HOFFMAN, Judge.
This is an action for declaratory judgment brought against the City of South [848]*848Bend et al. (City) by retired policemen and firemen and the widows of former policemen and firemen of the City (collectively referred to as Retirees) to recover additional pension benefits for the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive. Police retirees were seeking the difference between the pension benefits already paid and those payable if the pension base had been calculated according to the monthly wage paid to a corporal. Fire retirees sought a similar recomputation based on the monthly salary of an engineer.
In general the trial court found that police pensions had been properly computed on the basis of the salary paid to a first-class patrolman and fire pensions had been properly computed on the basis of the salary paid to a first-class fireman. The court also found that during the years in question corporals on the force were not first-class patrolmen nor were engineers on the fire department first-class firemen. It further found that corporals and engineers were paid by rank and not by length of service. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the City.
The issues raised by this appeal are:
(1) whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous;
(2) whether the trial court erred in rejecting the Retirees’ offer to read into evidence statements made by the City in response to certain motions to produce; and
(3) whether the trial court improperly rejected the Retirees’ offer of Exhibit 4 into evidence.
Retirees assail the findings of fact and conclusions of law as being clearly erroneous. They insist that the only difference between a corporal and a first-class patrolman and an engineer and a first-class fireman is that the corporals and engineers receive additional pay based on length of service. It is suggested that the titles of corporal and engineer were created so that the City would not have to include longevity pay in the computation of pension benefits.
The findings or judgment of the trial court will be found clearly erroneous only when on the entire record the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. University Casework Systems, Inc. v. Bahre (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 155.
The record discloses that on July 28,1969 the Board of Public Works and Safety (Board) adopted a resolution establishing a salary schedule for the City’s police and fire departments which included corporals and engineers. During the years in question the South Bend Police Department rank structure included in decreasing order of salary: (1) chief; (2) division chief; (3) captain; (4) lieutenant; (5) sergeant; (6) corporal; (7) first-class patrolman; (8) patrolman; and (9) officer-in-training. Throughout these same years the rank structure of the South Bend Fire Department included in decreasing order of salary: (1) chief; (2) assistant chief; (3) battalion chief; (4) captain; (5) lieutenant; (6) engineer; (7) fireman first-class; (8) fireman; and (9) fireman-in-training. In both departments, each member of a particular rank received the same salary as all other members of that rank. From the budget requests and pay ordinances it is apparent that as an individual advanced in rank his salary increased. Furthermore, there were varying numbers of policemen who were first-class patrolmen and policemen who were corporals. Similarly, there were varying numbers of firemen who were first-class firemen and firemen who were engineers. A comparison of statistics compiled by the City shows the following:
Firemen First Class Engineers
1969 131 0
1970 7 153
1971 32 142
1972 28 133
1973 35 143
1974 30 134
1975 23 165
Patrolmen Corporals
1968 68 0
1969 46 0
1970 20 66
1971 33 60
1972 41 57
1973 41 64
1974 51 72
1975 29 74
[849]*849It was also established that promotions were not automatic. After five years of service first-class patrolmen and firemen became eligible for promotion to the respective ranks of corporal and engineer. The first step in attaining such a promotion was to obtain a recommendation from the police or fire chief. However, if the chief determined that an individual’s general performance did not warrant a promotion, it was within his power to withhold any recommendation. In fact four or five first-class patrolmen were not recommended for promotion to the rank of corporal. If a recommendation was obtained then the Board could approve the promotion by resolution and order. Nevertheless the Board was authorized to reject any recommendation from the chiefs.
In light of this evidence, it must be concluded that the findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. The record reveals that salaries were paid by rank and not by length of service. No first-class patrolman or fireman was automatically entitled to a promotion after five years of service. The fact that very few patrolmen or firemen were denied promotions may indicate that the City considered their respective forces to be of a high caliber. It certainly does not lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the City’s purpose in creating the ranks of corporal and engineer was to circumvent the pension laws.
IC 1971,19-1-24-3 (Burns Code Ed.) provides generally that police pensions shall be computed on the basis of the monthly salary of a first-class patrolman. IC 1971, 19-1-37-14 (Burns Code Ed.) provides that fire pensions are to be based on the monthly pay of a first-class fireman. The City acted in accordance with these statutes. To the extent that Retirees believe their pensions ought to be computed on the basis of the salary paid to corporals or engineers, their recourse lies with the Legislature. Here Retirees failed to sustain their burden of proof that corporals and engineers were the same as first-class patrolmen and firemen.
Retirees also contend that the findings were erroneous because: (1) ultimate facts and not evidentiary facts should be set out in the findings of fact; (2) the findings contained conclusions of law; and (3) facts missing in the findings cannot be supplied by the conclusions of law. This contention was disposed of by In re Marriage of Miles (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 171 where the court opined:
“It is the stated purpose of our trial rules to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. To that end TR 52 must be construed as abolishing the old highly technical, distinctions and treacherous consequences which attended the consideration of whether a ‘finding’ was an evidentiary fact, an ultimate fact, a conclusion of fact or a conclusion of law.” (Footnote omitted.) 362 N.E.2d at 174.
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HOFFMAN, Judge.
This is an action for declaratory judgment brought against the City of South [848]*848Bend et al. (City) by retired policemen and firemen and the widows of former policemen and firemen of the City (collectively referred to as Retirees) to recover additional pension benefits for the years 1970 to 1975, inclusive. Police retirees were seeking the difference between the pension benefits already paid and those payable if the pension base had been calculated according to the monthly wage paid to a corporal. Fire retirees sought a similar recomputation based on the monthly salary of an engineer.
In general the trial court found that police pensions had been properly computed on the basis of the salary paid to a first-class patrolman and fire pensions had been properly computed on the basis of the salary paid to a first-class fireman. The court also found that during the years in question corporals on the force were not first-class patrolmen nor were engineers on the fire department first-class firemen. It further found that corporals and engineers were paid by rank and not by length of service. Accordingly, judgment was entered in favor of the City.
The issues raised by this appeal are:
(1) whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous;
(2) whether the trial court erred in rejecting the Retirees’ offer to read into evidence statements made by the City in response to certain motions to produce; and
(3) whether the trial court improperly rejected the Retirees’ offer of Exhibit 4 into evidence.
Retirees assail the findings of fact and conclusions of law as being clearly erroneous. They insist that the only difference between a corporal and a first-class patrolman and an engineer and a first-class fireman is that the corporals and engineers receive additional pay based on length of service. It is suggested that the titles of corporal and engineer were created so that the City would not have to include longevity pay in the computation of pension benefits.
The findings or judgment of the trial court will be found clearly erroneous only when on the entire record the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. University Casework Systems, Inc. v. Bahre (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 155.
The record discloses that on July 28,1969 the Board of Public Works and Safety (Board) adopted a resolution establishing a salary schedule for the City’s police and fire departments which included corporals and engineers. During the years in question the South Bend Police Department rank structure included in decreasing order of salary: (1) chief; (2) division chief; (3) captain; (4) lieutenant; (5) sergeant; (6) corporal; (7) first-class patrolman; (8) patrolman; and (9) officer-in-training. Throughout these same years the rank structure of the South Bend Fire Department included in decreasing order of salary: (1) chief; (2) assistant chief; (3) battalion chief; (4) captain; (5) lieutenant; (6) engineer; (7) fireman first-class; (8) fireman; and (9) fireman-in-training. In both departments, each member of a particular rank received the same salary as all other members of that rank. From the budget requests and pay ordinances it is apparent that as an individual advanced in rank his salary increased. Furthermore, there were varying numbers of policemen who were first-class patrolmen and policemen who were corporals. Similarly, there were varying numbers of firemen who were first-class firemen and firemen who were engineers. A comparison of statistics compiled by the City shows the following:
Firemen First Class Engineers
1969 131 0
1970 7 153
1971 32 142
1972 28 133
1973 35 143
1974 30 134
1975 23 165
Patrolmen Corporals
1968 68 0
1969 46 0
1970 20 66
1971 33 60
1972 41 57
1973 41 64
1974 51 72
1975 29 74
[849]*849It was also established that promotions were not automatic. After five years of service first-class patrolmen and firemen became eligible for promotion to the respective ranks of corporal and engineer. The first step in attaining such a promotion was to obtain a recommendation from the police or fire chief. However, if the chief determined that an individual’s general performance did not warrant a promotion, it was within his power to withhold any recommendation. In fact four or five first-class patrolmen were not recommended for promotion to the rank of corporal. If a recommendation was obtained then the Board could approve the promotion by resolution and order. Nevertheless the Board was authorized to reject any recommendation from the chiefs.
In light of this evidence, it must be concluded that the findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. The record reveals that salaries were paid by rank and not by length of service. No first-class patrolman or fireman was automatically entitled to a promotion after five years of service. The fact that very few patrolmen or firemen were denied promotions may indicate that the City considered their respective forces to be of a high caliber. It certainly does not lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the City’s purpose in creating the ranks of corporal and engineer was to circumvent the pension laws.
IC 1971,19-1-24-3 (Burns Code Ed.) provides generally that police pensions shall be computed on the basis of the monthly salary of a first-class patrolman. IC 1971, 19-1-37-14 (Burns Code Ed.) provides that fire pensions are to be based on the monthly pay of a first-class fireman. The City acted in accordance with these statutes. To the extent that Retirees believe their pensions ought to be computed on the basis of the salary paid to corporals or engineers, their recourse lies with the Legislature. Here Retirees failed to sustain their burden of proof that corporals and engineers were the same as first-class patrolmen and firemen.
Retirees also contend that the findings were erroneous because: (1) ultimate facts and not evidentiary facts should be set out in the findings of fact; (2) the findings contained conclusions of law; and (3) facts missing in the findings cannot be supplied by the conclusions of law. This contention was disposed of by In re Marriage of Miles (1977), Ind.App., 362 N.E.2d 171 where the court opined:
“It is the stated purpose of our trial rules to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. To that end TR 52 must be construed as abolishing the old highly technical, distinctions and treacherous consequences which attended the consideration of whether a ‘finding’ was an evidentiary fact, an ultimate fact, a conclusion of fact or a conclusion of law.” (Footnote omitted.) 362 N.E.2d at 174.
Special findings are intended to preserve the grounds for error on appeal by disclosing the factual basis for the legal theory applied below. Indianapolis Raceway Park, Inc. v. Curtiss (1979), Ind.App., 386 N.E.2d 724.
“Thus, whether the findings are adequate depends upon whether they are sufficient to disclose a valid basis under the issues for the legal result reached in the judgment. In making this determination a reviewing court will accept the findings made by the trial court if they are supported by evidence of probative value. Miller v. Ortman, supra, [(1956), 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17]; First Natl Bank of Mishawaka v. Kamm (1972), 152 Ind.App. 353, 283 N.E.2d 563. Furthermore, on appeal the findings will be construed together and will be liberally construed in support of the judgment. Scott v. Kell (1956), 127 Ind.App. 472, 134 N.E.2d 828, trf. den. 141 N.E.2d 106; TR 52(A).” Miles, supra, 362 N.E.2d at 174.
As noted earlier, the findings of fact and judgment of the trial court were not clearly erroneous. The findings disclosed that the theory on which the trial court decided the case was that first-class patrolmen and firemen were not corporals and engineers and that salaries were paid by.rank rather than length of service. There was no error here.
[850]*850Retirees next maintain the trial court erred in rejecting their offer to read into evidence statements made by the City in response to certain motions to produce. Prior to trial Retirees filed two motions to produce. The first motion sought the production of written job descriptions adopted for the categories of first-class patrolmen and corporals for the years 1969 through 1975. In their response the City stated that they had no written job descriptions for the categories in question. The second motion sought the production of all documentary evidence setting out the qualifications for the ranks of corporal and engineer other than length of service. The City’s response to this motion stated that there was no documentary evidence which established other qualifications for the ranks of corporal or engineer besides length of service.
Retirees first allege that these responses were admissions in a pleading. This allegation is ill-founded. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 7(A) provides in part:
“The pleadings shall consist of:
(1) a complaint and an answer;
(2) a reply to a denominated counterclaim;
(3) an answer to a cross-claim;
(4) a third-party complaint, if a person not an original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and
(5) a third-party answer.
No other pleadings shall be allowed;”
Thus a party’s responses to motions are not pleadings and cannot be considered as admissions in a pleading. See, Pomerenke v. Nat. Life and Ace. Ins. Co. (1968), 143 Ind. App. 472, 241 N.E.2d 390 where it was held that a motion for summary judgment is not a pleading.
Retirees also assert that the responses should have been • introduced as admissions. An admission is a statement against the interests of a party which is inconsistent with the defense or tends to establish or disprove a material fact. Marsh v. Lesh (1975), 164 Ind.App. 67, 326 N.E.2d 626. Under the particular circumstances existing in the case at bar, these responses do not qualify as admissions since their only import was to inform the Retirees that the City could not comply with the discovery request. These responses were required by Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 34(B) which provides that a party upon whom a request to produce is served shall serve a written response to the request. Cf.: Dure v. City of Macon (1925), 159 Ga. 875, 127 S.E. 142 where the failure of the city to produce documents of title to certain land in response to a notice to produce was held not to amount to an admission that the city did not have title nor did it relieve the petitioners of the burden of showing that the city did not have title.
Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 34 is a vehicle for inspecting and copying documents and other tangible things. It serves as a device to ascertain items that might be admissible evidence for a party or lead to admissible evidence or otherwise assist in the preparation of the trial. However, it was not intended that the motions and replies themselves would be evidence particularly-in the factual context here.
Of course the very nonexistence of certain documents may be of some evidentiary value. Nevertheless, the disallowance of the City’s responses into evidence should not have presented any great obstacle to the Retirees since the discovery rules provided several other avenues to establish that there were no written job classifications for the ranks of corporal and engineer or qualifications for those ranks aside from length of service. For example, the Retirees could have made a request for admissions, could have filed interrogatories or could have taken depositions. Finally they could have called witnesses at the trial to substantiate these contentions. The trial court was correct in its ruling.
Also assigned as error is the trial court’s refusal to admit into evidence Exhibit 4, the job classification manual of the Fire Department. Before trial the City had produced the exhibit, which was a copy of the original manual, in response to the Retirees’ motion to produce certain job descriptions. When the Retirees attempted to introduce [851]*851this exhibit into evidence, the City objected on the grounds that it was not the best evidence and was not properly authenticated. The objections were sustained.
Retirees maintain that documents produced pursuant to TR. 34 should be admissible in the form produced by the opposing party subject, of course, to any substantive objections available. They argue that the City ought not to complain about the form in which it produced the document.
Where a party in control of an original document produces a copy it would be manifestly unfair to sustain its objection to the admission of the copy on the grounds that it is not the best evidence or properly authenticated. TR. 34(D) provides:
“When a party or witness in control of a writing or document subject to examination under this rule or Rule 9.2(E) refuses or is unable to produce it, evidence thereof shall be allowed by other parties without compliance with the rule of evidence requiring production of the original document or writing as best evidence.”
This rule contemplates that when documents are requested the originals will be produced or else any best evidence objections to the admission of the copy produced are waived. Similarly any objections on the grounds of improper authentication are waived since the production of a document that is not genuine would be contrary to the notions of fair play and substantial justice which the discovery rules are designed to further.
Therefore the trial court was in error when it excluded Exhibit 4 from evidence at trial. Nevertheless this improper exclusion was harmless error since it was sufficiently covered by other evidence. Costa et al. v. Costa et a1. (1953), 124 Ind. App. 128,115 N.E.2d 516. The Retirees had offered the exhibit for the purpose of establishing that there was no such classification as engineer in the Fire Department and that all firefighters were privates except for those promoted to the officer grade. Patricia DeClercq, the Clerk of the Board, testified that all its records were in her custody and under her supervision. Her search of those records revealed that there was nothing in the minutes of the Board’s meetings to show that the category of engineer was ever established in the Fire Department. Ernest Rozanski, a former captain in the Fire Department and a 16-year veteran of the force, testified that engineers and privates were basically the same.
No reversible error having been shown, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, P. J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.