Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund

314 S.W.3d 913, 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 931, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 478, 2010 WL 2636124
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 2, 2010
Docket06-0975
StatusPublished
Cited by207 cases

This text of 314 S.W.3d 913 (Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grant Thornton LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 931, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 478, 2010 WL 2636124 (Tex. 2010).

Opinion

Chief Justice JEFFERSON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Certified accountants audit companies for many purposes, not least of which is to *915 provide corporate directors with an objective assessment of their companies’ performance. Audits are also prepared to give information to a specific investor who the auditor knows will rely on its contents. We must decide whether the law imposes an obligation on the auditor to provide an accurate accounting not to the corporation or known investor, but to anyone who reads and relies on it. We conclude that it does not. Likewise, we hold that the particular investors involved in this case could not have justifiably relied on the audit reports as to purchases made after they knew the corporation was at risk of financial ruin, and they may not substitute their escrow agent’s reliance for their own without also being bound by its knowledge. Finally, we reject the investors’ “holder” claims — claims not that they bought or sold securities based on the auditor’s reports, but that they held them when they otherwise would not have — in the absence of a direct communication with the auditors. For these reasons, we reverse in part the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment that the investors take nothing.

I. Background 1

Respondents, Prospect High Income Fund (Prospect), ML CBO IV (Cayman), Ltd., Pamco Cayman, Ltd., and Pam Capital Funding, L.P. (collectively, “the Funds”), are bond and hedge funds. Over a five-year period, the Funds bought bonds from Epic Resorts, LLC (Epic), a vacation timeshare operator, at prices ranging from par value to 21% of par value. Epic is not a party to this case.

In 1998, Epic registered its bonds with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and sold them on the open market. The bonds, secured by Epic’s assets, were high yield, below investment grade securities. 2 They were governed by an Indenture, and an escrow and disbursement agreement with United States Trust Company of New York (“U.S. Trust”). The Indenture required Epic to pay the bondholders semi-annual (June and December) interest payments of $8.45 million until the bonds matured in 2005. The Indenture also mandated that Epic file with the SEC audited financial statements, an annual report, and an independent auditor’s report. Epic also had to obtain a “negative assurance” statement 3 from its auditor, confirming Epic’s compliance with the Indenture.

The Indenture named U.S. Trust as trustee for the bonds, and the escrow and disbursement agreement named U.S. *916 Trust as escrow agent. Epic agreed to open an escrow account with U.S. Trust, from the bond proceeds, at an initial amount of $16.9 million. At all times thereafter, for the bondholders’ security, Epic was required to maintain in the account “funds sufficient to make the next required interest payment” — $8.45 million. Failure to maintain this minimum escrow balance for more than sixty days after receiving notice from U.S. Trust constituted an event of default under the Indenture. The account was to have been established in U.S. Trust’s name, and required that “all funds accepted by [U.S. Trust] pursuant to this Agreement shall be held for [U.S. Trust] for the benefit of [U.S. Trust] and the holders of the Notes.”

Shortly after Epic issued the bonds, Prospect — one of the four Funds here— made three bond purchases. Epic made the requisite interest payments to its bondholders in June and December 1999. Subsequently, in March 2000, Epic retained Grant Thornton, LLP to audit its 1999 financial statements and to review its statements for the first three quarters of 2000. Grant Thornton discovered that Epic had opened a U.S. Trust cash management account, instead of the stipulated escrow account, and that the balance fell short of the required minimum. Despite these discrepancies, Grant Thornton issued a report in April 2000 that confirmed Epic’s continued compliance with the escrow requirement. 4 The financial statement showed $12,004,000 cash in escrow, and Note F stated that “[t]he Company maintains [$8.45 million] at all times in escrow to cover the next required interest payment.” According to Grant Thornton’s partner-in-charge, Epic told Grant Thornton that U.S. Trust allowed Epic to use more than one account (the U.S. Trust account plus a PNC account) to meet its responsibilities under the Indenture and Escrow agreement; that the combined balance of those accounts was never less than $12 million; that U.S. Trust had never objected to the absence of funds in the U.S. Trust account; and that Epic periodically transferred funds to U.S. Trust to make the interest payment.

In early 2000, Highland Capital Management assumed the management of Prospect’s portfolio. Highland has more than $1 billion in assets under management, with below investment grade bonds comprising about 90% of its portfolio. Davis Deadman, Highland’s senior portfolio manager, was responsible for the Funds’ investments in Epic and made all purchasing decisions for them. In December 2000, Cayman (another one of the Funds) bought Epic bonds, and Epic timely made its December interest payment. Around that time, Epic’s primary lender, Prudential (which loaned Epic $2 million per week against its receivables), told Epic that it would not be renewing its credit arrangement. According to Epic’s president, the credit relationship with Prudential was critical to Epic’s existence and its ability to satisfy its obligations to bondholders, and Prudential’s failure to renew the loan would “devastate]” Epic. Deadman learned (early in the first quarter of 2001) of Prudential’s non-renewal but continued to buy bonds anyway, significantly increasing the Funds’ holdings of Epic debt.

*917 On April 17, 2001, Grant Thornton issued its 2000 report, which again showed over $12 million cash in escrow, and again confirmed that “[t]he Company maintains [$8.45 million] at all times in escrow to cover the next required interest payment.” On June 15, 2001, Epic missed its scheduled interest payment to the bondholders. Epic’s president testified that, although Epic could have made the payment, Prudential’s failure to renew the credit arrangement required Epic to use the money to fund operations. Four days later, the Funds purchased more bonds and then took action to protect their investments. Because Epic’s missed interest payment constituted an event of default under the Indenture, the Funds forced Epic into bankruptcy in July 2001. The Funds then sued Grant Thornton, alleging, among other things, 5 that the auditor’s reports misrepresented the escrow account’s status. 6 Nevertheless, the Funds — under Highlands’ management — continued to buy Epic bonds in February 2002, in April 2002, and again in April 2003. 7

The Funds alleged that Grant Thornton committed fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, third-party-beneficiary breach of contract, conspiracy to commit fraud, and aiding and abetting fraud.

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Bluebook (online)
314 S.W.3d 913, 53 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 931, 2010 Tex. LEXIS 478, 2010 WL 2636124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grant-thornton-llp-v-prospect-high-income-fund-tex-2010.