Pruss v. Butler (In Re Pruss)

235 B.R. 430, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 650, 1999 WL 404676

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: June 8, 1999
• Docket: BAP 98-6070NE
• Status: Published

Opinions

SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Marion F. Pruss, (“Ms. Pruss” or the “Debtor”) a practicing attorney and debtor under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code appeals from an order of the bankruptcy court denying her claim of exemption in a portion of her accounts receivable. The Debtor claimed the accounts receivable exempt under Neb.Rev. Stat. § 25-1558 which limits garnishment on earnings from personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, or otherwise. The bankruptcy court held the accounts receivable were not the equivalent of wages or salary and therefore were not exempt under the Nebraska statute. Because we interpret Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558 as excepting from garnishment the portion of Ms. Pruss’ accounts receivable attributable to her personal services as a self-employed individual, we reverse and remand.

Background

Ms. Pruss is an attorney engaged in the practice of law as a sole practitioner. When she filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on January 30, 1998, she owned accounts receivable from legal services billed to her clients. The scheduled value of these receivables was $41,000, of which Ms. Pruss claimed 75% exempt pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558. Her claim of exemption was, however, subject to the secured claim of Packer’s Bank to whom Ms. Pruss pledged her accounts receivable for a past and current (post-petition) operating loan. The Chapter 13 Trustee, Kathleen Laughlin (the “Trustee”), and Richard Butler (“Mr. Butler”), the Chapter 7 Trustee of two other bankruptcy estates which are creditors of Ms. Pruss, objected to her claim of exemption on the grounds that the accounts receivable of a professional person who does not work for wages do not constitute disposable earnings as defined in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558. The Trustee and Mr. Butler, (collectively, the “Objectors”) maintained that § 25-1558 was intended to protect only the periodic income stream of individuals in a traditional employee-employer relationship and did not encompass accounts receivable of the self-employed.

The bankruptcy court agreed with the Objectors and denied the claim of exemption on three grounds. First, the court found significant that the statute speaks of “disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek” and concluded that the statute did not apply to the Debtor as a self-employed professional because there was no evidence that the accounts receivable were directly related to any particular workweek. Second, the court found that the accounts receivable did not fit within the statutory definition of “disposable earnings.” Disposable earnings are defined in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25 — 1558(4)(b) as “that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after deducting ... any amounts required by law to be withheld,” and as a self-employed professional, the bankruptcy court concluded that although Ms. Pruss would be required to make certain estimated tax deposits, she was not required to “withhold” any amounts from her gross receivables. Third, the court reasoned that Ms. Pruss’ prior pledge of the accounts receivable as collateral was inconsistent with Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(5) which prohibits assignment of wages or salary. On this last point, the court reflected that the Debtor could not have it both ways; claiming the accounts partially exempt from garnishment as earnings from personal services while at the same time pledging the accounts as collateral for a loan.

On appeal, the Objectors echo the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the Nebraska statute, urging its application only to traditional employee situations. Conversely, Ms. Pruss places emphasis on the rationale of the statute and urges that its purpose of protecting the periodic income of individuals applies equally well to the self-employed as to those in traditional master-servant relationships.

Discussion

The bankruptcy court’s interpretation of the Nebraska garnishment and exemption statute is a question of law. We review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo. First Nat’l Bank of Olathe v. Pontow, 111 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir.1997). When interpreting a statute on appeal, this court looks to the statute’s express language and overall purpose. In re Martin (Martin v. Cox), 140 F.3d 806, 807-08 (8th Cir.1998). See Graven v. Fink (In re Graven), 936 F.2d 378, 384-85 (8th Cir.1991). The task begins where all such inquires must begin: with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989). When a statute’s language is plain, “ 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” Id. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). In relevant part, the Nebraska statute states:

§ 25-1558. Wages; subject to garnishment; amount; exceptions.

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment shall not exceed the lesser of the following amounts:

(a) Twenty-five percent of his disposable earnings for that week;

(b) The amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by § 29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1) in effect at the time earnings are payable; or

(c) Fifteen percent of his disposable earnings for that week, if the individual is a head of a family.

(4) For the purposes of this section:

(a) Earnings shall mean compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program;

(b) Disposable earnings shall mean that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld;

(c) Garnishment shall mean any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt; and

(5) Every assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of the wages or salary of an individual which is exempted by this section, to the extent of the exemption provided by this section, shall be void and unenforceable by any process of law.

(7) In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Commissioner of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in this section.

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558 (West WEST-LAW through 1998 1st Sess.).¹

Our analysis of this statute begins with the definition of “earnings.” Section 25-1558(4)(a) defines “earnings” to mean “compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement plan.” Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(4)(a) (emphasis added). In this case, Ms. Pruss concedes that her accounts receivable are not salary or wages, but she asserts that the receivables (at least the portion attributable to the legal services which she rendered, as contrasted with costs advanced on behalf of clients or fees billed for other attorneys) are nevertheless, compensation for Ms. Pruss’ personal services.

This court agrees and finds that when an attorney performs legal services, the fees generated constitute “earnings” from the attorney’s personal services. As such, the portion of the fees associated with the attorney’s personal labor fall squarely within the statutory definition of “earnings” in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558. Labeling the Debtor’s earnings as “accounts receivable” rather than “accrued compensation” does not change the essential fact that these funds constitute compensation earned by the Debtor for rendering personal services. Indeed, every wage earner and salaried employee whose compensation is paid in arrears holds an account receivable; yet, the existence of such a receivable does not change the character of the compensation from earnings to some other category of income.²

Having established that the Ms. Pruss’ receivables constitute “earnings,” we next consider whether those earnings are “disposable earnings” for which the Nebraska statute provides exemption. Paragraph 4(b) of § 25-1558 defines “disposable earnings” to mean “that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.” Because a self-employed individual is not required to withhold federal income tax or social security, the court and the Objectors concluded that self-employed individuals do not have “disposable earnings” subject to protection under this statute. Similarly, because paragraph (1) of the statute couches its limitations on garnishment in terms of weekly wages, the bankruptcy court and Objectors reasoned that the statute protects only those in traditional employee/employer transactions whose compensation is related to particular work periods.

This court disagrees with these approaches because they look to the definition of disposable earnings in paragraph (4)(b) and use the method stated therein to determine what percentage of earnings are subject to garnishment, in order to define whether certain categories of earnings fall within the statute’s protection in the first place. In other words, these approaches superimpose concepts from paragraph 4(b) onto the definition of “earnings” in paragraph 4(a). Rather, we think the language of paragraph (4)(a) is clear, and that our understanding of “earnings” should start and end there. “The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’ ” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982), quoted in Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031. Here, literal application produces a result that is consummately consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.

First, the statute itself states that “earnings” means “compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary commission, bonus, or otherwise.” Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(4)(a) (emphasis added). If the Nebraska legislature wanted to limit the nature of earnings to those of an employee in a traditional wage earner role, it could have done so in this definitional paragraph, but instead, the legislature chose to leave in the statute the expansive terms “or otherwise.” Had the legislature wanted the statute more narrowly tailored, it could have done so, as it had done in other instances in this section. For example, paragraph (5) is limited to wages or salary. That paragraph renders void “[ejvery assignment, sale, transfer, pledge, or mortgage of the wages or salary of an individual which is exempt under this section ...” Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(5). It does not render void the pledge of other forms of compensation from personal services. Further, the use of “wages or salary” in paragraph (5), contrasts with the choice of the more general term “earnings” in paragraph (4)(c) which defines garnishment as “any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of an individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.” Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25 — 1558(4)(c). The legislature obviously knew how to use the more general word (earnings) when intended in one portion of the statute and the more limiting words (wages or salary) when a restricted purpose was intended elsewhere.

Neither is the periodic nature of the payments particularly probative. Although paragraph (1) of the statute states its limitation in the context of a “workweek,” paragraph (7) requires the Commissioner of Labor to prescribe a minimum hourly wage equivalent to be applicable to earnings for any pay periods other than a week. Thus, we cannot conclude from paragraph (1) that only individuals with a traditional week-to-week means of compensation are covered by the statute. Rather, the statute applies generally to periodic payments for personal services, and although Ms. Pruss’ accounts receivable admittedly include components other than her earnings, the portion of the receivables that constitutes earnings from her personal services can be linked to discreet periodic units of work time. Moreover, while Ms. Pruss is not compensated on a weekly or monthly basis, her earnings reflect amounts billed for legal services rendered over distinct time periods. The court also observes that similar criticisms concerning the relatedness of income to temporal work periods exit with respect to commissions and bonuses, and yet, both are specifically denominated as examples of “earnings” in paragraph (4)(a) of this statute. For these reasons, we do not find that the temporal reference in the definition of “disposable earnings” furthers our analysis of whether a portion of the accounts receivable of a sole practitioner are exempt under this statute.

Likewise, we reject the notion that a source of compensation that qualifies as “earnings” under paragraph (4)(a) is incapable of fitting within the definition of “disposable earnings” simply because the pay or of those funds is not required to withhold taxes or similar payments prior to remitting compensation to the income earner. Disposable earnings under the statute are those “earnings” left after deducting amounts required to be withheld. In the typical employee/employer situation, this provision protects the employee by subjecting to garnishment only the net portion of his income after payment of taxes, social security and other mandatory withholding. In the context of a self-employed individual, since the remittor of funds is not required to withhold any amounts, the entire portion of the payment reflecting compensation for the individual’s personal services constitutes her “disposable earnings.” The absence of withholding does not preclude a self-employed individual from the benefits of the garnishment exemption statute. To hold otherwise would reach the absurd result that, in the case of an attorney, the exemption would be available to a sole practitioner who works through his or her own professional corporation but would not be available to the sole practitioner who avoids the mechanics of incorporation.

In concluding that exempt “earnings” under this statute can include sums earned by a self-employed individual for personal services even though paid or payable from clients or customers, we have guided ourselves by the canons of interpretation which require that a term should be known from its associates and that we must “avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying words.” Eilbert v. Pelican (In re Eilbert), 162 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995)). In this sense, we do not think all amounts due the Debtor constitute “earnings” or “disposable earnings,” but only those portions attributable to the Debtor’s own personal services, as contrasted with amounts attributed to the services of others or amounts reflecting profits or investment income. We find this interpretation gives meaning to the term “or otherwise” in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(4)(a), and yet does not render the concept of earnings so broad that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. Rather, we find that our interpretation is consistent with the statute’s goal of protecting income earned from personal labor and services as contrasted with income from investments or other sources.

Because we believe the language of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558 is clear, we look to the legislative history only to verify that our plain reading is consistent with the statute’s purpose. The Nebraska statute follows the Consumer Creditor Protection Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1677 (1998) (the “CCPA”). That act requires state garnishment exemption statutes to comply with federal limitations on amounts that may be garnished. Consequently, most state wage garnishment exemption statutes track the language of the federal act. Nebraska’s statute follows the identical language of the federal act. The Supreme Court interpreted the federal act in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 94 S.Ct. 2431, 41 L.Ed.2d 374 (1974), and determined that a tax refund did not constitute “disposable earnings” within the definition of the CCPA and therefore could not be exempt from administration in Mr. Kok-oszka’s bankruptcy case. In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the purpose of the CCPA, stating that

Indeed, Congress’ concern [in passing the act] was not the administration of a bankrupt’s estate but the prevention of a bankruptcy in the first place by eliminating ‘an essential element in the predatory extension of credit resulting in a disruption of employment, production, as well as consumption’ and a consequent increase in personal bankruptcies.

Id. at 650, 94 S.Ct. at 2436 (quoting H.R.REP. NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1967)).

The Court continued to cite the legislative history of the CCPA, explaining that “[t]he limitations on the garnishment of wages adopted ... while permitting the continued orderly payment of consumer debts, will relieve countless honest debtors driven by economic desperation from plunging into bankruptcy in order to preserve their employment and insure a continued means of support for themselves and their families.”

Id. at 651, 94 S.Ct. at 2436 (quoting H.R.REP. NO. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 21 (1967)). From this history, the Supreme Court summarized that “Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy, sought to regulate garnishments in its usual sense as a levy on 'periodic payments of compensation needed to support the wage earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis.” Id. (emphasis added).

This quotation, emphasizing that the CCPA was intended to protect “periodic payments ... needed to support the wage earner ...” provides the basis for a split of authority on whether the exemption statutes apply to self-employed professionals and independent contractors or whether the statutes are limited to wage earners in an employee-employer relationship who receive periodic compensation. Courts that have denied protection of the statute to independent contractors rely upon the express words in the statement of congressional intent concerning the periodic nature of payments to “wage earners,” (see Olson v. Townsend, 148 Vt. 135, 530 A.2d 566 (1987); Coward v. Smith, 6 Kan.App.2d 863, 636 P.2d 793 (1981)); while those that extend protection of the statute look to the policy of the statute and conclude that the Congress’ concerns apply equally to individuals working as independent contractors, as well as, to those engaged in traditional employee relationships. (See In re Duncan, 140 B.R. 210, 213 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1992); In re Sexton, 140 B.R. 742 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1992); Marian Health Center v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d 846 (Iowa Ct.App.1989)).

We believe that the concerns which motivated Congress to enact limitations on garnishment apply with parallel force upon individuals who earn a living as independent contractors as they do upon employees in traditional wage earning positions. The better distinction, we find, is for the court to “distinguish!] between types of income, for example, income from investments versus income from personal services.” Marian Health Center v. Cooks, 451 N.W.2d at 847-48. In Kokoszka, the Supreme Court recited that the CCPA did not protect all forms of compensation derived from personal services nor all assets traceable to such compensation. Id. at 651, 94 S.Ct. 2431. We agree. The act does not protect all income derived from personal services, but it does protect income in the nature of wages or salary. The dissent’s conclusion renders nugatory the “or otherwise” language in paragraph (4)(a) and erroneously fails to appreciate the relatedness and similar nature of a self-employed person’s income from personal services, and the “wages” or “salaries” of a traditional employee. The dissent’s understanding of “earnings” (through the gymnastics of the definition of “disposable earnings”), strips the self-employed debtor of all income by denying him any protection under the act. Such a reading makes it impossible for a self-employed person to support himself or his family and is inconsistent with the general policy of the act. While the dissent criticizes our interpretation of “earnings” as enabling professionals, entrepreneurs, and independent contractors to treat everything as disposable earnings (which we do not), the dissent’s analysis protects none of the earnings of the self-employed' — a result which is hardly consistent with a holistic view of the statute.

We therefore, hold that the exemption for “earnings” from personal services contained in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558 is available to Ms. Pruss as a self-employed practitioner to the extent that the compensation sought by the Trustee to be applied in considering confirmation of Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan is from Ms. Pruss’ own independent services. This result, is also consistent with the directive that we are to construe exemption statutes liberally in favor of the debtor. Wallerstedt v. Sosne (In re Wallerstedt), 930 F.2d 630, 631 (8th Cir.1991); In re Welborne, 63 B.R. 23 (Bankr.D.Neb.1986).

Finally, we reject the Objectors’ assertion that the Debtor’s prior pledge of her accounts receivable as collateral for an operating loan precludes the accounts from qualifying as exemptible disposable income. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1558(5) specifically invalidates a pledge of only wages and salaries. Because Ms. Pruss’ accounts receivable are comprised not only of her personal earnings, but costs, other professional’s time and hopefully, a profit, the court finds that the accounts are not fully within the ambit of paragraph (5). Moreover, even to the extent that Ms. Pruss has pledged funds which are the equivalent of wages or salaries, we need not be distracted by the potential invalidity of that pledge because the matter of the validity of the bank’s lien in such accounts is not before this court today.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the bankruptcy court and remand for a determination of what portions of the Debtor’s accounts receivable constitute funds that are exempt as the disposable earnings of the Debtor.

1 . All subsequent references are to this statute.

2 . The only distinction that might exist between the receivable of a self-employed individual and an employee, is the identity of the party obligated to pay the receivable. For the self-employed person, a third party client or customer is the party responsible for payment, whereas for an employee, the employer is the account debtor. The Nebraska statute does not specify by whom compensation is to be paid in order for the compensation to constitute "earnings." Thus, this distinction does nothing to advance our understanding of what constitutes earnings from personal services.