NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NAVDEEP SINGH, No. 25-4096 Agency No. Petitioner, A215-674-445 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 18, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Navdeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, humanitarian asylum, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994)] and also provides its own review of the
evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “We
‘review questions of law de novo’ and the agency’s ‘factual findings for substantial
evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do
not recount them here. We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review,
and remand for the agency to address the second prong of the humanitarian asylum
analysis in the first instance.
1. For asylum and withholding of removal, if an applicant demonstrates past
persecution, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant does not have a
well-founded fear of future persecution because: (1) “[t]here has been a
fundamental change in circumstances”; or (2) “[t]he applicant could avoid future
persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country . . . [and] it
would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)-(ii), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
The agency found that, although Singh established past persecution on
account of his political opinion, DHS had demonstrated that Singh could safely and
2 25-4096 reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution. Substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination. The agency noted that: (1) Singh had been
accepted to the National Institute of Technology in Delhi and his admission had
never been cancelled; (2) Singh spoke English and Hindi fluently; (3) Singh did
not have any trouble during the three months he resided with his aunt in Delhi
before leaving for the United States; (4) Singh’s fears that the Bharantiya Janta
Party (“BJP”) would track him down outside of Haryana were not reasonable;
(5) Jats reside in many states throughout India; (6) seven out of ten chief ministers
in Haryana were Jats; (7) there was no evidence of generalized violence between
the Jats and non-Jats, or violence targeting political activists on either side, since
the February 2016 riots in Haryana; and (8) the BJP had accumulated significant
Jat support.
In addition, Singh argues that the BIA erroneously stated that the IJ did not
also rely on a “fundamental change in circumstances” to rebut the presumption of
future persecution. However, any error by the BIA was harmless because
relocation and changed circumstances are independent alternative grounds. See
Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Singh argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by allowing DHS
to admit Exhibit 10—a public news article that had not been previously filed with
the IJ—as rebuttal evidence during its cross-examination of Singh at the merits
3 25-4096 hearing.
To establish a due process violation, the petitioner must show: “(1) the
proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the [petitioner] was prevented from
reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the [petitioner] demonstrates prejudice,
which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the
alleged violation.” Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted).
Singh fails to show that the admission of Exhibit 10 prevented him from
reasonably presenting his case. Singh’s counsel was given time to review Exhibit
10, offered no objection aside from timeliness, and did not ask Singh any questions
about Exhibit 10 on redirect. Cf. Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding a due process violation where the petitioners were not given a
pre-hearing opportunity to review forensic reports concluding that the petitioners’
documents were fraudulent and DHS did not make the reports’ author available for
cross-examination).
Moreover, Singh fails to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of
Exhibit 10. Although the IJ relied on Exhibit 10 for the proposition that the BJP
had been able to accumulate significant Jat support, the IJ also considered Singh’s
testimony and other evidence in the record to find that he could safely and
reasonably relocate to another part of India.
4 25-4096 3. “Regardless of whether the government has rebutted the presumption of
an asylum applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA may still grant
humanitarian asylum.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2019). An
applicant seeking humanitarian asylum must show either (1) “compelling reasons
for being unwilling or unable to return” to his country of nationality “arising out of
the severity of the [applicant’s] past persecution,” or (2) “a reasonable possibility
that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
The IJ set forth the above standard, but only addressed the first prong. The
BIA did not address humanitarian asylum, so it adopted the IJ’s decision under
Burbano. See Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 2009).
For the first prong, the record does not compel the conclusion that the
agency erred in finding that Singh’s past persecution did not rise to the necessary
level of atrociousness to warrant humanitarian asylum. See Singh, 914 F.3d at 662
(“Our case law demonstrates that extremely severe persecution is required to
warrant humanitarian relief.”).
The IJ did not address the second prong. The Government argues that Singh
failed to raise the second prong before the IJ or BIA, and therefore failed to
exhaust the issue. However, Singh explicitly raised the second prong in his pre-
hearing statement to the IJ, which is sufficient under Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NAVDEEP SINGH, No. 25-4096 Agency No. Petitioner, A215-674-445 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 18, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN, OWENS, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Navdeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for asylum,
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). withholding of removal, humanitarian asylum, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). “Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of
Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994)] and also provides its own review of the
evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “We
‘review questions of law de novo’ and the agency’s ‘factual findings for substantial
evidence.’” Id. (citation omitted). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do
not recount them here. We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review,
and remand for the agency to address the second prong of the humanitarian asylum
analysis in the first instance.
1. For asylum and withholding of removal, if an applicant demonstrates past
persecution, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) bears the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant does not have a
well-founded fear of future persecution because: (1) “[t]here has been a
fundamental change in circumstances”; or (2) “[t]he applicant could avoid future
persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country . . . [and] it
would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)-(ii), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
The agency found that, although Singh established past persecution on
account of his political opinion, DHS had demonstrated that Singh could safely and
2 25-4096 reasonably relocate within India to avoid future persecution. Substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination. The agency noted that: (1) Singh had been
accepted to the National Institute of Technology in Delhi and his admission had
never been cancelled; (2) Singh spoke English and Hindi fluently; (3) Singh did
not have any trouble during the three months he resided with his aunt in Delhi
before leaving for the United States; (4) Singh’s fears that the Bharantiya Janta
Party (“BJP”) would track him down outside of Haryana were not reasonable;
(5) Jats reside in many states throughout India; (6) seven out of ten chief ministers
in Haryana were Jats; (7) there was no evidence of generalized violence between
the Jats and non-Jats, or violence targeting political activists on either side, since
the February 2016 riots in Haryana; and (8) the BJP had accumulated significant
Jat support.
In addition, Singh argues that the BIA erroneously stated that the IJ did not
also rely on a “fundamental change in circumstances” to rebut the presumption of
future persecution. However, any error by the BIA was harmless because
relocation and changed circumstances are independent alternative grounds. See
Zamorano v. Garland, 2 F.4th 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2021).
2. Singh argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by allowing DHS
to admit Exhibit 10—a public news article that had not been previously filed with
the IJ—as rebuttal evidence during its cross-examination of Singh at the merits
3 25-4096 hearing.
To establish a due process violation, the petitioner must show: “(1) the
proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the [petitioner] was prevented from
reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the [petitioner] demonstrates prejudice,
which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the
alleged violation.” Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation
omitted).
Singh fails to show that the admission of Exhibit 10 prevented him from
reasonably presenting his case. Singh’s counsel was given time to review Exhibit
10, offered no objection aside from timeliness, and did not ask Singh any questions
about Exhibit 10 on redirect. Cf. Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding a due process violation where the petitioners were not given a
pre-hearing opportunity to review forensic reports concluding that the petitioners’
documents were fraudulent and DHS did not make the reports’ author available for
cross-examination).
Moreover, Singh fails to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of
Exhibit 10. Although the IJ relied on Exhibit 10 for the proposition that the BJP
had been able to accumulate significant Jat support, the IJ also considered Singh’s
testimony and other evidence in the record to find that he could safely and
reasonably relocate to another part of India.
4 25-4096 3. “Regardless of whether the government has rebutted the presumption of
an asylum applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution, the BIA may still grant
humanitarian asylum.” Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2019). An
applicant seeking humanitarian asylum must show either (1) “compelling reasons
for being unwilling or unable to return” to his country of nationality “arising out of
the severity of the [applicant’s] past persecution,” or (2) “a reasonable possibility
that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).
The IJ set forth the above standard, but only addressed the first prong. The
BIA did not address humanitarian asylum, so it adopted the IJ’s decision under
Burbano. See Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 2009).
For the first prong, the record does not compel the conclusion that the
agency erred in finding that Singh’s past persecution did not rise to the necessary
level of atrociousness to warrant humanitarian asylum. See Singh, 914 F.3d at 662
(“Our case law demonstrates that extremely severe persecution is required to
warrant humanitarian relief.”).
The IJ did not address the second prong. The Government argues that Singh
failed to raise the second prong before the IJ or BIA, and therefore failed to
exhaust the issue. However, Singh explicitly raised the second prong in his pre-
hearing statement to the IJ, which is sufficient under Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d
5 25-4096 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Although Singh’s claim under the second
prong may be in tension with the agency’s holding that Singh could safely relocate
within India, we will not uphold the agency on grounds it failed to consider. See
Sanchez Rosales v. Barr, 980 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 2020). Therefore, we remand
for the agency to consider the second prong in the first instance. See Hanna v.
Keisler, 506 F.3d 933, 939 (9th Cir. 2007).
4. The BIA deemed Singh’s CAT claim waived because he failed to raise
any “meaningful challenges” to the IJ’s denial of CAT protection. A petitioner
must “put[] ‘the BIA on notice’ of a challenge such that the BIA ‘had an
opportunity to pass’ on it.” Martinez v. Barr, 941 F.3d 907, 922 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted).
In his brief to the BIA, Singh stated only that the IJ’s denial of CAT
protection rested solely on the finding that he could relocate within India, and that
finding was erroneous for the same reasons as for his asylum claim. However, the
IJ did not deny CAT protection solely based on relocation, and the CAT standard
differs from that for asylum. See Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696,
705 (9th Cir. 2022). Therefore, the BIA reasonably concluded that Singh’s mere
reference to his relocation argument for his asylum claim did not meaningfully
challenge the IJ’s denial of his CAT claim. See Alanniz v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1061,
1068-69 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2019).
6 25-4096 PETITION DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, AND
REMANDED.1
1 The motion to stay removal is granted (Dkt. No. 14).
7 25-4096