelated to the traffic violations for which defendants were stopped and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to act on what they saw. However, the state asserts that the questions that the officers asked were of the same variety that this court has held to be permissible in officer-citizen encounters, without amounting to seizures under Article I, section 9. See State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 410, 813 P2d 28 (1991) (“[L]aw enforcement officers remain free to approach persons on the street or in public places, seek their cooperation or assistance, request or impart information, or question them without being called [618]*618upon to articulate a certain level of suspicion in justification if a particular encounter proves fruitful.”). The state also asserts that this court already has rejected the premise that an officer may never ask questions unrelated to the stop itself, citing State v. Amaya, 336 Or 616, 626, 89 P3d 1163 (2004) (“To the extent that defendant argues that every question by an officer that is unrelated to the reason for a valid traffic stop violates Article I, section 9, unless the question is based on reasonable suspicion, we reject defendant’s argument.” (emphasis in original)).
The state acknowledges that, in the context of a lawful traffic stop, the police will have “stopped” the motorist to question him or her about a traffic violation. Therefore, the state argues, the question becomes whether an officer is entitled to ask questions, including seeking consent to search, without effecting an unreasonable seizure under Article I, section 9. Focusing on the scope and length of the questioning at issue, the state proposes a rule that police questioning that is unrelated to a traffic stop, or a request for consent to search during a lawful traffic stop, will not constitute an unconstitutional seizure if that questioning creates only a de minimis delay during an otherwise lawful stop. That determination, the state argues, involves a fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances that can “take into account the many factors that contribute to the determination [of] whether any given circumstance amounts to an unreasonable seizure.”
Applying its proposed rule here, the state asserts that, in Rodgers, Van Arsdall’s questions and request to search defendant’s vehicle did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under Article I, section 9, because Van Arsdall posed the same kinds of questions to defendant during the course of the lawful traffic stop that he could have posed to defendant had he approached him on the street. The two questions that Van Arsdall asked about the blue liquid and the white sack took only a few moments and caused only a de minimis delay. Thus, the state argues, the questions did not render the traffic stop unreasonable in either its length or scope.
[619]*619Likewise, the state argues that, in Kirkeby, the officer’s single question about whether defendant had any weapons, followed by a request for consent to conduct a patdown and then a search, did not constitute an unreasonable seizure, because the exchange took only about four to five minutes and the questions could have been asked of any person walking down the street.
In response, defendants assert that the traffic stop itself is a seizure for constitutional purposes. Defendants contrast “mere conversation” between an officer and a person on the street — who freely may end the interaction and walk away — with a traffic stop, where the motorist is legally obligated to stop at an officer’s direction, must interact with and respond to officer-initiated inquiries, is not free to end the encounter, and may not leave without the officer’s consent. Therefore, defendants argue, Article I, section 9, limits an officer to investigatory questions about the vehicle code violation for which a driver is stopped, unless the officer develops reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that the driver has committed, is attempting to commit, or is committing a crime.2 Defendants argue that the state’s proposed rule, which focuses only on the temporal duration of a stop, is unworkable, because too many variables arise in the traffic stop context. For example, defendants argue that traffic stops have no standard length: an experienced officer would be more efficient than an inexperienced officer, while a stop for a more serious traffic infraction could take longer than a stop for a minor infraction.
II. ANALYSIS
The authority of a police officer to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation is governed by ORS 810.410.3 The statute has [620]*620a long history in this court. Before 1997, this court, in a series of cases, held that the statute not only described what an officer could do respecting a traffic stop; it also indicated what the officer could not do. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 120, 817 P2d 1306 (1991) (“* * * [B]y implication, the statute proscribes any further action by the police [beyond that specifically authorized] * * *, unless [that further action] has some basis other than the traffic infraction.”). See also State v. Farley, 308 Or 91, 94-95, 775 P2d 835 (1989); State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 212, 895 P2d 306 (1995) (both to same effect). This court held that, because the statute was intended to limit police activity associated with a traffic stop, it was also the legislature’s intention that evidence seized in violation of the statutory proscription be suppressed. Porter, 312 Or at 121; Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 214.
The foregoing interpretations of legislative intent were superseded by the legislature in 1997. In that year’s legislative session, the legislature enacted ORS 136.432. That statute provides, in part:
[621]*621“A court may not exclude relevant and otherwise admissible evidence in a criminal action on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of any statutory provision unless exclusion of the evidence is required by:
“(1) The United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution[.]”
ORS 136.432 prohibits the judicial branch from excluding evidence obtained by government conduct that exceeds statutory authority. Thus, although the legislature has continued to circumscribe the authority of the police in ORS 810.410 — requiring that, during a traffic stop, police investigatory conduct be reasonably related to the traffic violation, the identification (of persons), and the issuance of a citation — any evidence that is obtained when the police exceed that authority is not suppressible unless it violates some constitutional rule. We turn to a determination whether there is such a constitutional rule.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution establishes a right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure.” Among the potentially “infinite variety of encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens,” Holmes, 311 Or at 406, this court has identified three general categories of encounters and described whether or when those encounters implicate the protections afforded to individuals under Article I, section 9. Id. at 406-07. First, “mere conversation” or a “noncoercive encounter” between an officer and a citizen that involves no restraint of liberty requires no justification and does not implicate the liberty protections provided in Article I, section 9. Second, a temporary restraint of a person’s liberty for the purpose of criminal investigation— i.e., a “stop” — qualifies as a “seizure,” under Article I, section 9, and must be justified by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Third, an arrest also is a “seizure,” under Article I, section 9, and that degree of restraint must be justified by probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a crime. Id. at 407.
A person is “seized” under Article I, section 9, when either (1) a police officer intentionally and significantly interferes with the person’s freedom of movement; or (2) the person believes, in an objectively reasonable manner, that his or [622]*622her liberty of movement has been so restricted. Id. at 409-10. That determination requires a “fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 408.
As noted, the state acknowledges that, in the context of a lawful traffic stop, the police have “stopped” the driver and any passengers in a vehicle. The state also concedes that the police inquiries at issue in these cases were unrelated to the reasons for which defendants were stopped (that is, for traffic violations) and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that crimes (as opposed to those traffic violations) had been or were being committed before the inquiries were made. However, the state asserts that the essential question is whether, notwithstanding the fact of the traffic stop, an officer may make the kinds of inquiries that were made in these cases without violating the liberty interests protected by Article I, section 9. That argument proceeds from the premise that the police inquiries in these cases were of the same variety that this court held in Holmes would be permissible in any police-citizen encounter. That is, the state relies on this court’s observation in Holmes that police officers may approach persons on the street or in public places, question them, and even accompany them to another location without the encounter necessarily resulting in a seizure under Article I, section 9. And, as this court further explained, that principle may carry over to police-driver interactions. Id. at 409-11.
In our view, the state’s assertion — that police may make unrelated inquiries (including requests to search a person or vehicle) during the course of a traffic stop without implicating Article I, section 9 — is correct in the sense that verbal inquiries are not searches and seizures. That is, we agree that police inquiries during the course of a traffic stop (including requests to search a person or vehicle) are not searches and seizures and thus by themselves ordinarily do not implicate Article I, section 9. However, police conduct that involves physical restraint or a show of authority that restricts an individual’s freedom of movement typically does implicate Article I, section 9.
Nevertheless, in contrast to a person on the street, who may unilaterally end an officer-citizen encounter at any [623]*623time, the reality is that a motorist stopped for a traffic infraction is legally obligated to stop at an officer’s direction, see ORS 811.535 (failing to obey a police officer) and ORS 811.540 (fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer), and to interact with the officer, see ORS 807.570 (failure to carry or present license) and ORS 807.620 (giving false information to a police officer), and therefore is not free unilaterally to end the encounter and leave whenever he or she chooses. Moreover, an officer ordinarily cannot casually “approach” a moving vehicle on the road in the same way that an officer may approach a person on the street. It follows that a traffic stop by its nature is not an ordinary police-citizen “encounter,” as the court described such encounters in Holmes.
Moreover, if the purpose of a traffic stop is to investigate crime, evidence gained from the stop must be obtained in compliance with Article I, section 9. See State v. Anderson, 304 Or 139, 141, 743 P2d 715 (1987) (criminal sanctions were intended consequence of sobriety roadblock; thus, where officers had neither warrant nor individualized suspicion that defendant was engaged in illegal activity, evidence gained from roadblock must be suppressed). Seizures or searches for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, conducted without a warrant or without an exception to the warrant requirement, violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 101, 743 P2d 692 (1987) (plurality opinion).
In summary, Article I, section 9, and this court’s case law establish the following principles that must guide the police in their contact with motorists stopped for routine noncriminal traffic violations. Police authority to perform a traffic stop arises out of the facts that created probable cause to believe that there has been unlawful, noncriminal activity, viz., a traffic infraction. Police authority to detain a motorist dissipates when the investigation reasonably related to that traffic infraction, the identification of persons, and the issuance of a citation (if any) is completed or reasonably should be completed. Other or further conduct by the police, beyond that reasonably related to the traffic violation, must be justified on some basis other than the traffic violation.
[624]*624To put the matter another way, constitutionally, Article I, section 9, protects persons and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring a judicially authorized warrant supported by probable cause authorizing a search or seizure. There are, however, certain limited exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. One such exception permits the police to stop and briefly detain motorists for investigation of noncriminal traffic violations. Police conduct during a noncriminal traffic stop does not further implicate Article I, section 9, so long as the detention is limited and the police conduct is reasonably related to the investigation of the noncriminal traffic violation. However, a police search of an individual or a vehicle during the investigation of a noncriminal traffic violation, without probable cause and either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, violates Article I, section 9. Because police inquiries during a traffic stop are neither searches nor seizures, police inquiries in and of themselves require no justification and do not necessarily implicate Article I, section 9. However, police inquiries unrelated to a traffic violation, when combined with physical restraint or a police show of authority, may result in a restriction of personal freedom that violates Article I, section 9.
It is within that framework that this court now must decide whether the police conduct in these cases, conceded by the state to be unrelated to the investigation of a traffic violation, transgressed the limits of Article I, section 9, resulting in an unlawful seizure and, if so, whether the evidence seized by the police in each case should be suppressed because it is a product of an unlawful seizure.4
[625]*625In doing so, we consider the totality of the circumstances, and we are bound by the trial courts’ findings of historical fact, to the extent that those findings are supported by evidence in the record. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). However, this court determines de novo whether the trial courts applied the legal principles involved here correctly to those facts. Id.
In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, we believe that two cases should serve as guideposts. The first is State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 942 P2d 772 (1997). In that case, this court observed that, for purposes of Article I, section 9, interference with a person’s freedom of movement may take the form of either physical force or a show of authority. Id. at 6.
The second guidepost is State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 531, 964 P2d 1007 (1998). In that case, police officers stopped the defendant for driving at night without the use of headlights. After running a records check and instructing the defendant to turn on his lights, the officer advised the defendant that he was free to go. Id. at 529. After making that statement, however, the officer immediately asked the defendant for his consent to search the vehicle and questioned the defendant about whether he was carrying any illegal drugs. Id. The defendant initially withheld his consent to a search; however, after further questioning, he admitted to the officer that he was in possession of drugs.
In concluding that the traffic stop had ended and that the police officer’s subsequent questioning and repeated requests for consent to search resulted in defendant’s seizure, the court stated:
[626]*626“Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person in defendant’s position could have believed that the officers significantly had restricted his liberty or freedom of movement. Indeed, the officers’ continuous show of police authority constituted conduct that was ‘significantly beyond that accepted in ordinary social intercourse.’ Holmes, 311 Or at 410. Therefore, through that conduct, they continued to detain defendant. See State v. Painter, 296 Or 422, 425, 676 P2d 309 (1984) (‘[A] show of authority may suffice to convert a police-citizen encounter into a “stop” of statutory proportion.’).
“The state contends that, because Smith told defendant that he was free to go, the traffic stop ended before Smith began questioning defendant about possessing drugs. It is true that, when an officer tells a driver that he or she is free to go, that factor certainly can weigh in favor of concluding that a traffic stop indeed had ended. However, our case law demonstrates that, when viewing the totality of the circumstances, an officer’s conduct after stating that a driver is free to go may negate such a statement.”
Toevs, 327 Or at 536-37 (brackets and emphases in original).
As previously noted, in defendant Rodgers’s case, when Van Arsdall returned to defendant’s driver-side window, he had all the information necessary to issue defendant a citation and end defendant’s limited detention. Although Van Arsdall chose not to issue the citation at that time, his authority to detain defendant evaporated from that point, because Van Arsdall had completed the investigation reasonably related to the traffic infraction and issuance of the citation. Van Arsdall did not advise defendant in any way that the traffic stop was at an end. The inquiries regarding the items in the car and the request to search occurred after Van Arsdall had completed the traffic violation investigation, and were made by Van Arsdall from the driver-side window while Officer Kantola was stationed on the passenger side of the car. Defendant was not informed that he was free to go, and thus he had no way of knowing that Van Arsdall’s questions and request to search the car were not part of the traffic investigation and that his cooperation in Van Arsdall’s investigation was not required to continue.
[627]*627Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Van Arsdall’s position at the driver-side window and Kantola’s presence on the passenger side of the car was a sufficient “show of authority” that, in combination with the unrelated questions concerning the items in the car and the request to search the car, resulted in a significant restriction of defendant’s freedom of movement. See Toevs, 327 Or at 536-37 (“[0]fficers’ continuous show of police authority constituted conduct that ‘was significantly beyond that accepted in ordinary social intercourse.’ ” (quoting Holmes, 311 Or at 410)). See Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or at 213 (officer who told defendant that he was free to go while leaning on open door of defendant’s vehicle continued to detain defendant). Because that conduct occurred after completion of the investigation of the traffic violation and because (as the state has conceded) Van Arsdall did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that justified defendant Rodgers’s continued detention, we conclude that defendant Rodgers was unlawfully seized in violation of Article I, section 9.5
In Kirkeby, the deputy lawfully stopped defendant for the traffic violation of driving with a suspended license. Defendant was well-known to the deputy and was cooperative and “businesslike” during the encounter. After defendant gave the deputy his driver license, the deputy had defendant’s name, date of birth, and driver license number. The deputy acknowledged that that was all the information that would be contained on a traffic citation; however, he testified that he “probably” did not have everything he needed to issue the citation, because he had not requested and received from defendant the vehicle registration and proof of insurance. The deputy apparently did not ask any other questions of that kind, however. Instead, because defendant had left his car and the deputy was concerned for his safety, he asked whether defendant had any weapons. (Again, we emphasize that defendant does not assert on review that the deputy’s [628]*628initial question about the presence of weapons constituted a seizure under Article I, section 9.) Defendant responded in the negative, and the state concedes that nothing else gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, instead of then either issuing a traffic citation or asking for insurance information, the deputy asked defendant for consent to conduct a patdown and, following the patdown, asked for defendant’s consent to examine each of the items that he had felt in defendant’s pockets. The deputy did so, even though he was confident defendant did not have any firearms on his person and had no reasonable suspicion that the items in defendant’s pockets were contraband or evidence of a crime. And, as the deputy acknowledged, at the time that he asked defendant for permission to conduct a patdown and to examine the contents of defendant’s pockets, defendant was not free to leave.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the deputy’s show of authority that accompanied his request that defendant consent to a patdown and subsequent request that defendant consent to an examination of the contents of defendant’s pockets occurred after the point that defendant should have been issued a citation or sent on his way. Because the deputy’s further detention of defendant was a significant limitation on defendant’s freedom of movement and was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, defendant Kirkeby was unlawfully seized in violation of Article I, section 9.
Having concluded that each defendant was unlawfully seized in violation of Article I, section 9, we now must determine the effect of that illegality on the admissibility of the evidence obtained from the consensual search that occurred in each case.
In Hall, this court acknowledged that there are two related but distinct ways that a violation of a defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9, may affect the validity of a defendant’s subsequent consent to a search. First, illegal police conduct may negate a defendant’s consent to a search, on the ground that the police conduct rendered defendant’s consent involuntary. Second, Article I, section 9, may require the exclusion of evidence because a defendant’s consent was [629]*629derived from, or was the product of, the prior police illegality. In each of these cases, defendants contend only that their consent to search was derived from, or was the product of, the illegal seizure. The methodology for determining whether the state obtained evidence that should be suppressed because it had been obtained in violation of Article I, section 9, was first explained in State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511, 520-21, 73 P3d 282 (2003), and then summarized in Hall:
“After a defendant shows a minimal factual nexus between unlawful police conduct and the defendant’s consent, then the state has the burden to prove that the defendant’s consent was independent of, or only tenuously related to, the unlawful police conduct. Deciding whether the state has satisfied that burden requires a fact-specific inquiry into the totality of the circumstances to determine the nature of the causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and the defendant’s consent. A causal connection requiring suppression may exist because the police sought the defendant’s consent solely as the result of knowledge of inculpa-tory evidence obtained from unlawful police conduct. * * * Although determining the existence of such a causal connection requires examination of the specific facts at issue in a particular case, we view several considerations to be relevant to that determination, including (1) the temporal proximity between the unlawful police conduct and the defendant’s consent, (2) the existence of any intervening circumstances, and (3) the presence of any circumstances— such as, for example, a police officer informing the defendant of the right to refuse consent — that mitigated the effect of the unlawful police conduct.”
Hall, 339 Or at 34-35.6
Here, both defendants have shown the required nexus. In both cases the officers had completed the traffic [630]*630violation investigation and should have either issued a citation or informed each defendant that they could leave. As already explained, the officers in each case did neither and instead unlawfully detained each defendant. It was during the period of unlawful detention that the officers requested that each defendant consent to a search. Here, as in Hall, neither defendant spontaneously granted the officers consent to search; instead, each defendant gave his consent in response to the officers’ requests. The state does not advance any argument to this court to satisfy its burden under Hall that intervening circumstances or factors severed the connection between the unlawful seizures and defendants’ consent. Thus, as in Hall, given the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and each defendant’s consent, and in the absence of any other intervening circumstances, or other circumstances mitigating the effect of the unlawful seizures of each defendant, we conclude that each defendant’s consent, even if voluntary, was the product of police conduct that violated Article I, section 9. Because the consent to search in each case was a product of the unlawful seizure, the evidence obtained during the search, in both cases, must be suppressed.
In State v. Michael K. Rodgers, S056239, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. In State v. Anthony Douglas Kirkeby, S056237, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.