Johnson, Judge.
On June 7,1991, an x-ray of Sisk’s chest was taken at a Veteran’s Administration medical facility. Physician Patel interpreted it as [157]*157showing no abnormalities. Later examination of Sisk’s chest revealed a mass that proved to be a squamous cell lesion; review of the June 7, 1991 x-ray suggested the mass was visible at that time.
Sisk filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, attaching an affidavit from Dr. Scheer as required. Uncertain over Patel’s employment status, Sisk also sued him in superior court, alleging medical malpractice. Recognizing the need for an expert affidavit asserting malpractice to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, Sisk requested Dr. Scheer to execute and supply another affidavit, identical in wording to the first.
The superior court complaint was filed on June 7, 1993, exactly two years after the x-ray in question. At that time, Sisk did not have an affidavit from Dr. Scheer in hand, but he had a facsimile copy of one and Dr. Scheer’s assurance that the original would be forwarded. Rather than allege in his complaint that an affidavit “could not be prepared” under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), which would have resulted in an automatic 45-day extension to file the affidavit,1 Sisk filed his complaint with the facsimile of the affidavit, stating the necessary affidavit was attached. When Dr. Scheer’s affidavit arrived at the office of Sisk’s counsel the next day, it was not filed with the court but placed in a file in counsel’s office.
Patel responded and contended that the complaint failed to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. On March 21, 1994, Patel moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), based upon the failure to submit an expert’s affidavit. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). On March 28, without a response from Sisk being filed, the court granted dismissal, noting that the original affidavit had not been filed and that the record was devoid of any suggestion that its absence was due to a mistake. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). On April 1, 1994, Sisk moved to set aside-the dismissal and included the affidavit of Sisk’s counsel setting forth the reasons the original affidavit was not filed and including the original. The brief in support of the motion included a request that Sisk be permitted to amend his complaint to include the original affidavit. The motion was denied. The court noted that Sisk had not availed himself of the benefits of the procedure set forth in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), designed to protect plaintiffs with difficulties such as his, nor had he moved the court for a determination under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) that the affidavit was available when the complaint was filed and its absence was due to mistake.
Sisk filed his notice of appeal contending that there are two issues to be determined: whether the facsimile of the affidavit satisfies [158]*158the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, and if not, whether amendment should be permitted when the affidavit existed at the time of submission, as shown by the existence of a facsimile, even though the original was not in the plaintiff’s possession.
The Supreme Court has held that “since § 9-11-9.1 establishes an ‘ “exception to the general liberality of pleading permitted under (the Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq.)” [cit.],’ [cit.], it should be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Civil Practice Act where such construction does not detract from the purpose of § 9-11-9.1 ‘to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed,’ [cit.].” Gadd v. Wilson & Co., Engineers &c., 262 Ga. 234, 235 (416 SE2d 285) (1992). There is no question that the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is satisfied by the facsimile affidavit Sisk submitted; it is evidence that an expert deems the action to have factual merit, and Patel has made no challenge to the genuineness of the affidavit. “When viewed from this perspective, no question of frivolity could arise from absence of [an original].” Gadd, supra at 235. As the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is not offended by the facts of this case, we are required by Gadd to construe the section liberally.
Sisk argues that the existence of a facsimile of the affidavit establishes its existence and shows it is “available,” within the meaning and purpose of the statute. We agree. There can be no facsimile if there is no original. As an affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 must meet the more generous standards of a pleading requirement rather than those of an evidentiary requirement, Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123 (416 SE2d 102) (1992), it can be considered “available” within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) when it is in existence and acquirable by plaintiff, even though not physically in the plaintiff’s possession, as here.
The Supreme Court recently declined to require letter-perfect compliance with procedural requirements in a medical malpractice case. In Paulin v. Okehi, 264 Ga. 604 (449 SE2d 291) (1994), uncertified copies of office and hospital records were attached to an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ expert in response to a motion for summary judgment. The Court held that this defect was cured when the defendant doctor acknowledged the authenticity of the records at his deposition, which was subsequently filed with the challenged documents included as exhibits. “Under the[se] circumstances, those records should not be ignored for lack of certification. [Cit.] It is the policy of this Court whenever possible to seek ‘substantial justice and judicial economy rather than strict compliance with procedural technicalities.’ [Cit.]” Paulin, supra at 605.
We recognize that the affidavit at issue in Paulin was submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment, and held to a stricter standard, than to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-[159]*1599.1. “Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56
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Johnson, Judge.
On June 7,1991, an x-ray of Sisk’s chest was taken at a Veteran’s Administration medical facility. Physician Patel interpreted it as [157]*157showing no abnormalities. Later examination of Sisk’s chest revealed a mass that proved to be a squamous cell lesion; review of the June 7, 1991 x-ray suggested the mass was visible at that time.
Sisk filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, attaching an affidavit from Dr. Scheer as required. Uncertain over Patel’s employment status, Sisk also sued him in superior court, alleging medical malpractice. Recognizing the need for an expert affidavit asserting malpractice to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1, Sisk requested Dr. Scheer to execute and supply another affidavit, identical in wording to the first.
The superior court complaint was filed on June 7, 1993, exactly two years after the x-ray in question. At that time, Sisk did not have an affidavit from Dr. Scheer in hand, but he had a facsimile copy of one and Dr. Scheer’s assurance that the original would be forwarded. Rather than allege in his complaint that an affidavit “could not be prepared” under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), which would have resulted in an automatic 45-day extension to file the affidavit,1 Sisk filed his complaint with the facsimile of the affidavit, stating the necessary affidavit was attached. When Dr. Scheer’s affidavit arrived at the office of Sisk’s counsel the next day, it was not filed with the court but placed in a file in counsel’s office.
Patel responded and contended that the complaint failed to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. On March 21, 1994, Patel moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6), based upon the failure to submit an expert’s affidavit. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). On March 28, without a response from Sisk being filed, the court granted dismissal, noting that the original affidavit had not been filed and that the record was devoid of any suggestion that its absence was due to a mistake. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). On April 1, 1994, Sisk moved to set aside-the dismissal and included the affidavit of Sisk’s counsel setting forth the reasons the original affidavit was not filed and including the original. The brief in support of the motion included a request that Sisk be permitted to amend his complaint to include the original affidavit. The motion was denied. The court noted that Sisk had not availed himself of the benefits of the procedure set forth in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), designed to protect plaintiffs with difficulties such as his, nor had he moved the court for a determination under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) that the affidavit was available when the complaint was filed and its absence was due to mistake.
Sisk filed his notice of appeal contending that there are two issues to be determined: whether the facsimile of the affidavit satisfies [158]*158the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, and if not, whether amendment should be permitted when the affidavit existed at the time of submission, as shown by the existence of a facsimile, even though the original was not in the plaintiff’s possession.
The Supreme Court has held that “since § 9-11-9.1 establishes an ‘ “exception to the general liberality of pleading permitted under (the Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq.)” [cit.],’ [cit.], it should be construed in a manner consistent with the liberality of the Civil Practice Act where such construction does not detract from the purpose of § 9-11-9.1 ‘to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed,’ [cit.].” Gadd v. Wilson & Co., Engineers &c., 262 Ga. 234, 235 (416 SE2d 285) (1992). There is no question that the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is satisfied by the facsimile affidavit Sisk submitted; it is evidence that an expert deems the action to have factual merit, and Patel has made no challenge to the genuineness of the affidavit. “When viewed from this perspective, no question of frivolity could arise from absence of [an original].” Gadd, supra at 235. As the purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is not offended by the facts of this case, we are required by Gadd to construe the section liberally.
Sisk argues that the existence of a facsimile of the affidavit establishes its existence and shows it is “available,” within the meaning and purpose of the statute. We agree. There can be no facsimile if there is no original. As an affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 must meet the more generous standards of a pleading requirement rather than those of an evidentiary requirement, Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123 (416 SE2d 102) (1992), it can be considered “available” within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) when it is in existence and acquirable by plaintiff, even though not physically in the plaintiff’s possession, as here.
The Supreme Court recently declined to require letter-perfect compliance with procedural requirements in a medical malpractice case. In Paulin v. Okehi, 264 Ga. 604 (449 SE2d 291) (1994), uncertified copies of office and hospital records were attached to an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs’ expert in response to a motion for summary judgment. The Court held that this defect was cured when the defendant doctor acknowledged the authenticity of the records at his deposition, which was subsequently filed with the challenged documents included as exhibits. “Under the[se] circumstances, those records should not be ignored for lack of certification. [Cit.] It is the policy of this Court whenever possible to seek ‘substantial justice and judicial economy rather than strict compliance with procedural technicalities.’ [Cit.]” Paulin, supra at 605.
We recognize that the affidavit at issue in Paulin was submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment, and held to a stricter standard, than to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-[159]*1599.1. “Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the merits, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action. Accordingly, an expert affidavit which would be insufficient to satisfy the evidentiary standards of OCGA § 9-11-56 may nevertheless be sufficient to satisfy the pleading standards of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.” (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Bowen, supra at 123.
“With regard to whether a facsimile copy may be filed with the complaint, we turn to Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 204 Ga. App. 256 (2) (419 SE2d 36) (1992) for guidance. In that case, we noted that ‘(a)lthough the statute contemplates that the original affidavit of the expert should be filed, our decision in Gooden v. Ga. Baptist &c., 198 Ga. App. 407 (1) (401 SE2d 602) (1991) does not prohibit trial courts when justice so requires from considering facsimiles of affidavits that are available during the statutory period.” Brown v. Middle Ga. Hosp., 211 Ga. App. 884, 885 (1) (440 SE2d 687) (1994). We disagree with the final analysis in Brown which would require application of the renewal provisions of OCGA § 9-2-61 in those instances in which a facsimile was filed, rendering the filing of a facsimile an amendable defect. Under those provisions the original affidavit would have had to have been in the physical possession of counsel at the time of filing, and the facsimile filed as a result of a mistake.
Electronic transmission of printed material has become an accepted method of communication and an indispensable tool for conducting business. A facsimile clearly establishes that the document existed, and was available, albeit in a different form, during the statutory period. Courts should be open to technological development in order to facilitate substantial justice and judicial economy. The better approach should be to allow the filing of a facsimile of a properly executed affidavit with a complaint in a professional malpractice action so as to avoid the running of the statute of limitation. Then the original should be allowed to be filed as a supplemental pleading, without requiring the action to be “renewed.”
Sisk filed the original affidavit with his motion to set aside the trial court’s dismissal. At that point the trial court had both the facsimile, filed with the complaint, and the original. In the absence of any evidence of differences between the two, the court exalted form over substance in refusing to set aside the dismissal of his complaint.
The dissent argues that the legislature specified the requirements and procedures applicable to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavits and we are precluded from taking judicial exception thereto. However, the history of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 in the appellate courts has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it is only with great difficulty made workable in [160]*160the practical arena of litigation, and has largely failed to achieve its purpose of reducing frivolous litigation. Rather, it has created an added layer of motions regarding the sufficiency of affidavits preceding the motions for summary judgment on the merits. Rather than continuing to interpret and reconcile subsection after subsection added to the statute by the legislature in attempts to fix what is fundamentally broken, the better approach is to construe pleadings liberally to do substantial justice in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-8 (f).
Judgment reversed.
McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Blackburn and Smith, JJ., concur. Beasley, C. J., Andrews and Ruffin, JJ., dissent.