Jermaine Lawson v. State of Arkansas

2024 Ark. 143, 697 S.W.3d 529

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: October 3, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. 143 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-23-201

Opinion Delivered: October 3, 2024

JERMAINE LAWSON APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 10CR-21-15]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE BLAKE BATSON, APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED.

RHONDA K. WOOD, Associate Justice

Jermaine Lawson was convicted of multiple offenses, including possession of a firearm

by certain persons. At trial, the State introduced certified copies of Lawson’s prior felony

convictions, despite his objection and offer to stipulate to the fact that he was a felon. Our

court of appeals reversed all of Lawson’s convictions. Lawson v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 91,

684 S.W.3d 917. While it found that the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted

the convictions rather than accept Lawson’s stipulation, it declined to apply a harmless-error

analysis. We granted the State’s petition for review. We also find an abuse of discretion in

the admission but hold harmless-error analysis applies. Because the error was harmless

considering the overwhelming evidence of Lawson’s guilt, we affirm the circuit court’s

judgment. I. Factual Background

In January 2021, Lawson drove eighty-five miles per hour through a twenty-five-

mile-per-hour school zone as children were exiting the school. He ignored a signal to stop

and instead led the police on a high-speed chase. Lawson was eventually pulled over and

charged with fleeing. A subsequent search of his person led to the discovery of a loaded

semiautomatic handgun and baggies of cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Lawson

was charged and convicted of five felonies1 arising from this incident: simultaneous

possession of drugs and a firearm, possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine),

possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), possession of firearms by certain persons

(“felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm”), and fleeing. He was also convicted of misdemeanor

possession of marijuana.

To prove the felon element of the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge, the State

introduced certified copies of the judgment and commitment orders from Lawson’s prior

felony convictions. Lawson objected and instead offered to stipulate that he was a felon. The

State refused the stipulation offer, and the circuit court admitted the certified copies of his

prior convictions over Lawson’s objection. The certified copies of the convictions revealed

that Lawson had been previously convicted of unauthorized use of property to facilitate a

crime, possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession of crack cocaine with intent

to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of delivery of a controlled

1 For each of the five felonies, Lawson was charged and sentenced as a habitual offender. 2 substance (marijuana). Lawson was convicted on all charges and appealed the issue of the

admission of the judgment and commitment orders.

II. Analysis

When we grant a petition for review, we consider the appeal as though it had

originally been filed with this court. In re Est. of Haverstick, 2021 Ark. 233, at 3, 635 S.W.3d

482, 484.

Lawson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it admitted the

certified copies of his prior felony convictions over his objection and offer to stipulate that

he was a felon. We review a circuit court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an

abuse of discretion and will reverse only upon a showing of prejudice. Keesee v. State, 2022

Ark. 68, at 7, 641 S.W.3d 628, 635.

In Old Chief v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting Federal Rule of

Evidence 403, held that the general rule is that when a defendant offers to stipulate to his

status as a felon to prove that element of a charge, it is an abuse of discretion for the circuit

court to instead allow the prosecution to admit evidence of the specifics of the prior

conviction. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92 (1997). In Ferguson v. State, we

adopted the reasoning from Old Chief and applied it to Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403.

Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547, 555–56, 210 S.W.3d 53, 57 (2005). We held that “when a

criminal defendant offers to stipulate or admit to the convicted-felon element of the felon-

in-possession-of-a-firearm charge, the circuit court must accept that stipulation or

admission, conditioned by an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant acknowledging

the underlying prior felony conviction and acceding to the stipulation or admission.” Id.

3 Looking to the record, toward the end of the State’s opening statement, the State

said that it would “submit six prior felonies that Mr. Lawson was convicted of, showing you

that he was in fact a felon at the time he was pulled over . . . .” As soon as opening statements

were finished, Lawson requested a bench conference.2 He raised the issue of the State

potentially introducing certified judgments, stated his objection to their introduction, and

instead offered to stipulate that he was a felon. The circuit court overruled his objection,

did not accept the stipulation, and allowed the State to proceed and eventually introduce

the multiple felony convictions. We find this was an abuse of discretion because it violates

Ferguson. The general rule from Ferguson is that if the defendant is willing to stipulate on the

record to his status as a felon, the circuit court must accept it for that element of the charge.

Id.

Yet our inquiry does not end. The State is correct that we do not reverse a circuit

court’s evidentiary errors absent a showing of prejudice. See Lewis v. State, 2023 Ark. 12, at

18. This court did not use a harmless-error analysis in Ferguson, but it also did not reject it.

On one hand, the dicta in Ferguson suggested the prejudicial impact might be severe. Yet

soon after Ferguson, we applied harmless error in a similar situation. See, e.g., Diemer v. State,

365 Ark. 61, 67, 225 S.W.3d 348, 352–53 (2006). In Diemer, we held that although it was

an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow the defendant to stipulate to his status as an inmate

(over the State’s introduction of his judgment and commitment order depicting his life

sentence for rape), we held we would not reverse absent a demonstration of prejudice. Id.

2 It was not completely clear in its opening how the State intended to submit evidence of his prior felonies. Lawson acted swiftly to preserve the issue before the State began its case and offered to stipulate to his felon status. 4 We find no reason not to use harmless error here as we do with other evidentiary

abuse of discretion errors. Although error can occur in trials, when error is harmless, we

will affirm. This also aligns with many federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 173

F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that any potential Old Chief error was harmless

because the evidence of Lawson’s guilt was overwhelming); United States v. Harris, 137 F.3d

1058, 1060 (8th Cir. 1998) (“To warrant relief under Old Chief, the asserted error must

not be harmless.”); United States v. Cunningham, 133 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 1998).

Harmless error exists when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error is

slight. Johnston v. State, 2014 Ark. 110, at 7, 431 S.W.3d 895, 899. We find the circuit

court’s error in admitting the certified copies of Lawson’s convictions was harmless. The

evidence of Lawson’s guilt was overwhelming. Lawson had the handgun and drugs on him.

At trial, the State presented officer testimony describing the high-speed chase, arrest, and

search. Prosecutors introduced into evidence the drugs, handgun, and ammunition found

on Lawson. Crime-scene photographs of Lawson, the handgun, the drugs, and the vehicle

with the open containers of alcohol were admitted. The State also introduced expert

testimony and state crime-laboratory test results identifying the drugs. Evidence of his guilt

on all charges was overwhelming.

In addition, both the prosecutor and the circuit court told the jury that they could

consider the certified copies of Lawson’s prior felonies only as evidence of Lawson’s status

as a felon (and therefore a person not permitted to possess a firearm). The court’s jury

instruction directed the jury not to consider the past convictions as evidence that Lawson

was guilty of any of the other charged conduct. We presume the jury follows instructions

5 given by the court. See, e.g., Nooner v. State, 2014 Ark. 296, at 25, 438 S.W.3d 233, 248.

Given these circumstances, we have no difficulty finding that although there was an abuse

of discretion initially to not accept Lawson’s stipulation he was a felon, the error was

harmless, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Affirmed; court of appeals opinion vacated.

BAKER and HUDSON, JJ., dissent.

COURTNEY RAE HUDSON, Justice, dissenting. I agree that the circuit court

abused its discretion by admitting certified copies of appellant Jermaine Lawson’s prior

convictions rather than allowing him to stipulate to his status as a felon. However, I disagree

with the majority’s conclusion that the error was harmless. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

We may declare an evidentiary error harmless if the evidence of guilt is

overwhelming and the error is slight. Collins v. State, 2019 Ark. 110, 571 S.W.3d 469. To

determine whether the error is slight, we look to see if the defendant was prejudiced by the

erroneously admitted evidence. Beard v. State, 2020 Ark. 62, 594 S.W.3d 29. Prejudice is

not presumed, and we will not reverse a conviction absent a showing of prejudice by the

defendant. Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1, 431 S.W.3d 249.

While the evidence presented by the State in support of Lawson’s convictions may

have been overwhelming, I cannot say that the error was slight in this case. In Old Chief v.

United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the petitioner was charged with assault with a dangerous

weapon, using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession

of a firearm. Old Chief’s prior felony conviction was for assault causing serious bodily injury.

Prior to his trial, Old Chief moved to prevent the Government from revealing the name

6 and nature of his prior conviction, arguing that this evidence “would unfairly tax the jury’s

capacity to hold the Government to its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” on his

current charges. Id. at 175. He instead offered to stipulate to the fact of his prior conviction

and contended that this offer rendered the name and nature of the offense inadmissible under

Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the danger of unfair prejudice from this

evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value.

The Supreme Court agreed with Old Chief’s argument that the details of his prior

conviction were more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 and reversed and

remanded. The Court stated that,

[i]n dealing with the specific problem raised by [ 18 U.S.C.] § 922(g)(1) and its prior- conviction element, there can be no question that evidence of the name or nature of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. That risk will vary from case to case, for the reasons already given, but will be substantial whenever the official record offered by the Government would be arresting enough to lure a juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning. Where a prior conviction was for a gun crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious, and Old Chief sensibly worried that the prejudicial effect of his prior assault conviction, significant enough with respect to the current gun charges alone, would take on added weight from the related assault charge against him.

Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).

In Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005), we addressed this issue in

the context of a defendant accused of violating Arkansas’s felon-in-possession statute.

Ferguson was charged with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of possession of

firearms by a convicted felon. To prove Ferguson’s status as a convicted felon, the State

sought to admit the record of his previous conviction for aggravated assault. The circuit

court denied Ferguson’s motion in limine offering to stipulate to his status as a felon and

7 requesting that the State be prohibited from introducing the specific details of the felony.

We adopted the rationale in Old Chief, stating that “[i]n the narrow sphere of felon-in-

possession-of-a-firearm cases, the prejudicial impact of evidence on the nature of the prior

crime offered merely to prove the convicted-felon-status element cannot be controverted.”

Ferguson, 362 Ark. at 555, 210 S.W.3d at 57; see also Austin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 380, 385,

255 S.W.3d 888, 891 (2007) (applying our holding in Ferguson and stating that the prejudice

to the defendant from the introduction of evidence of his prior felony conviction for

second-degree battery was “apparent” because it was a felon-in-possession case).

Here, Lawson faced charges of possession of a firearm by certain persons,

simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of methamphetamine, possession

of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and fleeing. Lawson’s prior convictions that were

presented to the jury over his objection involved very similar drug crimes—namely, delivery

of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver, possession of cocaine with

the intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. This is precisely the situation in

which the prejudicial impact on the defendant from the introduction of the prior

convictions has been held to be “especially obvious,” “apparent,” and uncontroverted. Old

Chief, 519 U.S. at 185; Ferguson, 362 Ark. at 555, 210 S.W.3d at 57; Austin, 98 Ark. App.

at 385, 255 S.W.3d at 891. Although the majority asserts that we have declined to reverse

based on a failure to demonstrate prejudice under similar circumstances in Diemer v. State,

365 Ark. 61, 225 S.W.3d 348 (2006), that case is clearly distinguishable. First, Diemer did

not involve a felon-in-possession charge and therefore does not fall within the “narrow

sphere” of cases discussed in Old Chief and Ferguson. See Ferguson, 362 Ark. at 555, 210

8 S.W.3d at 57. Second, unlike Lawson’s convictions, Diemer’s prior convictions were not

similar in nature to his current charge of capital murder. Finally, the prejudice claimed by

Diemer, which was that the jury would impose a death sentence knowing that he was

already serving a sentence of life, did not actually occur in that case. See Diemer, 365 Ark. at

67, 225 S.W.3d at 352–53. Because I cannot conclude that Lawson was not prejudiced by

the circuit court’s erroneous admission of his prior convictions, I would reverse and remand.

BAKER, J., joins.

Debra Reece Johnson, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.