[543]*543MeDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.
The appellee recovered a judgment of $17,890.66 upon a bond issued by appellant by which the performance of a certain contract between the Oklahoma Book Company and appellee was assured. The trial was without a jury, and upon a stipulation as to the evidentiary facts. The principal error assigned is that the trial court denied defendant’s motion for judgment on such facts. The petition alleged the contracts hereafter referred to, and that the Oklahoma Book Company had failed to account for $3,804.70 cash due for books admittedly sold, and for $25,019.28 of books delivered to it, which the book company had reported as unsold, but which had been disposed of; and that notice of such default was given defendant on August 2, August 8, and September 21, 1929, as required by the bond. The prayer is for $20,000, the penal sum of the bond.
The answer admitted the execution of the bond, but alleged that the plaintiff had knowledge that the book company was not complying with its contract, but was embez.zling funds; that it failed to notify the defendant; that all of the shortages sued for arose after plaintiff acquired such knowledge;' that by its failure to give such notice “the rights of this answering defendant were thereby prejudiced and that this defendant thereby has been discharged and released and is liable for nothing herein”; that, had defendant been given such notice, it could have terminated its further liability. Defendant further alleges that plaintiff received $6,918.-35 from the liquidation of the book company, and that defendant’s liability could not in any event, exceed $13,081.65. It is further alleged that the bond terminated on August 5, 1928, because the charter of the book company expired on that day; that it accepted premiums on the bond after that date without knowledge of the expiration of the charter; that no liability exists on account of defaults on August 5, 1928, because of failure of plaintiff to notify it thereof within 60 days, to its prejudice. Plaintiff’s replication denies that it was aware that the book company was not faithfully performing its contract prior to the notice to the defendant; it admits the receipt of a dividend of $6,918.35, but alleges that its net loss exceeded the penal sum of the bond; that upon the expiration of the charter of the book company, a new charter was secured on August 24, 1928, and the business was carried on without interruption; that plaintiff had no knowledge of the expiration of said charter.
The material facts as stipulated are: On June 30, 1924, a contract was entered into between plaintiff and the state of Oklahoma, by which plaintiff agreed to supply promptly, through a depository at Oklahoma City, certain school books for sale and distribution, for a period of 5 years, at certain prices; and further agreed to maintain agencies accessible to the patrons of the common schools throughout the state. That contract specifically provides that the various terms “shall be construed both as covenants * * * and as conditions to the continuance of the contract.”
This state contract was incorporated by reference in a contract of August 18, 1924, between the plaintiff and the book company. By that contract, plaintiff agreed to deliver on consignment, to the book company, within 30 days after notice of the quantity necessary, sufficient books to meet the market demand. The book company agreed to place such books on sale at points throughout Oklahoma, and was to receive a 10 per cent, discount for its services and expenses in distributing such books. The book company further agreed:
“Sixth: The party of the second part agrees to remit to the party of the first part on the first day of November, January, March and May of each year of this contract, payment in full for the sale of all books made by them up to the first day of October, January, February and April, respectively, said remittance to be accompanied by a statement showing the total sales at state contract prices and the total sales at exchange prices.
“Stock reports are to accompany these quarterly statements and these stock reports are to indicate the number of books on hand in the central depository and also the number'in the hands of the agencies throughout the State of Oklahoma.”
By paragraph 9, the book company agreed to be “accountable and responsible” to plaintiff for all books delivered.
To secure the performance of this contract, the book company and the defendant herein joined in the bond sued on; this bond incorporated the contract by reference; the pertinent provisions of the bond are:
“Now, the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the said Principal shall faithfully perform said contract on its part,, and comply with and perform all and singular promises, obligations and conditions of the said contract, including the safe custody of all monies and proper remittance of the [544]*544same, according to its terms, and shall perform all the promises, obligations and conditions laid upon The MacMillan Company by their contract with the State of Oklahoma bearing date of June 30th, 1924, regarding the keeping of a sufficient stock of its adopted texts to meet all demands and shall render satisfactory service in the distribution of the same, t-hen this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force and effect.
“Provided, That the MacMillan Company shall keep, do and perform each and every, all and singular the matters and things set forth and specified in said contract, to be by The MacMillan Company kept, done and performed and exclusively at the times and in the manner as in said contract specified:
“Provided Further, That in the event of any default on the part of the Principal, written notice thereof by registered letter, with a verified statement of the facts showing such default and the date thereof, shall within sixty days after such default be mailed to the Surety at its office in Des Moines, Iowa.
“Provided Further, That the Surety may at any time terminate this obligation by giving thirty days’ written notice by registered letter to The MacMillan Company of its desire to terminate this obligation but without prejudice to any claim for default during the time in which the bond was in force, although such default may not have been discovered when this bond was terminated, refunding to the Principal in this bond the pro rata unearned premium.
“Provided Further, That the said Surety shall not be liable for any amount in excess of the penalty of this bond.”
No notice of any default was given- the defendant until August 2, 19291. It is stipulated that the plaintiff did not suspect any error in the reports made from time to time, as to books on hand, until July 30, 1929. It did know that the quarterly reports were made late in many instances, and when made, were not accompanied by a full remittance of amounts due as shown by the reports; that the book company was falling behind in its cash remittances in substantial amounts; no notice of such delinquencies was given the defendant, as was agreed in the bond. The report due May 1, 1926, was made May 29, and full remittance did not accompany it, as the hook company stated that a state warrant could not be collected before June 10. The reports düe in the spring of 1928 were many days late, and were not then accompanied by remittances in full. In September, 1928, an indebtedness of $9,624.76 had been overdue for several months. On October 31, 1928, the book company was indebted for $3,624.76 on account of the preceding year’s business. On November 24, 1928, a reconcilement of inventories disclosed a large error in the hook company’s hooks, growing out of the dishonesty of one of its employees; and the hook company acknowledged an indebtedness in excess of $10,000 more than its books showed, for which a trade acceptance was given and paid. At that time, the indebtedness, including the trade acceptance, was $16,340.15. Without further detailing the proof, it discloses that the book company had been tardy in its reports and remittances as early as 1926; that it was delinquent in payment of substantial amounts conceded to be owing in 1928; that the delinquency was more than $16,000 in the fall of 1928, reduced to $3,804.70 by May, 1929; and that no notice of any such delinquency was given until in August, 1929, when plaintiff learned that the reported inventory of books on hand was false.
The defendant contends that the bond was terminated when the charter of the hook company expired in 1928, relying upon the analogy of the death of an individual principal. Both parties were in ignorance of the fact that the charter expired; both contracted for a term extending beyond the corporate life. A new charter was promptly secured, and the business was maintained without interruption during the few days between the expiration of the old and the granting of the new charter. No prejudice of any kind is even claimed, and the circumstance of the charter expiring was an incident without significance. Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376, 37 S. Ct. 614, 61 L. Ed. 1206, is very closely in point, and is adverse to defendant’s contention. We think the bond was not discharged by this circumstance.
The principal defense to the bond is that the plaintiff failed to notify the defendant, as it agreed to do, of defaults on the part of the principal. It is urged, with much force, that in a cóntinuing bond, the surety is entitled to know of any default, so that it may take steps to protect itself; that, unless such notice is given, a small rivulet may swell into a deep stream without the knowledge of the surety.
To this, plaintiff makes several answers. [545]*545It construes this clause as applying only to defaults which, are to be made the basis of a claim against the surety company, and refers to the fact that the “verified statement of facts” required by the clause is the usual re-, quirement of proofs of claim. The clause cannot be so limited. The plaintiff agreed to give notice of “any default,” and we cannot change it. Next, plaintiff contends that it has no reference to mere delinquency in remitting amounts admittedly due, but only to defaults involving wrongdoing, such as false reports or embezzlement. But the book company agreed to remit on stated dates; failure to do so is a default. It is then claimed that notice is required only of substantial defaults; it may be that, if a report, accompanied by full remittance, was late but a day or so, a reasonable construction might make notice of such a trifling breach unnecessary. But the defaults of the book company were substantial in amount, and continued for a substantial length of time. We are of the opinion that plaintiff breached its agreement by failing to notify the defendant of the substantial defaults existing at least as early as the fall of 1928. The defendant bad contracted to receive such notice; and it bad a right to know, so that it might have taken such steps as it might be advised.
We come, then, to the principal and difficult question, Is this agreement as to notice a condition precedent to liability, or is it a concurrent promise, for breach of which plaintiff is liable for such damage as may flow from the breach?. Are defendant’s obligations under its bond abruptly terminated upon the failure to give notice, or must it show that it was prejudiced thereby, as it alleged in its answer? The defendant did not undertake to prove the prejudice alleged, either by showing that the rules or practices of the company were such that, if notice bad been received, it would have exercised its option to cancel, or in any other way. . It is stipulated that plaintiff bad no knowledge of inventory losses, for which recovery was had herein; its knowledge was of delinquencies in cash settlement, which had been reduced from $16,000 in 1928 to $5,000 at the time the notice was sent. Defendant stands on the broad proposition that failure to give the notice terminated its obligations, whether it was prejudiced or not. Whether that be true, or whether it is entitled only to recoup the damages it suffered by the breach, is the pivotal question in this case.
There is a sharp divergence in the authorities as to the effect of failure to give no-tice of the default of a principal, where the bond expressly provides the liability of tbe surety is conditioned upon the giving of such notice. Many courts have held that such failure does not exonerate the surety, in the absence of a showing of prejudice.1 On the other hand the Eighth Circuit has, since the decision of National Surety Co. v. Long (C. C. A.) 125 F. 887, consistently held that if the bond so provides, it will be enforced.2 That rule is in accord with the many decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that where the language used is unambiguous, tbe courts will enforce the [546]*546contract made.3 In any event, we are disposed to follow the settled law of the Eighth Circuit, and hold that if the parties have made the giving of notice a condition upon the obligation of the surety company, failure to give such notice relieves the surety company of liability.4
The divergence in opinion exists in cases where the agreement to give notice is expressly made a condition of the liability of the surety company, by apt words used for that purpose. No one of the expressions customarily used to condition such liability is found in this bond; and it is worthy of note that one of the contracts, incorporated in the bond, did use apt language to create a condition. We are therefore confronted with a question of construction, Did the parties intend that failure to give the notice, as agreed, should automatically terminate all obligation under the bond? Or did they intend that the agreement was a promise, the breach of which should render the plaintiff liable for any damage occasioned thereby?
In an effort to ascertain the intent of the parties to a contract, the language used by them should he fairly studied, and terms used ought to be taken in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense. This rule is as applicable to contracts of insurance as to any other contracts. Chase v. Business Men’s Assur. Co. (C. C. A. 10) 51 F.(2d) 34, and eases therein cited. The rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured does not come into play unless a fair construction of •the contract leaves the intent of the parties in doubt. This court said, in East & West Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., v. Fidel, 49 F.(2d) 35, 38: “But it is not true that a strained construction will he resorted to in order to establish an ambiguity which does not exist. Courts do not force an ambiguity in order to resolve it against an insurer.” Judge Walter H. Sanborn, in Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. McNulty (C. C. A. 81 157 F. 224, 226, said: “But this rule ought not to be permitted to have the effect to make a plain agreement ambiguous, and then to interpret it in favor of the insured.” See, also, United States Fid. & Guaranty Co. v. Guenther, 281 U. S. 34, 50 S. Ct 165, 74 L. Ed. 683, 72 A. L. R. 1064; Imperial Fire Insurance Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 462, 14 S. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231.
In examining the bond, the first thing noticed is that it contains “no express provision in the bond declaring that it shall be void if the notice of prior misconduct is not given.”5 *7Considering the care with which insurance contracts are drawn, the absence of such a common provision is significant. The next point is that the language used is that generally used in a promise, “notice shall be mailed,” and not that generally used in a condition, “if notice is (or shall be) mailed.” The next thing noticed is that all four paragraphs, after the condition of the bond, are introduced by the phrase “Provided” and “Provided Further.” It is strongly urged that to introduce a term in a contract with the word “provided” is to designate that term as a condition on liability, and not- as a promise, unless a contrary intent may be determined from the writing itself.6 The Supreme Court has adverted to the matter in the following language: [547]*547trary, it gives way to the intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, and has frequently been thus explained and applied as expressing simply a covenant or limitation in trust.” Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. (73 U. S.) 119, 166, 18 L. Ed. 502.
[546]*546“It is trae that the word 'proviso’ is an appropriate one to constitute a common law condition in a deed or will, hnt this is not the fixed and invariable meaning attached to it by the law in these instruments. On the eon-
[547]*547“Where the undertaking on one side is in terms a condition to the stipulation on the other, — that is, where the contract provides for the performance of some act, or the happening of some event, and the obligations of the contract are made to depend on such performance or happening, — the conditions are conditions precedent. The reason and sense of the contemplated transaction, as it must have been understood by the parties and is to be collected from the whole contract, determine whether this is so or not; or it may be determined from the nature of the acts to be done, and the order in which they must necessarily precede and follow each other in the progress of performance. But when the act of one is not necessary to the act of the other, though it would be convenient, useful, or beneficial, yet as the want of it does not prevent performance, and the loss and inconvenience can be compensated in damages, performance of the one is not a condition precedent to performance by the other.” New Orleans v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 171 U. S. 312, 334, 18 S. Ct. 875, 883, 43 L. Ed. 178.
In Huggins v. Daley (C. C. A. 4) 99 F. 606, 608, 48 L. BR. A. 320, the question was “whether the proviso in the Hodges lease constituted a condition precedent.” It was held that it did, but the court so determined after a consideration of the entire lease and the circumstances under which it was made; as to technical rules of construction, that court said: “There are no precise technical words which distinguish conditions precedent or subsequent. Whether they are one or the other is a matter of construction, to be solved by ascertaining the intention of the party creating the estate. They are not determined merely by the structure of the instrument, or the arrangement of the covenants.”
Giving full force to the rule that the word “Provided” is more appropriate to a condition than a covenant, we do not feel that the use of the word stops the inquiry into the essential question, the intent of the parties as disclosed by their contract; even under the strongest statement of the rule, courts are not foreclosed from examining the entire contract. In this particular case, the third proviso cannot be construed as a condition upon liability, for it reserves to the defendant a right of cancellation; and the fourth proviso is a limitation upon, and not a condition of, liability. In this particular contract, the word “provided” has been indiscriminately used as an introduction to every paragraph of the contract after the one paragraph expressing “the condition of the above obligation.”
The contract, the performance of which was guaranteed, is expressly made a part of the bond. We turn to it to find what was the performance guaranteed. We find that the book company agreed to place school books at every place in the state where they might be needed, which means of course in practically every hamlet in the state of Oklahoma. Four times a year it agreed to report to the plaintiff the number of books sold by every dealer in the state, and the number left in his hands, and to do this within 30 days. If a single dealer failed to report promptly the books sold and on hand, the book company could not literally comply with its agreement. While the book company guaranteed the payment for all books, it was doubtless in the contemplation of the parties that it would, as a-general rule, undertake to collect from its dealers within that 30-day period. Some books were sold to the state, and getting vouchers through state offices is often a slow task. In such a widespread distribution, mechanical errors in counts and the like might, and did, require frequent reconciliations. This is the background against which this bond was made. True, the book company agreed to report and remit within 30 days; trae, the plaintiff agreed to notify defendant if the book company defaulted. But can it be said that the parties intended that the bond should stand forfeited if there was a failure to notify of a default that, from the correspondence and the stipulation, gave plaintiff no suspicion that anything was wrong?
Considering the nature of the details of the performance guaranteed, the failure to use apt words to express an intent that obligation should cease upon the failure to give notice, the use of words of promise rather than of the happening of an event, we do not believe that the parties intended that liability upon the bond should end with the failure to notify, where no prejudice resulted from such failure. We think the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. U. S., for Use of Pressed Brick Co., 191 U. S. 416, 24 S. Ct. 142, 48 L. Ed. 242, has some application to the case at bar. There the [548]*548bond was given under the federal statute governing buildings constructed for tbe United States, and was “conditioned not only upon the faithful performance of his work to erect the building according to his contract, and to any changes or additions made thereto, but to ‘promptly make payment to all persons supplying him labor or material in the prosecution of the work contemplated by said contract.’ ” The latter provision was for the benefit of those who furnished labor or materials to the contractor; one of the material-men brought suit on the bond. Tbe defense was that the plaintiff had consented to a change in the obligation by accepting notes for materials furnished, without the consent of the surety; that, by so doing, the agreement of the principal to promptly pay was modified, and the surety exonerated. The court considered the uncertainty of the situation which confronted the surety company when it executed the bond, and held that, no prejudice being shown, the obligation of the surety was not discharged because of the extension of time granted by the plaintiff. The court said, at page 426 of 191 U. S., 24 S. Ct. 142, 144: “The rule of strietissimi juris is a stringent one, and is liable at times to work'a practical injustice. It is one which ought not to be éxtended to contracts not within the reason of the rule, particularly when the bond is underwritten by a corporation which has undertaken for a profit to insure the obligee against a failure of performance on the part of the principal obligor. Such a contract should be interpreted liberally in favor of the subcontractor, with a view of furthering the beneficent object of the statute.”
Mr. Williston deals with the situation here presented, where it is stipulated that “reports shall be made,” as follows: “When a contract reads ‘It is agreed,’ or ‘it is provided,’ or ‘it is stipulated,’ or ‘it is understood’ that A shall do a certain act, or simply that the act shall be done it is not perfectly clear whether A promises to do the act in question, or whether he will acquire a right against the other party only by doing that act. Argument is possible that the words mean both these things. As matter of construction, it seems better to favor bilateral contracts than unilateral, and in bilateral contracts better, where the meaning of the agreement is doubtful, to construe words as involving a promise by the party who is expected to do the act in question than as words of condition. Such a construction protects both parties to the transaction, and also does not involve the consequences that a slight failure to perform wholly destroys all rights under the contract. The law recognizes the propriety of this rule of construction.” Williston on Contracts, § 665.
In any event, we cannot say that the contract is free from ambiguity, and plainly imposes a condition. The fact that the four judges who have minutely examined this contract are in disagreement as to its meaning, is some indication that its meaning is obscure. If ambiguity exists, there are two rules of construction which are applicable. The first is that ambiguities are resolved against’ the insurer. Graham v. Business Men’s Assur. Co. (C. C. A. 10) 43 F.(2d) 673, and eases there cited. The second is well stated by. Mr. Williston:
“In determining such a question at the present time little stress would be laid on refinements; rather the court would endeavor to interpret the meaning of the words used according to general principles of interpretation. A special rule of construction was established by the early eases which still might have some weight in ease of ambiguity. If the performance which is urged to be a condition was also the subject-matter of a promise by the party from whom the performance was due, so that even though the words were not treated as words of condition there is a remedy to secure the performance of the aet, the construction will be favored that no condition is meant; while on the "other hand, if there will be no remedy to secure the performance of the aet in question, unless the words can take effect as words of condition, because the contract contains no promise to render the performance, the construction will be given that the words create a condition. ‘Courts are disinclined to construe the stipulations of a contract as conditions precedent, unless compelled by the language of the contract plainly expressed. The reason of this disinclination is that sueh a construction prevents the court from dealing out justice to the parties according to the equities of the case.’ ” Williston on Contracts, § 671.
“Because the enforcement of conditions frequently leads to forfeitures and penalties courts have always been indisposed to construe contracts as conditional, unless the language is .too clear to be mistaken; and have frequently disregarded plainly expressed conditions, because of their unwillingness to deprive a promisee of all rights on account of some trivial breach of condition.” Williston on Contracts, § 827.
We conclude that the agreement to give notice is not a condition upon the liability of the defendant.
[549]*549Treating the stipulation as to notice as a promise, and not a condition, is plaintiff’s breach thereof fatal to its recovery on defendant’s promise? The rules applicable to this question, in the case of ordinary contracts, are the subject of an entire chapter in Williston’s treatise on the Law of Contracts, e. 26. But one of those rules need be here noted, first stated by Lord Mansfield in Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bl. 273, in these words: “The distinction is very clear, where mutual eove>nants go to the whole of the consideration on both sides, they are mutual considerations, the one precedent to the other, but where they go only to a part, where a breach may be paid for in. damages, there the defendant has a remedy on his covenant, and shall not plead it as a condition precedent.”
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated the rule as follows: “The nonperformance on one side must go to the entire substance of the contract and to the whole consideration, so that it may safely be inferred as the intent and just construction of the contract that, if the act to be performed on the one side is not done, there is no consideration for the stipulations on the other side.” New Orleans v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 171 U. S. 312, 334, 18 S. Ct. 875, 883, 43 L. Ed. 178.
It cannot be eontended that the stipulation as to notice goes to the whole of the consideration moving to the surety company. The principal consideration for the agreement of the surety company was the payment of the premium. So it is that aleatory contracts — those where performance on the part of one is conditioned on a fortuitous event— are not governed by the rules applicable to ordinary contracts. In the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, the American Law Institute deals with the nonperformance of a counter promise in sections 261 to 284 (Topic C). It then deals with aleatory contracts in section 287 as follows:
“(1) The rules of Sections 261 to 284 (Topic C) are not applicable to a bilateral contract in which one promise is substantially aleatory or in which both promises are substantially aleatory but not conditional on the same fortuitous event; and, except as stated in Subsection (2), actual or prospective nonperformance by one party to sueh a contract does not discharge the other.
“(2) Either party to sueh a contract as is stated in Subsection (1) can, by giving notice of his intention to do so, rescind the contract, if
“(a) He has received no substantial benefit under the contract, and
“(b) It has not become more probable than when the contract was made that a fortuitous event will happen on which his duty to perform depends, and
“(c) There has been a material failure to perform the return promise or sueh prospective unwillingness or inability to perform as is stated in Sections 2.75 to 282.
“(3) If a contract is rescinded as permitted by the rule stated in Subsection (2), neither party thereafter has a right based on the other party’s promise.”
Essentially the same rule is laid down in Williston on Contracts, § 888, wherein it is stated that in sueh contracts the premium is paid for the risk — the promise and not the performance of it; therefore, performances are not contracted for as equivalent to one. another. The elements for rescission not being present, and no sueh relief asked for, we conclude that “the nonperformance by one party to such a contract does not discharge the other.”
It is strongly and persuasively urged that the surety company may suffer a real hardship unless this phrase is otherwise construed; that mighty oaks from Httle acorns grow; that a small default may grow into a large one, without knowledge of the surety company, and with no opportunity to protect itself. The danger is not a fancied one. On the other hand, hardship might be worked on the insured if it is construed as the surety company wishes; a single failure of the book company to report or remit in 1925, as required, might defeat liability for a theft in 1928, although the 1925 remittance was later made, and no harm came of it. But it is not a question of relative hardships. The surety company could have easily conditioned its liability on the giving of notice; the question is, Did it do so? We think it did not; its remedy therefore is to recoup any loss it suffered because of plaintiff’s breach. Its answer three times alleged that it was prejudiced by plaintiff’s breach; but it offered no evidence in support thereof. Presumably it could not prove that, under its rules and practices, it would have terminated its liability, returned premiums paid, and foregone premiums to come, because the book company was apparently honest but dilatory. No recovery was allowed on account of the failure to pay the sum of $3,804.79 admittedly due in May for books reported sold. The knowledge which plaintiff had was that the book company was tardy in remitting the cash for [550]*550books it reported as sold, and no recovery was allowed for this item; it is stipulated that plaintiff had no knowledge or suspicion of the default for which the recovery was had, the failure to account for books which it reported as on hand. Furthermore, the amount due for books reported sold had been reduced from $16,000 in 1928 to $3,800 in May of 1929. The trial court found no prejudice resulted from the failure to give notice of the default of which plaintiff had knowledge. In this action at law, that finding cannot be overturned.
Defendant assigns as error that the trial court declined to hold that plaintiff, by its conduct, had changed its relationship with the book company from one of trust to one of debtor and creditor. Defendant argues that all it guaranteed was “the safe and separate custody of money” and the books; that, by not objecting to the book company’s failure to remit on the day specified, the relationship became one of open credit not protected by the bond. This defense is not pleaded; however, the premise is unsupported by the facts. The bond describes the contract as one “including the safe custody of all moneys and proper remittance of the same, according to its terms;” but the description is inaccurate; no such provision is in the contract; on the contrary, it contemplates the relationship of debtor and creditor as soon as the books are sold.
Defendant then contends that its liability, if any, is not in excess of the penal sum of the bond, $20,000, less the dividends received by the plaintiff in bankruptcy. The parties stipulated “that the following books reported as on hand unsold were not actually recovered or accounted for” amounted to $24,377.01; that the dividends applicable to items involved in this controversy, are $6,-483.35. The judgment was for $17,890.66, whieh (excepting for a $3 error in subtraction) is the difference between the two. The court held the defendant for the loss which plaintiff suffered because the book company did not perform its contract. That is the bond. There is nothing in the bond concerning subrogation; if defendant had paid the entire loss, or had paid the penal sum of the bond, a question of. equitable subrogation would be presented. New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Bank (C. C. A. 8) 51 F.(2d) 485. It did neither. A contention is made in the briefs, but not mentioned in the answer or assignments of error, that the judgment should be reduced by $3,804.70, the cash balance due on May 1, 1929, for books reported as sold. The judgment does not include that sum. The parties have stipulated that there were $24,-377.01 of books “reported as on hand unsold.” This excludes the sum of $3,804.70, and all other items, for books reported as sold. The judgment was for $24,377.01, less the dividend. Since recovery has only been had for the value of books reported unsold, it cannot be decreased by the amount of cash due for books reported sold.
The judgment is affirmed.