State of Texas v. Martin Bros.

160 S.W.2d 58, 138 Tex. 505, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 366
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1942
DocketNo. 7846.
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 160 S.W.2d 58 (State of Texas v. Martin Bros.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Texas v. Martin Bros., 160 S.W.2d 58, 138 Tex. 505, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 366 (Tex. 1942).

Opinion

*507 Mr. Justice Sharp

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This suit involves the construction of a contract between Martin Brothers and the State of Texas, for the improvement of fifteen miles of State highway in Liberty County. E. V. Martin and T. Q. Martin, composing the partnership of Martin Brothers, road contractors, after having obtained the permission of the Legislature, brought this suit for damages, alleging two grounds of recovery: (1) A claim for $3,090.64 for dirt removed, which the State refused to pay; and (2) a claim for $7,500.00, as additional compensation for extra work and expense in carrying out the contract, because of changes made by the State’s engineer in the plans and specifications after the contract was executed. Trial was to a jury; but at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, upon the State’s motion, a verdict was instructed against the plaintiffs on both counts. The Court of Civil Appeals, in reversing and remanding the case, held that, although the trial court correctly decided the law relating to plaintiffs’ claim for dirt removed, it erred in instructing a verdict on that feature of the case concerning the subsequent alterations of the specifications by the highway engineer. 146 S. W. (2d) 782. This Court granted the application for writ of error of the State. No application was filed by Martin Brothers complaining of the adverse holding of the Court of Civil Appeals to their claim for dirt removed.

Plaintiffs allegations with reference to the two claims are in substance as follows:

The first ground of recovery, for the sum of $3,090.64, relates to the difference in the actual quantity of dirt removed by the contractors in complying with their contract, and the amount estimated by the Highway Engineer. The contract provided that plaintiffs would be entitled to receive a stated amount for each cubic yard of dirt removed. The Highway Engineer estimated that plaintiffs had removed 199,196 cubic yards, and the State made payment on that basis. Plaintiffs accepted the money. However, plaintiffs contend that they removed 225,416 cubic yards of dirt, but that their claim for additional compensation, submitted .by them to the Highway Engineer, for the additional amount of dirt removed, was rejected. They then attempted to get a hearing before the Claims Committee; and being unsuccessful in this, they then brought suit on such claim.

*508 The second ground of recovery, for the sum of $7,500.00, relates to extra expenses incurred by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that in the plans and specifications, furnished bidders to be used as a basis for their bids, the nature of the work to be done was shown in detail. The specifications included a map or drawing of the road, drawn to scale, which showed the approximate location of each tree. Of the many trees shown, only 26 were marked to be saved along the entire 15 miles of highway. Before they were awarded this contract, the plaintiffs, in a questionnaire required by the Highway Department, plainly stated that they intended to perform the work with heavy machinery. They testified that with the trees distantly spaced, as shown on the may or drawing included with the specifications, they could have used heavy machinery for digging the ditches, moving the dirt, and placing it on the roadbed, and would have done so; but because they were required by the Highway Engineer to leave so many more trees, they were unable to use the heavy machinery, and were forced to have the work done with machines drawn by mules. They testified that the manner in which they were forced to carry out the contract was far more expensive to them than the manner they had anticipated. They detailed their extra expenses, and prayed for a recovery therefor under the contract. Plaintiffs admitted that they received and accepted approximately $42,000.00 under the contract; which is the amount the State considered to be due thereunder.

This suit is based upon the contract executed by the State and the contractors. There is no pleading that the State should be liable on quantum meruit for the value of the work done. It is not contended that any new or supplemental contract or agreement was entered into, or that the parties operated under a “Force Account.” Nor was there any pleading that the State had waived any right, or is estopped to rely or insist on any provision of the contract. The suit was based squarely on the contract; and if plaintiffs are entitled to recover, it must be by virtue of the provisions of the contract itself.

The pertinent provisions of the contract read as follows:

“4.3. Changes and Alterations. The Engineer will have the right to make such changes and alterations in the plans or in the quantities of the work, as may be considered necessary or desirable, and such changes and alterations shall not be considered as a waiver of any condition of the contract, nor shall *509 they invalidate any of the provisions thereof. The Contractor shall perform the work as increased or decreased and no allowances will be made for anticipated profits. When such changes and alterations increase or decrease the quantity of work to be done or of materials to be furnished under any item in excess of twenty (20%) per cent then either party to the contract, upon demand, shall be entitled to a revised consideration upon that portion of the work above or below twenty (20%) per cent of the quantity stated in the proposal; such revised consideration to be determined by special agreement or as is hereinafter provided under ‘Extra Work’.” (Italics ours.)

“4.4. Extra Work. Additional work made necessary by changes and alterations of plans or of quantities or for other reasons, for which no prices are provided in the contract, shall be defined as ‘Extra Work’ and. shall be performed by the Contractor in accordance with these specifications and as directed; pro-valid, however, that before any extra work is begun a ‘Supplemental Agreement’ shall be executed, or a written order issued by the Engineer to do the work on a ‘Force Account’ basis, as hereinafter provided.” (Italics ours.)

“9.4. Payment for Extra Work. Extra work ordered, performed and accepted will be paid for according to the terms of ‘Supplemental Agreements’ or on the ‘Force Account’ basis. (Italics ours.)

“9.5. Force Account. When extra work is ordered to be performed on the ‘Force Account’ basis, payment for same will be made as follows:

“(a) For all labor, teams, trucks and foremen the Contractor will receive the current local rate of wage, to be agreed upon in writing before beginning such work, for each hour that said labor, teams, trucks and foreman are actually engaged in such work, to which shall be added an amount equal to fifteen (15%) per cent of the sum thereof as compensation. No charge will be made by the Contractor for organization or overhead expenses except actual cost of premiums on public liability and workmen’s compensation insurance, and Contractor’s bond. No charge for superintendence will be made unless considered necessary and ordered by the Engineer.

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Bluebook (online)
160 S.W.2d 58, 138 Tex. 505, 1942 Tex. LEXIS 366, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-texas-v-martin-bros-tex-1942.