Sakkal v. Anaplan Inc., .

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedAugust 31, 2021
Docket3:20-cv-05959
StatusUnknown

This text of Sakkal v. Anaplan Inc., . (Sakkal v. Anaplan Inc., .) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sakkal v. Anaplan Inc., ., (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 FADEL SAKKAL, et al., 10 Case No. 20-cv-05959-RS Plaintiffs, 11 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 12 DISMISS ANAPLAN INC., et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 This federal securities class action arises out of allegedly false and misleading statements 17 made by Anaplan Inc. (“Anaplan”), its CEO Frank Calderoni, and its CFO David Morton to 18 investors in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC 19 Rule 10b-5. Though the complaint certainly describes a toxic and abrasive work environment, it 20 does not plead securities fraud. The motion is accordingly granted with leave to amend. The 21 requests for incorporation by reference and judicial notice are granted in part and denied in part. 22 II. BACKGROUND1 23 A. The Company 24 Anaplan is a software-as-a-service company providing planning and decision-making 25 software to companies. Its platform seeks to “fundamentally transform[] planning by connecting 26 1 The factual background is based on the allegations in the complaint (which must be taken as true 27 for purposes of this motion), documents incorporated by reference, and documents of which 1 all of the people, data, and plans needed to accelerate business value and enable real-time planning 2 and decision-making in rapidly changing business environments.” Amended Complaint (“AC”) ¶ 3 2 (alteration in original). One of its tools, Anaplan for Sales Forecasting, claims to obviate 4 “[d]elays in forecasting due to manual and siloed processes” by “[e]nabl[ing] accurate, real-time 5 forecast creation in one place while automatically surfacing actionable insights to improve sales 6 productivity.” Id. ¶ 27. 7 Unlike many other software companies, Anaplan’s direct sales team sells subscriptions, 8 which “creat[e] a stream of recurring revenue.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff indicates that under Generally 9 Accepted Account Practices, a focus on reported “revenue” would inadequately capture 10 subscription business generated within a given period, leading investors and analysts to focus on 11 the growth of Anaplan’s “billings.” He defines “billings” as the sum of Anaplan’s periodic 12 revenue and the change in its deferred revenue. Id. ¶ 31. Growth of this “billings” metric is 13 measured year-over-year, meaning the fourth quarter of 2018 would be compared to the fourth 14 quarter of 2019. Analysts endorsed the idea that Anaplan’s billings were a “key performance 15 indicator.” Id. ¶ 32. 16 Anaplan tracked billings, along with other related metrics including “bookings” and 17 “backlog.” While a “booking” is “the entire value of the contract,” “billings,” in the context of a 18 single contract, refers to the “total revenue the Company expects to recognize over the coming 19 year from that contract.” Id. ¶ 34. Confidential Witness (“CW”) 3, a Senior Revenue Accountant 20 at Anaplan from May 2019 to September 2020, was personally involved in preparing two reports 21 presented to Morton at the monthly CFO meeting – the “BBB” (bookings, billings, and backlogs) 22 report and the billing analysis report, which included all the invoices from the current month, 23 compared month-over-month billings, assessed billings, and accounted for variances. 24 B. The Culture 25 It was reportedly well-known that Calderoni and Morton often clashed with the sales team. 26 According to CW1, Chief Revenue Officer from February 2018 to April 2019, Calderoni’s “veins 27 popp[ed] out of his neck while he screamed expletives at Anaplan’s [sales] executives,” creating 1 “a combative environment on steroids.” Id. ¶ 36. CW1 also reported, and CW4 (Anaplan’s former 2 Vice President of Corporate Marketing from November 2019 to June 2020) corroborated, that 3 Calderoni “hovered over the sales department,” interfering with, and sometimes overruling, 4 leadership decisions and micromanaging day-to-day operations. Calderoni’s “erratic” changes, 5 CW4 said, “adversely affected” the sales team by “creating an environment of chaos and 6 paralysis.” Id. ¶ 36–37. Yet Calderoni asked CW4 at their job interview to fix Anaplan’s “big 7 morale problem.” Id. ¶ 37. 8 The demand that salespeople meet “unachievable” quotas exacerbated the problem. Id. ¶ 9 38. CW7, a Strategic Account Executive from August 2018 to November 2019, explained that 10 salespeople assign closing probabilities a stage (i.e., 30% of closing is a stage 2 while 50% is stage 11 4), though CW8, a Strategic Account Executive from early 2018 to early 2019, recalled that a deal 12 only had to be 80% to 90% likely to close to be labeled a “commit.” Id. ¶ 39. According to CW5, 13 Anaplan’s Regional Vice President of Sales from September 2010 to April 2020, CW6, an 14 Enterprise Account Executive from March 2018 to December 2019, and CW7, only 10% to 20% 15 of the sales team met their quotas, compared to 50% at CW7’s previous employer. 16 In addition to urging overcommitment, sales managers routinely inflated these “stages” in 17 the billings projections, said CW7.2 Sales managers would routinely report deals assigned a 50% 18 chance of closing by salespeople as likely to close by the end of the quarter, but rarely 19 downgraded the likeliness of closing. Many of the CWs agreed that salespeople were pressured to 20 exaggerate the likelihood that deals would close. CW6 recalled threats from their manager that 21 “people who don’t have [sales] pipeline don’t have jobs.” Id. ¶ 41. 22 This intense focus on the pipeline permeated the company. CW7’s supervisor indicated 23 that she and the other sales managers “ran the Company’s sales forecasting model each week” in 24 order to report it to “everybody” in leadership. Id. ¶ 43. CW2, Vice President of Financial 25

26 2 Notably, it is unclear whether these projections are the ones that went into the BBB report 27 handed to Morton every month. 1 Planning and Analysis from September 2017 to June 2019, recalled Calderoni was so “fixated” on 2 billings that he would get “directly” involved with sales teams who did not meet their quotas. Id. 3 This intense pressure to overcommit, Plaintiff alleges, resulted in an artificial inflation of 4 Anaplan’s billings, a delay and decrease in billings, and high turnover in the sales department. 5 CW2 said that the software he developed to model and project billings and billings growth 6 incorporated the exaggerated data manipulated by the sales managers. CW7 reported that the 7 forecasting practices forced commitments to be pushed to later quarters at lower closes. For 8 example, one of CW7’s deals that was originally expected to close in the fourth quarter of fiscal 9 year 2020 at $1.3 million eventually closed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021 for $400,000. 10 CW6 observed a high turnover rate throughout the sales department, as sales managers were urged 11 to “hire fast and fire faster.” Id. ¶ 46. CW4 lamented that Calderoni drove away all the best sales 12 and marketing people, including Global Customer Officer Paul Melchiorre, held up as a “guru” of 13 the platform by CW9, an Enterprise Business Development Representative at Anaplan from 14 October 2017 to July 2020, and CW10, Corporate Strategic Advisor at Anaplan from January 15 2020 to April 2020. Chief Growth Officer Mark Anderson, hired August 5, 2019 and touted by 16 Calderoni as a “visionary growth leader,” and by CW4 as a “rock star sales guy,” also left quickly, 17 purportedly to spend more time with his family. Id. ¶ 48. 18 C. The Call and Other Allegedly False and Misleading Statements 19 1. November 21 Earnings Call 20 Just before the start of the Class Period, which ran from November 21, 2019 through 21 February 26, 2020, analysts praised Anaplan’s billings growth as “further validation of strong 22 sales trends.” Id. ¶ 4.

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