OPINION
PARKER, Judge.
In a trial de novo following a condemnation award, the trial court excluded evidence of access to the frontage road from the remainder property on the basis that right of access to the remainder property was questionable. The State of Minnesota appeals on the basis that right of access was sufficiently certain so that the exclusion of the evidence denied the state a fair trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
The State of Minnesota began this condemnation proceeding in 1981, pursuant to plans for improving the frontage road which services the south side of Interstate 494 in Bloomington, Minnesota. At that time, the frontage road ran east and west along the northern boundary of property owned by respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. (NWA). NWA at that time had direct access to the frontage road from its property-
The state condemnation proceeding took 3.14 acres of NWA’s property, removing all existing access to the frontage road. The state planned to close the existing frontage road and build a new one ending in a cul-de-sac about 65 feet west of the border of NWA’s property (see Figure 1). The state acquired all of NWA’s access rights to the existing frontage road, but NWA retained a right of access to the proposed frontage road and cul-de-sac across 65 feet of state-owned right of way. The retained access begins at the northwestern corner of the remainder property and runs 140 feet south along the western boundary of NWA’s property.
[516]*516[[Image here]]
Throughout the condemnation proceedings, the parties discussed the state’s plan for the new frontage road in relation to the potential construction of an entrance and driveway from the cul-de-sac to the remainder property. Their discussion included the problems associated with constructing the entrance across the drainage draw that runs through the 65 feet of state-owned land. In designing the cul-de-sac, the state took into account NWA’s intent to build [517]*517itself an entrance to the cul-de-sac. However, NWA’s intent to build was tentative, depending on completion of its comprehensive plans for developing the remainder property.
On August 9, 1982, the court-appointed condemnation commissioners awarded NWA $1,581,730 to compensate for the taking of its property. The award apportioned $765,000 for the value of the land acquired and $816,730 for damages to the remainder. The commission conditioned the award on the state’s granting NWA a permit to build an entrance to the cul-de-sac and on NWA bearing the cost of constructing the entrance. Both parties appealed the award to the district court for a trial de novo of damages for the taking. By statute, the de novo review rendered the commission’s award moot. See Minn.Stat. § 117.175, subd. 1 (1986). However, the date of the commission’s award established the date on which damages for the taking must be assessed in the district court trial. State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 182, 100 N.W.2d 724, 728 (1960).
Before trial, NWA brought a motion to exclude any evidence of the right of access. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated June 5, 1985, based on its conclusion that the right of access was not certain on the date of taking. On September 19,1985, on the state’s motion, the trial court vacated this order and ordered that evidence of access provided by the frontage road and cul-de-sac be admitted. The court based its reversal on City of Chisago City v. Holt, 360 N.W.2d 390 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). However, on December 20, 1985, the trial court reinstated its original order excluding the evidence. The December 20, 1985, order was orally reaffirmed on September 15,1986, by the trial judge assigned to hear the case after the retirement of the original judge. The state, therefore, introduced no evidence of damages for the taking or the value of the remainder of the property.
A jury heard the case in December 1986 and awarded NWA $3,500,000, with $720,-000 apportioned for the value of the land taken and $2,780,000 for damages to the remainder property. Judgment was stayed pending this appeal, which the state brought from the trial court’s order denying a new trial.
ISSUE
Was it error to exclude evidence of the value of the access to the remainder property?
ANALYSIS
A motion for a new trial may be granted when an irregularity in the proceedings, including the erroneous exclusion of evidence, deprives the moving party of a fair trial. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 59.01(1). A motion for a new trial, however, should be granted “cautiously and sparingly and only in the furtherance of substantial justice.” Leuba v. Bailey, 251 Minn. 193, 207-08, 88 N.W.2d 73, 83 (1957). Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a new trial is required, and its decision will not be reversed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. See Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 258 Minn. 405, 407, 104 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1960).
Relying on City of St. Louis Park v. Almor Co., 313 N.W.2d 606 (Minn.1981), NWA argues that the trial court properly excluded evidence of NWA’s access to the remaining property because such access was not certain at the time of the condemnation proceedings. In Almor, pursuant to plans to upgrade Louisiana Avenue, the City of St. Louis Park acquired a strip of land along the western border of plaintiff’s property through eminent domain, taking all right of access. Id. at 607. At trial the owners claimed damages for landlocking the property based on the total taking of access. Id. The trial court allowed the condemnor to introduce evidence of the possibility of alternative access, specifically, that the city could give an easement to a public road across an intervening railroad right of way and over city-owned property to reach the street. On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that a factfinder cannot consider evidence of access to remaining property unless such [518]*518access existed or was certain at the time of the taking. See id. at 608-609.
The facts of the present case are different from those of Almor, and that case is inapposite. This is not a landlocked property case. Unlike Almor, here the state did not take all access to the property. NWA retained a right of access as an abutting owner to the frontage road and cul-de-sac at the northwest corner of the retained property. The condemnation petition and commission’s order clearly stated that “the abutting owner shall retain the right of access to an outer lane” of the frontage road.
NWA argues that it has not retained a right of access because it is not an abutting owner in that the cul-de-sac is built 65 feet inside the right of way on state-owned property. An abutting owner under Minnesota statutes, however, is one whose property abuts the right of way, whether or not the edge of the traveled portion of the highway is also the right-of-way line. See, e.g., State v. Gannons, Inc., 275 Minn.
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OPINION
PARKER, Judge.
In a trial de novo following a condemnation award, the trial court excluded evidence of access to the frontage road from the remainder property on the basis that right of access to the remainder property was questionable. The State of Minnesota appeals on the basis that right of access was sufficiently certain so that the exclusion of the evidence denied the state a fair trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
The State of Minnesota began this condemnation proceeding in 1981, pursuant to plans for improving the frontage road which services the south side of Interstate 494 in Bloomington, Minnesota. At that time, the frontage road ran east and west along the northern boundary of property owned by respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. (NWA). NWA at that time had direct access to the frontage road from its property-
The state condemnation proceeding took 3.14 acres of NWA’s property, removing all existing access to the frontage road. The state planned to close the existing frontage road and build a new one ending in a cul-de-sac about 65 feet west of the border of NWA’s property (see Figure 1). The state acquired all of NWA’s access rights to the existing frontage road, but NWA retained a right of access to the proposed frontage road and cul-de-sac across 65 feet of state-owned right of way. The retained access begins at the northwestern corner of the remainder property and runs 140 feet south along the western boundary of NWA’s property.
[516]*516[[Image here]]
Throughout the condemnation proceedings, the parties discussed the state’s plan for the new frontage road in relation to the potential construction of an entrance and driveway from the cul-de-sac to the remainder property. Their discussion included the problems associated with constructing the entrance across the drainage draw that runs through the 65 feet of state-owned land. In designing the cul-de-sac, the state took into account NWA’s intent to build [517]*517itself an entrance to the cul-de-sac. However, NWA’s intent to build was tentative, depending on completion of its comprehensive plans for developing the remainder property.
On August 9, 1982, the court-appointed condemnation commissioners awarded NWA $1,581,730 to compensate for the taking of its property. The award apportioned $765,000 for the value of the land acquired and $816,730 for damages to the remainder. The commission conditioned the award on the state’s granting NWA a permit to build an entrance to the cul-de-sac and on NWA bearing the cost of constructing the entrance. Both parties appealed the award to the district court for a trial de novo of damages for the taking. By statute, the de novo review rendered the commission’s award moot. See Minn.Stat. § 117.175, subd. 1 (1986). However, the date of the commission’s award established the date on which damages for the taking must be assessed in the district court trial. State v. Pahl, 257 Minn. 177, 182, 100 N.W.2d 724, 728 (1960).
Before trial, NWA brought a motion to exclude any evidence of the right of access. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated June 5, 1985, based on its conclusion that the right of access was not certain on the date of taking. On September 19,1985, on the state’s motion, the trial court vacated this order and ordered that evidence of access provided by the frontage road and cul-de-sac be admitted. The court based its reversal on City of Chisago City v. Holt, 360 N.W.2d 390 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). However, on December 20, 1985, the trial court reinstated its original order excluding the evidence. The December 20, 1985, order was orally reaffirmed on September 15,1986, by the trial judge assigned to hear the case after the retirement of the original judge. The state, therefore, introduced no evidence of damages for the taking or the value of the remainder of the property.
A jury heard the case in December 1986 and awarded NWA $3,500,000, with $720,-000 apportioned for the value of the land taken and $2,780,000 for damages to the remainder property. Judgment was stayed pending this appeal, which the state brought from the trial court’s order denying a new trial.
ISSUE
Was it error to exclude evidence of the value of the access to the remainder property?
ANALYSIS
A motion for a new trial may be granted when an irregularity in the proceedings, including the erroneous exclusion of evidence, deprives the moving party of a fair trial. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 59.01(1). A motion for a new trial, however, should be granted “cautiously and sparingly and only in the furtherance of substantial justice.” Leuba v. Bailey, 251 Minn. 193, 207-08, 88 N.W.2d 73, 83 (1957). Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a new trial is required, and its decision will not be reversed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. See Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 258 Minn. 405, 407, 104 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1960).
Relying on City of St. Louis Park v. Almor Co., 313 N.W.2d 606 (Minn.1981), NWA argues that the trial court properly excluded evidence of NWA’s access to the remaining property because such access was not certain at the time of the condemnation proceedings. In Almor, pursuant to plans to upgrade Louisiana Avenue, the City of St. Louis Park acquired a strip of land along the western border of plaintiff’s property through eminent domain, taking all right of access. Id. at 607. At trial the owners claimed damages for landlocking the property based on the total taking of access. Id. The trial court allowed the condemnor to introduce evidence of the possibility of alternative access, specifically, that the city could give an easement to a public road across an intervening railroad right of way and over city-owned property to reach the street. On appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that a factfinder cannot consider evidence of access to remaining property unless such [518]*518access existed or was certain at the time of the taking. See id. at 608-609.
The facts of the present case are different from those of Almor, and that case is inapposite. This is not a landlocked property case. Unlike Almor, here the state did not take all access to the property. NWA retained a right of access as an abutting owner to the frontage road and cul-de-sac at the northwest corner of the retained property. The condemnation petition and commission’s order clearly stated that “the abutting owner shall retain the right of access to an outer lane” of the frontage road.
NWA argues that it has not retained a right of access because it is not an abutting owner in that the cul-de-sac is built 65 feet inside the right of way on state-owned property. An abutting owner under Minnesota statutes, however, is one whose property abuts the right of way, whether or not the edge of the traveled portion of the highway is also the right-of-way line. See, e.g., State v. Gannons, Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 16, 145 N.W.2d 321, 324 (1966) (abutting property on street with 200-foot-wide right of way and traveled surface 85 feet wide); Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 437, 127 N.W.2d 165, 167 (1964) (property abutted right of way but was located 85 feet from traveled portion of highway). The remainder property need not physically touch the proposed frontage road; NWA is an abutting owner because the remainder property borders the state’s right of way.
According to Minnesota statutes, all abutting property owners have the right of access to a new right of way unless the right is specifically taken. The statute states that
[w]hen an outer lane is constructed, the abutting owners shall have access to the outer lane unless the petition and notice in condemnation * * * clearly specifies that the right of access to the outer lane has been acquired.
Minn.Stat. § 160.08, subd. 5 (1986). Because NWA is an abutting owner under the statute, the state retained for NWA a valuable right of access. In fact, it appears that the state’s condemnation petition went beyond the statute’s requirements and specifically provided that NWA would retain a right of access to the frontage road and cul-de-sac.
NWA makes much of the fact that the entrance has not yet been constructed and that it must cross a “deep drainage ravine” running between NWA’s property and the frontage road and cul-de-sac. NWA confuses certainty of access with difficulty in building the entrance itself. Failure to construct an entrance has no impact on the certainty of an abutting owner’s easement of access. A property owner acquires vested access rights immediately upon the dedication and acceptance of a street for public use. The street or highway need not be physically cleared, regulated, or in any way improved before an abutting owner’s right of access becomes certain. The access easement comes into being the moment a street or highway is legally designated by a road authority for highway purposes. See Stom v. City of Council Bluffs, 189 N.W.2d 522, 527-28 (Iowa 1971); Small v. State Roads Commission, 246 Md. 646, 229 A.2d 408, 411-12 (1967); 3 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 10.221[5], at 388 (1985). Accordingly, the certainty of NWA’s right to access is not dependent upon the construction.
NWA not only has a right of access to the retained property, but also has a statutory right to have the state build an entrance from that access to the frontage road. Minn.Stat. § 160.18, subd. 2 (1986) (“Except when the easement of access has been acquired, the road authorities in laying out and constructing a new highway or in relocating or reconstructing an old highway shall construct suitable approaches thereto within the limits of the right-of-way where the approaches are reasonably necessary and practicable, so as to provide abutting owners a reasonable means of access to such highway” (emphasis added)). The statute unequivocally provides that the state has the responsibility to build an entrance and provide at least one culvert. Minn.Stat. § 160.18, subds. 1-2 (1986) The [519]*519state must also supply the fill for an entrance to NWA’s property. See Op.Atty.Gen. 642-A-1 (March 23, 1932).
NWA also argues that because the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) reserves the right to control safety and design consideration for construction of the entrance, the right to access is made less certain. NWA asserts that the exercise of such regulatory power converts NWA’s right of access into a mere “permit,” revocable at the state’s discretion.
It has long been recognized in Minnesota that an abutting owner’s right to reasonable access to a street or highway is a property right. Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, 57, 19 N.W.2d 394, 399 (1945). An abutting property owner does not, however, have a right of access at every point on the street or highway; his right of access is subject to reasonable regulations in the public interest. See Gibson v. Commissioner of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 500, 178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (1970); 3 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 10.-221[5], at 381 (3rd ed. 1985). Nevertheless, the power to regulate does not include the complete taking of the right of access. Johnson v. City of Plymouth, 263 N.W.2d 603, 608 (Minn.1978). While the state may not refuse to permit construction of the entrance to NWA’s property, regulation of access and design consonant with traffic conditions and uniform police requirements is a proper exercise of the state’s police power and does not affect the certainty of access to NWA’s property.
NWA also argues that government agencies other than MnDOT may refuse to approve permits allowing construction of the entrance to the property. While an owner of property subject to condemnation has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to mitigate damages, State v. Pahl, 254 Minn. 349, 357, 95 N.W.2d 85, 91 (1959), NWA has not yet applied for an entrance permit from any government agency to construct the entrance. Consequently, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that these permits will be refused. NWA’s argument is based on mere speculation and is without merit.
As Justice Mitchell noted in King v. Minneapolis Union Railway Co., 32 Minn. 224, 226, 20 N.W. 135, 136 (1884), “any evidence is competent and any fact proper to be considered which legitimately bears upon the question of the marketable value of the property.” We hold as a matter of law that NWA, as an abutting owner, has a vested right of access and right to construction of a suitable entrance from its remainder property to the frontage road and cul-de-sac. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the state to show NWA’s vested right of access mitigated damages to the remainder property.
DECISION
The trial court erred in excluding evidence of access, because the state had not acquired all access rights to the remainder property but reserved sufficient access to construct an entrance.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
POPOVICH, C.J., and CRIPPEN, LESLIE, RANDALL and LOMMEN, JJ., dissented.
WOZNIAK and NIERENGARTEN, JJ., concurred specially.