Robinson v. Guzman

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 6, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00385
StatusUnknown

This text of Robinson v. Guzman (Robinson v. Guzman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Guzman, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK HENRY L. ROBINSON, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-0385 (LTS) ANDRIS GUZMAN, O/B/O VICTORY ORDER TO AMEND MITSUBISHI; ANDREA MARKEY, O/B/O FLAGSHIP CREDIT ACCEPTANCE; CRESCENT BANK & TRUST, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, asserting claims under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and other federal statutes and rules. Named as Defendants are Andris Guzman, an employee of Victory Mitsubishi (“Victory”) in the Bronx, New York; Andrea Markey, an employee of Flagship Credit Acceptance (“Flagship”), located in Chadds, Pennsylvania;1 and Crescent Bank & Trust (“Crescent”), located in New Orleans, Louisiana. By order dated January 30, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.

1 It is unclear whether Plaintiff seeks to sue Guzman and Markey or their respective employers, Victory and Flagship. In the caption to the complaint, Plaintiff lists the individuals “o/b/o” or “on behalf of” their respective employers. (See ECF 2, at 1.) In the “parties” section of the complaint, however, Plaintiff lists Guzman and Markey as defendants. (See id. at 2.) STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and asserts claims under the TILA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667, and the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. Plaintiff also purports to bring claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(p), Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (See ECF 2, at 3.)

In the statement of claim, Plaintiff writes: 1) Plaintiff2 introduced fraud within the contact entered with Defendant Victory Mitsubishi to defendant, including lack of full disclosure, including providing terms and definitions, and rescission rights, of the consumer credit transaction. Defendant has failed to respond to all affidavits and notices of claims that were sent certified mail via the United States Postal Service.

2) Defendant was provided the opportunity to State a claim or to remain silent and to agree with all terms set forth in the unresponded, unrebutted certified Notice of Recission, Notice of Fault and Opportunity to Cure and the Notice of Default, which included a Request for Admissions and a True Bill containing said violations.3 (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff asks the Court to “order Andris Guzman and partner, on behalf of Victory Mitsubishi, to cease communications with Plaintiff due to violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3).”4 (Id.) He also asks the Court “to order relief due to the discovery of fraud, and providing the opportunity for defendant to state a claim or remain silent to which the Defendants, has remained silent in not responding to certified claims,” and that the Court order “that Victory Mitsubishi officially rescind the transaction and return down payment, for Flagship Credit Acceptance, who

2 The Court presumes Plaintiff meant to refer to “Defendant” here. 3 The Court quotes the complaint verbatim. All spelling, punctuation, and grammar are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. 4 Section 1692e(3) includes “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney” in the definition of a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” for purposes of the FDCPA. Victory Mitsubishi assigned the contract to, to return all past payments made towards this acquisition, and to release any lien and interest that Victory Mitsubishi or other related parties may have.” (Id.

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Bluebook (online)
Robinson v. Guzman, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-guzman-nysd-2023.