Singh v. Blanche

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NIRMAL SINGH; HARVINDER KAUR No. 25-3468 GILL, Agency Nos. A208-008-355 Petitioners, A208-008-356 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 9, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: NGUYEN and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and HUIE, District Judge.***

Petitioner Nirmal Singh (“Singh”) and his wife, Harvinder Gill, a derivative

beneficiary, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Robert Steven Huie, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing for

substantial evidence, see Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020),

we deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility finding that

Singh was not persecuted on account of his interfaith and intercaste marriage. The

IJ found two material omissions in Singh’s original application. First, in his

testimony and declaration, Singh stated that the police informed him that he was

“lucky to be alive” given his “intercaste and interfaith relationship” and accused

him of “playing with the honor of religion.” But in his first declaration, he only

claimed that the police told him that he was “alive so there [was] no need to waste

time on such little things,” and ordered him to leave. Second, in contrast to his

later testimony, Singh omitted in his initial declaration information about the

police ordering him to remove his clothes before beating him, accusing him of

“messing with Sikh daughters,” and threatening to “kill [him] if [he] were to date

any Sikh woman in the future.” The agency concluded that these additional

allegations about police officers accusing Singh of “playing with the honor of

religion” and “messing with Sikh daughters,” as well as threatening to kill him if

he continued dating Sikh women, materially enhanced his claim because it

2 25-3468 connected the purported police persecution to his intercaste and interfaith marriage.

See Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “an

adverse credibility determination may be supported by omissions that . . . tell a

much different—and more compelling—story of persecution than the initial

application” (simplified)). The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that it is implausible

that Singh would not have medical records documenting his treatment following

the July 2013 attack. Considering that the attack allegedly caused him to lose

consciousness, his injuries were so severe that a doctor wanted to call the police,

he received medical care and medication at a hospital, and he remained under

observation for several hours at the hospital, the agency reasonably found it

implausible that the hospital did not make any records of his stay or treatment

simply because he “worked at the hospital.” See Singh v. Holder, 643 F.3d 1178,

1182 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The REAL ID Act has given immigration judges even

broader discretion in making their credibility determinations, but they’ve always

been permitted to use their common sense.”).1

1 We do not address Singh’s arguments that the agency erred in failing to consider his wife’s testimony as corroboration and in finding that he could relocate because he failed to raise these issues before the agency. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

3 25-3468 PETITION DENIED.2

2 The motion for a stay of removal, Dkt. No. 4, is denied. The temporary stay of removal is lifted.

4 25-3468