OPINION
RILEY, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Andrew D. Purcell (Purcell), appeals the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Appellee-Plaintiff, Southern Hills Investments, LLC (Southern Hills), with regard to Southern Hills' Complaint against Purcell alleging a breach of fidu-clary duty and self-dealing.
We affirm.
ISSUES
Purcell raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as the following four issues:
(1) Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the manager of a limited liability company (LLC) breached his common law fiduciary duty to the LLC and the LLC's member;
(2) Whether the trial court erred by concluding that a manager's actions on behalf of an LLC constituted willful misconduct or recklessness pursuant to Ind.Code § 28-18-4-2;
(3) Whether the trial court erred by concluding that a member of an LLC can maintain a direct action, rather than a derivative action, against the LLC's manager; and
(4) Whether the trial court properly refused to offset the damages awarded to Southern Hills.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Southern Hills is an Indiana limited liability company related to, and having certain owners in common with, Smithville Telephone Company, Inc. (Smithville). In furtherance of Smithyville's telecommunications and data transmission needs, Southern Hills purchased fiber-optic cable from Metro Xmit, LLC (Metro) based in Indiana and owned by Purcell and his wife. After Metro constructed the fiber optic cable networks, it sold indefeagible rights (IRUs) granting purchasers usage rights to certain parts of the network over a long period of time, after which such rights revert to Metro.
On December 29, 1999, Southern Hills purchased from Metro an IRU to use the six strands of fiber optic cable in the Southern Loop for a total amount of $1.5 million. The Southern Loop was a circuit [994]*994of 216 fibers being constructed by Metro, forming a complete loop from Indianapolis to Bloomington to Columbus to Shelbyville to Indianapolis. Southern Hills' interest in completion of the Southern Loop caused it to loan money to Metro which, under Purcell's direction, was chronically short of cash. By March of 2000, Southern Hills had loaned approximately $3,500,000 to Metro.
In late 1999 and early 2000, Dwane Glaney (Glancy), Smithville's and Southern Hills' chief financial officer pursued discussions with Purcell to convert Metro's debt to an equity position held by Southern Hills in the Southern Loop project. In March of 2000, these discussions resulted in the formation of VillageNet Services, LLC (VillageNet), with Southern Hills and Metro as its sole members, each owning 50% of the newly created company. Villa-geNet's purpose was to market and sell fibers in the Southern Loop, providing its members with a return on their investments. In exchange for its 50% ownership interest in VillageNet, Southern Hills agreed to forgive Metro's indebtedness and provide additional operating capital to Metro which had an aggregate value to Metro of $5,000,000. Metro contributed an IRU for 188 of the 216 fibers in the Southern Loop. Metro and Southern Hills agreed that the IRU's value was $10,000,000, and thus, when offset against the $5,000,000 value of the forgiven indebtedness to Metro, both founding members were each deemed to have contributed $5,000,000 of value to VillageNet in exchange for their equal ownership interests.
Pursuant to VillageNet's operating agreement, each of the members was to appoint its own representative as a Villa-geNet co-manager. In this regard, Metro appointed Purcell, while Southern Hills appointed Haney. Furthermore, the operating agreement stipulated that Metro would be solely responsible for the construction of the Southern Loop, including the financing thereof. In addition, both co-managers agreed that Metro would perform VillageNet's administrative functions, including accounting. Accordingly, in April of 2000, Metro hired Toni Niemann (Niemann), a certified public accountant, who was also charged with VillageNet's accounting and who reported to Purcell.
At the time VillageNet was formed, Metro was negotiating with AEP Communications, Inc. (AEP) regarding the purchase of IRUs for fibers located both in- and outside the Southern Loop. However, because VillageNet now owned the IRU for the Southern Loop fiber, Metro was not in a position to sell the right in a single contract, as requested by AEP. In order to grant AEP's request, VillageNet re-assigned to Metro a portion of the Southern Loop IRU. However when drafting this assignment (Assignment Agreement), ancy failed to include the Bloomington to Columbus portion of the Southern Loop. In exchange for the assignment, Metro agreed to forward to VillageNet AEP payments related to Southern Loop after Metro received them. (Glancy estimated the total payment to be in the amount of $2,136,664. Thereafter, Metro and AEP executed a single IRU contract.
Niemann, as the controller for Metro and in charge of VillageNet's accounting, was responsible for allocating AEP's payments to Metro between those attributable to the Southern Loop project, which needed to be forwarded to VillageNet, and those attributable to fibers outside the Southern Loop, which were to be retained by Metro. As a result of Glaney's omission to include the Bloomington to Columbus portion in the assignment, Niemann failed to mark certain AEP payments as payable to VillageNet.
[995]*995On or about October 31, 2000, Southern Hills received a payment of $945,473.82 from VillageNet. On December 29, 2000, Metro received a $200,717 payment from AEP for Southern Loop fiber. Metro did not forward any of this amount to Villa-geNet. Thereafter, on February 2, 2001, Metro received a payment of $478,870.15 from AEP, of which $301,075.50 was earmarked as Southern Loop fiber. Metro kept all of this money. In accordance with Glaney's Assignment Agreement, these payments should have been forwarded to VillageNet, minus a certain amount for administrative fees. A three percent commission would be paid by VillageNet to the member that had generated the sale, with the remainder of the sum distributed equally between both members.
On February 2, 2001, Purcell's wife wrote a personal check for $600,000 to Mastee North America (Mastec), one of Metro's contractors and creditors. Metro owed Mastec a substantial amount of money for the installation of fibers both in- and outside the Southern Loop project. The payment by Purcell's wife was treated as a loan to Metro. Eleven days later, on February 13, 2001, Purcell directed Metro to repay the loan, increased by twelve percent interest in the amount of $2,200, with funds received from AEP.
In March of 2001, Metro obtained refinancing under a Bridge Loan Agreement with GE Capital. Under the terms of the Bridge Loan, Metro was severely restricted in its ability to independently manage its cash resources. During May of 2001, Niemann discovered that the Bloomington to Columbus portion of the Southern Loop was mistakenly omitted from the Assignment Agreement. She calculated that in addition to a $160,249.80 payment received from AEP on February 9, 2001, Metro had received and kept all other AEP payments for the Southern Loop instead of forwarding them to VillageNet. She informed Purcell of this omission and resulting accounting errors and consequently advised Purcell to inform Ganey and forward Vil-lageNet the money it was due.
Because of Glaney's omission in the Assignment Agreement, Metro had sold AEP an IRU for fibers it did not own. In June or July of 2001, Niemann and Pat Opelt, Metro's general manager, met with Glaney to revise the Assignment Agreement. Neither Niemann nor Opelt told Glaney about the AEP money for the Southern Loop that Metro had failed to forward to VillageNet. As a result of this meeting, (Glaney prepared a corrected Assignment Agreement from VillageNet to Metro for the pertinent Southern Loop segment. This IRU assignment was backdated to be effective as of June 2000, and called for a total payment of $ 3,146,249 due one year after successful completion of the testing program.
In the late spring or summer of 2001, AEP decided to return eight fibers to Metro and, consequently, only paid for twenty-eight fibers. Upon the fibers' return, Metro offered to assign these eight fibers back to VillageNet. VillageNet refused this offer. Instead, VillageNet wanted Metro to sell the fibers and distribute the proceeds. On November 26, 2001, Metro filed for bankruptcy, with the eight returned strands held as assets. One year later, on November 19, 2002, Southern Hills and VillageNet entered into a settlement agreement with Indiana Fiber Works (IFW), successor in interest to Metro through purchase of Metro's assets in bankruptcy.
On August 29, 2002, Southern Hills filed a Complaint against Purcell, which it subsequently amended on November 21, 2008. This Amended Complaint alleges a breach of fiduciary duty and acts of self-dealing. On December 6 through December 7, 2004, [996]*996a bench trial was held. Thereafter, on February 14, 2005, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Southern Hills and awarded damages in the amount of $375,590.02, plus prejudgment interest in the sum of $120,518.18.
Purcell now appeals. will be provided as necessary. Additional facts
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In the instant case, the trial court entered special findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Therefore, our standard of review is two-tiered: we first determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Infinity Products, Inc. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ind.2004). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them, and the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by the findings and the conclusions which rely upon those findings. Id. In determining whether the findings or the judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id.
In conducting our review, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of any witness, and must affirm the trial court's decision if the record contains any supporting evidence or inferences. Id. However, while we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Carmichael v. Siegel, 754 N.E.2d 619, 625 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court's determination of such questions. Id.
II. Common Law Fiduciary Duty to Southern Hills as a Member of VillageNet
Initially, Purcell contends that the trial court erred by concluding that he breached his fiduciary duty owed to VillageNet and Southern Hills Specifically, he asserts that none of his actions at issue can credibly be characterized as a violation of his fiduciary duty under common law principles.
Limited lability companies, such as Vil-lageNet, were not available in Indiana until the enactment of Indiana's Business Flexibility Act in 1993. I.C. § 28-18-1-1 et seq. The recent popularity of LLCs has forced courts nationwide to address traditional business issues in terms of this new statutory creation. In Indiana, there is relatively little case law regarding LLCs and no case law concerning fiduciary duties in the LLC context. In this regard, parties present this court with an issue of first impression. However, we are not writing on a completely tabula rasa: the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana has provided us some guidance in Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F.Supp.2d 890 (N.D.Ind.2002). Reviewing the issue of whether an LLC's member violated a common law fiduciary duty owed to other member, the district court in its analysis focused on the LLCs hybrid nature between a corporation and a partnership and found that Indiana LLCs impose a common law fiduciary duty on their officers and members in the absence of contrary provisions in the LLC operating agreements. Id. at 899.
In Credentials Plus, the LLC, besides advancing federal claims, sued Calderone, a former member and operating employee for breach of her fiduciary duties. Id. at 894. In its evaluation of fiduciary duties within the Indiana Uniform Partnership Act and closely-held corporations, the dis[997]*997trict court concluded a detailed comparison to a shareholder's fiduciary duties in a closely held corporation to be appropriate. Id. at 900. The court based its conclusion on the resemblance of Credentials Plus to a closely-held corporation, i.e., the LLC's membership consisted of three members and there was no evidence that the company's shares were publicly traded. Id. In light of this analysis, the district court continued,
[shareholders may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to other shareholders and the corporation. A shareholder's fiduciary duty requires that he not appropriate to his own use a business opportunity that in equity and fairness belongs to the corporation. The standard imposed by a fiduciary duty is the same whether it arises from the capacity of a director, officer, or shareholder in a close corporation.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Applying these principles to the case before it, the district court found Calderone to have violated her fiduciary duties to Credentials Plus resulting in self-dealing and a breach of her duty of loyalty under Indiana law. Id. at 900.
In line with the district court's opinion in Credentials Plus, we now hold that common law fiduciary duties, similar to the ones imposed on partnerships and closely-held corporations, are applicable to Indiana LLCs.
Here, in support of their respective arguments, both parties direct us to the same case in an attempt to clarify the extent of common law fiduciary duties of an LLC's manager or member. In G & N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 227 (Ind.2001), Boehm, the minority shareholder of the closely-held corporation, G & N Aircraft, brought an action against the majority shareholder, Goldsmith, and the corporation, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Imposing a fiduciary duty standard arising from the capacity of shareholder in a closely-held corporation, our supreme court stated that "[t]he fiduciary must deal fairly, honestly, and openly with his corporation and fellow stockholders. He must not be distracted from the performance of his official duties by personal interests." Id. at 240 (citing Hartung v. Architects Hartung/Odle/Burke, Inc., 157 Ind.App. 546, 301 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1973)).
Concluding that Purcell had violated his fiduciary duties, the trial court found:
29. Purcell breached his fiduciary duty to VillageNet and Southern‘ Hills in the following respects:
e He failed to advise Ganey or anyone associated with Southern Hills that payments had been received by Metro from AEP for Southern Loop fibers.
e He used payments received by Metro from AEP for Southern Loop fibers to repay a personal loan.
e He failed to advise Glaney or anyone associated with Southern Hills that payments received by Metro from AEP for Southern Loop fibers were used to repay a personal loan.
e He directed Metro to keep and spend money that belonged to Villa-geNet and Southern Hills.
e He directed payments of substantial sums of money to creditors of Metro instead of to VillageNet and Southern Hills.
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32. Purcell engaged in acts of self-dealing to the detriment of VillageNet and its member, Southern Hills, in the following respects:
e He used payments received by Metro from AEP for Southern Loop [998]*998fibers to repay personal loans made ~ by Purcell and his wife.
e He directed payments of substantial sums of money to creditors of Metro instead of to VillageNet and Southern Hills.
e He failed to advise Glancy or anyone associated with Southern Hills of these activities, preventing Southern Hills from taking any steps to recover its losses before Metro filed for bankruptey.
(Appellant's App. pp. 23, 24).
Our review of the record discloses that pursuant to VillageNet's operating agreement, Purcell, as the co-manager, was responsible for the daily operation of the LLC. However, the operating agreement clearly stipulates that "the [mJanagers may have other business interests and shall devote only so much attention, skill and energies to the business and operations of [VillageNet] as they deem reasonable to promote the interests of [VillageN-et] and the [mJjembers." (Appellant's App. p. 58). In furtherance of VillageNet's business of making the Southern Loop's IRU profitable, both managers, in name of their respective member, agreed to reassign a portion of the 216 fibers representing the Southern Loop's IRU back to Metro for the sole purpose of its sale to AEP in a single contract. At the same time, the Assignment Agreement specified that Metro would forward to VillageNet all AEP payments related to the Southern Loop project after Metro received them. Upon receipt by VillageNet, the payment, minus commission and administrative costs, would be equally distributed between the members.
Our review of AEP's payment history reflects that although several payments were made to Metro, they were never forwarded to VillageNet. Specifically, on December 29, 2000, Metro received a $200,717 payment for Southern Loop fiber, which was not forwarded. On February 2, 2001, the amount of $301,075.50 was received, but not transferred to VillageNet. Likewise, a February 9, 2001 payment in the amount of $160,249.80 was never forwarded to VillageNet. Further, around the time of the February AEP payments, Metro became financially unstable with a contractor threatening to stop work if he did not receive payment for work performed to fibers in-and outside the Southern Loop. Accordingly, the record shows that on February 2, 2001, Purcell's wife wrote a personal check to the contractor for $600,000. Thereafter, on February 18, 2001, this loan was repaid with funds received from AEP.
Instead of addressing the trial court's concerns as enumerated in its two findings, Purcell, in his brief, focuses solely on the repayment of his personal loan and plainly makes the all-encompassing argument that he did not breach his fiduciary duty because he did not know at the time that the AEP payments to Metro which were used to repay his loan included amounts earmarked as Southern Loop payments. In reply, Southern Hills asserts that Purcell "admitted" he knew that the amount of $160,249.80 was a Southern Loop payment that belonged to VillageNet. (Appellee's Br. p. 14). We disagree with Southern Hill's characterization of Purcell's testimony. Our review of the transcript reveals that, in reply to the question "[alnd that money belonged to VillageNet, not to Metro. Isn't that true." Purcell stated: "That's my understanding, yes, from this document." (Transeript p. 158). Although being a far ery from an admission, like the trial court, we are equally unpersuaded by Purcell's answer.
Accordingly, especially in light of AEP's payment history, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably infer that Purcell knew about AEP's payment for Southern [999]*999Loop's fibers, but instead of forwarding the amount to VillageNet, as obliged under the Assignment Agreement, Purcell kept the money at Metro. See Infinity Prod-wets, Inc., 810 N.E.2d at 1081.
Nevertheless, even disregarding the question of Purcell's knowledge, we conclude that Purcell still breached his fidu-ciliary duty to VillageNet. Evidence introduced at trial establishes that during a meeting with Purcell in May of 2001, Niemann not only informed him of Glan-cy's mistake in the Assignment Agreement, but also advised him to forward VillageNet the amount it was due. The record is clear that Purcell did not advise Ganey until June or July of 2001, and even then, Purcell only admitted that Metro had failed to forward the last AEP payment in the amount of $160,249.80. Accordingly, we fail to find that Purcell acted fairly, honestly, and openly with VillageNet and Southern Hills. See G & N Aircraft, Inc., 743 N.E.2d at 240.
The record further discloses that Purcell not only kept AEP money that should have been forwarded to VillageNet and instead chose to repay a personal loan, but he also failed to inform VillageNet and its member of the money that was owed to them. Consequently, we conclude that Purcell was clearly distracted from the performance of his official duties by personal interests. See id. at 240. Thus, we find that the evidence along with all reasonable inferences supports the trial court's findings and its conclusion that Purcell breached his fiduciary duty to VillageNet and Southern Hills.
III. Wiliful Misconduct & Recklessness
Next, Purcell contends the trial court's conclusion that he acted willfully and recklessly in accordance with I.C. § 28-14-4-2. Specifically, Purcell claims that there is no evidence of any wrongdoing on his part.
Indiana Code Section § 238-18-4-2(a) (emphasis added) provides that:
Unless otherwise provided in a written ~ operating agreement, a member or manager is not liable for damages to the limited liability company or to the members of the limited liability company for any aclkion taken or failure to act on behalf of the limited liability company, unless the act or omission constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness.
We clarified the concept of willful misconduct or recklessness in Miner v. Southwest School Corp., 755 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), where we stated that "a willful and wanton act of commission is: an intentional act done with the reckless disregard of the natural and probable consequence of injury to a known person under the circumstances known to the other actor at the time." Id. at 1118 (citing Witham v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 561 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind.1990)). We further characterized a willful and wanton omission as a failure to act when the actor has actual knowledge of the natural and probable consequence of injury and his opportunity to avoid the risk. Id. "Whether the party has acted or failed to act, willful and wanton misconduct has two elements: 1) the defendant must have knowledge of an impending danger or consciousness of a course of misconduct calculated to result in probable injury; and 2) the actor's conduct must have exhibited an indifference to the consequences of his own conduct." Id.
In his brief, Purcell first advances the argument that he did not engage in any improper self-dealing by making a personal loan to Metro and by subsequently repaying it. Purcell maintains that the loan was to VillageNet's benefit because it avoided an immediate threat to the Southern Loop project. Purcell explains that by paying Metro's contractor's debt Purcell ensured Mastec's continued work on the [1000]*1000project. Purcell relies on Indiana and out-of-state case law supporting the premise that a corporation may borrow money from its officers and any repayment of this loan should be carefully scrutinized to prevent the officer's abuse of his position to obtain an unfair advantage over other creditors. See Bossert v. Geis, 57 Ind.App. 384, 107 N.E. 95, 98 (1914); In re Mader's Store for Men, Inc. 77 Wis.2d 578, 254 N.W.2d 171, 185 (1977).
Although Purcell cites a lengthy passage from Mader's in his brief, we find the, following language to be more illustrative for the case at bar:
[HJlowever, the possibilities for abuse are manifold, and where the rights of third parties are implicated, the law approaches transactions between a corporation and those in a position to control its acts with "a large measure of watchful eye." ... [I)f it appears that honoring the claim will work an injustice, subordination or disallowance of the claigm‘ may be required.
Mader's, 254 N.W.2d at 185. Here, we are not persuaded that the repayment of Purcell's loan was in furtherance of VillageN-et's interest. The record clearly establishes that Purcell, as Metro's CEO, made a personal loan to Metro to satisfy his company's debt to one of its creditors. At the time of repayment, Purcell allocated AEP Southern Loop money that belonged to a third party, VillageNet, to honor the pe'rsonal loan. Purcell now relies on Mas-tee's threat to stop work on the Southern Loop project to support his allegation that repayment of his personal loan with AEP Southern Loop money somehow was in VillageNet's interest as the Southern Loop project was the very purpose of the Villa-geNet venture. However, at trial Purcell admitted that pursuant to VillageNet's operating agreement Metro was solely responsible for financing and constructing the Southern Loop. Accordingly, by loaning money in order to pay Metro's debt to Mastec, Purcell satisfied a debt of Metro and not of VillageNet. Therefore, using AEP Southern Loop money, which was to be forwarded to VillageNet, to repay his loan Purcell acted solely in Metro's interest and to the detriment of the third party, VillageNet.
Next, Purcell attempts to establish the trial court's error in its conclusion that "Purcell's action in paying himself when he knew Metro had failed to turn over revenue to VillageNet and Southern Hills and failing to make disclosure of these facts constitute willfull and reckless conduct" by alleging that he was unaware that AEP payments were used to repay his voluntary loan. (Appellant's App. p. 27). However, as we stated above, in light of the evidence available and especially AEP's payment history we conclude that the trial court could reasonably infer that Purcell knew about AEP's payment for Southern Loop's fibers, but instead of forwarding the amount to VillageNet, as obliged under the Assignment Agreement, Purcell kept and spent the money. Accordingly, we find that by repaying his personal loan with funds rightfully belonging to VillageNet, Purcell's conduct exhibited an indifference to the consequences of his own conduct. See Miner, 755 N.E2d at 1118. Therefore, we refuse to reverse the trial court's conclusion that Purcell's misconduct amounted to willfulness or recklessness. See 1.C. § 28-18-4-2.
IV. Direct versus Derivative Action
Next, Purcell challenges the trial court's judgment by raising a standing issue. In particular, Purcell claims that Southern Hills has no direct claim against Purcell, and that any right it possessed derived solely from its status as a member of VillageNet.
In G & N Aircraft, our supreme court clarified the difference between direct and derivative actions and generally defined a [1001]*1001direct action as "[al lawsuit to enforce a shareholder's rights against a corporation. This action may be brought in the name of the shareholder to redress an injury sustained by, or enforce a duty to, the holder." G & N Aircraft, 7483 N.E.2d at 284 (internal quotations omitted). A derivative action, on the other hand, is a suit "asserted by a shareholder on the corporation's behalf against a third party ... because of the corporation's failure to take some action against the third party. They are brought to redress an injury sustained by, or enforce a duty owed to, the corporation." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
However, our supreme court acknowledged that the distinction between direct and derivative claims has been complicated in recent years by recognition in many jurisdictions, including Indiana, of direct actions by shareholders in closely-held corporations1 for derivative claims. In Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 561 n. 6 (Ind.1995), the court held that a shareholder in a closely-held corporation need not always bring a claim of corporate harm as a derivate action. Rather, in such an arrangement, the shareholders are more realistically viewed as partners, and the formalities of corporate litigation may be bypassed. The Barth court, following the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Section 7.01(d), held that a shareholder of a closely-held corporation may proceed against a fellow shareholder in a direct action if that form of action would not: (1) unfairly expose the corporation or the defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (2) materially prejudice the interests of creditors of the corporation; or (8) interfere with a fair distribution of the recovery among all interested persons. Id. at 562. Clarifying its reasoning, the supreme court stated that requiring a demand on the board and awaiting the recovery to the corporation may not be appropriate in a closely-held corporation where there are only two shareholders, and one owns a majority of the stock and controls the board. Id. Nevertheless, we are cautioned that the exception did not abrogate the rule: "it is important to keep in mind that the principles which gave rise to the rule requiring derivative actions will sometimes be present even in litigation involving closely-held corporations." Id. at 562.
In the instant case, Southern Hills pursued two claims against Purcell for clarity's sake, we will discuss each action in turn.2
A. With respect to Southern Hills' Common Law Fiduciary Claim
Based on the facts before us, insofar as Southern Hills relies on the claim that Purcell violated his fiduciary duties to Southern Hills as a Member of VillageNet, this is properly asserted in a direct action because it is based upon rights and duties owed to Southern Hills, not VillageNet. See Barth, 659 N.E.2d at 560-61 & n. 4. Because Southern Hills is asserting a direct claim addressing a harm in its own name and not a derivative claim of corporate harm in the name of VillageNet under the guise of a direct claim, we do not need to investigate whether the Barth exception is applicable.
[1002]*1002B. With respect to Southern Hills' Statutory Claim
In addition to bringing a direct claim based on a breach of common law fiduciary duties, we conclude that Southern Hills can bring a direct claim against Purcell pursuant to L.C. § 28-18-4-2. The plain language of the statute provides that "a member or manager is not liable for damages to the limited liability company or to the members of the limited liability company ... unless the act or omission constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness." Therefore, we find that the statute supports a direct action by Southern Hills against Purcell in his capacity as VillageN-et's manager.
V. Trial Court's Refusal to Offset the Damages
Lastly, Purcell asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to offset the damages it awarded to Southern Hills. Specifically, Purcell's allegation is two-fold: (1) the trial court improperly awarded Southern Hills double recovery of amounts it had already received on the same claim during its proceedings in bankruptcy against Metro and (2) the trial court improperly disregarded Purcell's request for a "true-up" in the price provision of an IRU agreement entered into between Southern Hills and Metro in accordance with the industry's practice.
We have previously held that a party may not recover twice for the same wrong. INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 784 N.E.2d 566, 577 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied. Damages are awarded to compensate an injured party fairly and adequately for the loss sustained. Id. Because the law disfavors a windfall or a double recovery, "our supreme court has noted that double recovery constitutes fundamental error which cannot be waived." Id.
A. Proceedings in Bankruptcy
First, Purcell asserts that the trial court improperly awarded Southern Hills double recovery of amounts it had already received on the same claim during its proceedings in bankruptcy against Metro. In support of his contention, Purcell focuses this court's attention on Southern Hills' claim asserted in the bankruptcy case filed November 26, 2001 which provides: "The claim arises out of Metro's wrongful withholding of amounts owed to VillageNet ... Metro collected amounts owed to VillageN-et and did not turn over these monies to Southern Hills." (Appellant's App p. 218). The bankruptey proceedings settled and under the bankruptcy settlement agreement, Southern Hills was ultimately awarded $288,000. Purcell now maintains that the trial court improperly concluded that the amount arising out of the bank-ruptcey settlement was not compensation for the same damages Southern Hills is claiming in the case before us. We disagree.
Whereas the language in the bankruptcy complaint clearly requests damages for Metro's wrongful withholding of amounts owed to VillageNet, the bankruptey settlement entered into on November 19, 2002 by IFW, Metro's successor in bankruptcy, and Southern Hills nevertheless clearly stipulates that in exchange for a subordination of IFW's claims against Purcell, payment of $288,000, and future consideration, IFW received: (1) dismissal of Southern Hills Adversary proceedings in the Metro bankruptcy; (2) release of all liens, claims, and encumbrances, including all UCC filings and utility mortgages Southern Hills had placed on Metro's assets; (8) consent to IFW's membership and full participation in VillageNet under the operating agreement; and (4) release of 12 fibers in the Southern Loop. The bankruptey settlement is silent on Metro's [1003]*1003wrongful withholding of amounts owed to VillageNet.
Accordingly, there is no evidence supporting Purcell's contention that the damages ultimately covered in the bankruptey settlement include damages for Metro's withholding of amounts owed to VillageN-et. Therefore, we cannot but conclude that the trial court's finding that the payment under the settlement agreement is not for compensation of the damages Southern Hills seeks in its current claim is supported by the evidence and, in turn, its conclusion to refuse Purcell's setoff claim is supported by the finding. Consequently, we refuse to disturb the trial court's judgment.
B. True-Up
In a second argument in favor of set-off, Purcell contends that the trial court improperly denied a set-off stemming from amounts that Southern Hills failed to pay for an IRU entered into between Southern Hills and Metro on December 29, 1999 (Southern Hills IRU). Separate from the Southern Loop fibers owned by VillageNet, this IRU provided Southern Hills with six fibers in the Southern Loop project. Even though the Southern Hills IRU appears to have priced the fibers as a lot, Purcell now urges this court to consider the industry's practice of true-up in its interpretation of the contractual provisions. As the contracts in the fiber industry are typically written based on estimated miles of fibers to be installed, a true-up or price adjustment occurs after installation when the actual number of miles of fiber under the actual route used can be calculated.
Upon reviewing the provisions of a written contract, our goal is to determine the intent of the parties at the time of execution as revealed by the language they chose in expressing their rights and responsibilities. Jacobs v. Hilliard, 829 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. If the contract language is clear and unambiguous, we will give the language its plain and' ordinary meaning. Fairway Developers, Inc. v. Marcum, 882 N.E.2d 581, 584 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trams. denied. Only when the meaning of the contract cannot be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, does the intention of the parties become a question of fact and resort to extrinsic evidence proper. Jacobs, 829 N.E.2d at 633. In a similar light, evidence of industry practice is only admissible to construe terms of art or ambiguous agreements. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1059 (Ind.2001).
Here, the Southern Hills IRU stipulates in its article VI, Terms of Payment that "[Southern Hills] shall pay [Metro] the sum of 1.5 million (1,500,000.00) U.S. dollars," followed by a detailed payment schedule. (Appellant's App. p. 227). The IRU does not include any provision for adjustment of this price. Thus, from the plain language of the contract, it is clear that the fibers were priced as a lot, not by mile, and the unambiguous intention of the parties appears to have been a fixed price. This interpretation is strengthened by review of another IRU between AEP and Metro, dated June 2, 2000, which clearly includes a price per mileage clause.3
[1004]*1004However, Purcell alleges that the Southern Hills IRU nevertheless raises to the level of ambiguity and therefore industry practice should be taken into account for its interpretation. In support of this argument, Purcell solely relies on the IRU's article I which states that "[Southern Hills'] Fibers will consist of approximately 157 miles of single mode fiber, which will be located generally along a route set forth in Exhibit A." (Appellant's App. p. 222) (emphasis added). Purcell's reliance on a mere two words which might be equated with inaccuracies simply do not rise to the level of ambiguity. Accordingly, mindful of our standard of review and in light of our interpretation of the contract as a whole, we find that the Southern Hills IRU clearly and unambiguously includes a fixed price. Therefore, the trial court properly refused a set-off.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court properly concluded that (1) Purcell breached his common law fiduciary duty to Southern Hills; (2) Purcell's actions on behalf of VillageNet constituted willful or reckless misconduct pursuant to Ind.Code § 28-18-4-2; (8) Southern Hills can maintain a direct action, rather than a derivative action, against Purcell; and (4) the damages awarded to Southern Hills do not need to be offset.
Affirmed.
BARNES, J., concurs.
SHARPNACK, J., concurring in result with separate opinion.