Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.

551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 374, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8270, 75 U.S.L.W. 4462
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJune 21, 2007
Docket06-484
StatusPublished
Cited by5,843 cases

This text of 551 U.S. 308 (Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 374, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8270, 75 U.S.L.W. 4462 (2007).

Opinions

[313]*313Justice Ginsburg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See, e. g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 345 (2005); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 (1964). Private securities fraud actions, however, if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct conforms to the law. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 81 (2006). As a check against abusive litigation by private parties, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 109 Stat. 737.

Exacting pleading requirements are among the control measures Congress included in the PSLRA. The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to state with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i. e., the defendant’s intention “to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 194, and n. 12 (1976); see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1), (2). [314]*314This case concerns the latter requirement. As set out in §21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA, plaintiffs must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U. S. C. § 78u-4(b)(2).

Congress left the key term “strong inference” undefined, and Courts of Appeals have divided on its meaning. In the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the “strong inference” standard would be met if the complaint “allege[d] facts from which, if true, a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.” 437 F. 3d 588, 602 (2006). That formulation, we conclude, does not capture the stricter demand Congress sought to convey in §21D(b)(2). It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the complaint’s allegations the requisite state of mind. Rather, to determine whether a complaint’s scienter allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a court governed by §21D(b)(2) must engage in a comparative evaluation; it must consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff, as the Seventh Circuit did, but also competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged. An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations for the defendant’s conduct. To qualify as “strong” within the intendment of §21D(b)(2), we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable — it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.

I

Petitioner Tellabs, Inc., manufactures specialized equipment used in fiber optic networks. During the time period relevant to this case, petitioner Richard Notebaert was Tel-labs’ chief executive officer and president. Respondents (Shareholders) are persons who purchased Tellabs stock between December 11, 2000, and June 19, 2001. They accuse [315]*315Tellabs and Notebaert (as well as several other Tellabs executives) of engaging in a scheme to deceive the investing public about the true value of Tellabs’ stock. See 437 F. 3d, at 591; App. 94-98.1

Beginning on December 11,2000, the Shareholders allege, Notebaert (and by imputation Tellabs) “falsely reassured public investors, in a series of statements . . . that Tellabs was continuing to enjoy strong demand for its products and earning record revenues,” when, in fact, Notebaert knew the opposite was true. Id., at 94-95, 98. From December 2000 until the spring of 2001, the Shareholders claim, Notebaert knowingly misled the public in four ways. 437 F. 3d, at 596. First, he made statements indicating that demand for Tel-labs’ flagship networking device, the TITAN 5500, was continuing to grow, when, in fact, demand for that product was waning. Id., at 596, 597. Second, Notebaert made statements indicating that the TITAN 6500, Tellabs’ next-generation networking device, was available for delivery, and that demand for that product was strong and growing, when in truth the product was not ready for delivery and demand was weak. Id., at 596, 597-598. Third, he falsely represented Tellabs’ financial results for the fourth quarter of 2000 (and, in connection with those results, condoned the practice of “channel stuffing,” under which Tellabs flooded its customers with unwanted products). Id., at 596, 598. Fourth, Notebaert made a series of overstated revenue projections, when demand for the TITAN 5500 was drying up and production of the TITAN 6500 was behind schedule. Id., at 596, 598-599. Based on Notebaert’s sunny assessments, the [316]*316Shareholders contend, market analysts recommended that investors buy Tellabs’ stock. See id., at 592.

The first public glimmer that business was not so healthy came in March 2001 when Tellabs modestly reduced its first quarter sales projections. Ibid. In the next months, Tel-labs made progressively more cautious statements about its projected sales. On June 19, 2001, the last day of the class period, Tellabs disclosed that demand for the TITAN 5500 had significantly dropped. Id., at 593. Simultaneously, the company substantially lowered its revenue projections for the second quarter of 2001. The next day, the price of Tellabs stock, which had reached a high of $67 during the period, plunged to a low of $15.87. Ibid.

On December 3,2002, the Shareholders filed a class action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Ibid. Their complaint stated, inter alia, that Tellabs and Notebaert had engaged in securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. §78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5,17 CFR §240.10b-5 (2006), also that Notebaert was a “controlling person” under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. §78t(a), and therefore derivatively liable for the company’s fraudulent acts. See App. 98-101, 167-171. Tellabs moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Shareholders had failed to plead their case with the particularity the PSLRA requires. The District Court agreed, and therefore dismissed the complaint without prejudice. App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a-117a; see Johnson v. Tellabs, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945 (ND Ill. 2004).

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551 U.S. 308, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179, 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 374, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8270, 75 U.S.L.W. 4462, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tellabs-inc-v-makor-issues-rights-ltd-scotus-2007.