Singh v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

SARABJIT SINGH, No. 24-7668 Petitioner, Agency No. A215-552-227 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Sarabjit Singh, a citizen of India, petitions for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal of an order of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum and withholding of

removal. We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial

evidence. See Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022).

Under this standard, “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.

1. The IJ held that Singh, a Mann Party member, established past

persecution on account of political opinion when he suffered two beatings by

Congress Party members in Punjab. As the BIA noted, that finding of past

persecution gave rise to a “rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future

persecution (for purposes of asylum)” and to a similar presumption that Singh’s

“life or freedom would be threatened in India (for purposes of withholding of

removal).” Nonetheless, the agency held that the Government had rebutted this

presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “[1] the

applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of India, and

that, [2] under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect him to do

so.” See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B); Akosung v. Barr,

970 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2020). On that basis, the BIA upheld the IJ’s denial

of asylum and withholding of removal. Substantial evidence supports these

conclusions.

First, the agency reasonably concluded that Singh could avoid future

persecution by relocating within India. The IJ noted that Singh was a “relatively

low-level Mann Party worker without substantial influence or notoriety,” and the

agency permissibly found that such “ordinary” members are generally not

2 persecuted outside of Punjab. Singh points to evidence that the Unlawful

Activities Prevention Act has been used to target minorities in India, but the

agency permissibly concluded that this evidence was “from several years ago,” that

such abuse was targeted more at Muslims than Sikhs, and that U.S. Government

reports in the record reflect that Sikhs are legally able to live freely in various parts

of India.1

Substantial evidence likewise supports the agency’s conclusions that

Congress Party members would not effectively be able to track Singh if he

relocated to another part of India. As the agency reasonably determined, Singh has

no criminal record and is not in any criminal database in India, and the country

lacks a centralized registration system that would allow Congress Party members

to track him elsewhere. Although Singh argued that his Aadhaar identification

card and the tenant verification system would provide such tracking opportunities,

the agency permissibly concluded that sufficient safeguards were in place

concerning the Aadhaar identification card system and that the tenant verification

system was of limited utility to be able to allow Congress Party members to use it

in the way Singh fears. Singh also pointed to record evidence concerning the

availability of facial recognition technology, but the BIA properly concluded that

1 The IJ and BIA erroneously referred to the Library of Congress reports that the IJ cited as the “State Department’s 2020 Human Rights Report,” but this technical error does not vitiate the IJ’s or the BIA’s reasoning.

3 this did not require rejection of the IJ’s finding that Singh would not be tracked by

Congress Party members.2

Second, the agency permissibly concluded that it would be reasonable for

Singh to relocate within India. Although the record contains evidence suggesting

that Sikhs may face practical problems in moving to some other parts of India, the

agency reasonably relied on evidence indicating that there are sizable Sikh

communities in various parts of India. Singh asks us to reweigh the evidence, but

when there are two permissible ways to read the record, we cannot say that a

conclusion contrary to the agency’s is “compelled.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Accordingly, we conclude that the agency properly rejected Singh’s asylum

and withholding of removal claims.

2. The agency permissibly rejected Singh’s claim for humanitarian asylum.

The agency may grant humanitarian asylum if the applicant establishes

(1) “compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country

arising out of the severity of the past persecution” or (2) “a reasonable possibility

that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.”

2 The BIA’s decision on this point contains another technical error: it is missing the crucial word “not” from the sentence stating that this facial recognition evidence “does [not] undermine the Immigration Judge’s findings.” But given the surrounding context, and the immediately ensuing sentence (which states that the BIA “also discern[s] no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s findings” on a related point), we have no doubt that the relevant sentence contains a scrivener’s error on this score.

4 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). Here, the agency reasonably determined that Singh’s

prior treatment did not rise to the level of the sort of “extremely severe persecution

. . . required to warrant humanitarian relief.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 662

(9th Cir. 2019). The agency also properly concluded that, in light of its relocation

ruling, Singh could avoid a reasonable possibility of other serious harm. On these

grounds, we conclude that the agency did not err in rejecting Singh’s claim for

humanitarian asylum.

PETITION DENIED.