Singh v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GURBAZ SINGH; MANVEET KAUR; A. No. 25-2130 S., Agency Nos. A243-146-541 Petitioners, A243-146-542 A243-146-543 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 22, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, BRESS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Gurbaz Singh,1 a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a decision by

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Gurbaz Singh is the lead petitioner. His wife Manveet Kaur and child A.S. are derivative petitioners. Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

“Where, as here, the [BIA] summarily affirms the IJ’s decision” without

issuing an opinion, we review the IJ’s decision. See Villavicencio-Rojas v. Lynch,

811 F.3d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “We review factual

findings, including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence.”

Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “Under

this standard, findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291,

1296 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination against Petitioner. Considering the “totality of the circumstances

and all relevant factors,” the agency identified several reasons, supported by

substantial evidence in the record, for finding Petitioner not credible. Alam v.

Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). In particular, the agency reasonably relied on Petitioner’s

omission from his declaration and direct testimony of two incidents where

members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) allegedly searched for him at his

home. “[O]missions are probative of credibility to the extent that later

2 25-2130 disclosures . . . would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum application.”

Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020). Petitioner recounted these two

instances only after being prompted by the IJ during cross-examination. Together,

the agency’s “specific and cogent reasons supporting [its] adverse credibility

determination” satisfy the substantial evidence standard. See Shrestha v. Holder,

590 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

determination against Petitioner’s witness, Harjeet Singh. An IJ may base

an adverse credibility determination on the “demeanor, candor, or responsiveness”

of a witness. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Here, substantial evidence supports

the IJ’s determination that Harjeet Singh was “non-responsive,” given that, on

several occasions, Harjeet Singh did not directly answer the questions asked, “even

after detailed instructions and warnings by the Court.” See Bingxu Jin v. Holder,

748 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding adverse credibility determination

when there were “many instances where the IJ explicitly said that [the witness’s]

answer was nonresponsive”).

3. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner

did not demonstrate eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief

through evidence independent of his own testimony or that of Harjeet Singh. See

Kalulu v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1009, 1023 (9th Cir. 2024), as amended. The agency

3 25-2130 reasonably accorded reduced weight to the third-party affidavits submitted by

Petitioner because Petitioner did not produce any of the authors as witnesses for

cross-examination. See Garcia, 749 F.3d at 791 (upholding the agency’s

determination that documents were insufficient to rehabilitate an asylum

applicant’s testimony, in part because the preparers were not available for cross-

examination).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. 8, is DENIED.

4 25-2130