REVISED, March 9, 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit
___________________________
No. 97-30008 ___________________________
ARABIE J. MANUEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
P.A.W. DRILLING & WELL SERVICE, INC.; WESTWOOD INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Louisiana ___________________________________________________ March 2, 1998
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Arabie J. Manuel appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his employer, P.A.W. Drilling & Well Service, Inc., and
its insurer dismissing Manuel’s action on the ground that he was
not a seaman because the barge upon which he worked was not a
vessel. We reverse, render, and remand.
I.
Arabie Manuel began his employment with P.A.W. Drilling & Well
Service, Inc. (“P.A.W.”) in June of 1995, approximately two months
before his alleged injury. Manuel worked during these two months
as a floorhand on a workover rig identified as “Rig 3.” Rig 3
consisted of a portable truck-mounted workover rig owned by P.A.W. that was driven onto the deck of a leased barge and bolted into
place. The summary judgment evidence established that the workover
rig had been bolted to this particular barge for more than two
years. The leased flat-deck barge was equipped with spuds used to
secure the barge to the water bottom once it reached the worksite.
Rig 3 had no motor power and was moved by tugboat from
location to location. The barge itself did not contain any
steering mechanisms, navigational devices, bilge pumps, or crew
quarters, except for a small shed in which the crew changed
clothes. The barge had a keyway in its stern to allow the barge to
be positioned over the wellhead. As a workover rig, Rig 3 was
equipped with essentially the same type of equipment as a drilling
rig. This included a derrick with traveling block, a drawworks-
type winch to run the traveling block up and down the derrick, a
driller’s console, a mud pump and mud tank, a cement unit for
pumping cement into wells, and a crane. P.A.W. used Rig 3
primarily to plug and abandon wells.
Rig 3's crew consisted of four men: a toolpusher, a driller,
and two floorhands. The crew did not live aboard Rig 3. Each
morning, a small boat picked up the crew at a dock and transported
them to wherever Rig 3 was located. Upon arriving on Rig 3, the
crew would raise the derrick and anchor the barge by dropping the
spuds. Each evening, the transport boat would return the men to
land, where they slept in lodgings provided by P.A.W. The crew
usually did not remain on Rig 3 while it was under tow to a
different location.
In the two years before August of 1995, Rig 3 worked at 19
2 different locations, all over water. It performed work on 63
different wellheads.1 Work on each wellhead lasted anywhere from
one day to thirty-five days. In the two months from June to August
of 1995 that Manuel spent working for P.A.W., Rig 3 worked on
several sites near Avery Island, Amelia, and Cut Off, Louisiana.
On August 6, 1995, Rig 3 was performing a plug and abandon job on
a well near Cut Off, Louisiana. The crew was running production
tubing in and out of the well to pump cement and mud into the well.
Manuel allegedly hurt his back when he and a co-worker, Lionel
Leblanc, attempted to pick up a joint of tubing that had fallen
from the barge.
In November of 1995, Manuel filed suit against P.A.W. and its
insurer under the Jones Act, 46 App. U.S.C. § 688, and the general
maritime law to recover for his injuries. Manuel alleged that he
was a member of the crew of Rig 3. Both Manuel and P.A.W. filed
motions for summary judgment addressing Manuel’s status as a
seaman. P.A.W. argued that Rig 3 was not a vessel as a matter of
law, and, therefore, Manuel’s Jones Act claim failed because he
could not establish that he was assigned to a vessel in navigation.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of P.A.W. and
dismissed all of Manuel’s claims. This appeal followed.
II.
A.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d
1 Several of these locations had multiple wellheads. Rig 3 was either towed, or, if the wellheads were located close together, maneuvered over each wellhead to perform its work.
3 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1995). We determine whether all of “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). We view this evidence and the inferences to be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Pavone, 52 F.3d
at 565.
B.
To recover as a seaman under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an “employment-related connection to a vessel in
navigation.” Chandris Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368-72, 115 S.
Ct. 2172 (1995). This “employment-related connection” has two
basic elements: First, an employee’s duties must contribute to the
function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.
Second, the connection to the vessel in navigation must be
substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature.
Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368-69. Obviously, the existence of a vessel
to which the employee is connected is a fundamental prerequisite to
a Jones Act claim. Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176
(5th Cir. 1995). The sole issues in this appeal are whether the
district court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that Rig 3
was not a vessel and, therefore, that Manuel was not a seaman.
C.
A “vessel” traditionally refers to structures designed or
utilized for “transportation of passengers, cargo or equipment from
place to place across navigable waters.” Cook v. Belden Concrete
4 Prods., 472 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Bernard v.
Binnings Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 824, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1984);
1B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 11a, at 2-7 (7th ed. rev. 1996); GRANT GILMORE
& CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-11, at 33 (2d ed. 1975).
This is consistent with the statutory definition which defines the
word “vessel” as including “every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a
means of transportation on water.” 1 U.S.C. § 3. The
determination of whether a given craft is a vessel is ordinarily
resolved as a matter of law. Our cases have recognized, however,
that at the margin, fact issues may be presented. See Ducote v. V.
Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000, 1002 (5th Cir. 1992) (“marginal
claims are properly left for jury determination”); Gremillion v.
Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1990);
Bernard, 741 F.2d at 829.
In evaluating whether a structure is a vessel, we begin by
examining “the purpose for which the craft is constructed and the
business in which it is engaged.” The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S.
17, 30, 24 S. Ct. 8, 12 (1903); see also Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176.
In applying this test, two divergent lines of cases have emerged.
In one line of cases, we have concluded that special purpose
structures such as jack-up rigs, mobile, submersible drilling
barges, derrick barges, spud barges, and others are vessels as a
matter of law, even though they also served, in part, as work
platforms.2 Conversely, in the second line of cases, we have held
2 See, e.g., Mouton v. Tug “Ironworker”, 811 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1987); Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817
5 that a variety of structures utilized predominately as work
platforms are not vessels.3
1.
In a long line of cases, we have held a variety of special
purpose structures, far removed from the conventional notion of
ships and seagoing barges, to be vessels.4 As previously stated,
“unconventional craft [such] as submersible drilling barges and
floating dredges which are designed for navigation and commerce are
vessels within general maritime and Jones Act jurisdiction and
retain such status even while moored, dry-docked, or otherwise
immobilized and secured to land.” Cook, 472 F.2d at 1001. A
review of the development of this line of cases follows.
The seminal case of Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769
(1959), addressed whether workers attached to “special purpose
structures” used in the oil and gas industry were “seamen” under
the Jones Act. The structure at issue was a drilling rig mounted
on a mobile drilling barge. The barge was towed from location to
location and was equipped with retractable legs which could be
lowered to the ocean floor in order to lift the barge above the
water to serve as a platform from which drilling operations were
(5th Cir. 1975); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966). 3 See, e.g., Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 1995); Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Watkins v. Pentzien, Inc., 660 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1981). 4 See Colomb v. Texaco, Inc., 736 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1984); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (1959).
6 conducted. The court held that the term “vessel” had a “wide range
of meaning” under the Jones Act, and, therefore, genuine issues of
fact existed regarding whether the drilling barge qualified as a
“vessel.” Id. at 779-80.
In Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.
1966), the plaintiff was injured while working on a submersible
drilling barge. This barge, equipped with all of its drilling
equipment and supplies, was towed from one location to another.
Once at the drilling site, the barge was submerged to the bottom of
the body of water to conduct its drilling operation, and then
refloated to be moved to another location. The court concluded
that the barge was a vessel as a matter of law. Id. at 437. Since
Producers Drilling, this Court has generally held that special
purpose drilling craft are vessels as a matter of law.5
The same analysis has been applied to other types of special
purpose craft. In Brunet v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., Inc., 715 F.2d
196 (5th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff was injured on a barge that
consisted of several interlocking flexi-float platforms that
carried a crane to drive pilings. The barge was moored by cable to
pilings at the time of the accident. The court overturned the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, finding that the “barge by necessity is designed to
transport a pile-driving crane across navigable waters to jobsites
that cannot be reached by land-based pile-drivers.” Id. at 198.
5 See, e.g., Colomb v. Texaco, Inc., 736 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases); Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 640 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1981); Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975).
7 Mobility over navigable waters was one of the barge’s features and
the barge lacked the “Cook similarity to dry docks or construction
platforms.” Id. The barge was designed both to support the crane
and to transport it on a fairly regular basis from one jobsite to
another. Id. at 198-99. Thus, the court concluded that the
transportation function was not so incidental as to “warrant a
conclusion that the barge was not a vessel as a matter of law.”
Id.; see also Sharp v. Johnson Bros. Corp., 917 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1990) (reversing summary judgment because fleet of barges had more
than incidental transportation function).
The above cases are typical of the numerous “special purpose
vessel” cases this Circuit has decided. They exhibit a common
theme: Despite the outward appearance of the structure at issue,
if a primary purpose of the craft is to transport passengers,
cargo, or equipment from place to place across navigable waters,
then that structure is a vessel.6 In the special purpose craft
cases, particularly the drilling barge cases, the transportation
function of the structure was more than merely incidental to its
purpose. Each craft was used as a work platform when its crew
drilled for oil and gas. However, before the crew could drill, the
barge was used to transport its specialized drilling equipment over
water to the drilling site.
6 See Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992); Ducote v. V. Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1992) (planned extensive movement a factor that would support jury’s finding of vessel status); Vickers v. Chiles Drilling Co., 822 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1987); Mouton v. Tug “Ironworker”, 811 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1987); Colomb v. Texaco, Inc., 736 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1984); Burks v. American River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982).
8 2.
Another line of cases developed in this Circuit concludes that
certain structures that float upon the water are not vessels. The
clearest examples of such floating craft that do not qualify as
vessels are dry docks and similar structures that maritime law has
never considered, at least while secured to land, to be vessels.
Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., Inc., 472 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (5th
Cir. 1973); see also Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411
F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969). In Cook, the structure at issue was a
large flat-deck barge upon which the defendant’s employees
fabricated concrete barges. The barge was secured to the
defendant’s dock and had the effect of extending the dock’s work
area. The barge was moved infrequently, primarily to launch the
newly constructed concrete barges. This Court, relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S.
625, 7 S. Ct. 336 (1887), concluded that the barge was a
construction platform not designed for the transportation of
passengers, cargo, or equipment across navigable waters, and that
“the status of the craft [was] governed by the proposition that,
‘as a matter of law, a floating dry dock is not a vessel when it is
moored and in use as a dry dock.’” Id. at 1002 (citations
omitted). The barge in question was merely an extension of the
dock. See also Watkins v. Pentzien, Inc., 660 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that two barges fastened together, moored to bank of
river, and used to weld pipeline together were not vessels);
Leonard v. Exxon Corp., 581 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
platform consisting of four flat-deck barges moored to banks of
9 Mississippi River “more or less permanently” by steel cables was
not a vessel).
Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 824 (5th Cir.
1984), addressed the question of whether a “work punt” which the
plaintiff used to guide sheet pilings to construct a flood wall
qualified as a vessel. The work punt was a floating iron platform
measuring sixteen feet long and four feet wide with a tank in the
middle and at each end for buoyancy. The parties stipulated that
the work punt was “used solely as a small platform from which to
break the cement and guide the sheet pilings” while men on the
shore lowered the sheet pilings into position. Id. at 826. The
plaintiff paddled short distances to get the work punt into
position. At the time of his injury, the plaintiff was standing
with one foot on the work punt and one foot on a brace connecting
two pilings. Id. at 826. Synthesizing the line of cases in our
Circuit that developed in the wake of Cook, the court stated that
[a] review of these decisions indicates three factors common to them: (1) the structures involved were constructed and used primarily as work platforms; (2) they were moored or otherwise secured at the time of the accident; and (3) although they were capable of movement and were sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of normal operations, any transportation function they performed was merely incidental to their primary purpose of serving as work platforms.
Id. at 831. From this, the court concluded that the work punt was
not a vessel because it was not designed for navigation and it did
not have any significant transportation function. Id. at 832.
Several of our cases have followed this reasoning. See, e.g.,
Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that shoreside quarterboat barge serving as floating hotel
10 was not a vessel); Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that floating barge moored to shore, remaining in
same place for approximately seven years, and used as work platform
to clean and strip cargo and gas from barges was not a vessel);
Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enters., Inc., 877 F.2d 393 (5th
Cir. 1989) (holding that barge moored to the shore and used as a
stationary work platform to clean other barges was not a vessel).
P.A.W. argues that our decision in Ellender v. Kiva Constr. &
Eng’g., Inc., 909 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1990), controls, and leads to
the conclusion that Rig 3 was a work platform and not a vessel. In
Ellender, the plaintiff was assigned to a job constructing an
offshore platform containing oil production equipment, tanks, and
adjacent flow lines. A flotilla of four barges was engaged in this
work, including a spud barge and three other general purpose barges
tied to the spud barge. Once in position, Kiva anchored the
flotilla of barges by lowering the spuds on the spud barge. The
spud barge was equipped with a crane that was used to drive pilings
to construct the platform. Tugs moved the barges several feet on
occasion to reposition them in order to drive a new set of pilings.
The plaintiff was injured while working on the spud barge.
The court concluded that “the four-barge platform assembly
which included the ATHENA 3 [the spud barge] clearly was not a
Jones Act vessel at the time that [the plaintiff] suffered his
accident.” Ellender, 909 F.2d at 807. The structure was built
“primarily to serve as a work platform.” Id. The court found that
any transportation function was incidental to its use as a work
11 platform. Id.7
We conclude our discussion of the work platform cases by
recalling their origin.8 In Cook, we held that the work platform
was analogous to a dry dock. The work platform, like the dry dock,
is considered an extension of land. Carrying “passengers, cargo,
or equipment” from place to place across navigable waters is not
central to its purpose so that it is not routinely exposed to the
hazards of such travel.
D.
With this background, we now consider what conclusions can
properly be drawn from the above cases. We start from the bedrock
premise that in determining what is a vessel, we ask what is the
“purpose for which the craft is constructed and the business in
which it is engaged.” The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 30, 24
7 The court’s conclusion that the flotilla’s transportation function was merely incidental to its work was driven by two factors. First, the job constructing the platform was the single assignment for this flotilla. The flotilla did not travel from location to location as Rig 3 was assigned to do. Second, we infer from the facts stated in the opinion that the job was relatively close to shore and an insignificant amount of the flotilla’s time was devoted to movement of the equipment and materials to the jobsite. The flotilla was engaged almost exclusively in performing construction work. 8 We must also note that many of our work platform cases were decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 112 S. Ct. 486 (1991), where the Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed “regarding whether the floating platforms [upon which plaintiff worked] were vessels in navigation” and whether the plaintiff had a sufficient connection to these platforms to qualify as a seaman. Id. at 494. The floating platforms consisted of a pontoon barge, two float barges, a rail barge, a diver’s barge, and a crane barge. None of the barges had means of steering, navigation lights or aids, living facilities, or motor power. The barges were moved around the shipyard by tugboat and were used to transport equipment, materials, supplies, and vessel components around the shipyard and on to and off of the vessels under repair. Id. at 489.
12 S. Ct. 8, 12 (1903). If the owner constructs or assembles a craft
for the purpose of transporting passengers, cargo, or equipment
across navigable waters and the craft is engaged in that service,
that structure is a vessel. In many cases, the purpose for which
the craft is constructed or assembled can be inferred from the use
to which the craft is put by the owner. For example, in the case
at hand, P.A.W. assembled Rig 3 for the purpose of transporting the
workover rig across navigable waters to plug and abandon wells
located in various sites on navigable waters. In the occasional
case where the intended purpose of the craft is not clear, our
cases have recognized that other factors may be relevant. These
include the intention of the owner to move the structure on a
regular basis and the length of time that the structure has
remained stationary. Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 293. “Objective
vessel features” such as navigational aids, a raked bow, lifeboats
and other lifesaving equipment, bilge pumps, crew quarters, and
Coast Guard registration may also be relevant in determining an
owner’s purpose in constructing or assembling a craft. Bernard,
741 F.2d at 832 n.25.
The second prong of our inquiry, the business in which the
craft is engaged, is usually the most difficult. Here, evaluating
the importance of the craft’s transportation function is the key to
determining the craft’s status. In all of our work platform cases,
the transportation function of the craft at issue was merely
incidental to its primary purpose of serving as a work platform.9
9 Indeed, in the vast majority of these work platform cases, the structure at issue was moored or otherwise fastened in a more or less permanent manner to either the shore or the water bottom.
13 Conversely, where the use of the craft in transporting passengers,
cargo, or equipment was an important part of the business in which
the craft was engaged, we have found that craft to be a vessel,
even if it also served as a work platform. For example, our
drilling rig cases recognize the premise that a vessel can serve
the dual function of transporting cargo, equipment, or persons
across navigable waters and acting as a work platform. Colomb, 736
F.2d at 220-21; see also Brunet, 715 F.2d at 198-99 (crane barge
was designed both to support crane and to transport it on fairly
regular basis from jobsite to jobsite). These drilling rigs and
other special purpose craft do more than merely float on navigable
waters and serve as work platforms. Instead, an important part of
their function includes transporting passengers, cargo, or
equipment across navigable waters.
III.
We turn now to apply these conclusions to the summary judgment
evidence produced in this case to determine whether the district
court correctly ruled that Rig 3 was not a vessel as a matter of
law. Because we find Rig 3 indistinguishable from special purpose
craft such as submersible drilling barges and jack-up rigs that
this Court has previously found to be vessels, we conclude that the
district court erred in finding that Rig 3 was not a vessel as a
matter of law. See, e.g., Colomb, 736 F.2d at 220 (submersible
drilling barge); Vickers v. Chiles Drilling Co., 822 F.2d 535 (5th
See, e.g., Burchett, 48 F.3d at 174; Daniel, 892 F.2d at 405; Watkins, 660 F.2d at 606.
14 Cir. 1987) (jack-up rig). The “purpose for which the craft was
constructed” is clear. The evidence established that Rig 3 was
assembled to transport the workover rig and its attendant equipment
from place to place across navigable waters to service wells
located in navigable waters.
As for the “business in which it was engaged,” Rig 3 was
plugging and abandoning old wells situated at various locations in
navigable waters. The transportation function of Rig 3 was not
merely incidental. Rig 3's mobility was essential to the work it
was designed and built to perform. It was a highly mobile, self-
contained unit equipped with most of the equipment found on a
drilling rig. The mobility of Rig 3 allowed it to service wells
located in various places on navigable waters. Rig 3 did more than
merely float or move upon navigable waters: It transported all of
the necessary equipment across navigable waters to each location.
While Rig 3 did serve as a work platform when stationed over
wellheads, this does not detract from the importance of its
transportation function. Other special purpose craft such as
submersible drilling barges, jack-up rigs, and spud barges remain
stationary while performing work, yet retain their vessel status.
See, e.g., Ducote, 953 F.2d at 1003-04; Colomb, 736 F.2d at 221.
Like the barge in Brunet, Rig 3 was designed both to support the
workover rig and to transport it on a regular basis from one
jobsite to another. See Brunet, 715 F.2d at 198-99.
P.A.W. argues that Rig 3 lacks features that objectively
suggest that one of its primary purposes was transportation over
water. These features include: navigational aids; a raked bow;
15 lifeboats and other lifesaving equipment; bilge pumps; crew
quarters; and registration with the Coast Guard as a vessel.
Bernard, 741 F.2d at 832 n.25; see also Johnson v. ODECO Oil and
Gas Co., 864 F.2d 40, 43 (5th Cir. 1989). We have cautioned
however that these factors are not to be “applied mathematically”
and are only “useful guides.” Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 294 n.9.
These factors alone are not determinative of vessel status. See,
e.g., Pavone, 52 F.3d at 564 (casino boat with vessel features held
not a vessel); Burchett, 48 F.3d at 175-77 (midstream bulk cargo
transfer barge with raked bow, anchor lights, lifesaving equipment,
and radar held not a vessel); Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 294
(quarterboat having several vessel features held not a vessel).
Given the undisputed evidence in this case that P.A.W. assembled
Rig 3 with a primary purpose that it be used to transport the
workover rig and other necessary equipment from place to place
across navigable waters, reliance on the lack of objective “vessel
features” is misplaced.
In sum, the summary judgment evidence clearly reveals both
“the purpose for which the craft [was] constructed and the business
in which it [was] engaged.” P.A.W. assembled Rig 3 as a highly
mobile unit to plug and abandon wells at various locations in
navigable waters. Consistent with this purpose, Rig 3 was engaged
in the business of plugging and abandoning these wells located in
navigable waters. The summary judgment evidence demonstrated that
transporting the necessary equipment from location to location
across navigable waters was essential to Rig 3's work. Rig 3 is,
therefore, a vessel as a matter of law, and the district court
16 erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.
Because it found that Rig 3 was not a vessel as a matter of
law, the district court did not consider whether Manuel satisfied
the other requisite for seaman status--a substantial employment-
related connection to a vessel in navigation. Chandris, 515 U.S.
at 368. Ordinarily, seaman status is a fact-specific inquiry
better left to the province of the jury. Ducote, 953 F.2d at 1002;
see also Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779-80 (5th Cir.
1959). However, “[w]hen the underlying facts are established, and
the rule of law is undisputed, the issue is whether the facts meet
the statutory standard.” McDermott Int’l. v. Wilander, 498 U.S.
337, 356, 111 S. Ct 807 (1991).
The summary judgment evidence established that Manuel was
assigned to and worked aboard Rig 3 the entire two months he worked
for P.A.W. Also, it is undisputed that Manuel’s duties contributed
to the function of Rig 3. P.A.W.’s argument that Manuel does not
have the requisite connection to a vessel is limited to the
assertion that the possibility that Manuel could have been assigned
to other work locations renders his assignment to Rig 3 less than
permanent. This argument is seriously flawed. In Chandris, the
Supreme Court makes it clear that the adequacy of the plaintiff’s
connection to a vessel is properly assessed on the basis of his
work assignment at the time of his injury:
Such a person should not be denied seaman status if injured shortly after the reassignment [to a vessel], just as someone actually transferred to a desk job in the company’s office and injured in the hallway should not be entitled to claim seaman status on the basis of prior service at sea.
17 Chandris, 515 U.S. at 372. At the time of his injury, Manuel was
assigned to work aboard a vessel in navigation. The fact that
Manuel was subject to reassignment by P.A.W. at some later time is
of no moment. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Chandris,
“[w]hen a maritime worker’s basic assignment changes, his seaman
status may change as well.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 372. Manuel’s
basic assignment never changed; he remained assigned to Rig 3 for
the entire two months leading up to his injury. Therefore, we
conclude that Manuel satisfies Chandris’ two-prong test for seaman
status as a matter of law.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district
court erred when it concluded that Rig 3 was not a vessel as a
matter of law. Also, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that
Manuel had a substantial “employment-related connection” to Rig 3,
a vessel in navigation, and was a seaman as a matter of law.
Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to P.A.W. and RENDER judgment, granting Manuel’s motion
for summary judgment on seaman status. We REMAND this case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED, RENDERED, and REMANDED.