Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 78 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CR-24-399
SAMUEL GLADDEN Opinion Delivered February 12, 2025
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE INDEPENDENCE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 32CR-22-126]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE TIM WEAVER, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Appellant Samuel Gladden (“Gladden”) appeals his second-degree sexual-assault
conviction by an Independence County jury and resulting sixteen-year sentence. Gladden
maintains on appeal that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict
because the State failed to set forth sufficient evidence that he engaged in sexual contact with
the minor child (“MC”) or that he was in a position of trust or authority over MC. He also
makes several evidentiary arguments that he contends require reversal of his conviction. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts
On October 9, 2021, Gladden and his wife, Beth Gladden (“Beth”), hosted a birthday
party at their home for two of their daughter’s friends and a sleepover with eleven teenagers.
In attendance at the Gladdens’ house was Gladden, Beth, MC, Gladden’s biological minor son, and seven other minor girls. Gladden and Beth provided alcohol for the party and stayed
up partying and drinking with the minors.
MC testified that she fell asleep around 1:30 a.m. on the couch in the downstairs
living room, which was right next to the Gladden’s bedroom. MC was sixteen years old at
the time. MC testified that she woke up at approximately 4:00 a.m. to Gladden’s kissing
first her neck then her mouth. Gladden pulled MC’s pants down and inserted his fingers
into her vagina. He then performed oral sex on MC. MC testified that she knew it was
Gladden who sexually assaulted her because she felt his goatee, and Gladden was the only
man at the house with facial hair. MC also recognized Gladden’s voice when he said her
name and stated, “You don’t know how bad I want you.” After the assault, MC fell back
asleep. When MC woke up a few hours later, she disclosed the incident to her boyfriend
over the phone—while she was still at the Gladdens’ home—and some of the minor girls who
attended the sleepover. MC also told Beth.
MC underwent a medical examination that day and a criminal investigation began.
During the examination, MC explained that her vaginal area was sore, painful, and felt like
“little paper cuts” inside her vagina. The medical examination revealed that MC had “acute”
injuries that had occurred within the past twenty-four to forty-eight hours; there were
abnormal findings to MC’s labia majora and clitoris; and she had a contusion on her clitoral
hood that the nurse who performed the exam explained means “blunt-force trauma.”
Additionally, the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory tested the swabs and clothing
taken from MC during the medical examination. The forensic analyst testified that the DNA
2 found on the swab from MC’s neck matched Gladden’s DNA profile. The DNA on MC’s
vaginal swab and tape lift from her underwear was consistent with Gladden’s and any of his
paternal relatives’ DNA. On August 2, 2022, Gladden was charged with second-degree
sexual assault pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iv) (Supp.
2021), knowingly furnishing alcohol to a minor, and contributing to the delinquency of a
minor. Beth was also charged with—and convicted of—knowingly furnishing alcohol to a
minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
At a pretrial hearing on the eve of trial, Gladden requested a continuance. Defense
counsel argued that he needed additional time to hire an expert to review MC’s supplemental
medical records. The medical records in question were received by the State on Thursday,
January 4, and electronically sent to Gladden on January 5. The medical records contained
documents from MC’s follow-up medical examination a month after the sexual assault and
the laboratory results from testing completed during MC’s initial medical examination. The
circuit court denied Gladden’s request for a continuance and, instead, excluded the
supplemental medical records due to their late disclosure.
After a short recess, Gladden declared that he reviewed the supplemental medical
records and wanted to use the portion of the documents showing that MC had tested positive
for chlamydia. He also requested additional time so that Gladden could get tested for
chlamydia and to determine whether MC’s sexually transmitted infection could provide an
alternative theory for the redness, swelling, and pain in MC’s vagina. The circuit court held
3 that the parties were to “stay away from any reference to chlamydia” but allowed Gladden to
file a motion for continuance.
In the motion, Gladden reiterated that a continuance was necessary so that he could
get tested for chlamydia and also argued that the medical records showing that MC tested
positive for chlamydia should not be excluded under the rape-shield statute because it was
relevant to provide an alternative explanation for MC’s vaginal redness and inflammation.
On the morning of trial, Gladden presented his motion, and after hearing arguments from
both sides, the circuit court held that any evidence that MC tested positive for chlamydia
was more prejudicial than probative; therefore, it excluded the evidence. Trial commenced
after the circuit court made this ruling.
After the State rested its case, Gladden moved for a directed verdict on the second-
degree sexual-assault charge. He argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proof
because MC never made a positive identification of Gladden. The circuit court denied the
motion. After the defense rested, Gladden renewed his motion for a directed verdict, adding
that the State failed to prove “sexual contact” or that he was a “guardian of [MC] during that
time.” Once again, the circuit court denied the motion.
The jury convicted Gladden of second-degree sexual assault, knowingly furnishing
alcohol to a minor, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. As a result, Gladden
was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment and a $15,000 fine. The sentencing order was
entered on January 17, 2024, and Gladden filed a timely notice of appeal on February 16.
This appeal followed.
4 II. Standard of Review
On appeal, this court treats a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Armstrong v. State, 2020 Ark. 309, 607 S.W.3d 491. In reviewing
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and considers only the evidence that supports the verdict. Price v. State,
2010 Ark. App. 111, 377 S.W.3d 324. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists
to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will,
with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to
speculation or conjecture. Id. The duty of resolving conflicting testimony and determining
the credibility of witnesses is left to the discretion of the jury. Kelley v. State, 375 Ark. 483,
292 S.W.3d 297 (2009).
Furthermore, appellate courts review the admission of evidence by the circuit court
using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Ventry v. State, 2021 Ark. 96, 622 S.W.3d 630. The
decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court, and
this court will not reverse a court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply
require error in the circuit court’s decision but also requires that the circuit court act
improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id.
III. Points on Appeal
Gladden argues that his second-degree sexual-assault conviction should be reversed
because (1) there is insufficient evidence that he engaged in sexual contact with MC; (2) there
5 is insufficient evidence that he was MC’s caregiver or in a position of trust and/or authority
over her; (3) the circuit court erred by excluding evidence that MC had chlamydia; (4) the
circuit court abused its discretion by admitting MC’s hearsay statements to her boyfriend the
morning after the assault; (5) the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
question Beth regarding Gladden’s prior misdemeanor conviction; (6) the circuit court erred
by allowing the State to call Beth as a witness Gladdens’ jury trial; and (7) the circuit court
abused its discretion by denying Gladden’s motion for continuance after the State’s late
disclosure of new evidence.
IV. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of Evidence
Preservation of Gladden’s right to freedom from double jeopardy requires a review of
the sufficiency of the evidence prior to a review of trial errors. See Harris v. State, 284 Ark.
247, 681 S.W.2d 334 (1984). Gladden contends that the circuit court erred in denying his
motions for directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence that he engaged in sexual
contact with MC or that he was a temporary caretaker or otherwise in a position of trust or
authority over MC. Specifically, Gladden argues that there was insufficient circumstantial
evidence proving his identity as the perpetrator.
Gladden includes several subpoints in support of this argument for reversal: (1) the
State’s proof did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, particularly that Gladden’s
son and/or multiple other teenagers committed the sexual assault; (2) the DNA evidence
failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis; and (3) the State cited case law that does
6 not exist when it argued against Gladden’s directed-verdict motions. In response, the State
contends that Gladden’s arguments—other than his argument regarding identification—are
not preserved for review because Gladden did not raise them below. We agree with the State.
In Gladden’s directed-verdict motion after the State rested, he argued that the court
should grant the motion for two reasons: (1) because there had been no evidence that the
incident happened in Independence County, Arkansas, and (2) because MC never made a
positive identification of Gladden. After Gladden rested his case, defense counsel renewed
the motion for directed verdict—on the same basis—and added that the State failed to prove
that Gladden had sexual contact with MC or that he was her guardian during the time in
question. On appeal, however, Gladden has extended his insufficiency arguments well
beyond his arguments at trial. Gladden never argued before the circuit court that his son or
someone else in the residence could have committed the sexual assault, nor did he argue that
the DNA evidence failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis. Accordingly, those
arguments are not preserved for this court’s review because a party is bound by the nature
and scope of the objections and arguments made at trial and may not enlarge or change those
grounds on appeal. See Davis v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 510, 657 S.W.3d 207.
Furthermore, Gladden did not properly preserve his argument regarding the
temporary-caretaker element of second-degree sexual assault because he did not raise this
argument in his directed-verdict motion at the close of the State’s case-in-chief. Rather,
Gladden made this argument for the first time after the defense rested; thus, he waived this
argument for the purposes of appellate review.
7 We now turn to the only insufficiency argument that Gladden preserved for our
review: that the State failed to set forth sufficient evidence identifying Gladden as the
perpetrator. Specifically, Gladden maintains that MC never affirmatively identified him;
thus, the jury had to resort to speculation and conjecture to find the evidence sufficient to
prove his identity as the perpetrator. We disagree.
A person commits sexual assault in the second degree if the person engages in sexual
contact with a minor and the actor is a temporary caretaker or a person in a position of trust
or authority over the minor. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iv). It is well established
that a sexual-assault victim’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence to sustain a
conviction for sexual assault. See Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008). The
victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, and the victim’s testimony alone describing the
sexual contact is enough for a conviction. See Scaggs v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 142, 596 S.W.3d
562. Moreover, the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury’s consideration. Tryon v.
State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007). Where the testimony is conflicting, this court
does not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses and has no right to disregard the testimony
of any witness after the jury has given it full credence, where it cannot be said with assurance
that it was inherently improbable, physically impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that
reasonable minds could not differ thereon. Kirkland v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 56, 618 S.W.3d
167 (citing Davenport v. State, 373 Ark. 71, 281 S.W.3d 268 (2008)). Furthermore, the jury
is free to believe all or part of a victim’s testimony as it sees fit. See Baker v. State, 2021 Ark.
App. 117, 628 S.W.3d 462.
8 Here, MC testified that she fell asleep on Gladden’s couch, and around 4:00 a.m.,
she woke to Gladden’s kissing her neck and mouth. MC said that she knew it was Gladden
because she “felt his goatee.” She also recognized his voice when he said her name and stated,
“You don’t know how bad I want you.” Gladden then pulled MC’s pants down to her knees,
put his fingers inside her vagina, and performed oral sex on her. MC testified that she was
on her period during the assault and Gladden ended up lodging the tampon she was wearing
further up her vaginal canal, and she had a hard time removing it the next day.
On appeal, Gladden argues that MC never affirmatively identified him as the person
who assaulted her. Specifically, Gladden asserts that MC never saw his face; that MC testified
her eyes were closed during the assault; that MC stated she pretended to be asleep during
some of the assault; and that MC testified she could not see what clothing the perpetrator
was wearing. Furthermore, Gladden points to the fact that MC had been drinking at the
party and contends MC was “only able to guess” that it was Gladden who sexually assaulted
her as opposed to someone else. Essentially, Gladden is asking this court to assign less weight
to MC’s testimony for the reasons set forth above; however, this court does not reweigh the
evidence or make credibility determinations. Here, that was a job for the jury, who was free
to believe all or a portion of MC’s testimony. See Daniels v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 334, 551
S.W.3d 428. The jury was also instructed to use common knowledge and its own
observations and experiences in the affairs of life in considering the evidence. Accordingly,
in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the circuit court
did not err in denying Gladden’s motions for directed verdict.
9 B. Evidentiary Arguments
1. Rape-shield statute
Gladden maintains that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence under the rape-
shield statute that MC tested positive for chlamydia. Specifically, Gladden argues that the
evidence is relevant because “it provided an alternate explanation for the redness, burning,
swelling, and pain in [MC’s] vagina,” and there was no evidence that he was ever diagnosed
with the same infection.
The rape-shield statute provides that evidence of specific instances of a victim’s prior
sexual conduct with any person is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct
examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other
prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim or for any other purpose. Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b) (Supp. 2023). However, when the circuit court, at an in camera
hearing, makes a written determination that such evidence is relevant to a fact in issue and
that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, an exception is
granted. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-42-101(c). The purpose of the statute is to shield victims of
rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their sexual conduct, unrelated to the
charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to
the defendant’s guilt. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, 384 S.W.3d 515. The circuit court is
vested with discretion to determine whether such evidence is relevant and will not be
reversed unless the decision constitutes clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion. McKee
v. State, 2020 Ark. 327, 608 S.W.3d 584.
10 In State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, 233 S.W.3d 680 (2006), our supreme court
embraced a five-factor test to consider whether the prior sexual conduct of a child is
admissible to prove an alternate source of the child’s sexual knowledge. The Townsend factors
are (1) that the prior act clearly occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled those of the
present case; (3) that the prior act is clearly relevant to a material issue; (4) that the evidence
is necessary to the defendant’s case; and (5) that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. These factors have also been applied to determine
whether prior sexual conduct can be introduced to show another source of injury to a child.
See McKee, supra.
Gladden did not argue the Townsend factors at trial or on appeal; however, the circuit
court ruled that any “reference to [MC’s] chlamydia [was] much more prejudicial than
probative.” Gladden offered no evidence that the swelling and redness in MC’s vaginal area
could have been caused by chlamydia, he merely asserts that it was possible. MC also had
other injuries to her vaginal area that were consistent with blunt-force trauma and lacerations
inside her vagina caused by “penetrative trauma.” Therefore, we hold that the circuit court’s
exclusion of the evidence did not constitute clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion.
2. Hearsay
Next, Gladden asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting MC’s
statements to her boyfriend the morning after the assault. Specifically, Gladden argues that
(1) MC’s statements to her boyfriend do not fall under the excited-utterance exception to
hearsay pursuant Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(2) (2024); (2) the statements were
11 inadmissible as “prior consistent statements” under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1);
and (3) he suffered “massive” prejudice from the court’s admission of the boyfriend’s
testimony because it bolstered MC’s credibility. At trial, Gladden objected to the boyfriend’s
testimony regarding what MC told him about the assault, arguing that because the statement
was made hours after the assault, it did not qualify as an excited utterance. The circuit court
overruled the objection and held that the testimony qualified as an excited utterance.
This court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision regarding the admission of
evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Beard v. State, 2020 Ark. 62, 594 S.W.3d 29.
An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the circuit
court’s decision but requires that the court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without
due consideration. Cherry v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 249, 688 S.W.3d 164. Moreover, an
appellate court will not reverse a circuit court’s evidentiary ruling absent a showing of
prejudice. Id.
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ark. R. Evid.
801(c) (2023). Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(2) (2023) provides that an excited utterance
is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, and
an excited utterance is a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. This court
has observed that sexual abuse is a startling event within the meaning of Rule 803(2). See Frye
12 v. State, 2009 Ark. 110, 313 S.W.3d 10; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392, 836 S.W.2d 380
(1992).
The relevant inquiry is whether the statement was made under the stress of
excitement or was made after the declarant calmed down and had an opportunity to reflect,
which is a matter within the circuit court’s sound discretion. Lester v. State, 2024 Ark. App.
206, 687 S.W.3d 344. Admissibility is not to be measured by any precise number of minutes,
hours, or days but requires that the declarant is still under the stress and excitement caused
by the event. Ludwick v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 347, 635 S.W.3d 330. Continuing emotional
or physical shock, unabated fear, and other factors may also prolong the time, making it
proper to resort to Rule 803(2). See Evans v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 368, 690 S.W.3d 871.
The trend in the law is toward relaxing the time element. Id.
Here, shortly after she woke up, MC disclosed to her boyfriend--over the phone—that
she had been sexually assaulted. The boyfriend testified that MC was crying and sounded
“panic[ked] and stress[ed].” According to precedent, Gladden’s argument that the statement
was not an excited utterance simply because of the hours that had elapsed between the assault
and MC’s phone call with her boyfriend lacks merit. Because the boyfriend testified that
MC was stressed and sounded panicked, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing MC’s boyfriend to testify regarding the statements MC made to him
a few hours after the assault. Finally, because Gladden failed to object at trial to the
boyfriend’s testimony as a prior consistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1), the argument is
not preserved for this court’s review.
13 Furthermore, Gladden cannot demonstrate prejudice from the boyfriend’s testimony
because it was merely cumulative of other evidence that was admitted without objection. See
Graham v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 502, 655 S.W.3d 918. Defense counsel elicited the same
testimony from the boyfriend on cross-examination, asking whether MC used the word
“sexual assault.” The boyfriend explained that MC said she was “sexually assaulted” over the
phone but over text messaging she used the word “rape.” Furthermore, Beth testified
without objection that her daughter woke her up by saying, “[MC] is accusing [Gladden] of
molesting her,” and another witness testified, without objection, that MC told him that
Gladden had raped her. Thus, no prejudice could be established with the admission of the
testimony.
3. Rebuttal testimony
Gladden argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by allowing the State to
question Beth about his prior misdemeanor assault conviction. Specifically, Gladden
contends that Beth’s testimony regarding his prior misdemeanor conviction was not
admissible to rebut his minor son’s testimony that he and his friends “felt safe in [Gladden’s]
home around the time of the charged acts.” Accordingly, Gladden asserts that Beth’s
testimony was inadmissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404 and that it should have
been excluded as unduly prejudicial. In response, the State argues that the circuit court
correctly admitted the testimony about his prior conviction as rebuttal evidence, and
alternatively, any error was harmless.
14 Under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) (2023), evidence of a person’s character
or a trait of his character is not admissible for proving that he acted in conformity therewith
on a particular occasion, except by the accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same. Our
supreme court has recognized that when a defendant produces a character witness, the
defendant opens the door to evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible. Frye, supra.
Furthermore, once the door is open, the State can inquire onto a witness’s knowledge of
specific instances of conduct, and there is no limit, other than relevancy, on the kind of
instances of misconduct with respect to which cross-examination may occur. Wilcoxon v.
State, 2022 Ark. App. 458, 655 S.W.3d 686.
During direct examination, Gladden elicited testimony from his son that he always
felt safe in his home; that Gladden never did anything to make his friends feel
uncomfortable; and that his friends never made any complaints about Gladden’s behavior.
After defense passed the witness, the State brought to the court’s attention that it believed
Gladden had opened the door by introducing character evidence that his son always felt safe
in his home and that his friends never felt uncomfortable around Gladden. Accordingly,
the State argued it could now inquire about Gladden’s prior misdemeanor assault wherein
Gladden was intoxicated and assaulted his wife, and Gladden’s son was present. The circuit
court agreed with the State and held that Gladden opened the door for his son to be cross-
examined about the prior misdemeanor assault.
Thereafter, when the defense called Beth to the stand, the State informed the court
that it intended to question Beth regarding Gladden’s prior misdemeanor assault. Gladden
15 objected, arguing that Beth had not provided any character testimony; thus, the door had
not been opened for the State to question her about the prior assault. The State disagreed
and argued that because Gladden had produced several character witnesses to demonstrate
that his home was a safe place, it was allowed to call any witness to rebut that testimony. The
court held that the State could not cross-examine Beth regarding the prior assault because it
was outside the scope of Gladden’s direct-examination; but that the State could call Beth as
a rebuttal witness. On rebuttal, the State questioned Beth about an altercation in 2013
wherein Gladden struck her and grabbed her neck. In response, Beth replied that she did
not remember the incident. Beth then admitted that Gladden “pled guilty for assault but it
wasn’t against me.”
As referenced above, our appellate courts have upheld the admission of prior
convictions when offered to rebut the defendant’s opinion testimony. Accordingly, we do
not find that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that Gladden opened the door
for the prior misdemeanor assault to come in through cross-examination or on rebuttal.
However, even if the testimony was admitted in error, it merely amounts to harmless error.
Harmless error exists when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error is slight.
E.g., Lawson v. State, 2024 Ark. 143, 697 S.W.3d 529. MC testified that it was Gladden who
sexually assaulted her; the medical examination revealed that MC had bruising on her clitoral
hood, redness and swelling on her vagina and labia majora, and a laceration inside her vagina
that was indicative of penetrative trauma; and Gladden’s DNA matched the male DNA
found on MC’s neck and was consistent with the male DNA found on MC’s vaginal swab
16 and tape lift from her underwear. Thus, the evidence of Gladden’s guilt on the charge of
second-degree sexual assault was overwhelming.
4. Fifth Amendment
Gladden contends that the circuit court erred by allowing the State to call Beth as a
witness in the Gladdens’ jury trial. Specifically, Gladden acknowledges that he did not object
when the State called Beth as a rebuttal witness; however, he argues that no objection is
required to preserve an issue for appeal when the error is so flagrant and egregious that the
circuit court should, on its own motion, have taken steps to remedy it. In support of his
argument, Gladden cites Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), and states
that Beth’s Fifth Amendment right is a fundamental right that falls under an exception to
the contemporaneous-objection rule as set forth therein.
In response, the State maintains that Gladden’s argument must fail because (1) he
does not have standing to assert that Beth’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated, and (2)
Beth waived her Fifth Amendment privilege when she voluntarily testified; thus, she was
subject to being recalled by the State on rebuttal. We agree.
A witness’s right to not incriminate himself or herself is personal, and another person
does not have standing to assert a violation of the witness’s Fifth Amendment rights. Dodson
v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). Consequently, Gladden does not have standing
to assert that Beth’s right to not incriminate herself was violated. Furthermore, Gladden
called Beth as a witness, and Beth voluntarily testified at trial; a dispositive fact that Gladden
17 failed to address on appeal. Accordingly, because Gladden lacks standing to assert Beth’s
constitutional rights, we need not address the merits of this argument.
C. Motion for Continuance
Finally, Gladden argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a continuance based on the State’s late disclosure of new evidence. Specifically,
Gladden contends that if he had had time to review MC’s supplemental medical records, he
“would not have sought and agreed to [exclude] the evidence, but rather would have
attempted to use them at trial.”
During a pretrial hearing, defense counsel noted that he had just received twenty-
three pages of MC’s medical records from the State and requested a continuance so that
Gladden could hire an expert to go through them because he believed that the records “could
possibly contain some exculpatory evidence.” Alternatively, the circuit court excluded the
records. After a recess, defense counsel argued that after reviewing the new medical records,
he discovered that MC tested positive for a sexually transmitted infection; thus, he argued
for a continuance so that Gladden could get tested for chlamydia and to “peruse [Gladden’s]
medical records from this time period going forward.” Once again, the circuit court denied
Gladden’s request for a continuance and held that the medical records—specifically anything
about chlamydia—was excluded from evidence.
The circuit court shall grant a continuance only on a showing of good cause and only
for so long as is necessary, taking into account not only the request or consent of the
prosecuting attorney or defense counsel, but also the public interest in prompt disposition
18 of the case. Ark. R. Crim. P. 27.3 (2023). The standard of review for granting or denying a
motion for continuance is abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413.
An appellant must not only demonstrate that the circuit court abused its discretion by
denying the motion for continuance but also must show prejudice that amounts to a denial
of justice. Jackson v. State, 2009 Ark. 336, 321 S.W.3d 260.
We hold that Gladden failed to demonstrate either good cause for the continuance
or resulting prejudice from the court’s denial of the motion. Admittedly, the new evidence
that Gladden sought to use was that MC tested positive for chlamydia—as discussed above—
and the circuit court held that the evidence was protected by the rape-shield statute and not
admissible. Thus, requesting a continuance so that Gladden could get tested for chlamydia
does not constitute good cause. Furthermore, on appeal, Gladden does not offer any
additional evidence from the excluded medical records that he asserts would have been
beneficial to his case or would have affected the outcome of the trial. Therefore, we hold
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gladden’s motion for a
continuance.
V. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm Gladden’s second-degree sexual-assault
conviction.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and THYER, JJ., agree.
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.
19 Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.