The Robert W. Parsons

191 U.S. 17, 48 L. Ed. 73, 24 S. Ct. 8, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1495

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: October 26, 1903
• Docket: 16
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Brown,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case raises the question of the construction and constitutionality of the statutes of the State, of New York, giving a lien for repairs upon vessels, and providing for the enforcement of such lien by proceedings in rem. The statute conferring the lien, so far as it is material, is given in the margin.¹ It will be noticed that it expressly excludes liens founded upon maritime contracts.

That a State may provide for liens in favor of materialmen for necessaries furnished to a vessel in her home port, or in a port of the State to which she belongs, though the contract to furnish the same is a maritime contract,- and that such liens can be enforced by proceedings in rem in the District Courts of the United States, is so well settled by a series of cases in this court as to be no longer open to question. The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The Planter (Peyroux v. Howard), 7 Pet. 324; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522. The remedy thus administered by the admiralty court is exclusive. The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624; The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558; Johnson v. Chicago &c. Elevator Co., 119 U. S. 388, 397; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1, 12; The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; Poole v. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554. If there were any doubts regarding this question they were completely put to rest by the case of The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, in which it was distinctly held, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, that the enforcement in rem of a lien upon a vessel for repairs and supplies furnished in her home port, was exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.

'It is equally well established that for causes of action not cognizable in admiralty, either in rem or in 'personam, the States may not only grant liens, but may provide remedies for .their enforcement. Contracts for the building of a ship are the most prominent examples of such as are not maritime in their character, and hence within this rule. The Jefferson, 20 How. 393; The Capitol, 22 How. 129; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; Johnson v. Chicago &c. Elevator. Co., 119 U. S. 388; Sheppard v. Steele, 43 N. Y. 52.

It remains to consider whether the contract in this case, which was for repairs furnished to a canalboat in a port of the State to which-'she belonged, was a maritime contract. If it were, the position of the state courts was wrong. The denial of exclusive jurisdiction on the part of the admiralty court to enforce' this lien must rest upon one of two propositions: either because the cause of action arose upon an artificial canal, or because a canalboat is not- a ship or vessel contemplated by the maritime law, and within .the jurisdiction of the admiralty court.

1, At an early day; and following English precedents, it was held by this court in The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, that the admiralty courts could not rightfully exercise jurisdiction “except in cases where the service w;as substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.” The opinion is a brief one by Mr. Justice Story, and contains little more than the announcement of the general principle, and with no attempt to distinguish the English cases. It lacks wholly any display of the abundant learning which ten years before had characterized his celebrated opinion in De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398; S. C., Fed. Cas. No. 3776. The case was a strong one for the adoption of English precedents, as it concerned a voyage from a port in Kentucky up the Missouri River and back again to the same port. It was, however, flatly overruled in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, and the modern doctrine established, to which this court has consistently and invariably adhered, that not the ebb and flow of the tide, but the actual navigability of the waters is.the test of jurisdiction. It is true that case arose upon the Great Lakes, but the rule was subsequently extended to cases arising upon the rivers above the tidal effect. Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. 466; The Magnolia, 20 How. 296. In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, it was held that Grand River, a navigable water wholly within the State of Michigan, being. a stream, capable of bearing for a distance of forty miles a steamer of 123 tons burthen, and forming by its junction with Lake Michigan a continuous highway for commerce, both with other States and with foreign countries, was a navigable water of the United States, and the rule was broadly announced that "those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law, which are navigable in fact,” and that “they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries, in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.” The same principle was applied in The Montello, 20 Wall. 411, to the Fox River in Wisconsin, although its navigability was interrupted by rapids and falls over which portages were required to be made; and to Chicago River in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 See also Miller v. The Mayor, 109 U. S. 385; In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 8.

The only -distinction between canals and other navigable waters is that they are rendefed navigable by artificial means, •and sometimes, though by no means always, are wholly within the limits of a particular State. We fail to see, however, that this creates any distinction in principle. They are usually constructed to connect waters navigable by nature, and to avoid the portage of property from one navigable lake or river to another; or to improve or deepen a natural channel; and they are usually navigated by the same vessels which ply between the naturally navigable waters at either end of the canal. Examples of these are the St. Clair Ship Canal, connecting St. Glair River with the lake of the same name; the' St. Mary's Canal, connecting the waters of Lake Superior with those of Lake Hurón; the Illinois and Michigan Canal, connecting the waters of Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River; the Welland Canal, between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie; the Suez Canal, between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; the Great North Holland Canal, connecting Amsterdam directly with the German Ocean; and the Erie Canal, connecting Lake Erie with the Hudson River. Indeed, most of the harbors upon the lakes. and Atlantic coast are made accessible by canals wholly artificial, or by an artificial channel broadening and deepening their natural approaches. Can- it be possible that a cause of action which would be maritime, if occurring upon those connected waters, would cease to be maritime if arising upon the connecting waters? Must a collision which would give rise to a- suit in admiralty, if occurring upon Lake Ontario, or Lake Erie, be prosecuted at common law, if happening upon the Welland Canal? This question arose in this country in the case of The Avon, 1 Brown’s Ad. 170; S. C., Fed. Cas. 680, in which Judge Emmons, in a carefully considered opinion, took jurisdiction of a collision upon that canal, although it was wholly within British territory.. While this was with one exception, Scott v. Young American, Newberry’s Ad. 101, the earliest case in this country, it was no novelty in England, since in The Diana, Lush. 539; Dr. Lushington assumed jurisdiction of a collision between two British vessels in the Great North Holland • Canal, rejecting altogether the contention that the legislature did not intend to give the court jurisdiction over matters occurring in foreign territorial waters.. This jurisdiction has since been declared in England to extend to collisions between foreign vessels in the Bosphorus, The Mali Ivo, L. R. 2 Ad. & Ecc. 356; and in the Scheldt, The Halley, L. R. 2 Priv. Coun. 193. See also The Thomas Carroll, 23 Fed. Rep. 912; The Oler, 2 Hughes, 12; S. C., Fed Cas. 10,485; The E. M. McChesney; 8 Ben. 150; S. C., 15 Blatch. 183; Malony v. The City of Milwaukee, 1 Fed. Rep. 611; The General Cass, 1 Brown’s Ad. 334; S. C., Fed. Cas. 5307. The tidal Test was long since abolished by statute in England. 24 Vict, c. 10, May 17, 1861; Marsden on Collisions, 3d ed. 210.

Finally, in Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, such jurisdiction was held by- this court to extend to collisions between two canalboats' occurring in the Illinois and Lake Michigan Canal, Mr."Justice -Blatchford-observing that “navigable water sit- . uated as this canal is, used for the purposes for which it is used,a highway for commerce between ports and places in different States,, carried on by vessels such as those in'question here, is public water of the United States,, and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, even though the qanal is wholly within the body of a State and subject to its ownership-and control.” The case is the more noteworthy, from the 'fact that the canal was but sixty feet wide and six feet deep. It has never been overruled or questioned, and must be treated as settling the jurisdiction of the admiralty court over the waters of any artificial canal which is the means of communication between ports and places in different States and Territories. It is not intended here to intimate that if the waters, though navigable,' are. wholly territorial and used only for local traffic, such, for instance, as the interior lakes of the State of New York, they are to be considered as navigable-.waters of the United States. The Montello, 20 Wall. 411. In the case under consideration, however, the Erie Canal, though wholly within the State of New York; is a great highway of commerce between ports in different States and foreign-countries, and is navigated by vessels which also traverse the waters of Hudson River from the head of navigation to its mouth.

2. But the crucial question involved in this case is whether the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts attaches to canalboats — in other words, whether they are ships or vessels within the meaning of the admiralty law. If it- be once conceded, as for the reasons above given we think it must be, that navigable canals used as highways for interstate or foreign commerce are navigable waters of the United States, it would be an anomaly to hold that such jurisdiction did not attach to the only craft used in navigating such canals. It is true that, in the .more modern constructions, these canals are made wide and deep enough for the largest vessels; but it so happens that the Erie Canal was built at an early day, and was adapted only for vessels o\light draught and peculiar construction. The possibilities of the future were then scarcely foreseen, and even if they had been, the State was too poor to provide for anything beyond the immediate present.. For those purposes the canal was amply sufficient, and for twenty, years was the principal means of communication with the Northwest, and was net only the. highway over which all the merchandise was carried between the Hudson River and the Great Lakes; but was largely used for the transportation of passengers in the great Western immigration which immediately followed its construction. As late as 185.0. large and handsomely equipped passenger vessels were "run every day at stated-hours, and the canal continued to be, even after • the building of the railways, a favorite method of communication with the Great Lakes. While these boats were Vessels of. light draught, and were drawn by animal power, they were!;, from 150 to 300 tons capacity — larger than those out of which •arose the maritime law of modem Europe, and much larger' than those employed by Columbus and the earlier navigators in their discovery of the new world.- It is said by a writer in the Quarterly Review and quoted in Ben. Ad. Practice, sec. 220, that “ the first discoverers of America committed themselves to the unknown ocean in barks, one not above fifteen tons; Forbisher, in two vessels of twenty or twenty-five tons; Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in one of ten tons only.” -The ships in which the Vikings of Scandinavia invaded England, and ravaged the coasts of western Europe, (specimens of which are still preserved at Christiania,) were open boats, not exceeding 100 feet in length and 16 in breadth, and propelled partly by oars and partly by a single sail. In fact, neither size, form, equipment nor means of propulsion are determinative factors -upon the question of jurisdiction, which regards only the purpose for which the craft was constructed, and the business in which it is engaged.

The application of this criterion has ruled out the floating dry dock, the floating wharf, the ferry bridge hinged or chained toa wharf, the sailors’ Bethel moored to a wharf, Cope v. Valette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625; and a gas float moored as a beacon, The Whitton, L.R. 1895, P. 301; S. C., L. R. 1896, P. 42; S. C., L. R. 1897, A. C. 337.

But it has been held in England to include a fishing coble, a boat of ten tons burthen, twenty-four feet in length, decked forward only, though accustomed to go only twenty miles to sea, and to remain out twelve hours at a time, Ex parte Ferguson, L. R. 6 Q. B. 280; a barge, The Malvina, Lush. 493, affirmed on appeal, Brown & Lush. '57; though not a dumb barge, propelled by oars only, Everard v. Kendall, L. R. 5 C. P, 428; and in America to steamers of five tons burthen, engaged in carrying freight and passengers upon navigable waters, The Pioneer, 21 Fed. Rep. 426; The Ella B., 24 Fed. Rep. 508; The.Volunteer, 1 Brown’s Ad. 159, affirmed 15 Int. Rev. Rec. 59; a barge, without sails or rudder,- used for transporting grain, The Wilmington, 48 Fed. Rep. 566; a floating elevator, The Hezekiah Baldwin, 8 Ben. 556. See also The Northern Belle, 9 Wall. 526; The Alabama, 22 Fed. Rep. 449; Endner v: Greco, 3 Fed. Rep. 411.

Again, in Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, this court held the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to extend to a collision between two eanal’boats of more than twenty tons burthen, one of which was in tow and the other propelled by steam.. If the jurisdiction of the admiralty court in the case under consideration depends, as it must, upon the facts that the cause of action arose upon the canal, arid upon canalboats navigating such canal, the case of Boyer would seem to be decisive of this.

So far as the Congress of the United States and the. Parliament of England have incidentally spoken upon the subject, they have fixed a criterion of size as to what shall be considered a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction far below the tonnage of an ordinary canalboat. By the original Judiciary Act of 1789, section nine, 1 Stat. 73, c. 20, jurisdiction was given to the District Courts of all seizures made “on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten tons or more burthen;” and by the act of February 26, 1845, 5 Stat. c. 20, 726 (now obsolete), The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, admiralty jurisdiction was given to vessels navigating the Great Lakes and their connecting waters of twenty tons burthen and upwards. By section'4311, Rev. Stat., vessels of twenty tons and upwards, enrolled and licensed, and vessels of less than twenty tons, not enrolled but licensed, shall be deemed vessels of the United States; and by section 4520 all vessels of fifty tons or upwards are required to ship their seamen under writ1 ¿n articles. By ■the English Merchants’ Shipping Act of 1854, the word “ship shall include every description of vessel used in navigation, not propelled by oars;” and a similar description is given of vessels within the admiralty jurisdiction, in the Admiralty Court Act of 1861.

It seems, however, to be supposed that the fact that boats engaged in traffic upon the Erie Canal are drawn by horses is sufficient of itself to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts. This, however, is an argument which appeals less to the reason than-to the imagination. So long as the vessel is engaged in commerce and navigation it is difficult to see how the jurisdiction of admiralty is affected by its means of propulsion, which may vary in the course of the same voyage, or with new discoveries made in the art of navigation. Thus, canalboats, upon their arrival at Albany, ¿re at once relieved of their horses, and taken by a steamer in tow to New York or Jersey City. To hold that such boats are not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts, while on a trip down the Hudson River, would require us to overrule a large number of cases in this court, in which it was assumed by both parties and the court that for damages sustained by collision with other vessels they were entitled to pursue the wrongdoer in courts of admiralty. The Quickstep, 9 Wall. 665; The Syracuse, 12 Wall. 167; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302; The L. P. Dayton, 120 U. S. 337; The E. A. Packer, 140 U. S. 360. . But it would seem like sticking in the bark to hold that a canalboat might recover for a collision while in tow of a tug, but might not recover while in tow of a horse. The case does not raise the question whether hay and oats furnished the horses are necessaries within the meaning of the admiralty law, though a casuist might have difficulty in drawing a distinction between coal and oil furnished to one engine of propulsion and hay and oats to another, or between food furnished to a crew and food furnished to the horses.

Replying to the suggestion that, if jurisdiction were sustained of repairs upon a canalboat drawn' by horses, it would apply with equal propriety to a blacksmith’s bill for shoeing the horses, it is only necessary to say that, for incidental repairs made on land to articles of a ship’s furniture or machinery, it has never been supposed that a court of admiralty had jurisdiction. Indeed, it would seem extremely doubtful, if liens for these trivial bills were intended to be created by the state law. Articles removed from a vessel and repaired or renovated upon land at the shop of.the artisan, stand upon quite a different footing from repairs made upon the vessel herself, and are the subject, of a possessory lien at common law:

The.truth is, the present employment of horses.is a mere accident, and likely to be changed at any time by an enlargement of the canal, now in contemplation, when steam or electricity will probably supplant the present methods of locomotion. The modern law of England and America rules out of the admiralty jurisdiction all vessels propelled by oars, simply because they are the smallest class and beneath the dignity of a court of admiralty; but long within the historic period, and for at least seven hundred years, the triremes and quadriremes of the Greek and Roman navies were the largest and most powerful vessels afloat.

It is true the amount involved in this case is a small one, but the jurisdiction of the admiralty court has never been dew-mined by the amount, though appeals from the District Cour.t to the Supreme Court were first limited to cases involving $300, subsequently reduced to $50, and finally, by the Court of Appeals act, allowed apparently in all cases regardless of amount. So, also, cases may be brought under the patent and copyright laws, quite irrespective of the amounts involved.

3. As heretofore observed, the exclusive jurisdiction of the admiralty court in this case was attacked upon the grounds,; already discussed, that artificial canals and the vessels plying thereon are not within its jurisdiction. A further suggestion^ however, is made that the contract in this case was not only; made on land but was tó be performed on land, and was in fact performed on- land. This argument must necessarily rest* upon the assumption that repairs put upon a vessel while in dry dock are made upon land. We are unwilling to admit this proposition. A dock is an artificial basin in connection with a harbor, used for the reception of vessels in the taking on or discharging of their cargoes, and provided with gates for preventing the rise and fall of the waters occasioned by the tides, and keeping a uniform’level within the docks. A dry dock differs from an ordinary dock only in the fact that it is smaller, and provided with machinery for pumping out the water in order that the vessel may be repaired. All injuries suffered by the hulls of vessels below the water fine, by collision or stranding, must necessarily be repaired in a dry dock, to prevent the inflow of watei!, but it has never been supposed, and it is believed the proposition is now for the first time made, . that such repairs were made onjand, Had the vessel been hauled up by ways upon the land and there repaired a different question might have been presented, as to which we express no opinion; but as all serious'repairs upon the hulls of vessels are made in dry dock, the proposition that such repairs are made on land would practically deprive the' admiralty courts of their largest and most important jurisdiction in connection with repairs. No authorities are cited to this proposition and it is believed none such exist.

Suppose, for instance, it were believed that the repairs could' be made upon this vessel without going into dry dock, but it was afterward discovered that the injuries were more extensive and that a dry dock were necessary; would a court of admiralty therfeby be deprived of jurisdiction? Or, suppose such repairs were made in a floating dry dock, as sometimes happens, would they be considered as made upon land or water? Or, suppose they were made in dry dock upon a seagoing vessel?

There is no doubt of the proposition that a dry dock itself is not a subject of salvage service or of admiralty jurisdiction, because it is not used for the purpose of navigation. That was settled in Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625. But the case was put upon the express ground that a dry dock was like a ferry-bridge dr sailors’ floating meeting house, and was no more used for the purposes of navigation than a wharf' or a warehouse projecting into or upon the water.

4. Suggestion-is also made that the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts does hot extend, to contracts for the repair of vessels engaged wholly in commerce within a State. It is true that as- late as 1858, in The Fashion (Allen v. Newberry), 21 How. 244, it was held that, under the act of Congress of 1845,- extending jurisdiction of the Federal courts to vessels employed in navigation upon the Great Lakes, between ports and places in different States, it did not extend to the case of a shipment of goods from a port in one State to another port in the same State; and that in the case of The Goliah (McGuire v. Card), 21 How. 248, the same doctrine was extended to a contract for supplies furnished to a vessel engaged in trade between different ports in the State of California. These cases, however, were practically overruled by that of The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, in which a state statute, similar.to the statute of New York involved in this case, for a breach of contract of affreightment between ports in the same State, (Alabama,) was held to be unconstitutional and void, although the shipment was between ports of 'the same State. The contention was distinctly made (p. 635) that the state court had jurisdiction because the contract of affreightment was between ports and places in the same State, but it was as distinctly disclaimed by the court, and the prior cases practically overruled. So. also in Ex parte Boyer, 109 U. S. 629, the doctrine of The Belfast was reiterated and applied to a collision between canalboats, Mr. Justice Élatchford saying: “That it makes no difference as to the jurisdiction of the District Court, that one or the other of the vessels was at the time of the collision bñ a voyage from one place in the State of Illinois to another place in the same State.” To the same effect are The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; The Montello, 20 Wall. 411; The Commerce, 1 Black, 574, and Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541.

So, tooj in In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1; the limited liability act was field to be a part of the law of the United States,, enforceable upon navigable rivers above tide waters, and applicable to vessels engaged in commerce between ports in the same States. In' delivering the opinion Mr. Justice Bradley said (p. 15): “In some of the cases it was held distinctly that this jurisdiction does not depend upon the question of foreign or interstate commerce, but also exists where the voyage or contract,’ if maritime in character, is made and is to be performed wholly within a single State” — citing all the cases noticed in this opinion.

In The E. M. McChesney, 8 Ben. 150, Judge Blatchford-, more recently of this court, sustained a libel against a canal-boat for non-delivery of a cargo shipped on a canalboat in Buffalo to be carried to New York. In that case, as in this* it was contended that neither the canal nor the canalboat were subjects of the admiralty jurisdiction. The case is directly in point.

It is believed that since the case of The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, the distinction has never been admitted between contracts concerning vessels engaged in trade between ports of the same and between ports of different States. Of course, nothing herein said is intended to trench upon the common law jurisdiction of the state- courts, which is, and always has been, expressly saved to. suitors “where the common law is competent to give it.” Rev.Stat. sec. 563,sub. 8.. By that law-an action will always he against the master 'or owner of the vessel, and, if the laws of the State permit it, the vessel may be attached as the property of the defendant in the case. But, as remarked by Mr. Justice' Miller in The-Hine v: Trevor, 4 Wall. 655, 571: A statute providing that a. vessel may be sued and made defendant without any proceeding against the owners, or even mentioning their names, partakes of all the essential features of an admiralty proceeding in rem, of which exclusive jurisdiction is given to the District Courts of the United States.' See also The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 427, wherein it is said: “The action against the boat by name, authorized by the statute of California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic’ feature of such suit is that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly.” .

In The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, a proceeding was taken in a state court in Alabama for the enforcement óf a hen for the loss- of certain cotton. The statute was, in its essentials, a reproduction of the. New York Statute' under consideration.' Plaintiffs contended that, admitting the admiralty courts had jurisdiction,. the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction' to afford the parties the same remedies. It was held that state legislatures had no authority to create a maritime lien, or to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practiced in the admiralty courts.

In all these cases the distinction is sharply drawn between a common law action in personam with a concurrent attachment against the goods and chattels of the defendant, subject, of course, to any existing hens, and a proceeding in rem against the vessel as the debtor or “offending thing,” which is the- characteristic of a suit in admiralty. The same distinction is carefully preserved in the general admiralty rules prescribed by this court; rule second declaring that in suits in personam the mesne process may be “by a warrant of arrest of the person' of the defendant, with a clause therein that if he- cannot be found, to attach his goods and chattels to the amount sued for;” and. rule nine, that in suits and proceedings in rem the process shall.be by warrant of arrest of the ship, goods or other things to be arrested, with public notice to be given in the newspapers. The former is in strict analogy to a common law proceeding and is a concurrent remedy. The latter is a. proceeding distinctively maritime, of which exclusive jurisdiction is given to the admiralty courts. That the New York statute belongs to the latter class is evident from the code, by which, upon written application to a justice of the Supreme Court,- a warrant is issued for the seizure of the vessel, and for an order to show cause why it should not be sold to satisfy the lien. The warrant in this case recites “that an application had been made to me . . . for a warrant to enforce a lien against the canalboat or vessel called Rob’t W. Parsons,” and commands-the sheriff “to seize and safely keep said canalboat to satisfy said claim ... as above set forth, to be a lien upon said vessel according to law.” The proceeding authorized by the New York statute in question-was held to be in tijie nature of a suit in admiralty in The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19, and Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554. The proceeding is also similar to that provided by the laws of Massachusetts, which, in the case of The Glide, 167 U. S. 606, was held to be, as to repairs and supplies in the home port, exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts. ■ • '

As section 30 of the' New York statute excludes a debt which is not a lien by the maritime law, and Code § 3419, providing for their enforcement, also excludes liens founded upon a maritime' contract, we think the state courts were in error in enforcing -this lien, thereby holding that a contract for the repair of a canalboat while lying in the Erie Canal was not a maritime contract, and' that the statute so construed is pro tanto unconstitutional.

The judgment of the court below must, therefore, be reversed, and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of New York for further'proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.