Richter, S.A. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n

939 F.2d 1176, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19867
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 26, 1991
DocketNos. 89-1925, 90-8110
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 939 F.2d 1176 (Richter, S.A. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Richter, S.A. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 939 F.2d 1176, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19867 (5th Cir. 1991).

Opinion

BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

In this most unusual Texas lender liability diversity action, the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association appeals a jury verdict for plaintiffs, as well as the district court’s (1) award of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs and (2) judgment against the Bank on its counterclaims. And, the plaintiffs appeal the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest and the amount of the fees. We AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART.

I.

In the early 1980s, Henry Bernabé, a representative of Richter, S.A. — an international vineyard company headquartered in France — came to Texas to pursue opportunities to develop the wine industry. He met Richardson Gill, who was already involved in a winery in Texas. They explored possible locations in Texas for a winery and enlisted the help of Domaines Cordier, S.A., headquartered in France and one of the largest wine distributors in the world. Bernabe, Gill and Cordier representatives decided to locate the winery on land, with vineyards, owned by the University of Texas, and formed GRC, a corporation, in the summer of 1983. In the sum[1180]*1180mer of 1984, they brought in the Sanchez family as additional investors; and a limited partnership was formed: S-G-R-C, Ltd. (SGRC), for Sanchez, Gill, Richter and Cor-dier.

SGRC was formed to lease land and vineyards from the University, construct the winery, and produce, market and sell wine. The limited partners were: (1) Bakersfield Development Corporation, owned by a Sanchez enterprise, Tesoro Savings and Loan Association; (2) Gill Wine & Grape Company, formed by Richardson Gill; and (3) Richter-Cordier Corporation, owned equally by Richter and Cordier. The general partner was SGRC, Inc., owned by Richter-Cordier Corporation, Gill Wine & Grape Company, and Tesoro.

As will quickly become evident, the distinction between SGRC, including its general and limited partners, and the persons or entities (Tesoro, Richardson Gill and his wife Sharon Gill, Richter, and Cordier) that owned them is critical. As stated in the Wine Purchase Agreement (WPA) between SGRC and these persons and entities, referenced in the WPA as “purchasers”, the purchasers “controlled] all the limited partners of [SGRC] and controlled] all the stock of S-G-R-C, Inc., the sole general partner of [SGRC].”

The University had invested more than $7 million in the land and vines. As the vines reached maturity, SGRC was to take over the cultivation and harvesting. Under the lease with SGRC, the University kept title to the grapes until harvest. The initial SGRC business plan called for an initial capital investment of $4 million and for the winery to operate at a loss for several years.

SGRC came in contact with the Bank in 1984 in its search for financing. The Bank arranged three lines of credit: (1) a $1 million working capital line of credit, frozen in 1986 at $500,000; (2) a $2.8 million building financing lease; and (3) a $7.2 million equipment lease held by General Foods Credit Corporation (GFCC), backed by a Bank letter of credit. GFCC owned SGRC’s equipment, took a tax depreciation deduction and charged SGRC rent. In the event of default, GFCC was entitled to draw against the letter of credit (not only the amount due under the lease, but also an additional amount for tax penalties GFCC would face if it were prematurely forced to surrender its investment).

To secure the financing, the Bank and SGRC entered into a credit agreement, a winery credit agreement, a security agreement and a deed of trust. The credit agreement permitted acceleration without notice and required any waiver of default to be in writing; any failure to pay debts to the Bank when due was considered a default.

The SGRC partners would not provide an additional form of security desired by the Bank — personal guarantees.1 Accordingly, as noted, SGRC and the persons and entities that controlled the partners entered into the Wine Purchase Agreement (WPA), which created obligations from Richardson and Sharon Gill, Richter, Cordier and Teso-ro (the purchasers) to SGRC. The Bank and the SGRC partners were not parties to [1181]*1181the WPA. The WPA provided that if SGRC’s net worth dropped below $1.4 million and SGRC did not pay its debts when due to the Bank or GFCC, the purchasers would pro rata purchase up to $5 million of wine from SGRC “in order to enable [SGRC] to meet its Monthly Payment Obligations when due.” If wine were not “immediately available,” the purchasers agreed to “pre-order and make advance payments” to SGRC. In addition, all WPA proceeds to SGRC were “assigned and [to be] paid directly” to the Bank. And, under the security agreement, the Bank had the right “to demand, receive and ... sue for all moneys payable to [SGRC].”

Under the SGRC partnership agreement, all actions required unanimity. The partnership agreement also provided a buy/sell provision which permitted one partner to propose a buy-out to another, who could either accept or elect to buy out the proposing partner on the same terms. Moreover, a buy/sell proposal was subject to approval by both the University and the Bank.

The SGRC partnership agreement also provided that the partners would not receive compensation until the company was profitable. However, when a French bank purchased Cordier in late 1984, it requested compensation for its services. This led to problems among the partners and an attempted buy-out by the Cordier successor in early 1985. The University did not approve the buy-out, because it wanted all four partners to remain.

Among other problems in late 1985, SGRC’s wines were not being marketed, they were unavailable for purchase, and the winery was overbuilt and expensive to operate. A December 31, 1985, audit of SGRC revealed that it was in violation of its loan agreements and “all of the debt could be called for payment in 1986.” SGRC met in February 1986 to discuss its problems and consider a change in the partnership structure. It hired a workout negotiator, Don Thomas, to assist in restructuring its financing with the Bank. Thomas advised SGRC that the best way to get the Bank to negotiate would be for SGRC to default on its obligations to the Bank. In April 1986, Thomas met with Bank officials Sadani and Kalp, from Houston, and told them that SGRC would not make further payments “until a restructure acceptable to all parties was made.” The Bank responded that the GFCC lease had been in default since January and could be called in May, after 95 days of default.

On May 6, 1986, Bernabe met with Sada-ni and Richard Albright, a senior Bank officer from California who had initially approved the credit. Bernabe told them that Richter was interested in buying out Cordier if the Bank would restructure the financing. The officers advised Bernabe that they were willing to “work with [him] toward a restructuring” if Richter would both bring the GFCC lease current and keep the winery operating throughout the summer. At that time, SGRC owed approximately $320,000 on the equipment lease; but Richter was only liable, as a purchaser under the WPA, for approximately $115,000 of this amount. And, through its partnership interest, it was not obligated to fund SGRC’s operating expenses.

The next day, May 7, Richter committed to pay (and shortly thereafter did pay) approximately $320,000 to bring the GFCC equipment lease current through April 1986. That amount was credited against its obligations under the WPA. That same day, Bernabe met with SGRC and made a proposal for Richter to buy out the partners.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
939 F.2d 1176, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 19867, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/richter-sa-v-bank-of-america-national-trust-savings-assn-ca5-1991.